David
Chalmers' frequent uses of conceivabilities (as it were) or
possibilities irks many scientists and not a few philosophers. What
exactly are we getting from these “thought experiments”? All
sorts of strange and bizarre possibilities, it seems.
David
Chalmers, for example, argues that it's logically possible that
zombies could exist. What do these claims amount to? Do they amount
to much and should we be put-out by them? Bertrand Russell thinks
not. He wrote the following about one well-known logical possibility:
"No
logical absurdity results from the hypothesis that the world consists
of nothing but myself… and that everything else is mere fancy. But
although this is not logically impossible, there is no reason
whatever to suppose that it is true; and it is, in fact, a less
simple hypothesis, viewed as a means of accounting for the facts of
our own life, than the commonsense hypothesis that there really are
objects independent of us, whose action on us causes our sensations."
[1912]
Thus,
when I woke up this morning, it was logically possible that I was
still asleep. When I moved over to the tap, it was logically possible
that poison (not water) could have come out of the tap. If it was
water, it was also logically possible that I might have choked on it. Then I looked out of the window and it was logically possible
that the town I saw in front of me was a projected simulation of what
I had seen the day before. And so on.
Still,
logical possibility excites sceptics and philosophers like
Chalmers. So should I conclude in the same way as Russell above?
Should I say that
"although [they are] not logically impossible, there is no reason whatever to suppose that [they are] true"?
Put
simply: something that's logically possible may not be actual (or the case). Indeed
what's logically possible is often not the case. So why contemplate
the logically possible at all - even philosophically? Where will it
get us?
As
I said, many people are bemused - and sometimes annoyed - by
Chalmers' various “zombie” scenarios. Perhaps that's because they
believe that they involve natural or metaphysical theses; whereas in
fact they're often only about logical possibility.
That
basically means that they're about possibilities - not actualities or realities.
Then again, people already know that there are no zombies. Thus the
logical nature of these thought experiments should already be
apparent.
Zombies
and Conceivability
Prima
facie, conceivability (as Chalmers sees it) isn't as strange or
broad as may be presumed. Chalmers himself says that “a claim is
conceivable when it is not ruled out a priori”. Put simply,
there'll be an indefinite (infinite?) number of scenarios (or claims)
which can't be “ruled out a priori”. Even the
existence of shark with legs or mushrooms with a sense of humour
can't be ruled out a priori. In other words, the only things
which can be ruled out a priori are claims/scenarios which
break known logical laws or which contain contradictions. Thus the
conceivable universe (as it were) could be highly populated with
strange and bizarre entities, conditions, events, etc.
Chalmers
offers his own example of the conceivable. He says that it's
“conceivable that there are mile-high unicycles”.
Again,
what are we supposed to gain or achieve by saying that mile-high
unicycles are conceivable and therefore possible? Where does it take
us?
Conceivability
is strongly tied to Chalmers' scenarios of possibility. Thus:
Zombies
are logically possible because they're conceivable.
Or
contrawise:
If
zombies are conceivable, then they're logically possible.
Of
course that leaves us with questions about this supposedly strong tie
between conceivability and logical possibility.
Kripke
Kripke
said that he was working with his own “Cartesian intuitions” when
he tackled the mind-body problem. It's also fairly clear that
Chalmers has Kripkean intuitions on the same subject.
Kripke
is an interesting philosopher to bring into this debate because,
prima facie, he seems to hold two mutually-contradictory
positions on conceivability (or on the philosophical use of the
imagination).
In
the first instance, Kripke tell us about an act of imagination which
misleads us (metaphysically speaking). He writes:
“...
we thought erroneously that we could imagine a situation in which
heat was not the motion of molecules. Because although we can say
that we pick out heat contingently by the contingent property that it
affects us in such and such way...” [1971]
Imagination
(or what we can conceive), on the other hand, can also tell us
something important (as well as true) about the world. In Kripke's
words:
“[J]ust as it seems that the brain state could have existed without any
pain, so it seems that the pain could have existed without the
corresponding brain state.” [1980]
Thus
Kripke stresses our ability to imagine a pain state without its correlated brain state (usually characterised as the “firing of
C-fibres”). Thus Kripke concludes:
If
we can imagine mental states without their correlated brain states,
then
such states are possible.
Or,
alternatively, Kripke is saying that there's no necessary identity
between mental states and brain states.
Kripke,
on the other hand, also claims that those who imagine heat being caused by
something that's not “molecular motion” aren't really imagining
heat at all. They just think that they are because they've based
their act of imagination on a contingent property of heat – its
affect on persons.
Zombies
and Qualia in Practice
Chalmers
believe that zombies are worth discussing because “there
seems to be no a
priori
contradiction in the idea” of zombies. There's also no a
priori contradiction
in a human having 26 legs; though such a thing won't tell us much. So
it's not just the bare possibility that zombies exist. It's that the
possibility can tell us something about the world.
What's
the link between possibility and actuality? Clearly possibilities can
be a thousand miles away from actualities and the zombie scenario
appears to be a good example of this. However, Chalmers' possible
zombies tell us something about the limits of physicalism.
