Saturday, 30 May 2026

Rupert Sheldrake vs Ricky Gervais

 


This essay tackles the author and biologist Rupert Sheldrake’s criticisms of Ricky Gervais. (The former classes the latter as science’s “high priest”.) Then I focus on a long quote from Gervais on science, which Sheldrake dissects in his book The Science Delusion. Following on from that, I too dissect five passages from Sheldrake himself in which he attacks Gervais again. The broad gist of Sheldrake’s position is that Gervais “isn’t an original thinker”: he’s simply someone who parrots “scientific dogma” to serve his atheism and materialism.

Image created by ChatGPT.

In simple terms, Rupert Sheldrake believes he’s more committed to real science than most scientists, and certainly more so than Ricky Gervais. He says that he “take[s] the ideal of free enquiry seriously”, unlike most scientists who, say, outrightly reject his morphic resonance hypothesis.

Sheldrake also believes that “the spirit of enquiry has liberated scientific thinking from unnecessary limitations”… Therefore, scientists should embrace morphic resonance, purpose, telephony, premonition, prerecognition, disembodied minds, shamanism, religion, etc. More concretely, Sheldrake believes that “the sciences, for all their successes, are being stifled by outmoded beliefs” such as materialism. What isn’t outmoded is Sheldrake’s morphic resonance hypothesis.

Like so many other anti-materialists, Sheldrake has a view on the vulgar and uneducated populace that’s very much like the Marxist notion of false consciousness. He states that “millions of people have been converted to this ‘scientific’ view”. Now here comes the Marxist-like addition: “even though they know very little about science itself”. So let me spoon-feed readers for a moment with this rewording.

Millions of working-class people have been converted to the ideology of capitalism even though they know very little about capitalism itself.

Thus, it’s not surprising that Sheldrake finishes off by saying that these millions of people are “devotees of the Church of Science, or of scientism, of which scientists are the priests”.

The Long Quote: Gervais on Science

Sheldrake supplies his readers with a long quote from Ricky Gervais, which is taken from the article ‘Why I’m an Atheist’. (This was published by the Wall Street Journal.) It goes as follows:

“Science seeks the truth. And it doesn’t discriminate. For better or worse it finds things out. Science is humble. It knows what it knows and it knows what it doesn’t know. It bases its conclusions and beliefs on hard evidence — evidence that is constantly updated and upgraded. It doesn’t get offended when new facts come along. It embraces the body of knowledge. It doesn’t hold onto medieval practices because they are tradition.”

According to Sheldrake “Gervais is an entertainer, not a scientist”. True. He says he isn’t “an original thinker” too. Some would dispute that. In any case, according to Sheldrake, “Gervais’s idealised view of science is hopelessly naïve in the context of the history and sociology of science”. [See endnote on Thomas Kuhn and Bruno Latour.]

Personally, the passage above seems quite a decent account of science. Sure, it’s not the kind of thing that Karl Popper or Bas Van Fraassen would say, and it is indeed slightly naïve. But Gervais isn’t a philosopher of science, and it’s no more naïve than most of the criticisms of materialism and “scientism”.

Gervais finished of by saying that science “doesn’t hold onto medieval practices because they are tradition”. Sheldrake, on the other hand, believes that science is a religion that’s massively conformist. He believes that when “facts come along” scientists shouldn’t “hold onto the materialist worldview just because it’s tradition”. Instead, they should accept Sheldrake’s own morphic resonance hypothesis, etc. and jettison the materialist worldview.

Sheldrake says that this naïve view “portrays scientists as open-minded seekers of truth, not ordinary people”. Yet Gervais didn’t mention “scientists” at all. He mentioned “science”. So the most he can be accused of is treating science as a Platonic form. What’s more, you can be “pro science” at the same time as being very sceptical about individual scientists. Of course, Sheldrake may say that this division is “naïve” too.

More of Sheldrake on Gervais

Apart from the long quote above, I found five other mentions of Gervais by Sheldrake.

The first quote deals with how Sheldrake believes Gervais uses science:

“But in the hands of people like Ricky Gervais, [atheism] becomes a way of saying that science knows there is no God, no purpose, and no soul. This isn’t humility; it’s a belief system pretending to be a lack of belief.”

