"although [they are] not logically impossible, there is no reason whatever to suppose that [they are] true"?
Firstly he says that “absent qualia” and “inverted qualia” are “logically possible”. However, they're still “empirically and nomologically impossible”. In terms of science and the problem of consciousness, it can be intuitively said that if an x is “empirically and nomologically impossible”, then why should we care that it's also “logically possible”? What do we gain (philosophically and perhaps scientifically) from cogitating about scenarios which involve logical possibility yet, at the same time, empirical and nomological impossibility?
Asadullah Ali al-Andalusi (a philosopher at The Andalusian Project) says that the
“mind is capable of imagining and conceiving of possibilities that the external world does not offer through direct experience”.
“The idea of something being beyond is not the result of direct experience from the natural world -- rather it is a projection.”
“We can think of Allah being outside time and space (to an extent) and being beyond merciful and beyond kind, etc."
“Let's not reduce my argument to only one of the terms I used: 'imagination'. I also used the word 'conceive'.”
“Imagination is the the result of experiences and the minds ability to mold them into different forms or to conclude connections between them. It takes two to tango in this regard. Conception is more abstract and doesn't require external experiences at all.”
Armstrong, D.M. (1986) 'The Nature of Possibility'.
Chalmers, David. (1995) 'Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia'.
-- (1997) The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.
Kripke, Saul. (1971) 'Identity and Necessity'.
-- (1980) 'The Identity Thesis', in his Naming and Necessity.
Russell, Bertrand. (1912) The Problems of Philosophy.