Stephen Hawking's Model-dependent Realism

“Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge.” - Stephen Hawking, The Grand Design (2010)

i) Introduction

ii) Why Model-dependent Realism?

iii) The Brain's Models

iv) True Reality and Models

v) Pluralism

vi) Hawking's Constructive Empiricism?

vii) The Aesthetics of Models

viii) Conclusion

Introduction

The words "model-dependent realism" (MDR) were first used in Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow's book The Grand Design, which was published in 2010. Before that, Hawking had of course already talked about the importance of models in physics. (As a physicist, it would be hard not to stress their importance.)

For example, here's Hawking from 1994 – some 16 years before the The Grand Design:

“If what we regards as real depends on our theory, how can we make reality the basis of our philosophy? But we cannot distinguish what is real about the universe without a theory. I therefore take the view, which has been described as simple-minded or naïve, that a theory of physics is just a mathematical model that we use to describe the results of observations… Beyond that it makes no sense to ask if it corresponds to reality, because we do not know what reality is independent of theory.”

Still, at that time Hawking hadn't turned that emphasis on models into a philosophical position with its very own title: namely, model-dependent realism.

In the following, Hawking expresses what model-dependent realism is in a strong and clear manner:

"There is no picture- or theory-independent concept of reality. Instead we will adopt a view that we will call model-dependent realism: the idea that a physical theory or world picture is a model (generally of a mathematical nature) and a set of rules that connect the elements of the model to observations. This provides a framework with which to interpret modern science."

Thus without theories and models we would be bombarded by a possible “infinite variety of facts” (Karl Popper). Reality, therefore, is “seen” through the lenses supplied by our (sometimes-conflicting) theories or models.

One may wonder why Hawking stresses scientific models rather than scientific theories. (In fact, he sometimes appears to use the two words as virtual synonyms – perhaps for convenience’s sake.) So let the scientist and professor John Holland describe what he takes models to be:

“Although model building is not usually considered critical in the construction of scientific theory, I would claim that it is. Every time a scientist constructs a set of equations to describe the world, such as Newton’s or Maxwell’s equations, he or she is constructing a model.”

Now many would regard that as a fairly loose description of a model. Or, more accurately, a description that’s certainly at odds with our everyday use of the word “model”. Yet in Hawking’s case too, theories can take the form of a “mathematical models”. More specifically, mathematical models are used “to describe the results of observations”.

Why Model-dependent Realism?

One question which needs to be asked here is the following:

Why did Stephen Hawking use the word “realism” to characterise his position?

At an intuitive level, MDR appears to be an anti-realist position, rather than a realist one. After all, if one is stressing models, theories and “mental concepts” (see later section), then isn't that also to stress some kind of anti-realist position?

Perhaps the wording doesn't matter.

Hawking wouldn't have read that much contemporary philosophy of science; so this kind of conceptual clarification might have annoyed him. (Many physicists get annoyed by philosophical “conceptual analysis” because they believe it implies “conceptual conservatism”.) In any case, perhaps because MDR claims that all we have is models, theories and mental concepts, then why can't we be realist about these things instead? That is, not realist about noumena, “objective reality” or “the Real” - but realist about our models, theories and mental concepts instead.

As already hinted at, Hawking didn't have much time for philosophy and on more than one occasion he said that it was “dead”. Yet it's very odd that he didn't realise he was doing philosophy when he wrote these parts of The Grand Design. What's more, Hawking made the following incredible claim:

“Model-dependent realism short-circuits all this argument and discussion between the realist and anti-realist schools of thought.”

So perhaps it wasn't philosophy simpliciter that Hawking was against; but only philosophy “which has not kept up with modern developments in science”. (Many philosophers themselves have said the same about their fellow philosophers.) Thus one must now assume that model-dependent realists have kept up with modern science. However, even philosophy which has kept up with science still remains philosophy. And that's also true of Hawking's own model-dependent realism.

The Brain's Models

Hawking wrote about how the human brain models the world and how scientific models do the very same thing. Indeed he seemed to have taken the brain's models as the basis of (or inspiration for) scientific models . Hawking writes:

"According to the idea of model-dependent realism ... our brains interpret the input from our sensory organs by making a model of the outside world. We form mental concepts of our home, trees, other people, the electricity that flows from wall sockets, atoms, molecules, and other universes. These mental concepts are the only reality we can know. There is no model-independent test of reality. It follows that a well-constructed model creates a reality of its own."