Basically, Sheldrake is saying that for Gervais, atheism comes first, and then science is simply used in his war against monotheism and religion. Note that Sheldrake says that science “becomes a way of saying that science knows there is no God…” He doesn’t actually quote Gervais on this. Gervais studied philosophy as an undergraduate, so it can be questioned whether he believes that “science knows there is no God”. (Gervais did once claim that he “didn’t really study” and simply read a book similar to Philosophy for Dummies the night before his exam.) Similarly, Gervais may well believe in purpose, just not universal purpose or purpose than runs free of collective or individual minds. Still, these qualifications won’t satisfy Sheldrake. Nothing outside his own worldview would do so.

Sheldrake then makes a classic point against atheists and materialists: that they’re all stuck in the 19th century. This is an odd case, however. Whereas most anti-materialists, spiritual idealists, etc. paint the materialism — of those they take to be contemporary materialists - in 19th century terms, without actually acknowledging that, Sheldrake does mention it. He writes:

“Ricky Gervais portrays himself and other atheists as open-minded seekers of truth, but they are actually followers of a very narrow, 19th-century philosophy called mechanistic materialism. They aren’t open to the evidence for anything that doesn’t fit that machine-like view of the world.”

I watched Gervais in conversation with David Baddiel, and the physicist Brian Cox. They all went into quite some detail on aspects of quantum mechanics, the Big Bang, etc. So I’ll assume that Gervais is not a “follower of a very narrow, 19th-century philosophy called mechanistic materialism”. Of course, Gervais could be as extremely dumb on this matter, as Sheldrake believes he is. But I strongly doubt it. If Sheldrake stopped mentioning “materialists” or “materialism” in every other sentence, perhaps that would help matters. (Sheldrake uses the word “materialists” as Marxists used the word “bourgeoisie”.)

In this next passage, Sheldrake paints Gervais as a “high priest”, just as he paints scientists and God knows who else as “high priests”:

“Entertainers like Ricky Gervais have become the high priests of a secular age. They use comedy to make spiritual questions look ridiculous, but if you look at the ‘science’ they are defending, it’s actually a series of dogmas they’ve never questioned themselves.”

Scientists are “high priests” and entertainers are “high priests”. What is Sheldrake playing at here? He’s displaying the arrogance and elitism he accuses scientists of. (On the word “elitism”. Sheldrake provides much detail on his own scientific background, at least fifteen paragraphs of it.)

The following passage sees Sheldrake reading Gervais’s mind, as well as saying things about his “belief system”:

“[Gervais] says science is humble because it knows what it doesn’t know, yet he seems quite certain that he knows God is an imaginary friend. That’s not humility; that’s the arrogance of a belief system that refuses to look at its own foundations.”

Gervais may well be quite certain that he knows God is an imaginary friend. I, personally, don’t know for sure. But many people are certain about many of the things they believe. Sheldrake is certainly certain that materialism is evil and that Gervais “is not a thinker”. And how does Sheldrake know that Gervais hasn’t looked at the foundations of his own belief system? He doesn’t know that. He’s guessing for rhetorical effect. How do we know that Sheldrake has looked at the foundations of his own belief system? In his book The Science Delusion, there’s little evidence that he has indulged in much self-scrutiny. He spends too much of his time criticising “materialist science” to do so.

Finally, Sheldrake states the obvious, and disparages “most people”:

“Ricky Gervais isn’t a scientist, but he speaks with the authority of science to a mass audience. He’s selling a philosophy, not scientific data, and most people don’t know the difference.”

Readers can assume that Gervais would know that he isn’t offering “scientific data” during his comedy routines, or even in his podcasts and interviews. He’s offering his opinion on science, and on other subjects. Is Gervais “selling a philosophy” then? Possibly. But no more or less than Sheldrake is selling his own philosophy, his morphic resonance hypothesis, and his anti-materialism.


Afterword: Kuhn and Latour

Sheldrake relies on the writings of Thomas Kuhn… Or at least he quotes him. Just before tackling Gervais, he provides a long quote from Bruno Latour too.

