Saturday, 20 June 2026

Iain McGilchrist Is a Mystical and Wise Man With a Hammer

 


The British psychiatrist, neuroscientist and mystic Iain McGilchrist ties almost every political, religious and philosophical issue to his left-and-right-sides-of-the- brain research. In almost every interview, McGilchrist brings this subject up. Is this a classic case of someone seeing the world through the lens of his own personal specialisation?

Iain McGilchrist. Image at Wiki Commons. Source here.

This essay focuses on an interview with Iain McGilchrist carried out by Unherd’s Freddie Sayers. (It can be found on YouTube under the title ‘Iain McGilchrist: How to escape left-brain thinking’.) So rather than introduce McGilchrist myself, I’ll let Sayers do so instead:

“McGilchrist is one of our favorite thinkers here at Unherd. He’s a neuroscientist, a philosopher, a writer. Unherd itself tells us about McGilchrist’s ‘central theory of the bihemispheric brain, the divided brain’, and how each of the two parts of our brain thinks differently about the world, and how if we understand that, we can better understand how humans think. And now Iain is one of the biggest names both on the internet and on the lecture circuit and all around the world.”

McGilchrist Is a Man With a Hammer

Arguably, all McGilchrist has done is add some science to various mystical traditions. More concretely, he adds talk about the right and left hemispheres of the brain into the mystical melting pot.

Is this an attempt to naturalise mysticism?

No one would deny that there is solid neuroscience on hemispheric differences. However, when McGilchrist talks about civilisation being “left-hemisphere dominated”, he’s no longer doing neuroscience or any form of science. Perhaps he would admit this.

It’s clear that McGilchrist has a hammer because he’s spent decades developing and using it. His hammer is now part of his intellectual identity.

As for the phrase “a man with a hammer” itself. These five words come from the psychologist (ironically) Abraham Maslow, who wrote: “If the only tool you have is a hammer, it is tempting to treat everything as if it were a nail.”

Like the reductionist Donald Hoffman reducing everything down to conscious agents (or, more broadly, to consciousness itself), McGilchrist reduces everything down to the left and right hemispheres of the brain. Of course, both will say that they aren’t doing that at all, or that it ain’t that simple. But those they class as “reductionist” or “materialist” can justifiably claim something similar too!

Taking on Left-Brained Pinker and Dawkins

Let’s not play down what McGilchrist is attempting to do. Take his words here:

“I’m prepared to stick my neck out and say that if enough people, and it might only be 2% of the population, started to think like this and talk like this, that we could see things turn around in a matter of a decade. And maybe we haven’t got a decade, but I’m hoping that we have that in a decade’s time, there would be distinct differences in the way public discourse went on, a sophistication of the way that people talk about what we are, what we’re doing here, what the world is, way beyond the Pinker and the Dawkinsian bankrupt vision of simply random movement of meaningless matter.”

That’s rhetoric. McGilchrist may say it’s literally true. But let me rewrite it:

I’m prepared to stick my neck out and say that if enough people, and it might only be 2% of the population, started to think like I think and talk like I talk, that we could see things turn around in a matter of a decade.

This reads like a political manifesto. McGilchrist has even done some calculations and come to the conclusion that if only 2% of the population came to think and talk as he does… then what, exactly, will follow?

McGilchrist’s mystical and religious trajectory was set early in his life, at least according to himself. He states the following in the interview:

“When I was in my teens, I imagined that after a spell at Oxford [University], I would go into a monastery because it seemed so important to me to devote myself to understanding these truths that seem to me the most profound truths [ ].”

Personally, I become suspicious when people use the word “profound”, “deep”, etc. This is especially the case when they’re talking about what they themselves are doing. In basic terms, McGilchrist is saying that it is he who is offering people profound truths.

In any case, it doesn’t take long for McGilchrist to wield his hammer in the interview:

“The left hemisphere on its own is prone to delusion. And I don’t just mean in the popular parliament’s idea of a delusion. I mean technically whatever you think of a civilization when it collapses all kinds of unbelievable evils will follow.”

Mystical Right-Brained Apophatic Thinking

McGilchrist focusses a lot on apophatic thinking. This is him explaining what that is:

“Now that idea of a process that is getting nearer and of clearing away things that are untrue [ ]. It is apophatic. I mean people like Pinker and Dawkins would throw a wobbly if I said that because they don’t understand what’s meant by the apophatic path towards the divine. In other words, the clearing away of what is not true in order to allow what is there to shine forth.”

