It’s of course the case that the title of this piece is somewhat provocative and rhetorical. It was — at least partly — motivated by some of the critical remarks of analytic philosophy and analytic philosophers I’ve read from continental philosophers and academic specialists on continental philosophy; as well as from those who simply don’t like analytic philosophy.
It must also now be said that some people argue that the continental-analytic philosophy distinction is a terrible “binary opposition” and that such entities don’t even exist in the first place. Yet Christina Howells herself must believe that continental philosophy exists. Take the following part of her academic curriculum vitae (CV) — as found on the University of Oxford’s website:
“Christina Howell’s research work centres on Continental philosophy, literary theory, and twentieth-century French literature.”
(There’s also the Oxford Companion to Continental Philosophy, which is hardly written by critics or outsiders. See note at the end.)
Oddly, some such “continentals” have graphically displayed their own tribalism in their very accounts of the supposed tribalism — and other sins — of analytic philosophy and analytic philosophers. (Professor Ansell-Pearson is a good example of this, as will shortly be shown.)
It must now also be admitted that, at times, some analytic philosophers have been tribal too— both in their accounts of continental philosophy itself (which, apparently, doesn’t exist) or when they’re just being (as it were) self-conscious about what it is they do. In addition, this piece must itself be somewhat tribal in that it only mentions the tribalism of continental philosophy and its fans.
Finally, the following mainly focuses on the words of a single academic and what she has to say about analytic philosophers and their relationship to continental philosophy.
That said, let’s begin with a few words on Professor Ansell-Pearson
Professor Ansell-Pearson
Professor Keith Ansell-Pearson points his very-judgemental finger at analytic philosophers.
He claims that all analytic philosophers believe that continental philosophers are “pretentious and portentous”. And Ansell-Pearson doesn’t like this attitude. He believes that such criticisms are “intellectually smug” and also “ethically deficient”. What’s more, this position of all analytic philosophers is an expression of “the ideology of the ruling class”. (Ansell-Pearson classes himself as a “Marxist” in the same interview from which these quotes are taken.)
So it can only be presumed that Professor Ansell-Pearson said all this because he also believes that all — or at least most — continental philosophers are politically and/or philosophically radical and not part of any ruling class. Indeed the professor says that continental philosophy “had a radicality about it that appealed to [him]”. He also stated that because he “readily identif[ied]” with “Marcuse, Adorno, Bataille, Deleuze, Foucault”, then that meant (to him at least) that he was part of a “terribly un-English education and absolutely outside of the analytic establishment”.
Ansell-Pearson’s words are clearly aggressive and very tribal.
And that’s partly why I used the words “all” above when mentioning his references to analytic philosophers. In other words, there’s nothing in Ansell-Pearson’s words to suggest that he believes that there are any analytic philosophers who’re exceptions to his categorical pronouncements. And he mustn’t believe that any subtle positions have ever come from analytic philosophers when they’ve discussed continental philosophy either.
That said, it’s Christina Howells I shall concentrate on in this piece.
Professor Christina Howells
Professor Christina Howells (of the University of Oxford) says that
“there is a risk of [analytic philosophers] transforming [continental] philosophers into something they’re not, and making them say something they weren’t saying”.
Why is that? Howells believes that it’s because
“we’d loose much of the specificity that way, and you could we be left with banality”.
Howells then goes on to say that
“when you extract from a long elaborated discussion a kernel which is then acceptable to analytic philosophy, whether it is about being with others, or about what Derrida might mean by différance, if he were prepared to express it quite differently, you’ve lost too much”.
Here Howells is primarily talking about how analytic philosophers have read (or “used” — see Howells’s later quote) the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Jacques Derrida.
So what exactly is it to transform a philosopher into something he’s not? Does this mean that Howells knows exactly who Derrida/Sartre/etc. is? And what is it to know what Sartre/Derrida/etc. is? Yes — how comes Howells has the keys to this particular kingdom? Of course it’s not being said here that Howells believes she’s the only person with the keys — but she’ll certainly believe those outside her academic tribe of continental philosophy specialists don’t have the keys. (Unless, that is, they’re particularly compliant and agreeable students, followers, etc.)
In addition, how does Howells know that these analytic philosophers are “making [these philosophers] say something they weren’t saying”? Perhaps she’s making them say something they weren’t saying. Again, how does Howells know — exactly — what they were “saying”? What’s more, even if analytic philosophers — seemingly by definition — do make these philosophers say things they weren’t saying, why is that automatically a bad thing?
So what happened to The Death of the Author? And what about Jacques Derrida’s “interpretative play” and there being “no outside-text” (il n’y a pas de hors-texte)?
Aren’t free readings, for example, meant to be a good thing — at least if they’re interesting, informative or enlightened in some way (even if not in precisely the ways academics would like)? Probably not. That is, probably not if the readers are analytic philosophers. Or, alternatively, if such readers aren’t politically and/or philosophically “radical”. Indeed at one point various theorists championed free readings… that is, until they realised that such freedom resulted in at least some readings they politically disagreed with. (Derrida is a good example of this — see here.)