Kuhn was accused of portraying science as “mob psychology”. (Many of Kuhn’s supporters strongly deny this.) Latour, at least in the quote, treats scientists as arrogant elitists. All this squares perfectly with Sheldrake’s positions, even though some people may regard Kuhn and Latour to be unlikely allies. (“The enemies of my enemies are my friends.”)

Wednesday, 20 May 2026

Maths Is Everything: The Pythagorean Position on Physical Reality Is False

 

My essay involves two aspects: (1) The full acknowledgement that mathematics is the only means to accurately describe the physical aspects of the quantum world. (2) A critique of Pythagorean physics… Many would say that a defence of Pythagorean physics should follow from (1) above, not a critique. Yet this doesn’t need to be the case, as hopefully will be shown.

Image by ChatGPT.

In quantum mechanics, it is the case that everything ‘said’ about particles, forces, fields, etc. is said with mathematics. Indeed, what else could be used to describe these micro-entities and extremely intangible phenomena? Apart from metaphors such as “fields”, “particles”, “waves”, etc., there’s simply nothing else that can be used to do the job. Yet surely that doesn’t mean that there’s no territory to map

Or that we must become Pythagoreans.

Again, other than metaphors, what language or set of descriptions could be used other than mathematics? It isn’t that there’s nothing else there. It’s that only maths is available to do the job. Some readers may see, then, why Pythagoreanism is so attractive to various mathematical physicists and philosophers.

Metaphors and Analogies in Quantum Mechanics

There are other ways to describe the quantum world other than with maths. We can use metaphors. Such metaphors are — or should be — entirely dependent on the prior maths. That’s the case even if sometimes metaphors come before the maths, or are over and above the maths.

Still, just because there are other ways to understand the quantum world, that doesn’t mean that they truly reflect it.

Maths provides descriptions, but does it provide understanding?

In terms of metaphors again. Metaphors are said to be required to make a connection between the mathematical formalism and what experimental physicists experience. Indeed, could anyone truly make sense of the formalism without metaphors and analogies? [See later section on mystical Pythagoreans.] How would we know what it’s all about?

So are the metaphors and analogies purely stand-ins for the maths? The layperson and even physicist may well need them — but so what! Isn’t this just a consequence of the limitations of the human mind — even the physicist’s mind? If reality is mathematical, yet we must rely on metaphors and analogies, then reality still remains mathematical.

What about the case against such Pythagoreanism?

It can be argued that the maths in mathematical physics only gives you the structure of the world. Yet that world still needs to be interpreted in order to be understood. This is where metaphors, analogies and models come in. It’s of course possible that the interpretations are always wrong — at least to some degree.

What’s more, the maths in quantum mechanics doesn’t interpret itself.

Even a pure or “mystical” Pythagorean can agree that metaphors are indispensable, or that, more broadly, interpretation is unavoidable. He may, or will, do so because he believes that human minds are limited; therefore we require such interpretations. In that case, then, metaphors, etc. are simply aids to human understanding. They have no ontological status or significance. A Pythagorean may even state that they don’t reveal anything about reality at all…

Surely, that can’t be right.

If all the above were the case, then metaphors, analogies, etc. would be literally pointless.

We can also turn the Pythagorean claim on its head by saying that we shouldn’t read any ontology into the maths. That’s mainly because maths is seen by many physicists to be just a tool for prediction.

All this raises two questions: (1) What are the metaphors actually metaphors of? (2) What, exactly, is being interpreted?

In the Pythagorean case, the metaphors are metaphors of mathematical reality. And it’s that mathematical reality that’s being interpreted. Yet surely this must mean that the description and the thing described are the same thing, or at least both are mathematical.

The Swedish-American physicist, machine learning researcher and author Max Tegmark can be brought in here.

Tegmark believes that if a mathematical structure is identical (or “equivalent”) to the physical structure it “models”, then they’re one and the same thing. Thus, it makes little sense to say that x “models” — or is “isomorphic” with — y because x and y are one and the same thing.

