Comments on Dennett's *Intuition Pumps*: Zombies & Thought Experiments (2)

This is a short response to the 'Zombies and Zimboes' chapter of Daniel Dennett's book, Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking.

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For Dennett, the main point of what he calls a “zimbo” is that there's no way of knowing if it instantiates  - or doesn't instantiate - experiences or consciousness. And if there's no way of knowing that (at least according to Dennett's behaviourist and verificationist logic), then why deny less to the zimbo than one would do so to a human being?

There's a problem here.

If Dennett's zimbo were literally identical - in every respect - to a human being, then how could we say that there's either something less - or something more - to it? And that's because we could - or would - never know that we were actually confronting a zimbo. However, this point, of course, is part of the point of the thought experiment... a thought experiment which is itself a response to other philosophers' thought experiments.

Yet Dennett doesn't like thought experiments in philosophy. Or at least he doesn't like many of them.

Thought Experiments

Many thought experiments can irritate people – even philosophers. Then again, thought experiments certainly serve some purpose.

Dennett has a big problem with David Chalmers and his (philosophical) zombies. Many other philosophers and laypersons do too.

It all stems from the philosophical move from conceivability to possibility (as with Descartes' Cogito). This is central to Chalmers' work on zombies, panpsychism and all sorts of other stuff. As stated, it tends to become a pain in the arse.

Nonetheless, thought experiments have certainly been very important in physics - or at least in theoretical physics. Then again, many historical thought experiments in physics later came to be backed up by experiments, predictions, tests, and/or observations. This isn't the case when it comes to (most/all?) philosophical thought experiments; which, almost by definition, can never be confirmed or dis-confirmed. That is, they seem to be designed to have no experimental or observational component. In any case, that's certainly true of zombie thought experiments.

In that respect, then, the well-known and ironic question

"How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?"

seems to be more acceptable and productive than some of these thought experiments. 

Wittgenstein's Doubts About Doubt

In this piece Ludwig Wittgenstein is taken to be a “anti-philosopher”. More specifically, the following tackles Wittgenstein's position on philosophical doubt – or at least on what's often called “global scepticism” (or “universal scepticism”). (Other philosophers who've been classed as anti-philosophers include Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida.)

Like many of Wittgenstein's other positions, this is the Austrian philosopher's critique of a central tradition (dating back over two millennia) within Western philosophy.

Along with Wittgenstein's position on doubt, his position on language games will also be discussed. Indeed the two positions are tied together in various ways. The most important way doubt and language games can be tied together (at least within this context) is by seeing doubt itself as a (philosophical) language game. Oddly enough, Wittgenstein didn't seem to hold this position.

Throughout the following I'll also be bouncing off the words of Professor Sophie-Grace Chappell: a Professor of Philosophy at The Open University.

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Ludwig Wittgenstein’s case against scepticism (or at least against global scepticism) is simple. We can't doubt anything without exempting certain others things from doubt. Thus the basic position is that even philosophical doubt requires non-doubt. That is, in order to get the game of doubt under way, certain things must be placed beyond doubt.

As Wittgenstein himself puts it (in On Certainty):

“The questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those [doubts] turn.

“That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted…

“My life consists in my being content to accept many things.”

To put all that at its simplest.

Say that you're doubting a friend's geological theory. You wouldn't thereby also doubt the very meanings of your friend's words. That would be semantic doubt; not geological doubt.

Similarly, you wouldn't doubt that your friend is a person rather than a zombie or robot. That would be a doubt about “other minds”; not a doubt about geology.

Even if your other doubts aren't philosophical, they still needn't be doubts about geology.

For example, you may doubt your friend's honesty or why he's saying what he's saying. (You may doubt that you put your underpants on.) Thus these other doubts may be "properly ignored" (as the philosopher David Lewis put it).

What's at the heart of these "exemptions" is the "context" in which the doubt takes place. As Wittgenstein (again) puts it:

“Without that context, the doubt itself makes no sense: ‘The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty’; ‘A doubt without an end is not even a doubt.’”

If one doubts everything, then there's no sense in doubting anything. Doubt occurs in the context of non-doubt.

Even according to Descartes, the one thing you can't doubt is that you are doubting. And in terms of personal psychology, you need a context for your doubt/s.

