Saturday, 14 November 2026

When Chatbots Win Arguments: AI and Argumentation

 AI systems have moved from mining data and facts to winning arguments. This essay describes the work done to achieve this.

When Chatbots Win Arguments: AI and Argumentation
Photo by the author. Source here.

Douglas Adams’ Reason Software

To get the point across about AI and argumentation, Gilead Amit (in ‘Computers that can argue will be satnav for the Moral Maze’ for the New Scientist) mentions Douglas Adams’ novel Dirk Gently’s Holistic Detective Agency. This novel features computer software called Reason, which is used for nefarious purposes by the Pentagon. (How predictable.) Amit concludes:

“We’re not quite there yet. Machines have beaten us at logical games like Go and games of bluff and chance like poker. But no computer has ever come close to beating humans where it counts: in an argument.”

It is that last sentence which stands out. Which adult humans have computers never beaten in an argument? All adult humans? Really? Amit wrote these words in 2016. So, to give him the benefit of the doubt, AI has moved on tremendously in the last ten years or so. That is said because chatbots nowadays can indeed win arguments with adult humans. Of course, it may depend on what the word ‘win’ means here. In other words, sometimes it’s hard to say just who has won, or even if winning is always important.

We can bring in the cognitive scientists Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber here. (Specifically, their “argumentative theory of reasoning”.) Sperber and Mercier argue that human reason didn’t evolve to help us find “the solitary truth”, but rather as a social tool to persuade others, as well as to evaluate the arguments made by others.

To be a sceptic about AI for a moment. If AI systems argued/debated to win, then surely that would be a bad thing. Indeed, Douglas Adams’ Reason software would have been made flesh. This is the reality behind this fictional software:

  • Decide the conclusion: You specify in advance what conclusion you wish to reach.
  • Find the facts: You feed facts into the program.
  • Generate arguments: The software constructs a series of logical steps to connect the premises to your conclusion.

On a related theme. Amit quotes the computer scientist Noam Slonim:

“‘A lot of the questions we encounter in life are not factual. Questions where there is no one clear answer.’”

This seems to apply to winning arguments too.

Amit also tells his readers that a “full-blown argument machine sounds as implausible as Douglas Adams’ tongue-in-cheek Reason software”. He then concluded:

“It seems hard to believe that anyone would trust a machine to tell them, say, how to vote, or suggest what they should think about a certain issue.”

Why is Amit assuming that a machine will literally tell people how to vote? Surely it will (or it should) only offer arguments as to why someone should vote in a particular way. It needn’t literally tell them. Amit himself sees this when he then uses the word “suggest” (as in “suggest what they should think about a certain issue”) in a slightly different context.

Where To Find Arguments

It may be surprising to find out where certain AI researchers have gone to find “good arguments […] to use to train an AI to argue as we do”. In this particular case, the computer scientist Chris Reed’s “favourite source is the BBC radio show Moral Maze, in which panellists debate the ethics of an issue of the day”. Why that show? It’s because of its “quasi-legal cut and thrust, laced with appeals to our emotions”. It’s not the case that Reed has become completely reliant on the BBC’s Moral Maze, only that he has analysed its debates “to build a general framework for the essence of human argument”.

In terms of detail. It was in July 2012 that Reed’s team “performed their first real-time argument analysis, of a Moral Maze episode on the ins and outs of British colonial rule in Kenya”.

The researchers found good sources elsewhere too. They went to

“online forums [which] contain surprisingly well-structured arguments, despite users being inclined to wear their heart on their sleeve”.

There are many well-structured arguments in some online forums. More so than in many national newspapers or in the House of Commons… Yes, these researchers tried the UK parliament too. Amit says that they are “not good reference material: too much performative swagger and too many procedural interjections and references to previous debates”. Chris Reed himself says: “There is much less quality argument there than you would either expect or hope.”

Why did Reed expect better arguments in the House of Commons?

Whether it’s online debates or debates in the Commons, readers may be wondering about the actual processes used to extract good arguments from all this data. Not much detail is given about this by Amit. What detail he does give is that “[c]laim and counterclaim, and the connections between them, were represented on a giant touchscreen in a form ready to be fed into an AI”.

That’s a little bit helpful, but not much. The reference to “connections between them” certainly needs to be fleshed out. As for the touchscreen, it had “argument maps” on it.