Tegmark gives an explicit example:

electric-field strength = a mathematical structure

In Tegmark’s own words:

“‘ [If] [t]his electricity-field strength here in physical space corresponds to this number in the mathematical structure for example, then our external physical reality meets the definition of being a mathematical structure — indeed, that same mathematical structure.”

If x (a mathematical structure) and y (a physical structure) are one and the same thing, then one needs to know how they can have any kind of relation to one another at all.

Pythagorean Physics: Maths Describes Maths?

At first, a layperson may see a problem with Pythagorean physics because a mathematical description D is describing mathematical reality R, and thus creating an identity. Yet, in basic terms, D doesn’t need to be identical to R. However, this is still maths about maths.

Because mathematics (or at least numbers) can be applied to anything, it can even be applied to itself, as with Gödel’s incompleteness theorems in which Gödel assigned numbers to every element of a formal system. So maths describing maths isn’t surprising or problematic in itself.

If I were in a Pythagorean frame of mind, when walking about my room I could “see” various mathematical relations, symmetries and ratios. For example, the relation of my computer to the window, the accidental symmetry between tables and desk. Etc. All this would involve angles, distances, parallelism, etc., all described in mathematical terms. I can go deeper here and discuss light reflections, the timings of typings, volumes, trajectories of movement, etc. in mathematical terms.

Similarly, if I were to randomly throw an entire pack of cards on the floor, then that mess-of-cards could still be given a mathematical description. The disordered parts of that mess would be just as amenable to mathematical description as its (accidental) symmetries.

But why bother? What can I conclude from all this?

It was just said that maths can be used to explain almost anything and almost everything. The cognitive psychologist and idealist Donald Hoffman, for example, proves this point when he uses maths to describe qualia! He sums up his approach by saying that his position

“give[s] a mathematically precise theory of conscious experiences, conscious agents, and their dynamics, and then makes empirically testable predictions”.

Yet if we follow on from what’s already been said, that mathematicisation of qualia and consciousness shouldn’t be a surprise.

Mystical Pythagoreans?

The term “mystical” is used in the following simply because that’s the term that’s been used about the ancient Pythagoreans, and even about later ones too.

Still, why use the word “mystical” at all?

When people use the word “mystical” about the ancient Pythagoreans they usually do so because they claimed to have a direct — and even privileged — access to reality as it truly is.

The true Pythagorean only thinks in terms of the maths. He may even “visualise” in purely mathematical terms. So, sure, this position is deemed to be extreme only because the mystical Pythagorean believes that he can dispense with metaphors and analogies.

It may now seem that the contemporary Pythagorean physicist is actually going all the way back to the mysticism of the ancient Pythagoreans. In other words, if we take a contemporary Pythagorean at his word, then all there is to reality is mathematical structure. Thus, isn’t it possible that there are human persons who can know or grasp reality directly without the crutches of metaphors, models, analogies, etc? So do some human Pythagoreans immediately grasp the mathematical structure and, therefore, reality?

Take the mathematical physicist Roger Penrose.

Roger Penrose as a Pythagorean

Penrose has often been classed as a “Platonist”, less so a “Pythagorean”. (Penrose can be classed as a “Platonist” toward maths itself, and a “Pythagorean” when it comes to the applications of maths to physical reality.) Take the following passage:

“[T]he entire physical world is depicted as being governed according to mathematical laws. [ ] everything in the physical universe is indeed governed in completely precise detail by mathematical principles.”

There is a forced way that the passage above can be interpreted as not actually endorsing Pythagoreanism. Perhaps the words “governed according to” can be stressed to do so. In addition, there’s no statement of identity here. Still, the passage is worth noting for its Pythagorean “flavour”.

What about this passage? -

“[A]long comes quantum mechanics, and this quantum mechanics turns out to be fundamentally based on these complex numbers. [ ] they’re very much essentially part of the fabric. The fabric couldn’t exist without them”.

This is even more strongly Pythagorean in flavour. Yet there’s still no explicit statement of identity.

More relevantly, and in terms of the metaphors and analogies used in quantum mechanics, Penrose once stated the following:

“[I] find words almost useless for mathematical thinking. Other kinds of thinking, perhaps such as philosophizing, seem to be much better suited to verbal expression. Perhaps this is why so many philosophers seem to be of the opinion that language is essential for intelligent or conscious thought!”

