Saturday 16 March 2024

Why Care About the Contexts of People’s Ideas and Beliefs When Doing Philosophy?

 (i) Introduction

(ii) Two Cases: Immanuel Kant and Philip Goff
(iii) Too Much Context?
(iv) The Objectivity of a Free Market Think Tank
(v) Abortion and the Nazis Again!
(vi) The Nazis Believed Things Which Are True

Did this book go too far in the direction of (1)?

Opening note:

The word “context” will be used in this essay a fair few times. It’s a catchall term for capturing the circumstances, social/psychological backgrounds, historical/social surroundings, etc. which (as it were) give birth to the ideas and beliefs of philosophers and scientists.

However, what follows isn’t going to be sociological, psychological and/or historical in nature. Instead, it’s about the role of context when specifically dealing with the ideas, beliefs and theories of philosophers and scientists.

Ironically (or perhaps not), then, I’m going to be offering arguments (mainly aimed at analytic philosophers) as to why concentrating entirely on arguments may not always be the best — and only — approach when doing philosophy.

Introduction: The Contexts of Discovery

In philosophy, and perhaps generally, should we completely ignore the aetiologies and contexts of scientists' and philosophers’ beliefs, ideas and theories?

One reason it’s unwise to do so is that from the (as philosophers put it) context of discovery and belief we can gain a better understanding of the beliefs and ideas themselves. Thus, the contexts (whether psychological, historical, political, etc.) in these cases would only be a means to a philosophical end.

To put that another way. By learning about contexts, we may actually gain an insight into — and a better understanding of — philosophers’ and scientists’ beliefs and ideas themselves.

What should we make of this context?

Thus, the following binary opposition between

(1) Focussing almost entirely on context (e.g., biography, etc.).
and
(2) Completely ignoring everything except for the actual arguments and ideas of individuals.

must be questioned.

Many (even most) analytic philosophers may well go too far in the direction of (2), whereas many other people go too far in the direction of (1).

Two Cases: Immanuel Kant and Philip Goff

Philip Goff’s ethical and political panpsychism.

I once wrote an essay on Immanuel Kant in which I mentioned his prior Pietistic Lutheranism. Indeed, in that same essay, I also mentioned the English philosopher Philip Goff and his prior politics. [See my Do the (Hidden) Motives of Philip Goff and Immanuel Kant Matter?’.] More concretely, I attempted to tie the prior non-philosophical beliefs, ideas and values of both Kant and Goff to their later philosophical ideas and theories. [See the many essays, papers and books on ‘Kant and Pietism’ here.]

However, in both cases, I didn’t rely exclusively on context. Indeed, context simply served what I took to be a philosophical and argumentative purpose.

More specifically, I used the words “ulterior motives” in the essay on Kant. And I happily acknowledged that I too had an ulterior motive for arguing that Kant had moral — and even religious - ulterior motives for advancing his own philosophies. Indeed, I quoted Kant (more or less) admitting that he had such an ulterior motive.

For example, in The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant wrote the following passage:

[T]here can only be one ultimate end of all the operations of the mind. To this all other aims are subordinate, and nothing more than means for its attainment. This ultimate end is the destination of man. [] The superior position occupied by moral philosophy, above all other spheres.”

This is a long statement that “moral philosophy” should be — or actually is — First Philosophy. In other words, the quote above is an honest acknowledgement by Kant of his own moral — and perhaps religious - ulterior motive. [The mid-20th-century French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas explicitly stated that Ethics is — or at least it should be — First Philosophy. See here.]

Thus, Kant stated that “all the operations of the mind” (including all Kant’s own philosophising in metaphysics, epistemology, etc.) were nothing more than

“means for [the] attainment [of the] ultimate end [of] moral philosophy”.

There’s more — strictly philosophical — evidence of Kant’s religious and moral (as it were) a priori when it came to his attempted destruction of the Ontological Argument for the existence of God.

In this precise technical case, Kant attempted to demonstrate that the word “‘exist’ is not a predicate”. And, by doing so, he believed that the support underneath the Ontological Argument had been taken away. This backed up Kant’s prior (Protestant) Pietism in that “faith” (not proof, evidence or argument) became the true source of his religious and moral belief.

