Much has been made of the fact that many critics have used the work of the American historian and philosopher Thomas Kuhn to attack both science and scientists. The English biologist, parapsychology researcher and writer Rupert Sheldrake fits this pattern perfectly. He brings on board the French philosopher and sociologist Bruno Latour too. This is odd really because they are coming at this issue from very different angles to Sheldrake’s own. Still, there’s nothing to stop Sheldrake — and others — using the work of Kuhn to attack science and scientists. Indeed, even some philosophers, scientists, etc. who weren’t critical of Kuhn picked up on the fact that many of the critics of science and scientists (some religious people, postmodernists, post-structuralists, political activists, etc.) would use his work. And they did!
“Science became a view from nowhere. The minds of scientists were somehow disembodied. This is why Stephen Hawking is such an iconic figure in the popular imagination. Through the misfortune of his illness, he is as close to a disembodied mind as a human can be.”
— Rupert Sheldrake (from The Science Delusion)
Sheldrake on Science and Scientists
Many philosophers and others would say that a strong distinction can and should be made between science and scientists. Sheldrake doesn’t accept this distinction at all. Neither do the sociologists, postmodernists, etc. he relies upon. Take this passage:
“Sciences are human activities. The assumption that the sciences are uniquely objective not only distorts the public perception of scientists, but affects scientists’ perception of themselves. The illusion of objectivity makes scientists prone to deception and self-deception. It works against the noble ideal of seeking truth.”
It can be supposed that the words “the sciences” aren’t identical to “science”. Still, Sheldrake is talking about science. Basically, this is his argument:
i) Scientists are human persons.
ii) The sciences are human activities.
iii) Therefore, scientists are not objective.
Sheldrake then warns his readers about the “illusion of objectivity”. Yet how does it follow that because scientists are human persons, that science is not objective? Of course, it may depend on what Sheldrake meant by the word “objective”. However, is there an alternative to science being carried out by human persons? Should science be carried out by AI or by Sheldrakian mystics instead?
In any case, Sheldrake is keen to tell his readers that he believes that “seeking truth” is a “noble ideal”. It’s just that some, many, most or all mainstream scientists are not seekers of truth. Sheldrake, on the other hand, is a seeker of truth.
Despite Sheldrake’s many negative generalisations about scientists, he does state the following:
“Among the many scientists I have known, some are ruthlessly ambitious, others kind and generous; some boringly pedantic, others excitingly speculative; some narrow-minded, others visionary. [ ] They vary, just as other kinds of people vary.”
Now that seems to go against everything else Sheldrake writes about scientists. (For example: “Scientists constitute a priesthood superior to the priesthoods of religions, which maintain their prestige and power by playing on human ignorance and fear.”) He’d probably argue that I’ve missed the sophistication of his position. Yet, apart from this passage, that’s not at all clear. Indeed, if Sheldrake admits that some — even only some — scientists are “excitingly speculative”, “visionary”, “brave”, “honest”, “original”, etc., then his general position collapses. Unless, that is, all these noble scientists are out of the mainstream of science. In other words, unless they’re all scientists just like Sheldrake himself.
The whole point of the passage above is to tell readers that “scientists are indeed like other people”. So, again, if some scientists are excitingly speculative, visionary, brave, honest, original, etc., then do these scientists maintain their prestige and power by playing on human ignorance and fear too?
Sheldrake on the Scientific Priesthood
Even though there’s an element of truth in what Sheldrake says about scientists, what he does say is still monumentally rhetorical and over the top. Take this paragraph for starters:
“Scientists constitute a priesthood superior to the priesthoods of religions, which maintain their prestige and power by playing on human ignorance and fear.”
This is so hyperbolic it’s difficult to know where to start.
When Sheldrake says that “[s]cientists constitute a priesthood superior to the priesthoods of religions”, this hints at the possibility (or likelihood) that he isn’t against priesthoods per se: he’s against the scientific priesthood. In fact, in the very same book from which this passage is taken (i.e., The Science Delusion), he says very positive things about religious priesthoods of both the past and today.
Is there a scientific priesthood?