In
more detail, zombies are, in Chalmers' words, “microphysically
identical to us without consciousness”. Thus:
If
zombies are identical to human beings physically and behaviourally (yet
they don't have consciousness),
then
consciousness must be something over & above the physical.
In
addition, Chalmers explains this disjunction between logically
possibility and actuality (in relation to qualia) in the following
way.
Firstly he says that “absent qualia” and “inverted qualia” are “logically possible”. However, they're still “empirically and nomologically impossible”. In terms of science and the problem of consciousness, it can be intuitively said that if an x is “empirically and nomologically impossible”, then why should we care that it's also “logically possible”? What do we gain (philosophically and perhaps scientifically) from cogitating about scenarios which involve logical possibility yet, at the same time, empirical and nomological impossibility?
Firstly he says that “absent qualia” and “inverted qualia” are “logically possible”. However, they're still “empirically and nomologically impossible”. In terms of science and the problem of consciousness, it can be intuitively said that if an x is “empirically and nomologically impossible”, then why should we care that it's also “logically possible”? What do we gain (philosophically and perhaps scientifically) from cogitating about scenarios which involve logical possibility yet, at the same time, empirical and nomological impossibility?
Chalmers
supports his conceivability arguments by arguing thus:
“If
P & ~Q is conceivable, [then] P & ~Q
is metaphysically possible [as well as being] supported by general
reasoning.”
Is
there such a link between conceivability and possibility? If so, what
kind of link is it? In other words, just as there are arguments about
certain claims being conceivable and therefore possible, is that link
itself grounded in conceivability or possibility (or both)? What is
the nature of the link between conceivability and possibility?
******************************************************
Case
Study: Andalusi Conceives of Allah
Asadullah Ali al-Andalusi (a philosopher at The Andalusian Project) says that the
“mind is capable of imagining and conceiving of possibilities that the external world does not offer through direct experience”.
What
does it mean to “imagine” the possibilities in Andalusi's
argument? When people imagine such things, what, exactly, are they
imagining? Is it the case that this psychological feat means
virtually nothing until we find out what it is Andalusi is imagining?
We also need to know why he takes it to be an imagination of
something real/actual (or even possible), rather than simply
free-standing imaginative act.
There
are naturalist (as well as plain old empiricist) explanations as to
why the mind is “capable of imagining and conceiving of
possibilities that the external world does not offer through direct
experience”. The thing is that the mind doesn't really move beyond
experience in these instances (though it may in others). It simply
plays with experiences and juxtaposes them to create something that
doesn't itself exist in experience.
All
sorts of philosophers have tackled this issue.
Take
D.M. Armstrong's paper 'The Nature
of Possibility' (1986). Armstrong sums up what happens with a
single technical word: 'combinatorialism'. He states, for example,
that “all mere possibilities are recombinations of actual
elements”. Thus we can ask two questions:
i)
What does it mean to
imagine "Allah existing in a place beyond time and space"?
ii)
What constitutes that act of imagination? Was it its content? What is
being imagined?
Andalusi
himself expresses a possible limitation with the combinatorialist
position. He writes:“The idea of something being beyond is not the result of direct experience from the natural world -- rather it is a projection.”
Empiricists
or naturalists have no reason to reject composites or
combinatorialism.
We
can simply say that Andalusi doesn't imagine or conceive such things
in the first place. Sure, he conceives something. Though what
he conceives is not an x "outside time and space".
In
a similar vain, Andalusi writes:
“We can think of Allah being outside time and space (to an extent) and being beyond merciful and beyond kind, etc."
Whatever
goes on in this writer's (or mystic's) mind when he says he can
imagine “Allah outside time and space”, it doesn't mean that he
has literally imagined Allah and his being outside time and space.
His might have simply imagined what he deems to be Allah outside time
and space.
No
one conceives or imagines Allah beyond time and space. That which
they do imagine will be proxies for Allah and a place beyond time and
space. And those proxies may well be derived from our experiences of
the natural world.
Andalusi
also makes a distinction between the words 'conceive' and 'imagine'
He writes:
“Let's not reduce my argument to only one of the terms I used: 'imagination'. I also used the word 'conceive'.”
Despite
that, Andalusi explains a distinction which can be made between
conceiving and imagining. He writes:
“Imagination is the the result of experiences and the minds ability to mold them into different forms or to conclude connections between them. It takes two to tango in this regard. Conception is more abstract and doesn't require external experiences at all.”
Nonetheless,
imagination may still be required to juxtapose (or 'tango' with)
one's 'conceptions'. Even if conceptions (does Andalusi mean
concepts?) are abstract entities, it will still require the
imagination to juxtapose or use them. Allah and a place outside of
space and time aren't themselves deemed to be merely abstract
entities or concepts.
References
Al-Andalusi,
Asadullah Ali. (2015) 'Understanding
Atheism'.
-- (Summer
2015) Some of the quotes from Andalusi came from an online Facebook
debate.Armstrong, D.M. (1986) 'The Nature of Possibility'.
Chalmers, David. (1995) 'Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia'.
-- (1997) The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.
Kripke, Saul. (1971) 'Identity and Necessity'.
-- (1980) 'The Identity Thesis', in his Naming and Necessity.
Russell, Bertrand. (1912) The Problems of Philosophy.
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