Carlo Rovelli on Aristotle: Objects and Their Relations

 (i) Introduction

(ii) Aristotle: Substance and Essence

(iii) Rovelli on Nāgārjuna and Western Philosophy

(iv) Carlo Rovelli’s Relationalism

Firstly, let’s ignore Aristotle for a moment, and see what the word “substance” means when taken much more broadly. Here’s one account:

“In its first sense, ‘substance’ refers to those things that are object-like, rather that property-like. For example, an elephant is a substance in this sense, whereas the height or colour of the elephant is not. In its second sense, ‘substance’ refers to the fundamental building blocks of reality.”

Now let’s take this account of Aristotle’s own ontology of substances:

“Aristotle says that substances do not depend, for their existence, on any other being of which they must be predicated or in which they must inhere.”

Some readers will be able to see why the theoretical physicist Carlo Rovelli — as a relationalist — has a problem with Aristotle’s ontology.

This Aristotelean stance on substance is why the term “particular” came to be used. Relevantly, it was widely believed that a particular does not depend, for its existence, on any other being.

Relationalism, on the other hand, inverts this binary opposition by arguing that all substances (or all particulars) are — entirely?- dependent for their existence on their relations to other beings…

This means that such ?’s can’t really be substances (or particulars) at all!

Rovelli himself expresses all the above in a more technical way when he allows Aristotle (384–322 BC) to put a position (as paraphrased by Rovelli himself) which seems to be the exact antithesis of his own. Rovelli writes:

“For Aristotle the relation is a property of the substance. It is that belonging to the substance that is towards something else. Among all the categories, for Aristotle, relationality is the one that has ‘least being and reality’. Can we think differently?”

So, according to Rovelli, relationality has the most being and reality. However, is Rovelli’s strong stress on relations (or relationality) automatically to factor out substances, objects or particulars? (It’s not clear that Rovelli himself is differentiating these three different things.)

In any case, it can be supposed that most laypersons would probably sympathise more with Aristotle’s position than with Rovelli’s. Indeed, isn’t a relation something that has the “least being and reality” when compared to an object (i.e., if not to a substance)? What’s more, intuitively, it’s hard to see a relation as being “a property of the substance” at all.

Yet, of course, this issue is partly (or largely) dependent on how the words “relation” and “object” are defined.

Again, relations do indeed seem to have the least being and reality in the simple sense that they can’t be observed, touched, smelled, kicked, tested, or experimented upon. The objects which have (or bear) such relations, on the other hand, are physical: therefore they can be observed, touched, smelled, kicked, tested, or experimented upon.

Does all that make Rovelli’s relations abstract?

If not abstract, then… what?

To move on with Rovelli’s Aristotle.

Aristotle: Substance and Essence

Where there’s an Aristotelian substance, there’s also an essence — i.e., at least that’s often been the case in much Western philosophy. And Rovelli picks up on this too when he writes the following:

“If every metaphysics seeks a primary substance, an essence on which everything may depends [ ].”

It’s not clear if Rovelli seeing the words “substance” and essence” as being (virtual?) synonyms here. Or, if these words aren’t synonyms, then Rovelli seems to fuse the ontological categories substance and essence together. However, according to the following account, substance and essence aren’t the same thing:

“Aristotle examines the concepts of substance (ousia) and essence (to ti ên einai, ‘the what it was to be’) in his Metaphysics (Book VII), and he concludes that a particular substance is a combination of both matter and form, a philosophical theory called hylomorphism.”

That means that a substance has (or bears) an essence. In other words, a substance isn’t the same thing as its (own) essence. Moreover, the essence characterises “the what it was to be” of a substance. All that said, the essence must somehow still be instantiated by (or in) the substance…

Rovelli on Nāgārjuna and Western Philosophy

As already stated, the Aristotelian stress on substances seems to go alongside the stress on their ontological independence — at least according to Rovelli. Indeed, Rovelli uses the ideas of the Indian Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna to put his point across. He tells us that Nāgārjuna argued that

“it is possible to think of the manifestations of objects without having to ask what the object is in itself, independent from its manifestations”.

Rovelli uses the words “the manifestations of objects”. (More specifically, he uses the two words “of objects”.) Clearly, and perhaps obviously, then, objects aren’t really factored out of this alternative relationalist picture. Yet if Rovelli’s ontology is literally all about “manifestations” (as he makes it seem), then why mention objects at all?

What’s more, it’s not even clear that many people (Westerners or otherwise) do believe in the arcane notion of an object-in-itself. Sure, a few (perhaps more than a few) philosophers have done so in the past. However, virtually no laypersons or scientists do so today. Yet Rovelli’s argument is that this way of thinking has been central to all Western thought — not only to the thought of a small group of philosophers.

All that said, elsewhere Rovelli does state the following:

“In the history of Western philosophy there is a recurrent critique of the notion that ‘entities’ are the foundation of reality. It can be found in widely different philosophical traditions, from the ‘everything flows’ of Heraclitus to the contemporary metaphysics of relations.”