Of course since my words are written by someone who’s not in the Continental Philosophy Tribe, then they’ll probably be deemed to be misinterpretations — yes, misinterpretations — of ideas like the Death of the Author, etc. Either that, or Howells will believe that her very own Philosophical Other won’t know enough about these arcane issues. In fact and perhaps by definition, Academic Outsiders — especially those who are critical in any way — will fail and fail again when it comes to these sacred texts of wise continental men.
Let’s now focus specifically on Howells’s take on Derrida.
Professor Christina Howells on Derrida
Howells said that she’s not
“very keen on the idea of transforming Derrida into terms that analytic philosophy can cope with and use”.
Howell’s use of the words “cope with and use” are informative. They certainly seem very judgemental. These words make it seem that Howells herself doesn’t cope with and use Derrida’s works. So what is it that she does do with them?
Howells’s somewhat categorical and dogmatic stance must also mean that — for example — my own ‘Jacques Derrida’s Others’ must be flushed straight down the toilet. So isn’t it a little ironic that a follower (or admirer) of Derrida should explicitly state that at least some (or even many!) readings of him — i.e., those by analytic philosophers and perhaps others with the wrong politics — “loose too much” or are just plain wrong?
In any case, this isn’t really about translating Derrida’s writings and ideas into something analytic philosophers “can cope with and use”. It’s about translating Derrida’s writings and ideas into any other kind of prose.
So what is it to transform Derrida? Does Howells mean that she personally hasn’t transformed Derrida in any way whatsoever? And, again, why is the transformation of Derrida automatically a bad thing?
Howells also stresses how “technical language” (as it were) in itself is relevant when she says that Derrida claimed that he had created
“a specific type of philosophy, and it was technical, and there was no reason why anyone reading it should immediately understand it, anymore than they would any other specialised, technical language”.
Of course people don’t “immediately understand” Derrida’s writing style because it can be argued that the French philosopher went out of his way to make sure that people didn’t immediately understand it. And it can easily be argued that this wasn’t entirely down to Derrida’s prose being a “specialised, technical language” either.
Howells’s words above also seem to be an explicit endorsement of at least some kind of elitism — if only an academic kind of elitism (which clearly often spreads out beyond the Academy). Now I have no problem with academic specialisms — it’s just that I believed that many of the academics who champion continental philosophers do have a problem with… if not specialisms, then elitism. And how does such elitism square with their “radical philosophy”? Is Radical Philosophy only for an elite of academics who pass their own rarefied words down — if often in diluted form— to (fairly) uninitiated political activists below?
It’s also odd that one of the main criticisms of analytic philosophy — i.e., from fans of continental philosophy — is that it is too “technical” and therefore “dry, boring and irrelevant”. So it seems that the philosophers Howells appreciates are also technical - but presumably without also being dry, boring and irrelevant.
In any case, despite Professor Howell’s — and Professor Ansell-Pearson’s — personal problems with analytic philosophy, those problems are largely irrelevant to this issue. That’s the case because hardly anyone understands many of the continental philosophers they champion. And that fact also applies to the many highly-educated people (i.e., most of whom are completely unconnected to analytic philosophy) who’ve attempted to understand these philosophers.
Thus it can easily be argued that the prime appeal of these philosophers is solely their political and/or philosophical radicality. Indeed this kind of (as it were) philosophico-political hipsterism appeals especially to those between the ages of (roughly) 16 and 23. (Remember Professor Ansell-Pearson’s words earlier about how continental “radicality” strongly “appealed to him” as a young man who suffered from what he called “alienation”.) And this often means that such people (though not only the young) are prepared to overlook — or even deny — the esoteric (or simply pretentious) prose styles these philosophers engage in. In other words, being politically and/or philosophically hip (or radical) trumps everything.
Finally, what about Professor Howells on Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980)?
Howells states that Sartre was never “deliberately difficult”.
How does she know that? Did she ever read his mind?
No. She says that Sartre has a “difficult” (though not “deliberately difficult”) writing style because
“he took drugs so that he could write more quickly and he didn’t self-correct”.
That almost sounds like a non sequitur.
What has taking drugs got to do with someone’s (possibly) pretentious writing style? Sartre might have taken drugs and written in a pretentious writing style. Indeed Sartre might have written pretentious prose precisely because he had taken drugs and didn’t “self-correct”. After all, many people under the influence of certain drugs become very pretentious and develop a heightened sense of their own greatness and importance.
Note:
No critic has even claimed that continental philosophy is a platonic universal — or a natural kind — with clearly defined and determinate “identity conditions” which everyone on the planet agrees upon. (This is also true of consciousness, truth, freedom, capitalism, socialism … and even certain kinds of animal.) Thus the following kind of popular question — aimed at critics of continental philosophy — becomes very silly: “Where would you place Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, etc. in your neat division of analytic-continental philosophy?”
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