“[m]ost
contemporary metaphysicians think of themselves as concerned, not
primarily with the representations of language and thoughts, but with
the reality that is represented”.
Manley
goes on to write that “this approach in mainstream metaphysics”
has “only come to ascendancy lately, and is still widely
challenged”.
David
Manley also tells us that metaphysics
“is
concerned with the foundations of reality. It asks questions about
the nature of the world, such as: Aside from concrete objects, are
there also abstract objects like numbers and properties? Does every
event have a cause? What is the nature of possibility and necessity?
When do several things make up a single bigger thing? Do the past and
future exist? And so on.”
So
what if another metaphysician were to say the following? -
The
idea of there being “foundations of reality” is preposterous.
It
can even be said that talk of “the nature of the world” (rather
than, say, the plural natures) begs a few questions too. In
addition, why accept any distinction between abstract and concrete
objects? Or, alternatively, perhaps there are other kinds of objects.
Perhaps some metaphysicians even question that there are events in
the way that others question the existence of objects. And so on and
so on.
Possibly
all these questions can legitimately exist and it still be acceptable
to talk about “the foundations of reality” and “the nature of
the world”. After all, the discussion must start somewhere. And
even if a metaphysician rejects everything contained in Manley's
short descriptive account of metaphysics, these basic distinctions
are still accepted by many metaphysicians.
In
a very basic sense, this approach is classic metaphysical realism –
however you slice it. Thus many other philosophers will be mad (or
sad) that this is still the current paradigm for contemporary
metaphysicians. Then again, anti-realism (to take one alternative to
this) has only ever been one option in metaphysics.
It
may need to be added here that even though these realist (or
non-deflationary) metaphysicians are concerned with “the reality
that is represented”, they may still be very concerned with what
contemporary science has to say on this or on similar subjects. After
all, if science (as with Quine) tells us “what is”, then a
realist metaphysician needs to listen to science. Nonetheless,
metaphysicians who've been strongly committed to the findings of
science have also taken various anti-realist positions. Manley
himself (again) stresses the importance of science to both realist
metaphysicians and their opponents. He
writes:
“And
the preferred methodology for answering these questions is
quasi-scientific, of the type recommended by W. V. O. Quine,
developed by David Lewis...”
Strong
Deflationism
Many
people who're deeply suspicious of analytic metaphysics will be keen
on the position Manley describes as “strong deflationism”; which
is a term also used
by Ted Sider in his paper/chapter, 'Ontological
Realism'.
(That's if people who hate metaphysics will even care about a
position which criticises metaphysics.) The position of strong
deflationism is, of course, still a metaphysical position. Indeed
whatever position you take on the world (or on anything else for that
matter) will contain some assumptions (or even explicit beliefs)
which are metaphysical in nature.
What
is strong deflationism? According to Manley, it's
“[m]otivated
in part by intuitions of shallowness, they argue that the dispute is
merely verbal, or that the disputants are not making truth-evaluable
claims at all”.
All
“merely verbal”? Perhaps not. One is tempted here to make the
possibly trite point that there
must still be the way the world is.
And that is metaphysics. In addition:
i)
We talk about the world with words, concepts and theories. We also
rely on our embodied/embedded nature and our contingent sensory
systems. However, there is still the way the world is.
ii)
The things stated in i) above may distort (or simply alter) what we
say about the world. However, there is still the way the world is.
iii)
We may not even be able to get at the world unless we use words,
concepts or theories, sensory systems, etc. which distort or change
the world. However, there is still the way the world is.
Furthermore,
what does “shallowness” mean here? What are (realist?)
metaphysicians “shallow” about? Why is what they say shallow?
What can they say – metaphysically or otherwise – which isn't
shallow? And is it really the case that a dispute – any
dispute – can be “merely verbal”? Is that possible - even in
principle?
In
addition, if the metaphysicians' claims aren't “truth-evaluable”,
then what sort of metaphysical or even philosophical claims are
truth-evaluable? What makes them truth-evaluable? These questions
will require answers which must, at least in part, include
metaphysical answers. (The critics of - realist - metaphysics may
not, of course, deny that they're committed to some form of
metaphysics.)