The Things We Cannot Doubt

The important point to make about Wittgenstein’s position isn't that, as Professor Chappell puts it,

“there is some special class of privileged propositions that we simply can’t doubt”.

Wittgenstein's position, in other words, isn’t Cartesian or "foundationalist". The propositions we mustn't doubt could be of (just about) any kind. The general point is that there must be some propositions (of whatever kind) which we mustn't doubt in order to get the ball rolling. We can't start ex nihilo - as Descartes ostensibly did. We must bounce off certain propositions which we don't (rather than can't) doubt.

What we choose not to doubt (indeed what we also choose to doubt) will depend on context. That context will determine the nature of our doubts. (Or, alternatively, our lack of doubt vis-à-vis particular propositions or possibilities.)

Chappell (again) gives some very basic non-philosophical examples of this. He writes:

“… in each context, there is a very great deal that is not in doubt: the existence of the chessboard, the reliability of the atlas, the possibility of generally getting shopping sums right. This background makes it possible to have doubts, and possible (in principle) to resolve them. Where there is no such background, says Wittgenstein, the doubt itself makes no sense.”

We can create a table of what we can't doubt; and what we can doubt:

1a) The existence of the chessboard.

1b) The sincerity of our chess opponent’s naivety.

2a) The (general) reliability of the atlas.

2b) Whether or not the atlas is up-to-date.

3a) The possibility of (generally) getting our shopping sums right.

3b) That one’s hangover (today) is affecting one’s arithmetical judgement.

To put all the above another way:

i) You couldn't doubt the sincerity of your chess opponent’s naivety if before that you actually doubted the existence of the chessboard.

ii) You wouldn't doubt whether or not your atlas was up-to-date if you'd already doubted its general reliability.

iii) You wouldn't doubt your own arithmetical skills during a hangover if you'd already doubted your skills in all contexts.

Not only that: you can only resolve your lesser doubts if you simply disregard the more global (or extreme) doubts which might have proceeded them. That is, you can go ahead and win your chess opponent only if you simply disregard the possibility of the chessboard simply not existing in the first place.

Wittgenstein also seems to say that total (or global) doubt simply “makes no sense”. That's because there needs to be a reason to doubt. If you doubt everything, then you can have no reason to doubt – unless the very act of doubting everything is itself the reason to doubt!

Descartes’ Fallacy?

Chappell then offers us a logical argument against Descartes’ global doubt. She argues that it rests on a fallacious argument. She writes:

“Descartes – you could say – begins his philosophy by arguing that since any of our beliefs might be false, therefore all of our beliefs might be false. But this is a fallacious argument. (Compare: ‘Any of these strangers might be the Scarlet Pimpernel; therefore every one of these strangers might be the Scarlet Pimpernel.’) What is true of any belief is not necessarily true of every belief. So – the claim would be – Descartes’ system rests on a fallacy (the ‘any/all fallacy’, as it is sometimes called.)”

Prima facie, Chappell's argument does seem to follow. After all, she's not saying that all our beliefs are false if one is false. She's saying that all of them may be false if one is (found to be) false.

Then again, one belief (or “any” belief) being false doesn't entail every belief being false. Though it may leave open that possibility.

The analogy with the Scarlet Pimpernel doesn't work because, by definition, only one person can be the Scarlet Pimpernel. This may be a simple grammatical mistake in that Chappell uses the phrase “every one of these strangers might be the Scarlet Pimpernel”; whereas she should have said that “any one of these strangers might be the Scarlet Pimpernel”.

Perhaps there's nothing strange about saying that every (or all) our beliefs may be false - or even that they are all false. However, not all our beliefs are identical when it comes to their content (i.e., what they're about); though there can only be one other person who's identical with the Scarlet Pimpernel.

So saying that

“any of these strangers might be the Scarlet Pimpernel; therefore every one of these strangers might be the Scarlet Pimpernel”

isn't the same as the Cartesian example at all. Two beliefs may both be false; though they needn't be identical beliefs. However, if there were two people who were the Scarlet Pimpernel, then they'd need to be identical – indeed numerically identical.

The Language Game of Scepticism

Wittgenstein brings in his notion of a language game to make sense of global doubt. Again, his argument against doubt is simple. That argument is that philosophical (or sceptical) doubts don't arise in any of our language games. Therefore Wittgenstein believed that we should simply ignore them. Chappell writes:

“The trouble with crazy sceptical hypotheses, according to Wittgenstein, is that they don’t crop up in any of the various language games that make up the texture of ordinary life in the world. That is why it doesn’t make sense to discuss them.”