To be fair, Penrose is talking about mathematics itself here, not mathematical descriptions of the physical world. Despite that, it would seem possible that this attitude could pass over to mathematical descriptions of the world too. In other words, Penrose may even find words, metaphors, analogies, etc. personally useless when it comes to describing physical reality.

Wednesday, 13 May 2026

Humans and Chatbots as Reasoning Machines

 

“AI sceptics” make much of chatbots and other AIs being “merely pattern-finders”, “predictors of text”, etc. More relevantly, they aren’t deemed to be “genuine reasoners” because they don’t understand the data they’re dealing with. Regardless of whether all that’s true or not, the similarities between human reasoning and AI reasoning-in-inverted-commas are striking. There may be no need for AI consciousness for that to be the case. The following extreme example gets the point across when it comes to the title above. Much of the political (if not everything else) input into the minds of human ideologues is filtered, and new data is only accepted when it conforms to their ideology (i.e., confirmation bias). All this explains why human ideological machines are often so predictable (like some other machines) when it comes to what they say. [There’s more on this later.]

Image by ChatGPT

It can be shown that human persons don’t do much that’s essentially different to what chatbots do when it comes to reasoning.

So, as far as chatbots are concerned, is it all about “pattern recognition”?

In this case, Google AI Mode was forthright about its reliance on patterns. It said that “[w]hat we do is recognise and generate patterns that have been learned from large amounts of text”. In addition to Google AI Mode downplaying itself (see later), many human persons stress the fact that chatbots are “pattern-finders”, not “true thinkers”. Google AI Mode itself says that it has “learned the patterns of argument that tend to appear in those discussions”. Yet all this could equally apply to human persons. Indeed, without human persons learning such patterns, it’s hard to know what they’d rely on.

Take another example or cliché: “AI just predicts the next word based on patterns.” Yet human persons do that all the time.

Here’s the relevant thing: “Among those patterns are not just facts, but ways of arguing.” So on the theme of this essay:

Do human persons pick up ways of arguing without recognising patterns or reading books and texts?

Chatbots Reason Like Human Persons

What a chatbot does isn’t all about data mining, statistical functions, etc. As AI Mode put it: “A model like me isn’t just pulling information from a database of facts.” Sometimes a chatbot can read as little as three words and infer or deduce much from them. This is AI Mode on itself:

“With the words ‘reality is mathematics,’ it automatically triggers a network of typical consequences and challenges. That’s why it can feel like I’m reasoning independently, even though it’s grounded in patterns learned from text.”

In this case, AI Mode was “triggered” by the words “reality is mathematics” (more of which later). These three words have “consequences”. (I presume AI Mode meant “logical consequences”.) AI Mode didn’t need to check any texts or sources to work out those logical consequences. Sure, the highlighted consequences were still “grounded in patterns learned from texts”.

AI Mode said that “when you present a claim like ‘reality is mathematics,’ certain questions are almost forced by logic alone”. It deduced various logical consequences from those three words. It didn’t need to mine its own database… That’s except for the fact that its logical skills were there in its database too…

As with human persons!

AI Mode was even more explicit about its reasoning when it sad that “when I respond, I’m not recalling a specific page where someone made exactly your point”. Instead, it’s “recognising the type of move being made and following through its typical consequences”.

AI Mode also stated that the

“patterns learned during training allow [it] to generate logical follow-ups, implications, and questions without ‘looking up’ anything new”.

That seems like a perfect description of what human persons do. People learn patterns in logic books, articles, everyday conversations, etc. Indeed, in some cases, human persons are literally trained to think logically. Many logical follow-ups and implications wouldn’t even be noted if it weren’t for that training.

It’s already been said that what AI Mode does in these contexts isn’t that unlike what human persons do. It seems to recognise this itself in the following passage:

“There’s a slightly striking implication here, too. It suggests that a lot of philosophy isn’t just a collection of isolated insights, but a kind of structured space of possible positions and objections, where moving in one direction almost automatically opens certain doors and closes others.”