Despite
my own questions, Manley goes on to say that “[i]n its new forms,
strong deflationism poses as serious a challenge to metaphysics as
ever”.
Mild
Deflationism
The
“mild deflationist” position (as enunciated by Manley) is
difficult to grasp. Manley tells us that mild deflationists “admit
that there is a genuine dispute at issue”; though they also believe
that “it can be resolved in a relatively trivial fashion by
reflecting on conceptual or semantic facts”. Moreover, “nothing
of substance is left for the metaphysician to investigate”.
I
can't see how all that works.
If
these mild deflationists admit that there are “genuine disputes”
here; then how can they be entirely resolved by “reflecting on
conceptual or semantic facts”? Concepts and semantics are of course
important; though they can't possibly tell the whole story. Unless
that remainder is - by (semantic) definition - “trivial” (or
“nothing of substance”). But what the hell does that mean? The
only situation in which I can conceive of this position (as stated)
working would be when it comes to the position of linguistic idealism
(or perhaps some other form of idealism) - and even then I'm not
sure. Of course the simple solution to my quandary may be to read
more of what these mild deflationists actually have to say on the
subject.
It's
not surprising, then, that Manley rounds off his description of mild
deflationism by saying that
“mild
deflationists tend to be motivated more by intuitions of triviality
than by the intuition that nothing is really at issue in the
dispute”.
Here
again we see the word “triviality”; which is troubling. Moreover,
Manley hints that if these mild deflationists aren't motivated “by
the intuition that nothing is really at issue in the dispute”, then
doesn't that mean that they may well believe that something
really is at issue in these disputes? And if that's the case,
then how is the mild-deflationist circle squared?
In
any case, can any dispute be merely verbal in a literal sense? Can
any dispute be entirely “due to differences in the way the
disputants are using certain terms”? Despite saying that, perhaps
the problem is taking the phrase “merely verbal” too literally in
the sense that surely no one really believes that any dispute is all
about semantics and/or language.
Manley's
second point is more telling. He says that mild deflationists claim
that “[n]either side” in a metaphysical dispute “succeeds in
making a claim with determinate truth-value”. Surely here the mild
deflationist has moved away from the merely verbal if he's also
talking about truth-values. In other words, if neither metaphysical
position
x nor
metaphysical position y
(on the
same subject) have a truth-value; then that means that the mild
deflationist is – even if elliptically - making a metaphysical
statement about the nature of the world. He's saying that the world
couldn't possibly provide an answer to the question of whether or not
position x
or position y
has a
“determinate truth-value”. Thus we're still in the domain of
metaphysics.
Our
Conceptual Scheme
Peter
Strawson is a useful foil here.
Strawson
once wrote on what he called “revisionary”
and “descriptive” metaphysics (as expressed in his 1959 book,
Individuals).
More relevantly, Strawson stressed the importance of our
“conceptual scheme”. That is, we only get at the world (or
nature)
through our conceptual scheme. It isn't given to us in its pure form.
We are embodied creatures after all - with contingent brains, minds,
languages, concepts, sensory systems and the like. Thus, almost by
definition
(or, dare I say,
necessarily),
we could never get the world as
it is.
Strawson's
reference to our conceptual scheme doesn't imply or entail
relativism. That's why the word “our” was used before the words
“conceptual scheme”. That is, Strawson -like Donald
Davidson
(in
his 'On
the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme')
and
Frege (with his
“common
stock of thoughts”) - believed that there was only one conceptual scheme – ours:
the conceptual scheme of all human beings. Any minor differences
within that conceptual scheme (either between individuals or even
between cultures/epochs) don't in and of themselves constitute
different conceptual schemes. They're simply variations of our given
conceptual scheme or recombinations of the variables within it. Thus,
as with Kant, Strawson's position can't be deemed relativistic
(that's if my account is correct).