I’m not entirely sure what the words “a process that is getting nearer and clearing away things that are untrue” mean. Or, rather, I am, but I don’t understand why they are profound. I certainly don’t understand why they have anything to do with Pinker and Dawkins.

Do they understand apophatic thinking? I have no idea. Should they understand it?

Myths Are False But Holy

McGilchrist talks about myths in the following:

“I think this tells us about the nature of myths that are really important elements that cannot be looked at in that dissecting denotative frame of mind, [and] that we need to be clear about this. In other words, Dawkins’s frame of mind that ‘let’s get the facts right’. ‘Was there really this person?’, and so on.”

That’s supposedly Richard Dawkins’ position. This is McGilchrist’s own position:

“It doesn’t matter whether there really was this person because this story is completely independent of that. [ ] I saw a clip of Dawkins talking to Jordan Peterson. It was most unenlightening because Dawkins kept saying, ‘Well, you know, did the Virgin Mary actually lie with a man or was this actually a virgin birth?’ And Peterson didn’t want to say yes or no really. And I understand why because he was staying on a vision of what is true that didn’t depend on the facts of the case.”

Most Catholics do believe in the Virgin Birth. It’s not a myth to them. It is a myth to Iain McGilchrist.

It’s very evident that a story has an existence and role regardless of whether the characters and events in it existed and occurred. Again, why would Dawkins deny this? Surely, Dawkins’ point is that many people actually believe that these people existed and that the claims are true. They haven’t always got the deep and profound minds of people like McGilchrist. In addition, why would Dawkins need to deny that a story may still have a message without it being about real people and real events?

In detail, McGilchrist resurrects the Noble Lie in the following passage:

“[I]ncluding things that were literally or factually untrue and still end up in some closer to truth than someone who rejected the whole story outright. And [Dawkins] completely just didn’t come with me on that concept.”

Okay. Let’s be clear here. Even if a belief in “things that were literally or factually untrue” can have positive consequences, why would Dawkins deny that? He probably doesn’t. But McGilchrist must be honest here. He must state something like the following:

Many of the things that religious and other people deem to be true are not true. However, it is beneficial to believe in these things.

This stance goes back to Plato’s Noble Lie, Marx’s “the point isn’t to interpret the world but to change it”, and even to the pragmatism of William James.

William James and John Searle

Take William James’s popular book, Varieties of Religious Experience. It can be said that James was a kind of early language-games theorist. Indeed, James was well known for his idea of “the will to believe” too. This doctrine — according to certain commentators at least — states (to put it simply, though accurately) that if a myth or religious belief works for you (or works for a community as a whole), then why not adopt it? It doesn’t matter if one’s beliefs are true or whether they correspond to anything outside the actual language game. What matters are the pragmatic effects of myths and religious beliefs. In fact, according to James’s liberal pragmatism (unlike, say, C. S. Peirce’s), a belief is actually made true if and when it works. (I strongly suspect that many experts on James will see this as a simplification of James’s position.)

Now for John Searle’s views on these same matters.

The American philosopher John Searle believed that the majority of people within religious language games won’t — or even couldn’t — accept the nonrealist attitude of people like McGilchrist. Searle writes:

“[W]hether or not there is a God listening to their prayer isn’t itself part of the language game. The reason people play the language game of religion is because they think there is something outside the language game that gives it a point.”

Of course, we can ask here (in a Searlian spirit) whether the very concept of (realist) truth has any real purchase in some (or all) of these disparate language games.

Searle’s point, however, is that Wittgenstein’s liberalism (if that’s what it was) towards religious language games may not, in actual fact, have been much appreciated by the actual religious participants in these language games. That is, if they ever came to know that McGilchrist believes that such games are completely autonomous creations (or constructions), then they might not have accepted that their own particular religious practices are in fact language games at all.

Unherd Defends Pinker and Dawkins

It was up to Unherd’s Freddie Sayers to put Dawkins’ and Pinker’s views. That’s because McGilchrist didn’t even try to do so. Sayers states the following:

“To be fair, both Richard Dawkins and Steven Pinker are people who can talk lyrically about music, love and the kind of non-logical aspects of life. It’s not like they are blind to them, but I think their anxiety if they were listening to this conversation, and from the kind of worldview you have, might be that the gains of the enlightenment, the advances we have made from our emphasis on rationality and logic, are in danger at the moment anyway by a kind of regression of science, an increase of dangerous superstition, and people like Iain McGilchrist going off on YouTube telling people that it’s okay to believe myths even if they’re not really literally true is only encouraging this dangerous tendency and they probably quite anxious about it. What would you say back to them?”