The same point can be made about Ivan Habernal and Iryna Gurevych and their research team. In this case:

“In 2016 they asked nearly 4,000 people to say which of two arguments, each making the same case in different ways, they found the more convincing — and to explain why.”

Again, that’s not very helpful, and neither is Amit’s account of what happened to all this data:

“Over 80,000 responses later, they now have a database that can be used to teach computational systems to rank the arguments they process, and so argue more convincingly.”

How does all that data teach computational systems to rank the arguments they process? How does the AI extract the argument (or argument forms) from all the sentences which include (what Amit calls) “claims”?

Arguments, Not Facts

You can have all the data in the world, and even data that includes human arguments, but readers still need to know what the researchers did with all that. Prima facie at least, it seems like the AI simply represented the arguments and their relations (as well as the relations between premises and conclusions) in a very similar way to how it represents facts and other data.

This is about whether a machine can “graduate from facts to arguments”. Yet aren’t there facts (perhaps loosely construed) about arguments — or at least about argument forms?

Amit knows that in order for

“[a] machine [to be] able to formulate an argument — not just search [for] information [it must] also synthesise [that information] it into more or less reasoned conclusions”.

According to Amit, this would be a “research engine”, not a search engine. That said, a machine can just as easily search for arguments, as Amit shows in his article. After that, the machine can then synthesise those arguments — whatever that may mean.

What Is an Argument?

Amit says that an argument is a “claim backed up by evidence”. That’s a very odd definition of an argument. Even if we focus on arguments in the plural, it’s still an odd definition. (This seems to be an traditional account of a scientific process than a definition of an argument.) However, Amit does say that it’s a “rough answer”. So perhaps it’s only odd to those who’ve read too much philosophy of logic.

The problem with this definition is also one of the problems Amit’s article attempts to confront: the move from fact to argument. After all, an AI has easy access to much evidence, just as it has easy access to many facts. Evidence is never conclusive: it is what is done and said with the evidence. This must apply to what is claimed too.

Amit does add more to his definition. He informs his readers that “the team hopes to shift their focus to flagging up evidence that supports the claim”. So how is the claim “All swans are white” flagged up with evidence which supports it? And is any of this constitutive of an argument?

In terms of evidence. Amit distinguishes “anecdotal data” from “expert testimony”. The aim here is to make an AI “learn how much weight to give [these] different forms of evidence”.

Let’s now give more details on some of the big names in AI and argumentation mentioned by Amit.

Chris Reed, Douglas Walton, and Iryna Gurevych

We do get a basic clue from the computer scientist Chris Reed about the technical aspects of what Amit has discussed. His argument interchange format (AIF) is a language which is used to help machines understand the relationships between premises and conclusions. So here we have something logically concrete: the relationships between premises and conclusions.

Reed deals with computational argumentation too. He founded the Arg-tech laboratory, which builds software to map out human debates.

It’s surely argument forms which must be studied, not arguments in general. The Canadian academic and author Douglas N. Walton (who died in 2020) called them “argumentation schemes”. Apparently, his schemes became the blueprint which AI scientists use today. As it is, Walton himself didn’t initially focus on AI at all.

Douglas Walton did the same as what Chris Reed is now doing with the Moral Maze. He catalogued many everyday and legal argument structures (like “argument from analogy” and “argument from expert opinion”) into forms that computer programmers can translate into code.

The computer scientist Iryna Gurevych carries out what’s called “argument mining”. Argument mining is a subfield of natural language processing (NLP). It extracts and analyises argumentative structures in human languages. By picking out premises, claims, and counter-arguments, it maps out the inferential logic behind human person’s opinions.

Gurevych uses the word “claim”, just like Amit. The AI detects the claim and the premises (which involve data or evidence) which support it. Thus, we have various relationships between claims and premises. How do they relate to one another? Does another claim support or reject the initial claim?

Like Douglas Walton, Gurevych focuses on argument schemes, such as arguments from analogy, cause-and-effect, or expert testimony. Similarly, just as with Chris Reed and the BBC’s Moral Maze, so Gurevych’s team builds Natural Language Processing models which scan vast amounts of text in order to detect whether a sentence is a claim, supporting evidence for a claim, or a rejection of a claim.

Conclusion

It’s worth rounding off this essay by stating that chatbots (or AIs generally) don’t need to instantiate consciousness, display “real intelligence”, be real persons, “genuinely understand”, “know what it’s like” to be a human person or a sex worker, etc. to take part in debates and offer good arguments. Personally, chatbots have often shown me that my reasoning is faulty, not only that my facts are wrong. Surely, this is a good thing.