If Rovelli isn’t setting up a straw target here, then we can agree with him and say that it would be difficult — if not impossible — to describe any given object as it is in itself. (Kantian things-in-themselves, for example, are things-in-themselves largely because they can’t be described.)

Rovelli then says something similar about the history of physics when he writes:

“The discovery that quantities we had thought of as absolute are in fact relative instead is a theme that runs throughout the history of physics. Beyond physics, relational thinking can be found in all the sciences.”

It’s not clear how the words “absolute” and “relative” are being used here. If Rovelli (as a follower of Albert Einstein) is talking about space and time, then he has a strong case. As it is, though, Rovelli is not talking exclusively about space and time (or Einstein’s spacetime): he’s talking about literally everything.

But what of Rovelli’s relations?

Carlo Rovelli’s Relationalism

Intuitively, surely there must firstly be an object in order for it to have relations — of any kind whatsoever.

Inversely, could it be the case that firstly there’s relations, and only then do we have an object?

Unless, that is, we believe that object O and its relations have always (as it were) belonged together. Alternatively put, object O may actually be constituted by its relations. In other words, object O wouldn’t actually be object O if it weren’t for its relations.

That latter possibility is backed up by Rovelli’s own paraphrase of Nāgārjuna’s position. Rovelli put the following words into Nāgārjuna’s mouth:

“[Structures, not relations] are neither precedent to objects; nor not precedent to objects; neither are they both things; nor, ultimately, neither one nor the other thing.”

Perhaps there never was a time when object O didn’t have any relations. Yet wouldn’t that simply mean that we’d need to take into account all of O’s relations throughout its entire existence?

(This is similar to Leibniz’s position on essence, in which all the properties of an object are essential to that object — see here.)

So how could we distinguish important or relevant relations from unimportant or irrelevant ones when it comes to any given object? …

Isn’t it here that Aristotle’s substance and essence come to the rescue?

In detail.

Any given object O will have different relations at different times.

So what about object O at all these different times?

What accounts for the very same object having many different relations at many different times?

How do we know, for example, that the very same object O at t¹ had another — different — set of relations at t²?

Again, isn’t it here that Aristotle’s substance and essence come to the rescue?

Of course, we can bite the bullet and argue that object O at t² simply can’t be the same object as ? at t¹. And surely that would mean that we’d need to dispense with the object entirely. Yet taking this eliminativist view would also mean that we can’t speak of “O’s relations” either. In other words, relations would also need to be factored out if there are no (Aristotelian) objects in the first place.

Are Panpsychism and String Theory Unscientific or Non-Scientific?

 “We must distinguish between being non-scientific and being unscientific. [] philosophy [perhaps panpsychism and/or string theory] is a subject which is almost certainly of its very nature non-scientific. We must not jump from this purely negative statement to the conclusion that it has the positive defect of being unscientific.” — C.D. Broad

“‘Unscientific’ sounds more negative. It implies that something is pseudoscience. (A scam that is pretending to be science but not using the scientific method properly.) ‘Non-scientific’ is more neutral and might be used to describe parascience. (Fields of study that are not science or math but still valuable in their own way, such as law and history.).”

— See source here.

Let’s start off with a passage from the English philosopher C.D. Broad (1887–1971):

“We must distinguish between being non-scientific and being un-scientific. What I have admitted is that philosophy is a subject which is almost certainly of its very nature non-scientific. We must not jump from this purely negative statement to the conclusion that it has the positive defect of being unscientific. The latter term can be properly used only when a subject, which is capable of scientific treatment, is treated in a way which ignores or conflicts with the principles of scientific method.”

[As found in Broad’s paper, ‘Philosophy’, in Inquiry I.]

Interestingly, C.D. Broad had telekinesis, mind-reading and backwards causation in mind when he wrote the words above. [See this article on Broad in Psi Encyclopedia.] That alone shows us how problematic the distinction between x being unscientific and x being non-scientific is. What’s more, this distinction may allow too much leeway for the subjects under discussion (i.e., even when it comes to what’s non-scientific, never mind what’s unscientific).

In any case, if we forget telekinesis, mind-reading, etc., it’s feasible that both string theory and panpsychism can be non-scientific without thereby also being unscientific. However, there’s an obvious difference here. As stated, string theory is a science and panpsychism isn’t. Thus, if string theory is either non-scientific or unscientific, then that’s a problem. Perhaps panpsychism, on the other hand, is only problematic if it’s unscientific.

[I believe that it’s fair to say that the strong term “pseudoscientific” doesn’t apply to either panpsychism or string theory… Of course, some readers may disagree with that!]

So let’s speak in broader terms here.

Is Panpsychism Unscientific or Non-Scientific?

Panpsychism is a philosophical theory, whereas string theory is part of science. (Some — perhaps even many — physicists question the scientific status of string theory. See here.) Nonetheless, some of the philosophical (i.e., not scientific) problems which both face are similar.

Of course, panpsychist philosophers don’t claim that panpsychism is an actual science — or even that it’s scientific.

Philosophy itself isn’t a science. Consequently, that must mean that panpsychism isn’t a science.

(Some kinds of philosophy are classed as being “scientific”, without thereby also being actual examples of science. See here.)