McGilchrist responded:

“Well, I would say gosh, as I find myself saying almost in everything that I have to talk about, truths are not of the kind that you think 100% it’s this. There are a number of different truths and they need to be in order to be have an intelligent understanding let alone to approach wisdom one needs to be able to hold them and not lose one because you hold to another. [ ] Extolling these as very important ways of arriving at an understanding of the world but not on their own. They need supplementation by two other paths intuition and imagination.”

Most of that I don’t understand. And what I do understand has been said many times before in various mystical traditions. McGilchrist’s emphasis on intuition is very rationalist, and can also be very dangerous (think of the Nazis and Heidegger). The passage above also includes an indirect reference to McGilchrist’s hammer again. After all, it’s the right hemisphere that’s the domain of intuition and imagination.


Note:

Here are two other mentions of Steven Pinker and Richard Dawkins by Iain McGilchrist in the same interview:

“The trouble with Pinker and Dawkins is that they are biologists, and biologists until recently have been very much mechanists. Thank God that is now passing.”

And:

“[W]hen we’re not aware of things, and I’m afraid Dawkins and Pinker and Co. appear not to be aware of certain things, then you tend to adopt positions that are only partially true. [they] think of us as lumbering robots doing the bidding of our genes.”

Monday, 15 June 2026

Rupert Sheldrake’s History of Panpsychism — From Animism to Galen Strawson

 

Rupert Sheldrake states that panpsychism “is not a new idea”. To defend that claim, he puts “traditional people all over the world”, “Ancient Greek philosophy”, the “philosophers and theologians of medieval Europe”, Spinoza, Leibniz, Diderot, Johann Herder, Schopenhauer, Ernst Mach, Ernst Haeckel, Henri Bergson, A.N. Whitehead, and even C.S. Peirce into the melting pot that is panpsychism. One can easily argue that many of these people weren’t panpsychists of any description. Still, Sheldrake ties all of them to panpsychism.

Image from Wiki Commons. Source here.

Many People as Panpsychists

Sheldrake states that “[m]ost people used to believe in it, and many still do”. Well, that entirely depends on what panpsychism is taken to be. Some readers will probably guess that what most people used to believe will bear little resemblance to the panpsychism of Galen Strawson and many other contemporary panpsychists. Still, Sheldrake is free to stretch this term as wide as he wishes.

The first mistake that Sheldrake makes is when he seems to conflate x’s being “alive” and it instantiating experience. I can bet that most people and “traditional people” didn’t take “planets, stars, the earth, plants and animals” to simply instantiate various degrees of experience, from very rudimentary to sophisticated. Indeed, Sheldrake himself let the cat out of the bag when he said that such people believed that stars, etc. had “spirits or souls”. So either panpsychism is a strict philosophical position or it’s simply animism.

Oddly enough, Sheldrake does then make a distinction between panpsychism and hylozoism. He claims that “[a]ncient Greek philosophy” included philosophers who “saw all things as in some degree alive, without necessarily supposing that they had sensations or experiences”.

Sheldrake continues this line of argument and applies it to medieval Europe. He states that

“philosophers and theologians took for granted that the world was full of animate beings; plants and animals had souls, and stars and planets were governed by intelligences”.

Animals are certainly animate. But what has all this to do with panpsychism? (If animals were believed to have souls, then one can see how Descartes’ work moved against this earlier position.)

Leibniz as Panpsychist

Sheldrake ties Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz into his panpsychist picture, just as the cognitive psychologist Donald Hoffman ties Leibniz into his idealist picture. Sheldrake claims that Leibniz “proposed that the ultimate elements of the universe were interrelated through consciousness”. As it stands, that claim is vague. It can be taken as a proclamation of idealism, just as much as a proclamation of panpsychism. [See my ‘What Is a Conscious Agent? Donald Hoffman, Please Tell Me’, which discusses the influence of Leibniz on Donald Hoffman.]

So what are Leibniz’s ultimate elements?

Leibniz “called these ultimate units monads, which were both physical centres of force and mental centres of experience, each reflecting the universe”. This picture allows for both physical and non-experiential elements. That appears to go against basic panpsychism. Sheldrake quotes Leibniz himself:

“‘Each monad is a living mirror… which represents the universe from its own point of view and is as ordered as the universe itself.’”

