“[i]t is natural
to suppose that my mind, the subject of my consciousness, is not a
microscopic entity”.
It
can be assumed here that Goff must also believe that a rejection of a
microscopic mind is some kind of intuitive take (by laypersons) on our own minds.
However, perhaps most people don't believe that their minds are either microscopic
or macroscopic entities. I say that because Goff himself has a problem with the fact that some philosophers take intuitions
seriously. This must surely mean that Goff doesn't care that much about what it's "natural to suppose".
So
when Goff continues by saying that his
“mind is a
macroscopic entity which derives its nature from the microscopic
entities which compose it”.
that
may also be problematic.
The
problem may be one of terminology.
Thinking
that the mind is a whole (or a single entity) isn't the same as
thinking that it's macroscopic... or microscopic
for that matter. If Goff were talking about the brain and
its parts, there'd be no problem. However, he's talking about the
mind or consciousness. After all, the little minds/subjects of
the brain are supposed to make up a Big Mind/Subject/Consciousness.
Thus, all the way down, Goff is talking about the
physical also being phenomenal (or experiential). Or, as Goff himself
puts it, the Big Mind/Subject is
“ultimately
[constituted by] the entities that fundamental physics talks about,
which the panpsychist takes to be conscious subjects”.
So this isn't about small non-phenomenal brain-parts ganging up
together to create a phenomenal Big Mind/Subject. It's about small
physical and phenomenal brain-parts doing so. More
scientifically (or not), this is about the possibility that
“little subjects,
such as electrons and quarks, come together to produce big conscious
subjects, such as human brains”.
It's
certainly true that “little” atoms, electrons, quarks, etc. (or little bits
of the brain) “come together” together to constitute a big brain.
However, do “little subjects” come together to produce “big
conscious subjects”? Goff himself says that “it’s hard to make
sense of this kind of combination”.
Phenomenal
Bonding
Goff
uses the term “phenomenal bonding” to account for all the above.
It's defined in very simple terms when Philip Goff writes:
“If we identify
the phenomenal bonding relation with the spatial relation it follows
that, for any group of material objects, the members of that group,
being spatially related, determine a conscious subject.”
Put
simply, if all these little minds/subjects are part of the same brain (therefore they're all “spatially related”), then it makes sense
to say that they can “sum together” (not Goff's own words) to
form a Big Mind.
Goff
goes further than that when he states the following:
“Particles form a
conscious subject when and only when they form organisms (or a subset
of organisms, or the brains/central nervous systems of organisms...”
However,
spatial relatedness can't be enough. After all, this cup in front of
me is spatially related to my arm. Does my arm and that cup make up a
single object? Not according to non-metaphysicians. In the case of
the brain (as well as central
nervous system),
however, things are different. For one, my arm isn't always attached
to the cup; whereas little minds/subjects may always be part of the
same package – i.e., the brain and, perhaps, the central nervous
system.
However,
as stated elsewhere, spatial relatedness - even in the very same
package - doesn't show us how little minds/subjects sum together to form or
constitute a Big Mind/Subject. We need to know how little minds/subjects “bond”
and how that sum constitutes a Big Mind/Subject. Goff, of course, recogonises
this problem. He writes:
“The nature of
organisms and car engines are accounted for in terms of their parts,
but those parts constitute the organism/engine only when related in
the right way. The same is surely true of the explicability of
subjects in terms of other subjects.”
At
first glance, the relatedness of small minds must partly be a
scientific – or neuroscientific – problem. That is, little minds
are related to each other within the brain and central nervous
system. After all, it's neural networks, neurons, microtubules, molecules, biochemicals, atoms,
electrons, quarks, etc. which are said to have “phenomenal properties” - these things are scientifically legitimate entities. The claim
that such entities also have phenomenal properties, however, isn't
scientifically legitimate. Yet these phenomenal properties are
supposed to be embedded in the
neural
networks,
neurons, microtubules,
molecules, biochemicals, atoms,
electrons, quarks, etc. which are indeed scientific entities. Thus it's clear
that these entities are indeed physically related. (If sometimes in
peculiar ways; at least according to those who emphasise the quantum
mechanical aspects of the brain.)
Four
Matchsticks and Four Little Subjects
It's
certainly true that Goff is well aware of the problems which phenomenal combinatorialism faces. He states the problems in various
places. For example, Goff writes:
“Small objects
with certain shapes, e.g. Lego bricks, can constitute a larger object
with a different shape, e.g. a Lego tower. But it is difficult to see
how, say, seven subjects of experience, each of which has a visual
experience as of seeing one of the colours of the spectrum, could
constitute a distinct subject of experience having a visual
experience as of seeing white…”
Thus
four matchsticks put in random places – even if close together -
won't constitute a square shape. However, they can be arranged to
make a square shape. Nonetheless, the square shape is entirely a
product of the four matchsticks. There's no “strong emergence”
here.