This is a repeat of the claim that “crazy sceptical hypotheses” don’t have any context. And if they have no context (outside philosophy!), then “it doesn’t make sense to discuss them”. However, the sceptic (or philosopher) may simply reply:

So what! I don’t care if scepticism has "no context" or if there's no sceptical "language game". What I'm saying may still be legitimate and even true! In any case, why can’t scepticism (or philosophy generally) itself be a language game?

After all, philosophy is indeed a language game (if we must use Wittgenstein's term) which has been played for over two thousand years. And scepticism itself has been an important and influential language game within philosophy - and indeed within Western culture generally. What better examples of a language game could you have?

Moreover, is it really true that scepticism only exists in the language game of philosophy? To take two extreme examples. What about the many conspiracy theories that are so much a part of our culture? And what about the intense scepticism which is directed against science and indeed against philosophy (e.g., Wittgenstein's own position!) itself ?

In addition, shouldn’t a Wittgensteinian say that the very fact that that “crazy sceptical hypotheses” have been discussed at all means that they must have been discussed in one (or in various) language games? Every discourse - crazy or sane - needs its own language game. Indeed isn’t that one of Wittgenstein’s main points about language games?

Despite saying all that, Chappell states that

“the sceptic isn’t playing any legitimate language game in his discourse, and so is talking nonsense”.

Again, who says that the sceptic isn’t playing a language game? And who says that if the sceptic is indeed playing a language game, then his language game isn't "legitimate"? Is it because it's not the language game of the ordinary man speaking "ordinary language"? The sceptic may again say:

So what! Why should I care about ordinary language or the ordinary man?

So I’m not sure why - or how - Wittgenstein excluded scepticism from all language games or managed to deny that it's a legitimate language game.

Perhaps Wittgenstein might have replied:

But that’s where you're wrong! The sceptic’s discourse doesn't make sense. It's meaningless. It's meaningless precisely because it's not ordinary language. (It doesn't use accepted terms in the way that people use them in everyday life.) Therefore the sceptic’s discourse doesn't make sense. It's nonsense.

It's certainly true that sceptical “linguistic activity” does indeed have “its own rules”. Indeed it can hardly not do so. And because it does have its own rules, then it must also be a bona fide (Wittgensteinian) language game. However, it just happened to be a language game which Wittgenstein himself didn't like. (Just as William P. Alston – in his paper 'Yes, Virginia, There Is a Real World' - favours religious language games; though he doesn't like the language games of what he calls "relativism" or "scientism".) If we truly believe in Wittgensteinian language games, then we simply can't pick and choose which ones we accept and which ones we reject. If it's a “human linguistic activity with its own rules”, then it's also a language game. Indeed, according to Wittgenstein himself (if only implicitly), it's irrelevant if you or I agree or disagree with the other language games we don’t belong to. After all, all language games - almost by definition - are (at least partly) autonomous and thus beyond the criticisms of other language games.

Isn't all this the truly relativistic result of Wittgenstein's theory of languages games?

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*) This piece can also be found @ the New English Review as 'Wittgenstein's Doubts About Doubt'.

Daniel Dennett's Chinese Room

The following is a critical account of the 'The Chinese Room' chapter in Daniel Dennett's book, Intuition Pumps and Other Tools For Thinking.

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In this chapter Daniel Dennett doesn't really offer many of his own arguments against John Searle's position. What he does offer are a lot of blatant ad hominems and simple endorsements of other people's (i.e., AI aficionados) positions on the Chinese Room argument.

Indeed Dennett is explicit about his support (even if it's somewhat qualified) of the “Systems Reply”:

“At the highest level, the comprehending powers of the system are not unimaginable, we even get an insight into just how the system comes to understand what it does. They system's reply no longer looks embarrassing; it looks obviously correct.”

Dennett concludes:

“... Searle's thought experiment doesn't succeed in what it claims to accomplish: demonstrating the flat-out impossibility of Strong AI.”

