Scientism
can be seen as a position (or stance) on the huge importance of
science to philosophy and - often more broadly - to just about
everything else. Thus this position needn't be taken to be a
philosophy which advances independent arguments or positions on
philosophical subjects. Indeed if it did do such things, it would be
like a position within
philosophy
(such as anti-realism or physicalism)...
Naturalism,
on the other hand, is indeed a position within philosophy.
Scientism,
therefore, can be deemed to be over and above naturalism.
It
can be argued that one can be a philosophical naturalist without
displaying strong scientistic leanings. Such a philosopher can be
broadly naturalistic in his philosophy; yet not strongly scientistic.
Indeed he may know little science and therefore not feel the need to
consult the findings of science every time he tackles a philosophical
issue. A scientistic philosopher, on the other hand, would argue that
science must always be consulted when it comes to virtually every
issue.
For
example, if a philosopher is tackling the notion of an object or a
person (or even if he's tackling whether or not there's a God who
exists outside space and time), he must see what science has to say
on this issue. Either that or he must use scientific findings as a
tool to clarify the issue or help him find the answers.
In
terms of self-described supporters of scientism, they'll carry lots
of baggage about the relation between science and... well, everything
else. As for those who're accused by others of being proponents of
scientism (which happens a lot), I don't suppose they'll carry that
much – or any – baggage.
Thus
scientism, surely, requires an explicit and self-conscious commitment
to science and its role in all subjects.
In
terms of philosophers and scientism again.
A
distinction has to be made between what philosophers actually write
(or argue) and their general attitude towards science. What they
write (or argue) can't itself be science; though they can still have
an attitude towards science which people may call "scientistic".
This was true of the logical
positivists
–
and that's a point which they admitted to.
In
more detail: the logical positivists - and Quine
later - argued that science tells us “what
is”
(i.e., it provides our basic "ontological
commitments").
That effectively means that science has the last word on what is.
Nonetheless, what scientistic philosophers (as well as logical
positivists in the past) do isn't itself science. It can be
scientistic (as well as scientific); though it isn't itself science.
Criticisms
of Scientism
Having
said all that about the relation between scientistic philosophers and
science, some would still
argue that
“scientistic
people tend to be less concerned about actually consulting
scientifically sound theories and more about being arrogantly in
opposition to whatever they deem 'unscientific' -- notably religion”.
Following
on from that, others have argued (understandably) that scientism
works against the “commitment
to religious freedom as an integral part of democracy”.
However, I could imagine even a hardcore scientistic philosopher
still being committed to religious freedom. If I were that hardcore
scientistic philosopher, I would be committed to religious
freedom.... except when that religious freedom leads to a lack of
other people's freedoms and even (I dare say) to the destruction of
“evil atheistic secularism”. In other words, the freedom of a
religion may bring about the denial other people's freedoms. Indeed
such religions exist.
However,
there's also a problem with coming at scientism from that angle:
i.e., that scientism is automatically arrogant and even somewhat
totalitarian. Sure, it could be... in principle; though that's true
of all philosophical and non-philosophical positions. So I'm not sure
why scientism should be singled out for displaying traits that most
schools display and which nearly all religions and political
ideologies most certainly have displayed.
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