Let’s remember here that each monad has physical features, at least according to Sheldrake. As it is, I’m not going to comment on Leibniz’s own philosophy other than to compare it to panpsychism.

If monads have a “point of view”, then this too goes against panpsychism because panpsychists are often keen to stress that the basic units of panpsychism only instantiate very basic levels of experience. They certainly don’t have a point of view. That said, this depends on what Leibniz meant by “point of view”.

What about the word “perception”?

Isn’t perception over and above basic experience too? Perception, as usually understood, requires sense organs and a brain to perceive, something that the basic units of panpsychism don’t have. And they certainly don’t have an “appetite”.

So, as with all the other names brought into the panpsychist picture by Sheldrake, aspects of Leibniz’s philosophy could indeed be classed as “panpsychist”, whereas other aspects can’t be so classed.

Much of what has been said about Leibniz can also be said about Baruch Spinoza.

Spinoza as Panpsychist

In this case, rather than physical and experiential features existing together, Spinoza talked in terms of body and mind. Of course, both body and mind were “two aspects of the same underlying reality, which he called Deus sive natura, God or Nature”. It’s not being said here that body and mind are two aspects of an underlying reality that is purely — or even partly — experiential. Instead, the underlying reality is simply God or Nature. (It can be argued that God could be conceived as a being who is purely experiential.)

According to Sheldrake, in Spinoza’s philosophy a distinction is made between underlying reality and “the most basic aspect of substances at all levels of complexity”. Spinoza “called [this] conatus, a Latin word meaning ‘striving’ that was both physical and mental”. This use of the word “striving” is easier to tie to the philosophy of Schopenhauer than to panpsychism. So do the basic units of panpsychism strive? Is striving even part of the complex systems discussed by panpsychism?

As with Leibniz, there are elements of Spinoza’s philosophy which can be tied to panpsychism, and there are other elements which can’t be so tied. And that’s the story of Sheldrake’s three subchapters on panpsychism in his book The Science Delusion.

Galen Strawson as Panpsychist

Sheldrake brings panpsychism up to date with the English philosopher Galen Strawson. Interestingly, although Sheldrake doesn’t mention the combination problem, he does mention “aggregates of matter” and “self-organising systems”. Both are made up of parts. Both need those parts to be combined to create a greater experience or greater consciousness. According to Sheldrake, however, Strawson does make a distinction between aggregates of matter such as “tables and rocks”, and self-organising systems such as “atoms, cells and animals”.

Strawson “did not suggest that tables and rocks have any unified experience”. However, “the atoms within them may have”. This all hinges on the technical term “self-organising system”, which Strawson himself has rarely used. [See self-organising system.]

What does Sheldrake mean by “self-organising system”?

Sheldrake’s Strawson believes that “atoms and crystals [are] self-organising”. However, we’re not being told what self-organising means here. We’re simply given the examples of atoms, cells and animals. Sheldrake does say that “man-made objects, like chairs or cars, do not organise themselves”. They’re “designed by people and put together in factories”. So atoms, cells and animals aren’t designed by people and put together in factories. True. Yet we still need to know how self-organisation is relevant to the issue of panpsychism.

Strawson ties panpsychism to evolution.

Evolution may not seem easy to connect to panpsychism in that consciousness can’t be said to be a result of evolution if it was there all along. However, it can be argued that even though consciousness was there all along, evolution allowed it to become more rich or complex. This is Strawson’s 2006 position, as quoted by Sheldrake:

“‘Once upon a time there was relatively unorganised matter with both experiential and non-experiential fundamental features. It organised into increasingly complex forms, both experiential and non-experiential, by many processes including evolution by natural selection.’”

Note that two forms of evolution are mentioned above: (1) The evolution of non-biological entities in the universe. (2) The evolution of biological entities on Earth. Strawson also mentions organisation, as Sheldrake does.

This passage indirectly refers to the combination problem without mentioning it. After all, the “organised matter” was itself made up of organised matter. Alternatively, “complex forms” which instantiated experience were made up of less-complex forms which instantiated lesser-degrees of experience. So the issue here isn’t about the relation of basic and complex forms: it’s about how basic forms which instantiate experience combine to create complex forms which instantiate richer experience.