We can happily accept that Searle's thought experiment doesn't entirely (or even at all) succeed in what it claims to accomplish. However, Dennett's claims (or those he endorses) don't demonstrate the possibility of Strong AI either. In addition, it can also be said that the Searle himself never claimed the “flat-out impossibility of Strong AI” in the first place... Though that's another issue entirely.

The Systems Reply

It seems fairly clear that Dennett accepts the “Systems Reply (Berkeley)” argument against Searle's position. This is odd really because the Systems Reply is Searle's own take on what he thought the Opposition believed to be wrong with his own argument. (At least as it was first stated in the early days.) In other words, these aren't the actual words of any of the Opposition.

This is how Dennett himself quotes Searle in full:

“... 'While it is true that the individual person who is locked in the room does not understand the story, the fact is that he is merely part of the whole system, and the system does understand the story.'...”

So what is that “whole system”? This:

“... 'The person has a large ledger in front of him in which are written the rules, he has a lot of scratch paper and pencils for doing calculations, he has a 'data bank' of sets of Chinese symbols.'...”

I suppose it would be pretty obvious that if Searle put himself in a “system” (even if he had a large ledger of written rules, paper and pencils for doing calculations and data banks of Chinese symbols), it would still be Searle himself who'd be making use of all these elements of that system. Thus, in that sense, the original problem seems to be replicated. That is,

If Searle didn't originally understand Chinese

then

Searle + a large ledger, data banks, etc. wouldn't understand Chinese either.

That's because it is Searle himself, after all, who's making use of - and attempting to understand - these separate parts of the system. And even when the parts are taken together, it's still Searle who's taking them together and Searle who's doing the understanding. Thus the system doesn't seem to add anything other than a set of tools and data banks which Searle himself makes use of.

If all that's correct, then it's understandable that Searle-outside-the-room (i.e., Searle qua philosopher) should have a problem with this conclusion. So here's Dennett quoting Searle again:

“... 'Now, understanding is not being ascribed to the mere individual [Searle-in-the-room]; rather it is being ascribed to this whole system of which he is a part.'...”

To repeat. It's Searle-in-the-room who's making use of the whole system. Thus it's also Searle-in-the-room who's both using the system's parts and doing any understanding of its separate parts and the system taken as a whole.

Dennett's Examples

As stated, the Systems Reply simply seems to replicate the original problem - except for the addition of extra parts in order to create a system. Nonetheless, Dennett does indeed appear to believe that the addition of extra parts is of importance to this issue.

Firstly, instead of talking about Searle-in-the-room and the extra other things in that room, he now gives the example of a “register machine”.

Dennett says that 

“the register machine in conjunction with the software does perfect arithmetic”. 

So now we have this:

the register machine + software = a system capable of “perfect arithmetic”

Of course that's just like the following:

Searle-in-the-room + data banks + etc. =  a system capable of understanding Chinese

And then Dennett offers another equivalent example:

the central processing unit (CPU) + chess programme = a system capable of “beating you at chess”

Since Dennett is a behaviourist and a verificationist, his position seems to simply bypass Searle's central argument. So what is Dennett's behaviourist and a verificationist position? This:

If 

Searle-in-the-room delivers correct answers in Chinese, the register machine does perfect arithmetic, and the computer beats someone at chess, 

then 

Searle-in-the-room, the register machine and the computer understand (respectively) Chinese, arithmetic and chess. 

That is, Searle-in-the-Room, the register machine and the computer behave in a way that a True Understander would behave. Thus, to Dennett, they must be True Understanders.

Indeed Dennett is explicit about his verificationist and behaviourist position when he mentions that ultimate behaviourist and verificationist test – the Turing test. (Of course Dennett doesn't – as far as I know - call himself a “behaviorist” or a “verificationist”.) Actually, as with the Systems Reply, Dennett  quotes Searle again (this time only in part). Dennett writes:

“If the judge can't reliably tell the difference, the computer (programme) has passed the Turing test and would be declared not just to be intelligent, but to 'have a mind in exactly the sense that human beings have minds,' as Searle put it in 1988.” 

Now since Dennett doesn't argue against this account and description - or the conclusion - of the Turing test, then surely he must accept it. 

Dennett would very happily accept that the a computer which had passed the Turing test is “intelligent”. (Indeed I think that too; depending on definitions.) However, I don't believe that Dennett needs also to accept Searle's addition. That is, I don't believe that Dennett needs to believe that this particular computer 

“ha[s] a mind in exactly the sense that human being have minds”.

