Heidegger and Wittgenstein on Philosophy and Ethics
“…a
philosophy which is going to be ethics and metaphysics in one, though
they have previously been so falsely separated, like soul and body.”
(Schopenhauer, 1813/1988)
Heidegger on Ethico-Ontology
“…he
inherited from Hegel…the recognition that an individual life means
very little in isolation, that what we are is defined by our place in
a community and in history. We make our choices only within a social
and historical context, and they have no significance outside such a
context. Thus Heidegger, like Hegel, emphasises the historicity of
Dasein
and the ultimate insignificance of the individual even while he
praises individual resolution. Our resolution is not (as in
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche) one of going against the crowd but rather
of giving it our personal affirmation. Taken as a whole the message
of Heidegger’s philosophy is unabashedly conservative.”
(Continental Philosophy Since 1750: the Rise and Fall of the Self,
166)
Returning
to Heidegger.
Let’s
turn away from Heidegger’s attitudes towards science, etc., which
we covered earlier, and turn instead towards his positions on
philosophy itself.
Heidegger
distrusted traditional western philosophy and what he saw as its
basically Aristotelian urge to trap things in categories.
Essentially, Heidegger’s stance on these issues was ethical,
if not actually or overtly religious/spiritual. Derrida neatly
expresses Heidegger’s fears about, for example, traditional
ontology:
“Incapable
of respecting the Being and meaning of the other…ontology would be
[a] philosophy of violence.” (1967/1978)
Heidegger
himself wrote:
“If
the other could be possessed, seized, and known, it would not be the
other. To possess, to know, to grasp are all synonyms of power.”
(1978/67)
In
the following passage there are further elaborations on the dangers
of an all encompassing “instrumental rationality”:
“…Heidegger
says that when ‘the spirit is degraded into intelligence, into a
tool…the energies of the spiritual process, poetry and art,
statesmanship and religion, become subject to conscious cultivation
and planning’…” (1926/1962)
The
essential ethical or even spiritual pull of such positions can be
more clearly seen if one compares such views to the positions of
(straight) theological writers and philosophers of religion (or
religious philosophers).
For
example, Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) believed that in the “standpoint
of objectivity” one must assume the position of a “spectator”
rather than a “participator”. It will therefore follow from this
that one will also conceive of oneself as external to - and detached
from - the object, person or event under scrutiny (1950). Marcel’s
position is therefore not unlike Wittgenstein’s anti-Cartesian
externalism.
Martin
Buber too expresses a quasi-Wittgensteinian attitude (not unlike the
one above); though this time within a slightly more epistemological
context. (This position too has an ethical dimension that
isn't so explicitly or overtly found in Wittgenstein himself.)
That is, Buber stressed the importance of the “presentness” and
“concreteness” that's clearly apparent when we come across or
scrutinise persons or objects (or, in Buber’s ethical sense, the
“other”). In this externalist manner, Buber believed that one
should stay well clear of the methods and beliefs of the Cartesian
epistemological tradition (in which the subject both is - and is
required to be - purified from external world excrescences
(1990)). That is, the Cartesian epistemic spectator wants to replace
the clear “singularity” or particularity of each unique
interaction with objects, persons or events (1967). However,
“[Reason]
cannot replace the smallest perception of something particular and
unique with its gigantic structure of general concepts.”
(1964, Buber)
Schopenhauer
(who is particularly relevant to this essay) also offers us a
quasi-ethical take on the problems of ontological scrutiny. He
writes:
“To
intuit, to let the things themselves speak to us…only afterwards to
deposit and store this in concepts in order to possess it securely…”
(Schopenhauer, 1813/1969)
The
ethico-religious dimensions of the passages quoted above can also be
contrasted here with Gilbert Ryle’s somewhat ethico-religious take
on the Cartesian individualistic [i.e., subjectivist] philosophy of
mind and also Cartesian internalist epistemology:
“When
the [Cartesian] epistemologists’ concept of consciousness first
became popular, it [was]…in part a transformed application of the
Protestant notion of conscience. The Protestant had to hold that a
man could know the moral state of his mind…without the aid of
confessors and scholars…” (Ryle, 1949)
That
is, just as introspective moral indubitability was needed by the
Protestant to keep himself well clear of Catholic (as well as
Protestant) scholars and other intellectuals, so too was
introspective epistemological indubitability needed by the Cartesian
epistemologist to keep himself clear of the Scholastic philosophical
tradition and the falsehoods of other people and the external world
(amongst other things).
