“we can use facts about neural processing of visual information to indirectly explain the structure of colour space”.
(Note the word “indirectly”; which, in what follows, proves to be important.)
Chalmers then says that “the structure of experience will also be explained” (634). Nonetheless, Chalmers adds:
Tononi justifies his belief in an integrated single experience (or “visual scene”) when he says that he experiences “not the left side of the visual field independent of the right side (and vice versa)”. It's difficult to understand what that means. Why can't one experience the left side of a visual scene and then the right side of that visual scene? If such a visual scene is defined as including both a left side and a right side then, by definition, that experience (or scene) must include both sides. Wouldn't this be a question of definition and not one of phenomenology? The scene may have both a left and a right side; though why must the experience (or visual scene) be the same as the description of that scene? In more detail, a table has a right side and a left side; though must the experience itself (of that table) also include a left and a right side?
“one of which is a blue book, but I am not having an experience with less content—say, one lacking the phenomenal distinction blue/not blue, or colored/not colored”.
This use of positives and their negations is puzzling. Tononi appears to be saying that part of this experience of a bookcase (with a blue book) includes “the phenomenal distinction blue/not blue, or colored/not colored”. That is, this experience doesn't “lack” that precise “phenomenal distinction”. Yet earlier it seemed that basic experiences didn't have any phenomenal distinctions – they are grainless. Making distinctions between blue and not blue - as well as between coloured and not coloured - are surely acts of cognition; which were seemingly excluded when Tononi talked about “integration”.
“the experience of seeing the word 'BECAUSE' written in the middle of a blank page”.
His phenomenological (if it is phenomenological) analysis of this is that this experience of the word BECAUSE is “irreducible to an experience of seeing 'BE' on the left plus an experience of seeing 'CAUSE' on the right”. That may happen; though surely it's not definitive of an experience of the word BECAUSE in the middle of a page. Though we don't ordinarily distinguish the 'BE' from the 'CAUSE'. Perhaps if we did, we'd also distinguish the 'B' from the 'E', the 'E' from the 'C' and so on.