SHORTS (6): ‘Intertextuality or Philosophy Ex Nihilo?’

 A short analysis and summary of my essay.

Photo by the author. Source here.

Summary and Analysis of ‘Intertextuality or Philosophy Ex Nihilo?’

Central Argument

Paul Austin Murphy explores whether philosophical thought can truly originate from nothing (ex nihilo) or if it is inherently bound to existing texts and ideas (intertextuality). The essay argues that pure aprioristic philosophy is essentially impossible. Philosophers rely on established language, conceptual frameworks, and historical traditions to formulate their ideas. Consequently, even claims of independent or innate philosophical reasoning are rooted in pre-existing texts, vocabularies, and cultural contexts.

Key Distinctions and Themes

1. Radical Views vs. Shared Philosophical Language

  • Alien Philosophy: The text considers whether a completely original philosophy — devoid of links to prior tradition — could exist. It suggests that if a philosophy shared nothing with known frameworks, it would be inscrutable and might not be recognizable as philosophy at all.
  • Shared Language: Even radical schools of thought, such as eliminative materialism or anti-realism, must share language and concepts with their contemporaries to remain intelligible.

2. Intertextuality vs. Escaping the Text

  • Schopenhauer’s Critique: Arthur Schopenhauer criticized philosophers for depending on books rather than direct reasoning, arguing against what he saw as a parasitical reliance on previous works.
  • Intertextuality (Barthes & Derrida): Roland Barthes defines intertextuality as a web of past citations, anonymous formulae, and unacknowledged fragments that form all language. Building on this, Jacques Derrida contends that thinkers cannot step outside these intertextual webs, encapsulated by the notion that “there is nothing outside the text.”

3. Philosophy Ex Nihilo and the “Philosophy Faculty”

  • Bryan Magee’s Claim: Magee claimed to have naturally arrived at Kantian, Leibnizian, and Wittgensteinian questions as a child before reading philosophy.
  • Critique of Inherent Philosophy: The essay examines whether Magee’s experience implies a universal human “Philosophy Faculty” or individual genetic predisposition.
  • Cultural & Historical Limitations: If these questions were innate, they would appear cross-culturally and throughout history without exposure to Western philosophy.
  • Givens vs. Philosophy: While cognitive givens may exist (as argued by Thomas Nagel), empirical research suggests these are typically spiritual, mystical, or theological rather than specifically Kantian or Wittgensteinian. The essay suggests Magee likely reframed his childhood reflections to fit existing Kantian frameworks.

4. The Intertextual Nature of Philosophical Practice

  • Historical Context: Major philosophers developed their ideas directly in response to their predecessors. Immanuel Kant reacted to Rationalism, Empiricism, and David Hume; Schopenhauer built upon Kant and German Idealism.
  • Post-Hoc Independence: Thinkers like Schopenhauer and Ludwig Wittgenstein advocated for independent reasoning, yet both operated heavily on their extensive backgrounds in previous philosophy.
  • Academic Practice: Modern analytic philosophy remains deeply intertextual. Papers regularly cite dozens of existing texts, and students learn to analyze mind or metaphysics by engaging with established figures (e.g., Jerry Fodor or Daniel Dennett).

Concluding Point

The essay concludes that genuine ex nihilo philosophical thought is as unlikely as uncaused mental volition. A philosopher requires concepts, tools, and vocabulary — historically inherited from traditions like Greek philosophy or Judeo-Christian culture — to formulate questions and engage in philosophical inquiry.

Wednesday, 11 November 2026

SHORTS (5) ‘How Jean Baudrillard Tried to Annihilate the World’

 

A short analysis and summary of my essay.

Photo by the author. Source here.

How Jean Baudrillard (the Philosopher) Tried to Annihilate the World

Central Argument

Paul Austin Murphy analyzes Jean Baudrillard’s philosophical attempt to “annihilate the world” through the denial of referential value and philosophical realism. Murphy posits that Baudrillard’s philosophy rejects the idea that language or signs correspond to objective reality, replacing referential meaning with a self-contained system where signs refer only to other signs. According to Murphy, Baudrillard justifies a highly stylistic, ungrounded prose style by asserting that determinacy and the “real” have been eliminated, which ultimately serves a political objective to deconstruct concepts like objectivity, science, and truth.