Cartesians,
just like good Protestants, were thoroughly autonomous beings.
Looking
forward, perhaps 20th century “ontology of the social”,
“or social ontology”, has been just a little bit too catholic in
its general attitudes. It's therefore no coincidence that both
Wittgenstein and Heidegger were brought up in Catholic environments.
Though despite the fact, for example, of Heidegger’s semi-negative
attitude towards Thomist- Aristotelian ontology, he still embraced,
at one time, Catholic Scottist ontology. And it's also worth
mentioning here that Wittgenstein had certain strong affinities with
Protestantism, which perhaps can be seen in his less political (than
Heidegger’s) “social ontology” and also in the philosophical
social positions of Wittgenstein that have been and will be commented
upon.
Wittgenstein
and Heidegger’s Ethico-Ontological Particularism
Heidegger,
like Wittgenstein, was what I call a particularist rather than
a generalist. And like Wittgenstein in, say, his Philosophical
Investigations, Heidegger, say, in his Being and Time,
also provided very many particular examples and illustrations (e.g.,
the often-quoted mundane one about a hammer). Indeed Wittgenstein
himself was such a diligent and particular particularist that
he might well have hated my term “particularist” - it too is an
example of a generalisation (i.e., a generalisation about
particularism and, for that matter, generalism). Wittgenstein might
have thought that this term (as he thought with all other ’isms and
’ists) would have somehow trapped his thoughts (or unthoughts) in
its tiny semantic box.
Wittgenstein
once claimed to have never read the arch-generalist Aristotle.
Heidegger, on the other hand, did read the Greek philosopher and in
considerable detail. And from that deep knowledge of Aristotle he
developed a deep distrust of Aristotle’s generalisations and the
general Aristotelian “craving for generality” (Wittgenstein’s
term). Heidegger saw Aristotle’s categorial obsessions as a
desire to “seize…[the] object” (Caputo, 224). That is,
Aristotle and other philosophers used categories and concepts to
“master…[their] material [and] reduce the individual to an
instance of the general” (Caputo, 1998). In so doing, many
philosophers (Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian alike) thought that
they had succeeded in creating a hierarchical relationship between
the “imperfect” and the “perfect” (1998). And, implicitly
(or, sometimes, explicitly), it was always the imperfect (or
particular) that was subsumed under the perfect (or general).
This
is Christopher Norris’s take on Heidegger’s anti-Aristotelian
particularism:
“Language
itself perpetuates the rationalist parcelling-out of experience into
categories like ‘subject’ and ‘object’…the mastery of
nature by reason. To think one’s way beyond such categories is to
ask, with Heidegger, not how
things exist, but why
they should exist in the first place.” (Norris,
1982/1999)
One
can’t help but notice affinities in the above with a famous passage
in the Tractatus:
“Not
how
the world is, is the mystical, but that
it is.” (1921, 6.44)
Heidegger
found a way of thinking that he believed is superior to post-Socratic
and Aristotelian thought. He found it in certain pre-Socratics.
For
example, he might well have been inspired by Heraclites’s teachings
in which processes, rather than discrete things, were
the prime ontological category. In fact Heidegger might have even
seen Heraclites’s position as going against the very idea of
categorisation altogether and not, instead, of mistakenly putting
processes at the top of the ontological hierarchy (as was the case
with A. N. Whitehead).
Heidegger
also thought that the post-Socratics and Aristotle were guilty of
supplanting the “poetic thinking” of the earlier Greeks. So
whereas Heidegger’s great bugbear was Aristotelian
categorisation, perhaps Wittgenstein’s bugbear (as it was with
the logical positivists, etc.) was Hegelian generalisation.
Actually, Wittgenstein did once say:
“Hegel
seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look
different are really the same, whereas my interest is in showing that
things which look the same are really different.” (1946).
Wittgenstein
even criticised Darwin along similar lines. He said that the great
biologist’s evolutionary theory “hasn’t the necessary
multiplicity” (1946). Freud, on the other hand and according to
Wittgenstein, was actually a particularist with delusions of being a
generalist (i.e., a scientist!). Wittgenstein thought that Freud “had
been seduced by the method of science” (1943) and the “craving
for generality”. (Deconstruction also sees itself as defending and
stressing “singularities”.)
Heidegger
too thought that philosophy had “been in the constant predicament
of having to justify its existence before the ‘sciences’”.
Philosophy therefore believed, according to Heidegger, that “it
[could] do that most effectively by elevating itself to the rank of a
science” (Heidegger, trans 1977).