Firstly, this particular computer might have passed an extremely rudimentary test. Thus it couldn't possibly be said to “have a mind in exactly the sense that human beings have minds”. Perhaps it has a mind. However, how would we know that? And how could we also say that this computer has a mind that's "exactly" the same as all human minds or exactly the same any any particular human mind?

Secondly, surely Dennett would accept that there's more to human minds than merely answering questions. This may mean that the best that can be said is that this computer has a type of mind. Perhaps if this (or any) computer were more extensively tested (or if it accomplished different things other than answering questions), then this would take the computer towards having a mind which is very much like a human mind.

So this particular computer, after this particular test, can be said to have a kind of a mind; just not a mind that can be said to be the same as a human mind (i.e., in all respects).

However (as stated), perhaps Dennett's wouldn't see the point of my qualification. That is, after this particular computer had passed this particular test, then perhaps Dennett would indeed have said that it (to use Searle's words again) “has[s] a mind in exactly the same sense that human beings have minds”.

As before, whatever Dennett's exact position, he puts the Strong AI position on the Turing test without criticising or adding to it. Thus Dennett continues:

“Passing the Turing test would be, in the eyes of many in the field, the vindication of Strong AI.”

So why is that? According to Dennett again:

“Because, they [Strong AI people] thought (along with Turing), you can't have such a conversation without understanding it, so the success of the computer conversationalist would be proof of its understanding.”

Again, this is to judge this computer according to purely behaviourist logic. That is, if the computer answers the questions correctly, then that's literally all there is to it. It must also understand the questions. As for verificationism. All we have is the computer's behaviour to go on. There's nothing else to verify or to postulate.

Zombies/Zimbos

Dennett's behaviourist and verificationist position on this particular computer (as well as its Turing test) can also be seen as being analogous to those philosophers' zombies he also has a problem with.

Actually, Dennett calls such a zombie a “zimbo”. A zimbo is an entity which is physically, functionally and behaviourally exactly like us. However, a zimbo is still meant to be lacking a certain... something.

More relevantly, the zimbo can pass the Turing test too. (Or at least the specific Turing test which the aforesaid computer passed.) That is, the Turing test and you and I

“can't distinguish between a zimbo and a 'really conscious' person, since whatever a conscious person can do, a zimbo can do exactly as well”.

So just as this computer doesn't need that extra something, neither does Dennett's zimbo. In both cases, all we have is the behaviour of the computer and this zimbo. And their behaviour tells us that they're both intelligent and indeed that both have a mind.

In fact Dennett seems to go one step further than that.

Dennett moves swiftly from the computer and the zimbo being intelligent (or having intelligence), to their both being “conscious”. In Dennett's own words:

“[T]he claim that an entity that passes the Turing test is not just intelligent but conscious.”

As stated before, Dennett seems to be putting the Strong AI position. He also seems to be endorsing that position. And this appears to be the case because Dennett neither argues against this position nor does he really add to it.

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*) See my: 'Against Daniel Dennett's Heterophenomenology'.

"This piece is a critical account of the 'Heterophenomenology' chapter of Daniel Dennett's book, Intuition Pumps and Other Tools For Thinking."

Lee Smolin's Relationist (Meta)Physics

Lee Smolin is an American theoretical physicist who has contributed to quantum gravity theory. He specifically known for the theory of loop quantum gravity.

Smolin is also a faculty member at the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics, an adjunct professor of physics at the University of Waterloo and a member of the graduate faculty of the philosophy department at the University of Toronto.

In terms of the following piece, Smolin is a very philosophical theoretical physicist and cosmologist who takes philosophical positions on various issues in science. One example of that is his position on the nature of space and time and the things (to use a very broad term) which exist within space and time.

Newton on Space and Time

Smolin expresses what he deems to be Isaac Newton's “hierarchical picture” of space and time when he says that within that picture

“atoms with fixed and absolute properties move against a fixed background of absolute space and time”.

Indeed Newton's position (which has been called substantivalism) has it that space and time are themselves things (for want of a better word). That is, space and time are things which exist independently of all the other things "within" them.

Smolin concludes by saying that this Newtonian picture is “quite dead”.