Key Themes and Important Distinctions

1. Prose Style and Philosophical Framework

  • Style as Philosophy: Murphy notes that Baudrillard’s writing is rhetorical, exaggerated, and complex. Rather than offering traditional evidence or structured arguments, Baudrillard’s approach relies on hyperbole and general assertions.
  • Justification via Indeterminacy: Murphy argues that Baudrillard permits himself this style because his own theory claims that determinacy is dead and that signs operate independently of designated objects. Under this view, prose is not bound to clarify or represent an external reality.

2. The Rejection of Philosophical Realism and Reference

  • The Annihilation of Reference: Murphy highlights Baudrillard’s core premise: “referential value is annihilated.” In traditional language use, words (such as “frog” or “peace”) designate external objects or conditions. Baudrillard contends that signs now only exchange value with other signs within an autonomous system.
  • The Emancipation of the Sign: By severing the link between language and external reality, Baudrillard argues that signs are freed from the obligation to signify real-world entities, resulting in hyperreality and indeterminacy.

3. The Politics of Realism and Discourse

  • Politicization of Objectivity: Murphy explains that Baudrillard views realism not merely as an ontological position, but as a political strategy. Baudrillard holds that any attempt to ground language in an “objective real” is an ideological move designed to legitimize power structures and specific discourses.
  • Postmodern vs. Marxist Perspectives: While Marxists focus on concrete material conditions like labor exploitation, Baudrillard reframes these real-world social conditions as mere systems of signification. In this framework, all disciplines and claims to objective truth are intrinsically political.

4. Philosophy of Science and Logic

  • The Example of Two Atoms: Murphy examines Baudrillard’s discussion of physics and the principle of identity regarding “two atoms… in the same quantitative state.”
  • Convention vs. Reality: Baudrillard uses this scientific concept to argue that science does not discover objective reality; rather, it operates on pre-defined, conventional logic. Scientific explanations merely conform to their own initial definitions, which Baudrillard characterizes as a defensive system designed to preserve authority.

Summary Matrix

Concept Traditional / Realist View Baudrillard’s Position (as presented by Murphy) Language & Reference Words refer to real-world objects, states, or concepts. Signs refer only to other signs within an autonomous structure; reference is dead. Scientific Objectivity Science uncovers objective facts about physical reality. Science is a conventional logic system that conforms to its own pre-set definitions. Realism & Discourse Realism describes the actual world as it exists independently. Realism is an ideological and political strategy to disguise discourse as “objective.”

— By Gemini

Original essay: https://medium.com/paul-austin-murphys-essays-on-philosophy/how-jean-baudrillard-the-philosopher-tried-to-annihilate-the-world-e9424d2f4ec8


Wednesday, 28 October 2026

SHORTS (4) ‘Professor Van Norden, Western philosophy is not racist’

 

A short analysis and summary of my essay.

Photo by the author. Source here.

‘Professor Van Norden, Western philosophy is not racist’

Detailed Summary and Analysis of Paul Austin Murphy’s Essay

Overview and Sectional Breakdown

Paul Austin Murphy’s essay, “Professor Van Norden, Western philosophy is not racist”, is a detailed counter-argument to Bryan Van Norden’s 2017 Aeon article, “Western philosophy is racist”. Murphy structures his response into seven distinct sections:

  1. Professor Van Norden: Introduces Van Norden’s background and rhetorical tone.
  2. ‘Western philosophy is racist!’: Examines the broader context of academic anti-racism and double standards.
  3. Van Norden’s Political Thesis: Analyzes the underlying political objectives of Van Norden’s arguments.
  4. Western Philosophy’s Racist Turn: Critiques Van Norden’s historical narrative regarding Immanuel Kant and G.E. Moore.
  5. Orientalism/Occidentalism: Explores Edward Said’s influence and Van Norden’s treatment of Heidegger and Derrida.
  6. Oriental Occidentalism: Discusses historical non-Western biases against the West.
  7. Conclusion: Addresses academic departmental specialization and institutional politics.

Central Argument

Murphy’s core thesis is that Bryan Van Norden’s critique of Western philosophy is primarily a political intervention rather than a purely philosophical or historical analysis. Murphy contends that Van Norden uses rhetorical claims of “racism” and “xenophobia” to push what Van Norden himself calls a “multicultural manifesto.” According to Murphy, this effort aims to extend progressive ideological hegemony — already established in various humanities disciplines — into traditional Western philosophy departments.