The problem here is that the brain's models are hardwired and (as it were) given – unlike scientific models. Or, should I say, there is a hardwired element on top of which we apply contingent concepts. Thus those hardwired “interpretations” take a similar role to Kant's categories. That is, they are transcendental (in Kant's sense).

This means that we can agree with Hawking on the necessity and importance of scientific models; though also reject his analogy with hardwired brain “pictures”.

The basic gist of the brain's models is that they aren't the same as what it is they model. Indeed it may even follow that they don’t even resemble what it is they model. And if this is the case as far as the brain’s models are concerned, then the situation is even trickier when it comes to scientific models.

As some philosophers have put it, we don’t have (true) representations. (Though philosophers like Jerry Fodor use the word “representation” in a very technical way.) What’s more, it's counterproductive to believe that we do. (This was a line put forward by Richard Rorty and other pragmatists.)

In any case, Hawking goes into a little detail to demonstrate his case:

“In vision, one's brain receives a series of signals down the optic nerve. Those signals do not constitute the sort of image you would accept on your television...”

And then there’s Hawking’s philosophical conclusion. Namely:

“The brain, in other words, builds a mental picture or model.”

One problem that can be broached here is that just because the journey from the world's causal forces to the final “mental picture or model” is both circuitous and complex, that doesn’t in itself mean that the picture (or model) can't be a faithful (or even truthful) representation of those external causal forces. Then again, we can’t deny the contrary either.

Hawking then states something which can be taken as showing that the brain’s models are faithful or even truthful. He cites the following case:

“The brain is so good at model building that if people are fitted with glasses that turn the images in their eyes upside down, their brains, after a time, change the model so that they again see the world the right way up…”

True Reality and Models

Model-dependent realism asserts that all we can know about reality is that it

"consists of networks of world pictures that explain observations by connecting them by rules to concepts defined in models”.

Does that therefore mean (to jump forward a little) that an ultimate “theory of everything” will never be found? Hawking/Mlodinow suggest that this is unclear:

“In the history of science we have discovered a sequence of better and better theories or models, from Plato to the classical theory of Newton to modern quantum theories.”

Hawking then concludes in the following manner:

“It is natural to ask: Will this sequence eventually reach an end point, an ultimate theory of the universe, that will include all forces and predict every observation we can make, or will we continue forever finding better theories, but never one that cannot be improved upon? We do not yet have a definitive answer to this question.”

Hawking puts the well-known pessimistic meta-induction position in the above passage.

The pessimistic meta-induction is applied to previous theories and models and it's argued that this provides us with a very good reason to see a model as being precisely that – a model. Thus if it's (only) a model, then it can't be a piece of reality. (Though models must also belong to reality – what else can they belong to?)

Ontologically, “true reality” is true reality, not a model of true reality.

Can a model simply replicate a piece of reality?

Yes; though not in literally every respect. And even if it could model everything about any given x, then what would be the point of such modelling? That's not what scientific models are meant to do. (“A true model of the universe would be the universe itself.”) However, in everyday parlance things are complicated by the fact that that's exactly what models are – replicas of given bits of reality (i.e., as in model aircrafts, model cars, model soldiers, etc.).

Thus if we must model “true reality”, then it can't actually be that true reality. And if it's not that pure reality, then we have something less than that pure reality. What's more, that's a good thing because (as stated) there's little to be gained from any kind of exact replication – at least not in theoretical physics.

Yet it is also said that those who accept the model-dependent realist position also accept that there is indeed a "reality-as-it-is-in-itself".

Yes, “reality-as-it-is-in-itself” clearly exists. But that doesn't mean that we can access (or describe) it as it is in itself. After all, contingent brains (with their contingent “pictures”) and persons are doing the assessing and describing. And precisely because of that, a perfect model or theory will always be out of the question.

Now what about Hawking's “mental concepts”?

Hawking seemed to reduce scientific models to what he called “mental concepts”. And, as he put it, these “mental concepts are the only reality we can know”. However, does Hawking's own conclusion actually follow? He boldly states:

“It follows that a well-constructed model creates a reality of its own.”

