In extremely general terms, it can said that behaviourism was a response to the Cartesian (or, even more widely, Western) philosophical tradition in which behaviour, actions, and what is done by persons was seen as the outward expression of what goes on in the mind. Thus, in that sense, many of those who were initially involved in artificial intelligence (AI) were following in behaviourism's footsteps in that they believed that if a computer (or robot) behaved as if it had intelligence (or had a mind), then, almost by definition, it must actually be intelligent (or have a mind).
Many other currents in post-World War Two philosophy played-down the innards of the mind and, consequently, played-up
behaviour. We had the work of the late Wittgenstein in which private mental states were seen as nothing more than "beetles in boxes". We also had Gilbert Ryle's
The Concept of Mind and Quine saying that all there is to
meaning is “overt behaviour”. And then functionalism (in the philosophy of mind) followed all
that.
Specifically
in terms of AI: it can fairly safely be said that many of the
defenders of AI denied (or simply played-down) the distinction
between actions (or behaviour) and what's supposed to be “behind”
action (or behaviour). Thus if that "binary opposition" is rejected,
then all we have to go on are the actions (or behaviour) of
computers. And if computers pass the Turning test, then they're
intelligent. Full stop. Indeed it's only a few behavioural steps
forward from this to argue that computers actually have minds.
Of
course if we follow this line to the letter, then it can be said that
Zombies also have minds; as well as consciousness. And a thermostat
has a little bit of a mind too.
If
you think my last inclusion of a thermostat is ridiculous, then
here's John Searle talking about the inventor of the term "artificial
intelligence", John McCarthy. Searle writes:
“McCarthy
says 'even a machine as simple as a thermostat can be said to have
beliefs.' I admire McCarthy's courage. I once asked him 'What beliefs
does your thermostat have?' And he said 'My thermostat has three
beliefs – it believes it's too hot in here, it's too cold in here,
and it's just right in here.'...” (1984)
Weak and Strong AI
This
is where the distinction between strong and weak AI comes into play.
Weak
AI proponents argue that it's unquestionably the case that some computers (or
all computers?) act as if they're intelligent (or have minds). Though
the operative words here are “as if”. Thus, they continue, it may
take a little bit more time to develop computers which have "genuine
intelligence" (whatever that is) or have minds. In other words, there
has to be more than behaviour (or actions) to intelligence or mind.
Alan
Turing himself put the weak AI position when he argued that it
doesn't matter if a machine has a mind in the human sense: what
matters is whether or not it can act in the way that human beings act – i.e. intelligently.
(In those days that basically meant answering questions and solving
mathematical problems.) In fact that was the crux of the Turing test
which resulted in the Dartmouth proposal. Namely:
"Every
aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can be so
precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it."
(1955)
John
Searle states the strong AI hypothesis (with all its behaviourist
trappings) in the following way:
“The
other minds reply (Yale). 'How do you know that other people
understand Chinese or anything else? Only by their behaviour. Now the
computer can pass the behavioural tests as well as they can (in
principle), so if you are going to attribute cognition to other
people you must in principle also attribute it to computers.'...”
(1980)
Strong
AI bites the bullet and denies the distinction between behaviour and
mind/intelligence:
In other words, even though I've just written the words “as if”, there's no actual as if about it.
If a computer acts (or behaves) as if it's intelligent (or has a mind), then it is intelligent (or has a mind).
In other words, even though I've just written the words “as if”, there's no actual as if about it.
So
why worry our pretty little heads about what must lie
behind these expressions of mind or intelligence? In true
behaviourist fashion, all we really need (or have!) is behaviour.
Sentience and
Sapience
When
it's said that there's no way that we can know (or tell) that a
computer is sentient, it seems incredible. This is usually said about
animals or even about other human beings. However, logically the same
thing can indeed be said about computers; though, admittedly, not
with the same force or implications.
Of
course other human beings can tell us that they're sentient (even if they
don't use the words “I'm sentient”). Animals, on the other hand,
can hint (as it were) at their sentience. Then again, it's also possible
that a future computer could do the same.
So
let's get a little but more concrete about all this.
I just mentioned that the display of intelligence (or mind) is deemed to be intelligence (or mind). And computers certainly display intelligence. For example, computers can solve problems, play games (e.g., chess), prove mathematical theorems, diagnose medical problems, use language and so on. What more do we want?
I just mentioned that the display of intelligence (or mind) is deemed to be intelligence (or mind). And computers certainly display intelligence. For example, computers can solve problems, play games (e.g., chess), prove mathematical theorems, diagnose medical problems, use language and so on. What more do we want?
All
these things are undoubtedly displays of intelligence; though are
they also displays of mind? However, just as I mentioned the
mind-behaviour binary opposition; so we have the
intelligence-mind opposition too. That means we can construct an
argument which takes us from behaviour to intelligence; and then from
intelligence to mind. Thus:
i)
If a computer behaves intelligently,
ii)
then it is intelligent.iii) If computer is intelligent,
v) then it must have a mind.
Prima
facie, it does seem to be the case that when other people do
intelligent things, then we (as good behaviourists) say that they're
intelligent; whereas when the same actions are done by a computer it
rarely evokes the same response (or, at the least, not exactly the same kind of response). After
all, doesn't winning a game of chess match, etc. most people's criteria of a genuine display of intelligence?
References
Searle,
John. (1984) Mind,
Brains and Science.
London: BBC Publications.
-- (1980)
'Minds,
Brains, and Programs'. Behavioural
and Brain Sciences 3.J. McCarthy, M. L. Minsky, N. Rochester, C.E. Shannon. (1955) 'A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence'
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