Furthermore, Murphy argues that Van Norden’s account relies on anachronism and selective logic:

  • It evaluates historical Western thinkers using 21st-century sociopolitical criteria while failing to subject non-Western philosophical traditions to identical critical scrutiny.
  • It conflates institutional focus and academic specialization with racial prejudice, treating routine departmental boundaries as evidence of systemic bigotry.

Important Distinctions

1. Politics vs. Philosophy

Murphy draws a clear distinction between academic philosophy as an analytical discipline and political activism aimed at demographic or institutional representation. He argues that the widespread post-modern principle that “everything is political” serves as a self-fulfilling justification for activists to politicize academic subjects. In Murphy’s view, this conflation has led to the “dumbing-down” and ideological capture of university departments, turning intellectual disputes into moralized debates over political purity.

2. Negative Exclusion vs. Positive Orientalism

In examining how non-Western thought is treated, Murphy highlights a double bind in Van Norden’s framework:

  • Negative Exclusion: Dismissing non-Western traditions as non-philosophical is labeled by Van Norden as racist or xenophobic.
  • Positive Orientalism: Approaching non-Western traditions as distinct, valuable, or inherently alternative ways of thinking (as seen in some readings of Heidegger or Derrida) is criticized by Van Norden as patronizing “noble savage” thinking.

Murphy notes that under this framework, Western thinkers cannot acknowledge non-Western thought as fundamentally different without being accused of exoticizing it, nor can they treat philosophy as a specific Greek/European historical development without being accused of exclusion.

3. Orientalism vs. Occidentalism

While Van Norden draws heavily on Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism (Western stereotyping of the East), Murphy introduces the counterpart concept of Occidentalism (non-Western stereotyping of the West). Murphy points out that insularity, ethnocentrism, and anti-foreign bias have historically existed in non-Western societies — such as imperial China’s long-standing view of Westerners as “barbarians” — centuries before modern Western imperialism. Murphy argues that ignoring non-Western Occidentalism while framing all Western insularity as uniquely problematic creates an unbalanced, one-sided narrative.

Significant Examples and Case Studies

  • Immanuel Kant and “Whig History”: Van Norden holds Immanuel Kant and his 19th-century defenders responsible for a racist turn in Western philosophy that excluded non-white traditions. Murphy responds by framing this argument as a classic example of “Whig history” — a biased historical method characterized by present-mindedness, teleology, and moral judgment. Murphy argues that penalizing an 18th-century thinker for failing to adhere to 21st-century concepts of race and anthropology is anachronistic.
  • G.E. Moore’s Comment on Vedanta: To demonstrate modern institutional racism, Van Norden highlights a single off-the-cuff remark by English philosopher G.E. Moore during a meeting of the Aristotelian Society, where Moore joked that whatever Indian philosopher Surendra Nath Dasgupta said about Vedanta epistemology was “absolutely false.” Murphy counters that a single, casual exchange regarding one specific philosopher does not constitute a systematic rejection of Indian philosophy, noting that Moore never wrote on or claimed expertise in Eastern thought.
  • Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida: Van Norden criticizes Heidegger for stating that philosophy is uniquely Greek in nature, and Derrida for remarking during a 2001 visit to China that China possessed “thought” rather than “philosophy.” Murphy points out the irony that even thinkers like Derrida — celebrated for focusing on the “Other” and deconstructing Western metaphysics — are categorized by Van Norden as engaging in positive Orientalism.
  • Departmental Specialization: Addressing Van Norden’s example of a US Midwest philosophy professor who told a student, “This is the intellectual tradition we work in. Take it or leave it,” Murphy compares philosophy departments to other specialized academic faculties (such as Russian Studies, Black Studies, or Subaltern Studies). He argues that every academic department must maintain specific focuses and boundaries, and that declining to expand a department’s scope to include unrelated fields reflects administrative specialization rather than “thinly veiled racism.”

Conclusion of the Essay

Murphy concludes that multicultural and post-colonial frameworks already dominate a large portion of modern university humanities faculties. He asserts that Van Norden’s call for greater inclusion is not merely a request for open-mindedness, but a push to enforce ideological uniformism across the remaining traditional analytic and Western philosophy departments.

— By Gemini

Original essay here: https://medium.com/@paulaustinmurphy2000/professor-van-norden-western-philosophy-is-not-racist-fb3cbf30c39