Goff
concedes that when it comes to little pockets of experience and Big Minds/Subjects, we have something different. Though is it strong
emergence?
Goff's
own scenario is about the sum of the little-minds' experiences
creating an entirely different experience – that of a Big Mind/Subject.
Thus each little mind/subject is like a little matchstick. Taken on its own,
each little matchstick can't constitute a square. Taken together with
three other little matchsticks, they can constitute a square.
Similarly (or fairly so!) with little pockets of experience. Taken
individually they “see” different “colours of the spectrum”.
Taken together (at least in theory) they may bring about “a visual
experience as of seeing white”. However, as hinted at above, these
examples aren't of a kind (i.e., they don't belong to the same logical space). A matchstick square is nothing over and
above the individual four matchsticks which constitute the
square. In Goff's case, we have little minds/subjects experiencing various
colours of the spectrum summing together to produce a Big Mind/Subject which
experiences the colour white. A Big Subject's experience of white is,
therefore, over and above the experiences of all the little minds/subjects.
It's an example of strong emergence.... Or is it?
There
is a spectrum of colour. However, would - or could - it follow from this that if
little minds/subjects experienced the individual colours of the spectrum individually that
their sum would bring about a Big Mind/Subject which experiences the colour white?
A
More Technical Argument
Goff
also puts his position in a more technical way by expressing the
following argument; which he rejects:
“[The
metaphysical isolation of subjects] implies that there is no state of
affairs of the form <subject of experience S1
exists with phenomenal character x, and subject of experience S2
exists with phenomenal character y> which necessitates <subject
of experience S3
exists with phenomenal character z>.”
This
is a position against cases of “phenomenal bonding” which can be
seen to bring about a states which are strongly emergent . It
rejects any causal or even conceptual relation between different
“subjects of experience”. More correctly, S1
and
S2
can't “necessitate” S3.
Or, at the least, the phenomenal realities of S1
and S2
can't necessitate the phenomenal reality of S3.
Despite that,
it still can be said that the different phenomenal reality of S3
can't
be ruled out a
priori.
At the same time, it seems to lack any empirical or scientific
credibility. It is, in fact, a case of metaphysical speculation, as
Goff would admit.
In
addition, whereas the first position says that “there is no state
of affairs” as to S1
and S2 necessitating S3,
Goff also argues that this scenario “does not imply that there is
not some state of affairs” of S1
and S2
having
R
to S3.
Or in Goff's own words:
“[MIS]
does not imply that there is not some state of affairs of the form
<subject of experience S1
with phenomenal character x bears relationship R
to subject of experience S2
with phenomenal character y> which necessitates <subject of
experience S3
exists with phenomenal character z>.”
This
hinges on the (possibly false) move from
S1
and S2 necessitating S3
to
the (possibly correct) move that is
S1
bearing relationship R
to S2 and then, in turn, both S1
and S2
necessitating S3.
Thus:
i) S1
doesn't necessitate S2.
ii) S2
doesn't necessitate S3.
iii) However,
S1 standing in
relation R to S2 may necessitate S3.
I
really don't know what's going on here.
Prima
facie,
it's hard to see why there can't be a necessitating relation between
S1 and
S2,
yet, on the other hand, when S1
and S2
are taken together (via relation R), S1 and S2 can indeed necessitate S3.
********************************
Note:
In
a seminar entitled 'Phillip
Goff on Non-Compositional Panpsychism', Philip Goff claims that
the “mind is multiply located”. This, at first glance, seems to
create a problem for much of what's been said above. However, Goff
(in the seminar) doesn't really provide much detail for this
position. And even if there are arguments in its favour, they may not
make much of a difference.
Again,
prima facie, if the mind is multiply located and “wholly
present many times in the brain” (as Goff also says), then this
does seem to create problems for the positions enunciated above.
Though what do Goff's claims mean? Surely if the mind is multiply
located, then that seems to go against claims about “little
subjects”. It also seems to rule out any (strong) point of “bonding”. If
the mind is multiply located (as well as wholly present many times),
then there doesn't seem to be a (strong) requirement for either little
subjects or their bonding.
To
follow: 'Emergence' and 'Little Subjects?' See also my 'Philip Goff's Panpsychist Conceivability-to-Possibility Argument'.
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