In addition, note Strawson’s uses of the words “experiential and non-experiential”. In basic terms, this must mean that Strawson believes that all the way through these two evolutionary processes there were basic and complex forms that instantiated experiential and non-experiential features. Thus, not every element instantiates experience.

Saturday, 30 May 2026

Rupert Sheldrake vs Ricky Gervais

 


This essay tackles the author and biologist Rupert Sheldrake’s criticisms of Ricky Gervais. (The former classes the latter as science’s “high priest”.) Then I focus on a long quote from Gervais on science, which Sheldrake dissects in his book The Science Delusion. Following on from that, I too dissect five passages from Sheldrake himself in which he attacks Gervais again. The broad gist of Sheldrake’s position is that Gervais “isn’t an original thinker”: he’s simply someone who parrots “scientific dogma” to serve his atheism and materialism.

Image created by ChatGPT.

In simple terms, Rupert Sheldrake believes he’s more committed to real science than most scientists, and certainly more so than Ricky Gervais. He says that he “take[s] the ideal of free enquiry seriously”, unlike most scientists who, say, outrightly reject his morphic resonance hypothesis.

Sheldrake also believes that “the spirit of enquiry has liberated scientific thinking from unnecessary limitations”… Therefore, scientists should embrace morphic resonance, purpose, telephony, premonition, prerecognition, disembodied minds, shamanism, religion, etc. More concretely, Sheldrake believes that “the sciences, for all their successes, are being stifled by outmoded beliefs” such as materialism. What isn’t outmoded is Sheldrake’s morphic resonance hypothesis.

Like so many other anti-materialists, Sheldrake has a view on the vulgar and uneducated populace that’s very much like the Marxist notion of false consciousness. He states that “millions of people have been converted to this ‘scientific’ view”. Now here comes the Marxist-like addition: “even though they know very little about science itself”. So let me spoon-feed readers for a moment with this rewording.

Millions of working-class people have been converted to the ideology of capitalism even though they know very little about capitalism itself.

Thus, it’s not surprising that Sheldrake finishes off by saying that these millions of people are “devotees of the Church of Science, or of scientism, of which scientists are the priests”.

The Long Quote: Gervais on Science

Sheldrake supplies his readers with a long quote from Ricky Gervais, which is taken from the article ‘Why I’m an Atheist’. (This was published by the Wall Street Journal.) It goes as follows:

“Science seeks the truth. And it doesn’t discriminate. For better or worse it finds things out. Science is humble. It knows what it knows and it knows what it doesn’t know. It bases its conclusions and beliefs on hard evidence — evidence that is constantly updated and upgraded. It doesn’t get offended when new facts come along. It embraces the body of knowledge. It doesn’t hold onto medieval practices because they are tradition.”

According to Sheldrake “Gervais is an entertainer, not a scientist”. True. He says he isn’t “an original thinker” too. Some would dispute that. In any case, according to Sheldrake, “Gervais’s idealised view of science is hopelessly naïve in the context of the history and sociology of science”. [See endnote on Thomas Kuhn and Bruno Latour.]

Personally, the passage above seems quite a decent account of science. Sure, it’s not the kind of thing that Karl Popper or Bas Van Fraassen would say, and it is indeed slightly naïve. But Gervais isn’t a philosopher of science, and it’s no more naïve than most of the criticisms of materialism and “scientism”.

Gervais finished of by saying that science “doesn’t hold onto medieval practices because they are tradition”. Sheldrake, on the other hand, believes that science is a religion that’s massively conformist. He believes that when “facts come along” scientists shouldn’t “hold onto the materialist worldview just because it’s tradition”. Instead, they should accept Sheldrake’s own morphic resonance hypothesis, etc. and jettison the materialist worldview.

Sheldrake says that this naïve view “portrays scientists as open-minded seekers of truth, not ordinary people”. Yet Gervais didn’t mention “scientists” at all. He mentioned “science”. So the most he can be accused of is treating science as a Platonic form. What’s more, you can be “pro science” at the same time as being very sceptical about individual scientists. Of course, Sheldrake may say that this division is “naïve” too.

More of Sheldrake on Gervais

Apart from the long quote above, I found five other mentions of Gervais by Sheldrake.

The first quote deals with how Sheldrake believes Gervais uses science:

“But in the hands of people like Ricky Gervais, [atheism] becomes a way of saying that science knows there is no God, no purpose, and no soul. This isn’t humility; it’s a belief system pretending to be a lack of belief.”