Of course, I suspect that some readers won’t interpret Kant’s words as I’ve just done.

So what about Philip Goff?

Relevantly (or ironically) enough, Goff himself once warned other philosophers and scientists against “believing what they want to believe”. So that’s a good reason to quote a few passages from Goff himself (as found in the book Galileo’s Error):

“I agree on the benefit of panpsychism to eco-philosophy, and have in the past made similar arguments.”
“The terrible mass destruction of forests we witnessed in Brazil in recent years under Bolsonaro, have a different moral character if we see them as the burning of conscious organisms.”
[Panpsychism] entails that there is, in a certain sense, life after death.”

To me at least, these passages speak for themselves.

[There are another ten passages — of a very similar kind — from Goff which can be read in note 1 at the end of this essay.]

So does anyone write anything at all without motives of some kind?

Too Much Context?

Perhaps, then, this may be an argument against even mentioning such a universal — thus, possibly banal — phenomenon. Wouldn’t it be like mentioning the fact that water is wet?

In any case, most people do mention (or simply note) context. Analytic philosophers, on the other hand, generally don’t mention or write about context. (At least that’s part of the self-image of many analytic philosophers.) However, they too must still certainly think about such things.

Perhaps they wouldn’t deny this.

However, they would say that contexts are irrelevant to philosophy itself.

Yet there are, of course, dangers to citing contexts.

Julian Baggini (who’ll be featured later in this essay) picked up on one example. He wrote:

“Have you never, in an immune system-like response, repelled a view that contradicts your own with a ‘they would say that’?”

Thus, if Philip Goff denied (or simply played down) all the contexts I’d highlighted, then all I’d need to say in response is: He would deny that. Wouldn’t he.

Of course, all Goff (or one of his supporters) needs to say back is: Paul Murphy would say that. Wouldn’t he.

More critically, my citations or examples of context may be false. They may be irrelevant. Or, in Baggini’s eyes, they may simply be unfalsifiable.

In any case, the main problem (at least in philosophy) is relying exclusively on contexts, and also drawing too much out of them. Indeed, this approach too can be taken to extremes… as we’ll now see.

Derrida on analytic philosophers and other philosophers.

The following is an extreme example of someone relying on context, biography and someone’s supposed psychology in order to (as it were) escape from argument.

The American mathematician and physicist Alan Sokal, and the physicist and philosopher Jean Bricmont, wrote (in their book Intellectual Impostures) the following words on the French Critic and writer Philippe Sollers:

“Philippe Sollers asserts [] that our private lives ‘merit investigation’: ‘What do they like? What paintings do they have on their walls? What are their wives like? How are those beautiful abstract statements translated in their daily and sexual lives?’

Sokal and Bricmont continued:

“Well! Let’s concede once and for all that we are arrogant, mediocre, sexually frustrated scientists, ignorant in philosophy and enslaved by a scientistic ideology (neoconservative or hard-line Marxist, take your pick).
“But please tell us what this implies concerning the validity or invalidity of our arguments.”

What can you say to people like Philippe Sollers?

Well, Sokal and Bricmont themselves could have responded by stating the following:

I believe that Philippe Sollers’ private life merits investigation: What does he like? What paintings does he have on his walls? What is his wife like? How are Sollers’ psychoanalytic questions translated into his own daily and sexual life?

All this tangentially brings up the subjects of objectivity and bias.

The Objectivity of a Free Market Think Tank

There is a conundrum here, which the English philosopher Julian Baggini captures with his own specific example. He wrote:

“If a free market think tank reports that free markets are a good thing, we might at least question the objectivity of the research.”

However, Baggini concluded:

“Nevertheless, that research should stand or fall on its own merits.”

So surely the context here can’t be irrelevant.

In any case, of course a “free market think tank” would report that “free markets are a good thing”. The clue, after all, is in the words “free market think tank”.

[It can be supposed that — in theory at least— there could be such a free market think tank whose job it was to criticise the free market, question its very existence, etc.]

Julian Baggini

In addition, what did Baggini mean by the word “objectivity”?