[Even an] anti-realist wouldn’t be too keen on this type of language. As it stands, it's partly true and partly false. It's partly true in that we gain access to “reality” through models, theories and “mental concepts”. Thus, in that basic sense, if we use different models, theories and mental concepts about the same given x, then we’ll get different “realities”. 

The problem is that causal forces are completely written out of this picture. We can accept that, as the philosopher Donald Davidson argued, causal forces don’t "come under a [given] description". Nonetheless, they are still the same causal forces which are described by different models. So such causal forces must constitute some kind of reality which can’t be dispensed with.

In addition, models are part of reality in the sense that they can hardly be anything else. And even if models are seen as abstract objects, models are still part of reality. But does a model also “create a reality of its own”? Again, both yes and no.

Pluralism

Hawking's model-dependent realism is similar to the “poetic naturalism” of theoretical physicist Sean Carroll.

Firstly, here's Hawking writing about how “different theories” can exist side by side:

"It might be that to describe the universe, we have to employ different theories in different situations. Each theory may have its own version of reality, but according to model-dependent realism, that is acceptable so long as the theories agree in their predictions whenever they overlap, that is, whenever they can both be applied."

Sean Carroll, on the other hand, states:

“[T]here is only one, unified, physical world, but many different ways of talking about it, each of which captures an element of reality.”

The obvious question to ask both Carroll and model-dependent realists is:

How do we know if it's the same “element” described by different models or a different element entirely?

In other words, is Carroll correct to argue that “different ontologies” can liv[e] happily alongside “the same underlying reality”?

In addition, it isn't true that “different vocabularies” imply (or entail) “different ontologies”. At a very crude level, if someone uses the name the 'Morning Star' and another person uses the name the 'Evening Star', and both persons know that both names refer to the planet Venus, then we don't have different ontologies on our hands here. Instead, different words, senses, technical terms, etc. can be seen to have the same ontology and therefore they posit the “same underlying reality”.

Both Carroll and Hawking hold that reality should be interpreted and that interpretation takes the form of scientific modelling. Thus if the pluralism of “poetic” elements has it that various models don't coincide in describing the same particular x, then does that mean that many realities exist? (Hawking came close to saying this.) Again, if the models are very different, then how do we know that models/theories have the same x (or phenomenon) in their focus?

It's also argued that

“[w]here several models are found for the same phenomena, no single model is preferable to the others within that domain of overlap”.

Yet just because different models can model any given x, that doesn't also mean that “no single model is preferable”. It's true that no single model need offer us what Hawking calls the “absolute truth”. However, that doesn't also mean that a theory/model can't be superior to its rivals. Of course spelling out a model/theory's superiority may be a tricky business (see the last section); though scientists are already well aware of that.

To clarify this way of thinking about pluralism we can see what Hawking has to say about what physicists call “dualities”. These are “situations in which two very different theories describe the same phenomenon”. So Model¹ and Model² may deal with the same causal forces in different ways. That is, the descriptions are different even when the casual forces are the same. (Though how could we know that?)

Hawking complicates this by hinting that M¹ and M² deal with different “properties”, rather than saying that M¹ and M² say different things about the same properties. To be faithful to Hawking, he writes:

“Each theory can describe and explain certain properties, and neither theory can be said to be better or more real than the other.”

As stated, it’s hard to work out if Hawking meant different models of the same properties; or different models about different properties. It can be argued that properties can only come care of models or theories. Thus different models - by definition - will generate different properties. And if that’s the case, then M¹ and M² can’t be dealing with the same properties in their different ways.

Constructive Empiricism?

Immediately after making a comment about model-dependent realism short-circuiting philosophy, Hawking indulges in some philosophy of his own. Not only that, the philosophy he does indulge in is very similar to Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. Take Hawking's following words:

"According to model-dependent realism, it is pointless to ask whether a model is real, only whether it agrees with observation. If there are two models that both agree with observation ... then one cannot say that one is more real than another. One can use whichever model is more convenient in the situation under consideration."

The words above advance the idea of empirical adequacy, which is an element of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism.

This isn't to say that there isn't something real which underpins observations and models. It's just that “the Real” (to use Slavoj Žižek's favourite term) is basically a Kantian noumenon.

Yet the claim that different models/theories “predict the same phenomena” (i.e., they're all “empirically adequate”) is a little loose as it stands.

Take the philosophical position of panpsychism.