If there is, then it’s only a metaphorical one. In history and in many cultures, priesthoods had literal power over many aspects of life, and the publics were well aware of this. In contrast, Sheldrake says that “human ignorance” means that most publics today aren’t aware of the scientific priesthood.
Is there really much human ignorance of the scientific priesthood?
Some laypeople may be ignorant of scientists and scientific institutions. Other laypeople aren’t. In fact, many scientists and scientific institutions face much scrutiny from laypeople, far much so than historical religious priesthoods. Of course, laypeople don’t know as much about scientists, scientific institutions and science than scientists. But how could it ever be otherwise? Indeed, if ever Sheldrake’s central hypothesis of morphic resonance ever became mainstream, and enforced by a new priesthood, then laypeople would be equally ignorant of that too.
Sheldrake on Scientific Objectivity
Here’s another passage against scientists from the very same paragraph:
“For those who idealise science, scientists are the epitome of objectivity, rising above the sectarian divisions and illusions that afflict the rest of humanity. Scientific minds are freed from the normal limitations of bodies, emotions and social obligations, and can travel beyond the earth-bound realm of the senses to see all nature as if from outside, stripped of subjective qualities.”
It’s clear that Sheldrake has drank the cool aid of Thomas Kuhn, Bruno Latour, postmodernists, sociologists, etc. (Kuhn wrote a paper on scientific objectivity called ‘Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice’.) Such people have been at pains to tell their own readers that “scientists are people” too.
There are some interesting parts of the passage above that need commenting upon. Take the clause that scientists “can travel beyond the earth-bound realm of the senses to see all nature as if from the outside, stripped of subjective qualities”. Sheldrake explicitly connects this position to Plato. Yet even this take isn’t original to him. It’s a picture which he directly takes from Latour. For example, Sheldrake quotes Latour:
“‘Although the world of truth differs absolutely, not relatively, from the social world, the Scientist can go back and forth from one world to the other no matter what… In the original myth [i.e., Plato’s Cave], as we know, the Philosopher managed only with the greatest difficulty to break the chains that attached him to the shadowy world…’”
What about the clause “[s]cientific minds are freed from the normal limitations of bodies, emotions and social obligations”? This picture is taken from Descartes. And here too Sheldrake has borrowed from others. Descartes has been a favourite bogeyman of many postmodernists, post-structuralists, sociologists, political activists, etc. Sheldrake himself (elsewhere) tells us why that’s so.
Many scientists have not believed that they should be free of social obligations, and have openly expressed that view. What’s more, many political activists have demanded that they shouldn’t be free of social and political obligations. Indeed, a small number of scientists, and numerous academics and activists, have said that scientists should always be aware of the political implications of their work and their social status… Unless, that is, Sheldrake is fixated on scientists as they existed in Descartes’ time and, say, up to the 19th century. Yet even then, he would be guilty of generalising. That said, Sheldrake is talking about the scientists of today.
Sheldrake gives a concrete example of his idea that scientists supposedly see themselves as (Cartesian) disembodied minds: Stephen Hawking. He says that “[s]cience became a view from nowhere”, and that “the minds of scientists were somehow disembodied”. Then comes the conclusion:
“Through the misfortune of [Stephen Hawking’s] illness, he is a close to a disembodied mind as a human can be.”
The philosopher Thomas Nagel did say that science does attempt to capture “the view from nowhere”. But he said that positively, unlike Sheldrake. For example:
“If there is a way things really are, which explains their diverse appearances to differently constituted and situated observers, then it is most accurately apprehended by methods not specific to particular types of observers. That is why scientific measurement interposes between us and the world instruments whose interactions with the world are of a kind that could be detected by a creature not sharing the human senses.”
It’s very possible that Sheldrake won’t be impressed with this passage from Nagel. (Sheldrake does quote Nagel, as with Kuhn and Latour, positively elsewhere.) After all, scientific measurements are carried out, and instruments are used, by scientists who are human persons.
That said, Nagel did say that science fails, or at least it’s problematic, when it comes to the nature of subjectivity. Sheldrake, on the other hand, believes that science fails in multiple respects. Thus, a Sheldrakian revolution, not unlike a Kuhnian revolution, needs to occur in science in order to rectify such failings.