To state the obvious. A think tank which criticised this free market think tank wouldn’t be objective either. Similarly, if a free market think tank is by definition lacking in objectivity, then surely the person criticising that think tank is lacking in objectivity too.

What’s more, even if everything this free market think tank states is true, accurate, and evidence-based, its reports and research would still be selective and issue-led. Similarly, a critic of this think tank may also offer truthful, accurate, or evidence-based criticisms of this think tank. Yet he too will be selective and issue-led.

So would any think tank (or any person) be truly objective on this subject? Indeed, what does that word “objective” even mean in this specific context?…

Perhaps all this is precisely why Baggini concluded by saying that “research should stand or fall on its own merits”.

Abortion and Those Nazis Again!

The Nazis are often mentioned in order to place ideas and beliefs in some kind of (very negative) context. In extreme cases, this is — and it should be — classed as Godwin’s law.

Take the following account of this law:

“Godwin’s law, short for Godwin’s law (or rule) of Nazi analogies, is an Internet adage asserting: ‘As an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches 1.”

Indeed, we even have reductio ad Hitlerum:

“Reductio ad Hitlerum [] also known as playing the Nazi card, is an attempt to invalidate someone else’s argument on the basis that the same idea was promoted or practised by Adolf Hitler or the Nazi Party. Arguments can be termed reductio ad Hitlerum if they are fallacious (e.g., arguing that because Hitler abstained from eating meat or was against smoking, anyone else who does so is a Nazi). []

Julian Baggini (again) picked up on this in the case of Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor. He wrote:

“Given that Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor is a Roman Catholic, it comes as no surprise to find that he is against abortion. But it is still something of a shock to hear him compare the termination of foetal life with Nazi eugenics programmes, which he has done on several occasions. In the quote above he even evokes a comparison with the Holocaust with his reference to ‘6 million lives’.”

Two paragraphs later, Baggini concluded with the following words:

“The problem with guilt by association is that it fails to show what is actually wrong with the thing being criticized.”

Yet perhaps things aren’t so simple.

Is there really such a rigid line between using “guilt by association” (or providing some kind of context), and “show[ing] what is actually wrong with the thing being criticized”?

For a start, a Catholic (or even a non-Catholic) may say that Baggini himself was using guilt by association when he wrote the following words:

“Given that Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor is a Roman Catholic, it comes as no surprise to find that he is against abortion.”

Sure, a reader could now say:

But Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor was a Catholic! That’s just a fact.

So what about Baggini’s phrase “it comes as no surprise”?

Again, a reader could say:

Well, everyone knows that the Catholic Church is against abortion. So Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor’s position is indeed “no surprise”.

In any case and as already quoted, Baggini finished off by saying that the

“problem with guilt by association is that it fails to show what is actually wrong with the thing being criticized”.

Yet Baggini himself associates being against abortion with the Catholic Church, and he also fails to show what’s actually wrong with being against abortion…

Well, that’s surely because the chapter these words are taken from isn’t actually about abortion.

That said, the Catholic Church too has provided mountains of (good and bad) reasons as to why it believes abortion is morally wrong. It just happens to be the case that in the example cited by Baggini, Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor did indeed rely exclusively on guilt by association.

So clearly this is complicated.

For a start, there may be very good reasons to associate abortion with what the Nazis did. Yet there may also be very good reasons to reject those reasons. The problem still is, however, that (guilt by) association (or context generally) shouldn’t be exclusively relied on.

The Nazis Believed Things Which Are True

As we’ve seen, Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor mentioned the Nazis. Many people do. Indeed, so too does Julian Baggini. However, Baggini did so in order to get his point across.

Baggini wrote:

“The Nazis were very keen on ecology, forests, public rallies, compulsory gym classes and keep fit. [] Hitler too eschewed meat.”

Thus, those who’re against ecology, vegetarianism, etc. could mention the Nazis and/or Hitler. (In fact they often do!) However, Baggini continued:

“Nothing is bad or wrong simply because the hand of evil has touched it.”

Let’s look at this.

Most (even all) Nazis would have believed that 2 + 2 equals 4. That doesn’t thereby stop 2 + 2 equalling 4. And neither does it make the equation bad.