Despite the words above, many panpsychists (as with various other metaphysicians) claim that panpsychism must still be respectful of physics. [See here and here.] Alternatively, they say that it shouldn’t (directly) contradict anything in science. Indeed, because panpsychism deals with “intrinsic nature”, then — almost by definition! — it can be said that it can’t contradict anything in physics.

To return to the difference between non-scientific and unscientific.

If we say that panpsychism is non-scientific (to quote Broad again), then

“[w]e must not jump from this purely negative statement to the conclusion that it has the positive defect of being unscientific”.

The last statement from Broad is very helpful in this context. Let me re-quote it:

“The latter term [‘unscientific’] can be properly used only when a subject, which is capable of scientific treatment, is treated in a way which ignores or conflicts with the principles of scientific method.”

This means that if panpsychism deals with a subject “which is [in]capable of scientific treatment” (and which “is [also] treated in a way which ignores or conflicts with the principles of scientific method”), then we may have a philosophical problem. The point here is that panpsychists will simply claim that panpsychism has nothing whatsoever to do “with the principles of scientific method”.

Some philosophers may also claim that panpsychism and science are two non-overlapping worlds or language games.

In detail. This parallels — at least to some extent — the Wittgensteinian claim that science and religion don’t contradict each other because they’re dealing with different phenomena.

This means that science and religion are — in the words of Steven Jay Gould — “non-overlapping magisteria”.

Alternatively, some philosophers may claim that science and religion sometimes deal with the same phenomena, though in very different ways.

On this Wittgensteinian view, then, religion is non-scientific, not unscientific.

So does this also mean that panpsychism and physics are also non-overlapping magisteria? So, if that is the case, then how can they contradict one another?

That said, I would assume that panpsychism surely can’t be in an equivalent position as religion vis-à-vis its relation to science (or to physics).

So some of the claims above may be too convenient for panpsychism.

Take the following position:

i) If physics states that there are no “intrinsic properties” (certainly if it claims that micro-entities don’t have “phenomenal properties”),

ii) then panpsychism does indeed “conflict with the principles” of physics.

The problem is, however, that panpsychists (as well as some physicists) claim that physics simply “ignores” intrinsic properties. In other words, physics has no position at all on such things. As the philosopher Philip Goff once put it:

“This [panpsychist] argument presses us to the conclusion that there must be more to physical entities than what they do: physical things must also have an ‘intrinsic nature’…”

Elsewhere, Goff wrote:

“[G]iven that physics is restricted to telling us only about the behaviour of physical entities — electrons, quarks and indeed spacetime itself — it leaves us completely in the dark about their intrinsic nature. Physics tells us what matter does, but not what it is.”

Some (perhaps many) physicists, on the other hand, will simply claim that intrinsic properties don’t exist. Thus, we can conclude by saying that physics as a whole — as stated — doesn’t have a universal or systematic position on intrinsic properties.

The other much broader point which has to be made is that the scientific criticisms of panpsychism can also be applied to many (actually, most) other philosophical theories. Indeed, the entirety of metaphysics has been said to be suspect from a scientific point of view — at least according to some scientists and philosophers at certain points in history!

All this means that panpsychism’s relationship with science is far from being unique.

Yet philosophy can indeed be unscientific, rather than simply non-scientific.

What about string theory?

Is String Theory Unscientific or Non-Scientific?

See my ‘Physicist Peter Woit on the Sociology of String Theory’.

A simple — and perhaps naïve — example of the problem of string theory’s scientific credentials relates to the question as to what is and what isn’t observable and/or testable.

If what can be observed and/or tested — or can be in observed and/or tested (as it’s often put) “in principle” — is ignored or rejected, then surely that would be an unscientific position to take. However, even within science, many things are unobservable (e.g., quarks, protons, the iron core at the centre of the earth, distant galaxies, fields and forces, etc.). Some things are even unobservable in principle (e.g., the past, numbers, laws, universals, perhaps other minds, etc.).

All that clearly has relevance to both string theory and panpsychism.

Indeed, most (or all) of the claims of metaphysics (even those claims about things which are observable and/or testable) are still primarily about things which aren’t observable and/or testable.

This also means that if science has no problem with panpsychism (or even accepts the fruitfulness of research into it), then that would also fit in well with the “theoretical pluralism” referred to earlier.

Now what about string theory and the non-scientific/unscientific bifurcation?

We can say that because of the current state of play, many of the claims and theories of string theory aren’t (to use C.D. Broad’s words again) “capable of scientific treatment”. (Not only because of the experimental limitations brought about by the deficiencies and limitations of contemporary technology.) Nonetheless, that doesn’t necessarily also mean that string theory “conflicts with the principles of science”.

Of course, it can now be said that if string theory’s claims aren’t capable of scientific treatment, then how can they still be scientific? However, couldn’t this question also be asked of many 19th century and 20th century theories (in physics)? That is, many theories were created before the evidence, experiments or tests were in. So does that also mean that such claims and theories were unscientific?

What’s more, if the experiments and evidence did come later, then surely we can’t still say that such formerly untested theories were unscientific.