P.F. Strawson helped to define the notion of “descriptive metaphysics” and also defend it as an acceptable and feasible philosophical position.
Wittgenstein put the basic position of “descriptive philosophy” in his usual radical way. He believed that such a philosophy basically “leaves everything as it is”. In Wittgenstein’s own version of descriptive philosophy, the only task such a philosophy had (according to the Tractatus and the Wittgenstein of the first half of the 1920s) is to analyse the propositions of the natural sciences. And even then only to analyse and describe such propositions, rather than modify or correct them. Indeed it would be rather unbecoming of the Wittgensteinian descriptive philosopher to correct, modify or alter the propositions given to him by the natural sciences. This was primarily the case in terms of scientific propositions because such propositions would already contain correct and acceptable ‘logical forms’. That is, they abide by the rules stipulated in the Tractatus and by the later Wittgenstein.
Not only does this extremely radical stance leave philosophy with almost nothing to do; what it does do can be done equally well by logicians, mathematicians and scientists; along with linguists or even empirical lexicographers, etc.
Wittgenstein, L. (1922) Tractatus
-- (1951/53) Philosophical Investigations