Heidegger
wanted to escape from this science-worship or science-envy and
“return thinking to its element” (trans 1977). Of course such a
return to tribal thought or thoughtlessness, as it were, was, as
Heidegger conceded, almost bound to be called “irrationalism” by
positivistic philosophers (trans 1977). So almost inevitably
Heidegger’s creed was indeed deemed to be a creed of irrationalism
by the logical positivists or logical empiricists. (As well as by, it
must be added, by the English and American analytics who were
themselves under the spell of a – possible? – “verificationist
mis-reading” of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.)
Heidegger
and Wittgenstein on Society
“….
the Greek states, in which every individual enjoyed an independent
existence but could when the need arose, grow into the whole
organism…now made way for an ingenious clockwork, out of the
piecing together of innumerable but lifeless parts, a mechanical kind
of collective life ensues…[the individual] never develops the
harmony of his being…he becomes nothing more than the imprint…of
his specialised knowledge.” (Friedrich Schiller)
Heidegger
hated science-worship and despaired because of what he thought was
the resultant “flight of the gods”. Heidegger essentially looked
back to the pre-Socratics for a vision of “Being” that was
unencumbered by “instrumental rationality”. He had a lot of
admiration for the early Greeks. Indeed the idealisation of the
ancient Greeks was by Heidegger’s day a firmly entrenched
Austro-German custom. Heidegger himself thought, particularly, that
the ancient Greeks didn't experience anxiety in quite the same way
that modern Western man experiences anxiety. The early Greeks,
therefore, had no big problem with the “meaninglessness of life”
(or even the meaninglessness of particular existences). Of course
Nietzsche too (another admirer of the Greeks and also a strong
influence on Heidegger), for example, had many positive things to say
about the ancient Greeks. ⁷
Heidegger
believed that “modern man” suffered from anxiety or angst because
he had a rootless, nihilistic and technological “understanding of
Being”. So, unlike Hegel and, say, 19th century British
Victorians, Heidegger saw the history of the west as a gradual
decline.
Heidegger
also gave his reasons why past eras didn't experience anxiety,
nihilism and the sense of meaninglessness in quite the way that 20th
century man did.
For
example, he thought that the temple, in certain past cultures,
provided an axis around which the rest of society revolved. The
temple gave them rules and regulations on how to live “good lives”.
Later we had the medieval cathedral. This in turn taught the people
the concepts of, for example, salvation and damnation.
In this period everyone knew their place in the “larger scheme of
things” and also knew precisely what they had to do in this
earthly life. However, our own culture has become more and more
inclined to treat all things as “mere objects”. Also, most of
modern man’s moral and social guidelines had been jettisoned. He
didn't know how to behave or even what to think. This was indeed a
state of “nihilism”, according to Heidegger.
It
may well be too easy to take a rather cynical view of Heidegger’s
love for past eras:
“…Heidegger’s
critique of technology and science...[may] sound merely nostalgic for
a shadowy past of natural peasant respect for things and for the
surrounding world…” (Marian Hobson, 1998)
Wittgenstein
too had a similarly negative view of 20th century
existence. He believed that Western culture had lost the cohesiveness
that had existed in the past between different “forms of life”.
The result of this was that generations of Europeans had suffered
from a slow decay: as Heidegger also thought. Indeed Wittgenstein
believed that many 20th century western Europeans
essentially lived in an world without any culture. That is, it was an
age in which everyone had nothing but private ends to work towards.
Wittgenstein,
like many of his predecessors (as well as his contemporary
Heidegger), blamed all the foregoing on the rise of the
scientific-industrial “civilisation”. This was a civilisation
within which there was a naïve and superficial belief that
technological “progress” would solve our physical and spiritual
problems. It was also a civilisation in which people had a somewhat
superficial attitude towards philosophical knowledge.
Early
Wittgenstein believed that much of his philosophy could be used as a
solution to many of these inconsequential forms of thinking and
acting.
Much
of what Wittgenstein believed might well have been influenced by his
reading, in his Tractarian period, of Spengler’s famous The
Decline of the West (1918-22). In this once-popular book it is
stated that in a strong society and culture there must be an equally
strong “public space” in which there would be opportunities for
people to share their beliefs and pursuits; as well as to allow less
direct interrelationships between social areas as diverse as science,
art, religion, social policy and so on. In this Spenglerian society,
each individual happily contributed to many areas of communal
interaction and organisation.
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