Smolin is what philosophers would call an anti-essentialist. That is, Smolin doesn't believe that there are “intrinsic properties”. Instead, as he puts it, “all properties are about relations between things”.

Thus, in the quote above, Smolin used the words “absolute properties”, by which he meant:

“absolute entities” = entities with "intrinsic properties"

Thus if entities have intrinsic properties, then those properties will neither change over time nor will they be changed by other entities or conditions. (Unless the entity concerned simply stops existing as the entity that it is.) According to Smolin, it's this ostensibly unchanging nature of intrinsic properties which makes them “absolute”.

Such much for absolute entities. What about Newtonian space and relations?

It's not immediately clear why Newton's position on space would automatically exclude a “relationist” take on things/atoms. After all, “atoms with fixed properties” may still partake in relations even if space is fixed and also if the atoms within space have absolute properties. Why can't we have absolute properties and things which partake in relations?

Smolin's alternative picture to this is a “relational” or “dynamical”. It's a case of spacetime itself - and all properties/things/atoms within it - being relational or dynamical. In other words, in Smolin's universe, literally nothing is absolute or intrinsic.

Leibniz on Space and Time

Smolin then cites Gottfried Leibniz as a relationist. Or, at the very least, he sees Leibniz as being a relationist when it comes to space and time. So, unlike Newton, Leibniz

“wanted to understand [space and time] as arising only as aspects of the relations among things”.

Smolin sums up the two opposing positions when he says that “this fight” is

“between those who want the world to be made out of absolute entities and those who want it to be made out of relations”.

Smolin adds that this opposition is a “key theme in the story of the development of modern physics”.

In terms of Leibniz again, Leibniz's position (as expressed by Smolin) is that space and time don't exist – at least not as independent phenomena. Space and time essentially arise as ways of making sense (as it were) of the (as Smolin puts it) “relations among things”. In other words, space and time are the means by which we plot the relations among - or between - things. That basically means that if there were no things, then there would be no space and time either. That is, space and time aren't (to use Smolin's word again) “absolute”: they're a consequence of things and their interrelationships.

Nonetheless, if space and time don't exist, then what are these things moving about in? It can be supposed, of course, that both space and time come into being as soon as there are things which have relations with one another. But how does that work? Even if space and time do spring into existence as soon as things spring into existence, then it's still the case that things move about in space and exist through time.

So here are two alternative conclusions:

i) Space and time depend on things and their relations.

ii) Things and their relations depend on space and time.

The obvious way out of this opposition is simply to say that there's no hierarchy involved here: spacetime and things depend on each other. That is, space and time aren't more important (or fundamental) than things; and things aren't more important (or fundamental) than space and time.

What's called “relational theory”, however, is indeed eliminativist about space. This theory has it that if there were no things, then there would be no space either. Relational theory is eliminativist about time too in that if there were no events (in space), then there would be no time.

Smolin's sums up his non-Newtonian (or Leibnizean) position when he states (in his Three Roads to Quantum Gravity) that it's

“absurd in general relativity to speak of a universe in which nothing happens”.

Relationism or Relation[al]ism?

Smolin explicitly states his relationist (or Leibnizean) position in the following:

“There is no meaning to space that is independent of the relationships among real things of the world. ...Space is nothing apart from the things that exist. ...If we take out all the words we are not left with an empty sentence, we are left with nothing.”

However, there may be a problem here with the use (above) of the word “relationist”. That's because there are in fact two different words which are often used within this metaphysical context: “relationism” and “relation[al]ism”. Prima facie, they denote two (slightly?) different positions. However, on analysis, the distinctions between them appear to break down – at least in certain respects.

On my own reading, Lee Smolin seems to go one step beyond what's called “relationism” and delves into the domain of “relation[al]ism”. What I mean by that it can be said that relationism simply emphasises the relations between things: it doesn't deny that things exist. With relationalism (with an added “al”), on the other hand, “things exist and function only as relational entities”. That is, if there were no relations, then there would be no things. Relationism, on the other hand, simply notes the importance of relations between things; it doesn't claim that things - in and of themselves – don't exist.

Nonetheless, even if these definitions are incorrect (or if I've misnamed Smolin's own position), it's still the case that there's a difference between what can be called the eliminativist and the non-eliminativist position on things.

Thus relationalism is like ontic structural realism (which will be discussed later) in that the latter eliminates things from its metaphysical picture (“every thing must go”). Relationism, on the other hand, simply places relations in an important position in the metaphysics of things.