Nothing in panpsychist theory is contradicted by any phenomena or observations. The same applies for many other metaphysical theories. This point is shown when A.J. Ayer commented on monism and pluralism. He said that if monism were true, then the world would be exactly the same as that posited by a pluralist.

Hawking then cites the quark as an example of a model. He wrote:

“[A]ccording to model-dependent realism, quarks exist in a model that agrees with our observations of how subnuclear particles behave.”

This means that all we have is the quark model itself and our observations. We don't need anything “real” beneath, between or behind the model and our observations.

In addition, the empirical adequacy position and MDR are basically instrumentalist in nature. That is, instrumentalists believe that models, concepts and theories should be evaluated solely in terms of their agreement with observations; as well as in terms of their explanatory and predictive power.

Hawking himself appeared to move one step beyond merely emphasising the importance - and indeed necessity - of models: he also stressed what he called “mental concepts”.

Hawking certainly didn't believe that mental concepts and nature/reality are as one. Yet he once wrote that “mental concepts are the only reality we can know”. Furthermore, he stated: “There is no model-independent test of reality.”

This seems to mean that Hawking went further than simply saying that mathematics describes (or perfectly models) nature. After all, he stressed the importance of mental concepts. However, it can still be said that the models of physics are mathematically accurate. Thus even if we require mental concepts to get at these mathematical models, the models can still perfectly capture “reality”.

The Aesthetics of Models

What constitutes a good model?

It's here when certain aesthetic criteria are brought into play. Hawking (as well as other physicists) happily admits this. So here's Hawking's own list of what constitutes a good model:

i) It must be elegant.

ii) It must contains few arbitrary or adjustable elements.

iii) It must agrees with - and explain - all existing observations.

iv) It must make detailed predictions about future observations that can disprove or falsify the model if they are not borne out.

As for the first criterion: the recognition of elegance is partly subjective affair. Nonetheless, saying that the notion of elegance is subjective isn't necessarily a criticism. It depends. Elegance can be cashed out in very scientific (or third-person) ways.

However, there'll always be a aesthetic remainder. That is in the sense that the scientific (or third-person) criteria of an aesthetic criterion will always leave out any mention of the aesthetic term itself.

Even the criterion that models should contain “few arbitrary or adjustable elements” is not itself scientific. The word “arbitrary” will need a definition and explanation because – as it stands - it's quite loaded. Nonetheless, that's not to say that it can't be defined or that arbitrary elements can't be specified.

The final two criteria aren't aesthetic in nature; though they can still be problematic.

Thus Hawking was correct to state that no model meets all these aesthetic criteria. (This quandary has been well-discussed in the philosophy of science.) For example, a theory which scores well when it comes to “elegance” may score poorly when it comes to “[a]gree[ing] with and explain[ing] all existing observations”.

Conclusion

As already stated, it's very odd that Stephen Hawking should have said that “philosophy is dead” on more than one occasion. What did he think his model-dependent realism is? Above and beyond that, it's difficult to decipher why Hawking chose the term “realism” in the first place.

As for the philosophical position of model-dependent realism itself, it has a strong pragmatic - rather than a strictly empiricist - appeal. And, precisely because of that, metaphysical realists and scientific realists will have serious problems with Hawking's philosophical position.

John Horgan and Philip Goff on Panpsychism & Geocentrism

Philosopher Philip Goff and science writer/journalist John Horgan disagree about panpsychism

In a blog post ('The New Copernican Revolution: A Response to John Horgan'), Philip Goff lays out the philosophical problems he has with John Horgan's stance on panpsychism. It mainly concerns what Horgan sees as panpsychism's “geocentrism”; though it does touch on the nature of evidence (i.e., when it comes to both metaphysical and scientific theories).

The Pleasing Theory of Panpsychism

Firstly, Goff offers broad reasons for why he accepts panpsychism. Put simply, Goff believes that

“panpsychism offers the best account of how consciousness fits into a scientific worldview”.

I take it that because panpsychism is seen as being more “parsimonious”, “elegant” and “simple” (words Goff often uses) than its rivals, then that means that it's likely to be true. (This is precisely what string theorists believe about string theory.) Yet physicists and other scientists (such as Lee Smolin and Roger Penrose) have argued that simplicity, elegance, etc. alone don't always lead us in the right direction. They may offer a certain psychological neatness. However, beyond that, there’s an indefinite number of neat, elegant and parsimonious metaphysical theories which can explain the same data. The problem is that few of them seem to abide by the various scientific strictures. Thus, ultimately, often “anything goes” when aesthetics and metaphysics enter the game together.