Yet even outside simple beliefs about arithmetic this logic may still apply.

Perhaps, then, it would be wise to come down somewhere in the middle on this issue.

We shouldn’t believe that if a somehow culpable person states P, then that makes P false — or at least probably false. And neither should we believe P is false — or simply suspect — simply because it was articulated by a person at a certain suspect point in history, or in a certain suspect environment.


Note:

(1) Here are the passages from Philip Goff, which can mainly be found in his book Galileo’s Error:

“My hope is that panpsychism can help humans once again to feel that they have a place in the universe. At home in the cosmos, we might begin to dream about — and perhaps make real — a better world.”
“Could our philosophical worldview be party responsible for inability to avert climate catastrophe?”
“The view of the mystics, in contrast, does provide a satisfying account of the objectivity of ethics… According to the testimony of mystics, it is this realization [“formless consciousness”] that results in the boundless compassion of the enlightened.”
“It is no surprise that in this worldview [“dualism” — Goff says almost identical things about “materialism” in these respects] the act of tree hugging is mocked as sentimental silliness. Why would anyone hug a mechanism?”
“Panpsychism has a potential to transform our relationship with natural world.
[W]e now know that plants communicate, learn and remember. I can see no reason other than anthropic prejudice not to ascribe to them a conscious life of their own.”
[I]t would be nice if reality as a whole was unified in a common purpose.”
“… if they were taught to walk through a forest in the knowledge that they are standing amidst a vibrant community: a buzzing, busy network of mutual support and care.”
[] I also think that [panpsychism] is a theory of Reality somewhat more consonant with human happiness than rival views.”
“For a child raised in a panpsychist worldview, hugging a conscious tree could be a natural and normal as stroking a cat.”

Friday 15 March 2024

Philosophy: My Posts (or Tweets) on X (4)

 (i) Psychedelic Heaven: Psychedelic Hell 

(ii) Roger Penrose 
(iii) Peer-Review My Tweets! 
(iv) “Does God Exist?” “Shut up!” 
(v) Reductionism! 
(vi) Is Panpsychism an Affront to Science? 
(vii) Memorising Poems 
(viii) Epistemology Is…


Rather than reposting stuff, see the original introduction to my series of reposts from X here.


Psychedelic Heaven: Psychedelic Hell

People seem to be divided into two extremes on this subject: (1) Those who believe that if everyone started taking psychedelics, then a universal Utopia would follow within a week or so. (2) Those who believe that psychedelics create eternal hell for all those who take these drugs, and hell in the larger society too…

Sure, these are (slight) exaggerations.

In most of the debates I’ve read and seen, the two tribes talked passed each other. I’m quite boring and unsexy on this. It depends on lots of factors, and on individuals. Personally, I’ve experienced both heaven and hell on psychedelics. That said, even some fans of psychedelics admit that hell is one route that people can go down.

Roger Penrose

I have a hell of a lot of respect for the English mathematician, mathematical physicist, and Nobel Laureate Roger Penrose. He tries his hardest to make his ideas “as simple as possible, but not simpler”. Yet many academics do the exact opposite of this. That is, they make their often banal or simple ideas seem complex and Deep.

All that said, there’s much I disagree with when it comes to Penrose’s ideas and theories. But at least Penrose’s prose makes it possible for me to disagree with him… Not that I understand all the maths!

Peer-Review My Tweets!

I want my tweets (or posts) on X to be peer-reviewed.

So here’s my plan.

I’m gonna get four of my mates (all of whom share most of my beliefs and values), and get them to peer-review them…

That should do the trick!

Shorter

I’m a pluralist, and no one should ever ever ever be allowed to express views which aren’t in support of pluralism.

“Does God Exist?” “Shut up!”

I must confess that I grew bored with arguments both for the existence and for the non-existence of God roundabout the age of 20. This isn’t to claim that I, personally, had “proved” that God exists or that he doesn’t exist. Instead, after hundreds of years or even longer, I simply couldn’t be bothered carrying on being part of that grinding debate.

That may sound smug…

Perhaps it is.