Having said all that, it's hard not to see the importance of relations even if one accepts the existence of things as independent entities. (Of course the metaphysical notion of independence would also need to be cashed out.) On the other hand, it's also hard to accept (prima facie) the elimination of things from the metaphysical picture. 

Moreover, one can also see the vital importance of relations when it comes to physics. On the other hand, one can't really see how things could be entirely eliminated from physics either. (This may also ultimately depend on how the word 'thing' is defined.)

Yet in (“analytic”/pure) metaphysics one can indeed conceive of (or imagine) a metaphysical picture in which things don't exist. One could also imagine a picture in which things don't have any relations (at least no causal relations) to other things or indeed to anything. These scenarios could constitute the metaphysical natures of particular possible worlds. Though, since Smolin is dealing with the actual universe, it's hard to make sense of such metaphysical eliminativism when it comes to physics itself.

Nonetheless, relation[al]ism can also be read as not actually being eliminativist at all. After all, this metaphysical position may simply have it that things (or entities) aren't what's called “self-standing”. To put that another way: what makes things the things that they are may be their relations to other... things. Or we can even say that particulars (things) are essentially relational. Alternatively, we can say that all a thing's properties are relational. That is, it has no “intrinsic properties”.

Thus, in a weak (or even strong) sense, if all things only have relational properties (and such properties literally make all these things the things that they are), then there is a sense in which things are indeed eliminated from the metaphysical picture. To put that simply: if a thing's relations (or relational properties) were eliminated, then it would no longer be that thing. Indeed it would no longer exist.

Relations and Structure

Despite all the above, it's still hard to make sense of the idea (to use Smolin's words) that “the world is [only?] made of relations”. What does that mean?

This question also relates to the metaphysical position known as scientific structuralism (i.e., in the philosophy of science). Here too relations and structures are deemed to be fundamental. Yet two similar questions can also be asked here:

i) How can there be structures without things?

ii) How can there be structures without space and time?

Relations and structures may well be of utmost importance in both metaphysics and physics. Nonetheless, surely there are no relations and structures without things (or even substances).

So, again, how can the world be “made out of relations” alone? The same goes for Smolin's other claim that “all properties are about relations between things”.

And what does Smolin mean by the words “all about”? We can easily accept that relations between things are important. But so too are things and their properties. So how is it that properties “are [only] about” the relations between things? In other words, is this part of an identity statement? Namely:

“properties” = relations between things

There are indeed properties which are relational. However, it can be argued that not all properties are relational. Indeed isn't it the case that in order for some properties to be relational, other properties need to be non-relational?

As for the elimination of things. Take this simple sentence: “x is bigger than y.”

In order for x to be bigger than y, both x and y need to exist as things (or at least as something). It's true that the property (or universal) IS BIGGER THAN may be seen to have an abstract non-spatiotemporal nature. However, the original statements was “x is bigger than y”, not simply “is bigger than”. That is, we're not simply talking about the abstract property (or universal) IS BIGGER THAN.

Despite that, there may indeed be certain relations (or relational properties) which don't involve concrete things. (There are relations between numbers, for example.) However, if we return to Smolin, it's not the case that he's talking about relations between abstract entities even if the relations themselves can be deemed to be abstract.

Ontic Structural Realism

Smolin elaborates on his relationist universe firstly by saying that if

“the only meaningful things in this theory are relationships between real things”

then

“it doesn't make sense to talk about space being made up of different parts, or time being made up of distinct moments, unless the points and the moments can be distinguished by what's happening there”.

Here Smolin's position is fairly close to another structuralist position in the philosophy of science. Namely, the contemporary philosophical metaphysical position (as usually applied to physics) of ontic structural realism. In the ontic structural realism picture, “it doesn't make sense to talk about” things with their own determinate (or intrinsic) properties when these things “can only be distinguished” in terms of their structures and relations to other things (within spacetime). In simple terms, the “things” of ontic structural realism can only be distinguished in terms of their mathematical structures and relations. There literally isn't anything else.

In terms of Smolin's own picture, spacetime itself can only be distinguished in terms of (in Smolin's own words) “what's happening there”. That is, what's happening at specific spacetime points. And what's happening at specific spacetime points is invariably a matter of dynamical non-intrinsic properties and their mutual relations.