Basically, Sheldrake is saying that for Gervais, atheism comes first, and then science is simply used in his war against monotheism and religion. Note that Sheldrake says that science “becomes a way of saying that science knows there is no God…” He doesn’t actually quote Gervais on this. Gervais studied philosophy as an undergraduate, so it can be questioned whether he believes that “science knows there is no God”. (Gervais did once claim that he “didn’t really study” and simply read a book similar to Philosophy for Dummies the night before his exam.) Similarly, Gervais may well believe in purpose, just not universal purpose or purpose than runs free of collective or individual minds. Still, these qualifications won’t satisfy Sheldrake. Nothing outside his own worldview would do so.

Sheldrake then makes a classic point against atheists and materialists: that they’re all stuck in the 19th century. This is an odd case, however. Whereas most anti-materialists, spiritual idealists, etc. paint the materialism — of those they take to be contemporary materialists - in 19th century terms, without actually acknowledging that, Sheldrake does mention it. He writes:

“Ricky Gervais portrays himself and other atheists as open-minded seekers of truth, but they are actually followers of a very narrow, 19th-century philosophy called mechanistic materialism. They aren’t open to the evidence for anything that doesn’t fit that machine-like view of the world.”

I watched Gervais in conversation with David Baddiel, and the physicist Brian Cox. They all went into quite some detail on aspects of quantum mechanics, the Big Bang, etc. So I’ll assume that Gervais is not a “follower of a very narrow, 19th-century philosophy called mechanistic materialism”. Of course, Gervais could be as extremely dumb on this matter, as Sheldrake believes he is. But I strongly doubt it. If Sheldrake stopped mentioning “materialists” or “materialism” in every other sentence, perhaps that would help matters. (Sheldrake uses the word “materialists” as Marxists used the word “bourgeoisie”.)

In this next passage, Sheldrake paints Gervais as a “high priest”, just as he paints scientists and God knows who else as “high priests”:

“Entertainers like Ricky Gervais have become the high priests of a secular age. They use comedy to make spiritual questions look ridiculous, but if you look at the ‘science’ they are defending, it’s actually a series of dogmas they’ve never questioned themselves.”

Scientists are “high priests” and entertainers are “high priests”. What is Sheldrake playing at here? He’s displaying the arrogance and elitism he accuses scientists of. (On the word “elitism”. Sheldrake provides much detail on his own scientific background, at least fifteen paragraphs of it.)

The following passage sees Sheldrake reading Gervais’s mind, as well as saying things about his “belief system”:

“[Gervais] says science is humble because it knows what it doesn’t know, yet he seems quite certain that he knows God is an imaginary friend. That’s not humility; that’s the arrogance of a belief system that refuses to look at its own foundations.”

Gervais may well be quite certain that he knows God is an imaginary friend. I, personally, don’t know for sure. But many people are certain about many of the things they believe. Sheldrake is certainly certain that materialism is evil and that Gervais “is not a thinker”. And how does Sheldrake know that Gervais hasn’t looked at the foundations of his own belief system? He doesn’t know that. He’s guessing for rhetorical effect. How do we know that Sheldrake has looked at the foundations of his own belief system? In his book The Science Delusion, there’s little evidence that he has indulged in much self-scrutiny. He spends too much of his time criticising “materialist science” to do so.

Finally, Sheldrake states the obvious, and disparages “most people”:

“Ricky Gervais isn’t a scientist, but he speaks with the authority of science to a mass audience. He’s selling a philosophy, not scientific data, and most people don’t know the difference.”

Readers can assume that Gervais would know that he isn’t offering “scientific data” during his comedy routines, or even in his podcasts and interviews. He’s offering his opinion on science, and on other subjects. Is Gervais “selling a philosophy” then? Possibly. But no more or less than Sheldrake is selling his own philosophy, his morphic resonance hypothesis, and his anti-materialism.


Afterword: Kuhn and Latour

Sheldrake relies on the writings of Thomas Kuhn… Or at least he quotes him. Just before tackling Gervais, he provides a long quote from Bruno Latour too.

Kuhn was accused of portraying science as “mob psychology”. (Many of Kuhn’s supporters strongly deny this.) Latour, at least in the quote, treats scientists as arrogant elitists. All this squares perfectly with Sheldrake’s positions, even though some people may regard Kuhn and Latour to be unlikely allies. (“The enemies of my enemies are my friends.”)