All that said, I suppose that each new generation has to be introduced to very-old debates. And I’m also sure that American analytic philosopher, Christian apologist, and Wesleyan theologian William Lane Craig would crucify me on this subject anyway. (How does Mr Craig fair on non-religious subjects?)

Reductionism!

Most so-called “reductionists” don’t “break the world apart”. In specific cases of scientific theory and experiment, and more generally, scientists break things apart because that’s been fantastically productive in science. However, that’s not “breaking the world apart” in John Gregg’s poetic and rhetorical sense.

Is Panpsychism an Affront to Science?

Samuel posts a few critical words about panpsychism being deemed to be an “afront to science”. Yet he’s affronted by that very “idea” that panpsychism should be an afront to science.

All scientists certainly do not believe that all philosophical positions are an affront to science. Sure, they believe that some philosophical positions are. And panpsychism, at least for some scientists, is indeed such an affront.

Basically, it’s not enough, then, to simply say “philosophy isn’t science”. That’s because scientists already know that. It’s true that some scientists don’t like any philosophy at all! But that’s not the issue here.

So read what scientists actually have to say on panpsychism. What they say be philosophically, scientifically and argumentatively convincing… or it may be crap.

What’s more, panpsychism may (or may not) also be an affront to philosophy itself, and to much else. It depends.

Memorising Poems

Yes, it was the case in England too. I’ve met many people who were forced (or asked?) to memorise poems. I wasn’t. Perhaps that is one reason why I came to write poetry at various points in my life.

I suppose the teachers believed that memorising poems was a sure way of getting their students to get to know and understand poetry. That said, acts of memorisation can often be — literally! - mindless.

Shorter

Oh my God!

This meme has been posted yet again. Richard Feynman’s words, in the form of such Teen Memes, are posted (on X) six times before each breakfast.

Epistemology Is…

I’m not sure that epistemology “has to” do any single specific thing. (Not even “explain errors”.)

One philosopher may see x as being of vital and singular importance in epistemology. But another philosopher may see y (i.e., something very different) as being of vital and singular importance too.

Of course, if epistemology deviates too far from — what? -, then it can’t be epistemology at all… surely.


My X account can be found here.





Tuesday 12 March 2024

Philosophy: My Posts (or Tweets) on X (3)

 (i) Bernardo Kastrup: The YouTube Cult Leader 

(ii) Multiple Philosophy Memes on Twitter/X 
(iii) Is Analytic Philosophy Isolated From Other Disciplines? 
(iv) Stop Getting Nietzsche Wrong! 
(v) The Prose Style of Academics 
(vi) The Context of Discovery and Context of Justification 
(vii) Do You Hate Academics?

Rather than reposting stuff, see the original introduction here.


Bernardo Kastrup: The YouTube Cult Leader

The idealist philosopher Bernardo Kastrup has done dozens — perhaps over a hundred — of interviews on YouTube. Almost all those people who interview him seem to be in awe of the man. They seem starstruck. They very rarely offer any criticisms of his ideas and theories.

On the other hand, Kastrup is virtually ignored by all scientists and philosophers. This works well for his Outsider-With-a-New-Worldview persona. Yet Kastrup is also keen to mention that he’s “engaged” with “professional philosophers”. He has. It’s just that they virtually ignore him in their papers, books, etc. Indeed, I believe that a small number of philosophers have engaged with Kastrup simply because they know that he has a strong, large and dedicated (well) “following”.

That may also explain why he has also abused so many academic philosophers and so many scientists. [See my ‘Bernardo Kastrup: The Idealist Cult Leader Who Endlessly Abuses Others’.] Their supreme fault is that they simply don’t give Kastrup enough — or indeed any — time. However, on YouTube, Kastrup has legions of disciples who state embarrassing things about how they virtually worship every word he utters.

Thus, Kastrup is like a fish out out of water when he ventures outside his own cultish (idealist) echo chamber. And that’s why even Kastrup himself has said (on a number of occasions) that he regretted engaging with various professional philosophers and scientists outside his own charmed circle.

Shorter

Are Big Questions big questions mainly because people keep on classing them as “big questions” — and thus they endlessly discuss them?

What if some Big Questions are bogus questions?