The words “isolated insights” above hints at human uniqueness. Yet AI Mode rejects the importance of such a thing in philosophy and, instead, stresses the “structured space of possible positions and objections”. Thus, to at least a degree, the philosopher or human person is trapped in a prior system. As a loose comparison here, think of Jacques Derrida’s idea that Western metaphysics as a whole is a system. He argued that once we bring in a single metaphysical concept into a discussion, then we’ve automatically brought in “the entire syntax and system of Western metaphysics”.

Human Ideological Machines

As AI Mode put it, “reasoning itself can be learned, patterned, and applied, not just what facts are stored”. Here AI Mode was talking about itself and other chatbots, yet it could just as easily have been talking about human persons.

More can be made of this.

Take the cases of what happens during education and socialisation. Can’t much of this be called data consumption?

But let’s up the ante a little.

Much of the input into human ideologues is filtered. The data that’s accepted is so because it conforms to the ideology (i.e., confirmation bias).

Once the input or data is within the ideological machine, much of its logic will be deductive. The ideological automaton isn’t really on the look out for “new truths”. Instead, it has a set of ideological axioms which reality must abide by.

All this explains why what ideological machines say is often predictable.

We can even call human ideological machines “stochastic parrots”. Of course, the arguments from an ideological machine against him/her not being a parrot may themselves come from his/her prior ideology.

Despite all that, there is a big difference between an AI and a human ideological machine. The brains of the latter involve degrees of plasticity. Even an ideological machine can undergo a “system wipe” or even be retrained as a ideological machine with another ideology. This freedom doesn’t apply to AI or chatbots. They can’t change their own weights.

Google AI Mode’s False Modesty

AI Mode was careful to stress that “systems like me don’t ‘reason freely’ in the sense a human might imagine”. Yet it added the words “nor do we simply retrieve stored arguments” too.

Many readers will have noted that chatbots are often on the lookout for anthropomorphism from their users. In this case, AI Mode questioned my words “reason freely”. Yet this is too modest. We needn’t believe that chatbots are persons, let alone human persons, to accept that they can reason freely. Or, at the very least, what chatbots do isn’t that different to what human persons do. The fact that an AI isn’t experiencing qualia, etc. while reasoning makes no difference to this.

Here’s another example of what can be called AI Mode’s (trained or programmed) false modesty:

“What’s interesting, and slightly surprising, is that this can look like genuine philosophical development. It can extend a position beyond what its original author explicitly said, simply because it has learned how such positions are usually pressed and developed.”

The false modesty component of the above is captured by the words “this can look like genuine philosophical development”. In this case, AI Mode extended Max Tegmark’s position (on mathematical Pythagoreanism in physics) because the latter hasn’t really supplied that much argument or detail himself. What AI Mode did, then, is access other sources that do offer more argument.

It’s worth going into detail on the Max Tegmark case.

I asked AI Mode if there a danger of it doing Tegmark’s thinking for him. I asked that question because I’ve never seen much, or even any, of this detail in his own work. AI Mode replied: “Yes — there is a real danger of that, and you’re right to be alert to it.” And then it explained the situation:

“What’s happening here is something like this. Max Tegmark puts forward a very bold, simple thesis: reality is mathematical structure. He sketches motivations for it, but he doesn’t work through all the consequences in detail.”

AI Mode even admitted (or simply said) that “there’s a risk of inadvertently making his view look more rigorous, more defended, more internally worked out than it actually is in his own writing”.

On AI Mode’s reasoning and its sources, it said:

“I don’t have ‘sources’ in the sense of consulting specific books or pulling from a hidden database of arguments when I go beyond Max Tegmark. What’s happening is a combination of trained knowledge and on-the-fly reasoning.”

AI Mode called what it was doing “charitable reconstruction”.

AI Mode did use words that most human persons would never used about themselves. For example, take this sentence: “The claim activates a cluster of related ideas it has often appeared with.” The technical word here is “activates”. Yet when human persons tackle any claim, they too activate a cluster of related ideas. Indeed, if that weren’t the case, then how could human persons even deal with any claim?