So
perhaps this works against metaphysical realism. That is, even if
Strawson's conceptual scheme (like Kant's) is “universal”, it's
still the case that we don't get the world as
it is.
Perhaps we can't
(yes, the modal
verb 'can't')
get the world as it. However, I suppose that if what we share is
universal (at least in the Kantian sense), then perhaps our
limitations -vis-à-vis discovering the world as
it is -
don't really matter. The problem is, metaphysical realists have
always had a problem with Kant's position; just as they'll have a
problem with Strawson's.
Carnap's
Conceptual Schemes
Whereas
Strawson emphasises our conceptual scheme, so Rudolf Carnap
emphasised “conventions”, “frameworks” and the like.
Carnap
believed (at least at one point in his career) that truth is an
“internal
question”
(as discussed in his 1950 'Empiricism,
Semantics, and Ontology').
That is, truth is internal to a specific “convention” or
“scheme”.
However,
can't the metaphysical realist immediately ask why a philosopher
would choose a particular
convention or conceptual scheme in the first place? For example, why
did Carnap adopt the “framework” of what he called the
“thing-world”?
Why didn't he choose one which postulated abstract objects or
goblins?
We
could say that realist truth (in some form) is lurking in the
background, despite Carnap’s protestations against “external
questions” on the outside of all schemes, frameworks or
conventions. Thus
just as the truth of the
thing-language
is an internal question, so too is the question of truth itself
before it's applied to a thing-language or to anything else for that
matter.
Conventionalists,
however, may say that we have good philosophical or even scientific
reasons for adopting conventions. So what are those reasons? If
they're reasons outside frameworks, schemes, or conventions, then
doesn’t the conventionalist thereby stop being a (total/complete)
conventionalist by adopting those external reasons?
I
guess that metaphysical realists would happily accept that we need
conventions. No problem there. The realist can’t say anything
without conventions; even if these conventions do indeed capture (in
some way!) the actual nature of the world.
What's
being said here (if rather counter intuitively) is that metaphysical
realists are conventionalists (in some ways, at least) and
conventionalists are metaphysical realists (in some ways, at least).
Thus
why can’t the metaphysician still be a realist and also accept
(with the conventionalist) that there's more than one description (or
explanation) of a given “space-time point” (as Carnap put it in
his ontology), event or object? Why must a realist uphold a
single “correct description” of a given space-time point or of
any aspect of the world? That, surely, isn't necessarily entailed by
realism. (Think here of Edmund Husserl’s “profiles”.)
It's
true that conventions, frameworks or schemes aren't forced on us by
nature. (What would it mean to have such a thing forced upon us by
nature?) Some/many metaphysical realists may well accept that nature
doesn’t force itself on us. However, we still have causal
interactions with nature and these causal interactions impinge on us
- even if they don’t force us to speak nature's very own language.
However,
nothing thereby forces
the realist to say, “There are quarks and planets.” Despite that,
there are causal, observational, theoretical, philosophical, etc.
reasons for him to say what he says.
Again,
of course conventions, frameworks schemes are freely chosen and
contingent. The metaphysical realist can accept that. So perhaps the
"nature forcing itself on us” metaphor isn't very helpful in
this debate. Indeed was it really the case that, for example, all
metaphysical realists were horrified by Henri Poincaré's
admission
(as found in his Science
and Hypothesis)
that contradictory scientific and geometric principles
or theories can be maintained at one and the same time? Why can't the
metaphysical realist accept Poincaré's position too? You could
accept and still believe that your principle (or theory) is
disconfirmable in the future. Therefore the realist must accept and
live with the alternative descriptions (or explanations) of the world
even while accepting that, of course, some are true/correct and
others are false/incorrect. Thus one can be a metaphysical realist
and say that “there is a way the world is” and still happily live
with alternative descriptions (or explanations) of the world.
********************************************
*) See my 'Some Arguments Against Analytic Metaphysics (1)'.
**) To follow: 'Some Arguments For Analytic Metaphysics (3)'.
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