So just as spacetime works as a means to plot dynamic properties and things together, so ontic structural realism has it that things are mere placeholders used to plot relations and structures together.

Loop Quantum Gravity

Lee Smolin updates his relationism by tying it to the scientific theory of “loop quantum gravity”. Smolin also ties loop quantum gravity theory itself to relativity and quantum theory. Or as Smolin himself puts it:

“I believe that the main lesson of relativity and quantum theory is that the world is nothing but an evolving network of relationships.”

Thus Smolin explicitly ties Einstein's general theory of relativity to his own relationist position. Smolin believes (as stated in his The Trouble With Physics) that in the general theory of relativity

“[t]he geometry of space and time changes and evolves, as does everything else in nature”.

What's more, “[w]e no longer have fields moving in a fixed-background geometry”. Instead,

“[w]e have a bunch of fields interacting with one another, all dynamical, all influencing one another, one of which is the geometry of spacetime”.

Smolin christens this a “background-independent theory”. He defines this position as one in which

“[n]either space nor time has any existence outside the system of evolving relationships that comprises the universe”.

Indeed this soup of interrelating fields not only creates spacetime, it also creates the particles and all the other entities/conditions which exist at a specific point in time and place in space.

As just stated, Smolin makes his metaphysical relationism more concrete by tying it the physicists' notion of a “field”. More specifically, he ties it to the theory of “electric fields”. According to Smolin, “physicists using general relativity” can't

“speak of a point, except by naming some features of the field lines that will uniquely distinguish that point”.

Moreover, this “network of relationships evolve[s] with time” and is “constantly changing”.

Specifically in terms of “loops”.

The loops of loop quantum gravity theory describes the nature (or structure) of space. That is, loops are extremely small (the size of a Planck length) and they make up the “fabric” of space. Loops are also called “spin networks” (which provides a “spin foam”). Thus both matter and space (in the loop quantum gravity picture) are deemed to be “atomic” (this word is used very loosely in this context).

Another way of describing this is to say that in loop quantum gravity space and time are quantized. That is, space and time are made up of the aforementioned “atoms”. Or, more technically, space and time are seen to be “granular and discrete” in the same way that the quantities (e.g., photons, etc.) of electromagnetism (or energy) are seen to be discrete in quantum theory. This means that space, time and energy can be quantized precisely because they're discrete (or atomic).

Smolin himself says that

“what's wonderful about the loop picture is that it's entirely a picture in terms of relations”.

It is these loops which are relational and dynamic. And, by inference, loops make up our relational and dynamic spacetime.

In more detail, in this picture it's the case that there's

“no preexisting geometry for space, no fixed reference points; everything is dynamic and relational”.

What's more, Smolin claims that

“[t]his is the way Einstein taught us we have to understand the geometry of space and time – as something relational and dynamic, not fixed or given a priori”.

So whereas Newton believed that space and time are fixed; Smolin rejects that position by claiming that there's “no preexisting geometry for space” (or “no fixed reference points”). That means that we have a spacetime with a geometry that's “relational and dynamic”.

However, it's almost certainly the case that Einstein would never have expressed his own position in Smolin's own way. Nonetheless, Smolin's words may well still be an accurate (or faithful) reworking of Einstein's essential position on spacetime geometry.

Loop Quantum Gravity vs. String Theory

Smolin specifically counterposes loop quantum gravity with string theory. As Smolin puts it:

“In string theory one studies strings moving in a fixed classical spacetime. ...what we call a background-dependent approach. ...One of the fundamental discoveries of Einstein is that there is no fixed background. The very geometry of space and time is a dynamical system that evolves in time.”

Indeed Smolin (along with such people as Carlo Rovelli, John Baez and Abhay Ashtekar) have rejected string theory precisely because he deems it to have retained the (Newtonian) notion of “absolute space”. Loop quantum gravity, on the other hand, upholds “backgroundlessness”.

So here again Smolin allies himself with Einstein and connects his own “background independent” theory to his metaphysical relationism.

Let's sum up Smolin's overall relationist position.

Smolin isn't only talking about things and their relations: he also sees the geometry of space and time as being relational. Indeed one can says that the geometry of spacetime is relational/dynamical precisely because things and their relations are also relational/dynamical.

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