[See my ‘Bogus Philosophical Questions’.]

Multiple philosophy memes on Twitter/X.

This is the gist.

This or that guy is famous. He’s also deemed to be an important philosopher or scientist. Therefore, every single sentence he ever uttered is deemed to be profound, deep, and worth turning into a X/Twitter meme.

So here’s my own quote:

“Pass me that sandwich.”

Eddie Elizabeth Hitler

Is Analytic Philosophy Isolated From Other Disciplines?

All academic disciplines “operate in isolation from all others” — to varying degrees. That’s true of physics, chemistry, economics, and even Critical Race Theory. (Do Critical Theorists spend much time studying physics, the philosophy of science, chemistry, or even history?) However, analytic philosophy alone seems to get it in face (from political activists, academic experts in “Continental philosophy”, etc.) for being “isolated” That’s odd — much analytic philosophy has also been classed as being “scientistic” and “materialist”. Yet it’s hard to be scientistic or materialist without paying at least some attention to scientific disciplines. And that’s exactly what analytic philosophers have done — dating back to, say, the 1920s!

I can hardly think of a single important analytic philosopher who has isolated himself and his work from other disciplines. In late 20th century terms, many analytic philosophers also paid much attention to physics, biology, cognitive science, AI, mathematics, etc.

So perhaps analytic philosophers isolate themselves only from the particular disciplines that their (mainly academic) critics have in mind.

Perhaps analytic philosophers (as a whole) aren’t political enough in the right kind of political ways.

Perhaps they don’t do the same political things that their critics do.

Perhaps they don’t hold the same politics that their critics do.

And perhaps they don’t see philosophy as simply being just another political weapon — as some of their critics do.

Whatever the case, analytic philosophy as a whole has certainly not “operated in isolation from all other” disciplines. Sure, some individual analytic philosophers might have done so. But who cares about that!

Stop Getting Nietzsche Wrong!

“Stop getting Bond wrong!”

— Alan Partridge

Interpreting Nietzsche is like interpreting the Bible: everyone brings his or her own political, psychological, etc. baggage to the interpretation.

There is a war of all against all.

Thus, people get very hot under the collar about certain “readings” of Nietzsche.

Everything just written also applies to Wittgenstein and Derrida. And it’s largely down to the prose styles of these philosophers.

So, as a matter of interest, how would anyone get a philosopher like Nietzsche (or Derrida/Wittgenstein) right?

The Prose Style of Academics… and Postgraduates

A couple of commas would help in the tweet above.

However, this isn’t a case of a quickly-written tweet. You also find it in many published academic papers. In fact, ultra-long sentences are part of the academic style — at least in some disciplines.

Basically, the prose is either a self-conscious style or simply pure pretence — perhaps both.

The Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification

Sam captures the context of discovery and context of justification distinction. It’s not a perfect distinction. And it may well be somewhat of an idealisation or simplification. However, there’s still lots going for it.

In any case, many popular-science writers (though not many scientists themselves) fixate on biography or the context of discovery. And philosophers, not scientists, formulated this distinction in the first place. Of course, most scientists would have been aware of this distinction. However, qua scientists, they’d never tackled it in any great detail.

Do You Hate Academics?

I’m not sure what Kevin M (Kevin Morris) means by “this app”. However, his question “Why the hate?” seems rhetorical.

Does Kevin M mean that he doesn’t understand the criticisms of academics? That he doesn’t agree with the criticisms of academic?

And why use the word “hate” at all?

Does Kevin M hate the “haters”?

He may well say that he doesn’t. In that case, then, perhaps the critics of academics aren’t haters either.

In any case, there are many reasons to criticise (i.e., not “hate”) academics. More accurately, there are many reasons to criticise (many) specific academics about specific issues. Perhaps Kevin M should educate himself about these reasons.

So academics aren’t “just figuring out the nature of things”, as Kevin M claims. In fact, they’re doing all sorts of good and bad things for all sorts of different reasons.

Shorter

Among the many annoying literary tics of the sociologist and political activist Steve Fuller is his tendency to mistake his own rhetorical tweets, and his own obvious political commitments, for Deepness and Profundity.


My X account can be found here.