Goff also argues that

“rival accounts of materialism and dualism face serious problems (some empirical, some conceptual) that panpsychism avoids”.

That’s true. However, we can now say that that panpsychism faces serious problems (some empirical, some conceptual) that rival accounts avoid.

Geocentrism?

Firstly, John Horgan accuses panpsychists of “neo-geocentrism”. And then Philip Goff accuses John Horgan of geocentrism.

According to both Goff and Horgan, geocentrism is

“the attempt to drag us back to the pre-Copernican view that reality revolves us human beings”.

So let John Horgan himself put what he takes to be the geocentrist position:

“[R]ecently prominent scientists and philosophers have been propagating ideas that restore us—more specifically, our minds, or consciousness - to the center of things. I call this perspective neo-geocentrism.”

He then tells us about the theorists he sees as being geocentric:

“Neo-geocentric thinking has always lurked at the fringes of science, but it is becoming more mainstream. That was apparent at ‘Sages & Scientists,’ convened in September by holistic-health mogul Deepak Chopra. The meeting called for ‘a new science’ that “can accept consciousness as fundamental and not just something generated by the brain.

“Neo-geocentric thinking was also rampant at consciousness powwows I attended in Tucson, Arizona, last spring and at New York University last fall, where tenured professors from major institutions proposed that consciousness matters at least as much as matter.”

There’s a distinction to be made here between the following:

i) Seeing consciousness as being “fundamental” to our own conceptions of the universe/reality.

and

ii) Seeing consciousness as being fundamental to the universe/reality simpliciter.

Thus it’s almost a truism to say that consciousness is fundamental to our individual and collective conceptions of reality/the universe because we observe and think about that reality through consciousness and the mind. However, this doesn’t mean that consciousness has a superior pride of place in the universe regardless of the individual or collective minds of human beings.

So in these senses, “consciousness matters” to us “at least as much as matter”. Again, that’s simply because we don’t have Thomas Nagel’s “view from Nowhere” when it comes to the universe/reality.

As for different kinds of “centrism. There will be properties that are specific to human beings; just as there are properties which are specific to ants or limestone rocks. So that doesn't necessarily mean that John Horgan also believes that “reality revolves around human beings”. In fact, what does that mean?

Goff then quotes Horgan (taken from his 'The Rise of Neo-Geocentrism' at Scientific American) thus:

“'As far as we know, consciousness is property of only one weird type of matter that evolved relatively recently here on Earth: brains.’”

I just take that as a statement of fact. Or, perhaps more correctly, a statement of what Horgan takes to be a fact. After all, he does precede that statement with the words “as far as we know”. So why designate this claim as “geocentrism”?

Goff then goes into greater detail about what he thinks “non-panpsychists” believe. He writes:

“For non-panpsychists, consciousness – the source of all that is of value in existence – is to be found on the planet alone, and only in its very recent history. In the immensity of the cosmos, we are uniquely special and privileged.”

There are many “non-panpsychists” who don't believe that. They realise that in our vast universe there will be many oases of consciousness or mind (depending on how these words are defined). In fact such non-panpsychists frequently tell is that we’re not “uniquely special and privileged”.

Goff then puts the panpsychist position. He writes:

“Panpsychists, in contrast, propose a new Copernican revolution, according to which there’s nothing special about human consciousness...”

Again, this view dates back a long time – all the way back to Aristarchus of Samos in the 4th century BC. Then we had “Kant’s aliens”, etc.

In addition, even if “phenomenal properties” exist all the way down, human consciousness may still be special and/or unique. This brings in, of course, the “combination problem”. That is, a human consciousness may be the combined result of myriad little minds/subjects; though that combination (or “subject summing”) is still something entirely different from its various phenomenal parts.

Again, even if someone accepts that phenomenal properties exist all the way down (i.e., to rocks and atoms), it may still be the case that human consciousness is indeed special. However, the word “special” is loaded because everything in the universe – from a type of rock to an ant - is special and unique in some (or even many) ways.

Unobservable Consciousness

Goff’s next argument is simple.

He argues that “non-panpsychists” stress the important fact that we can’t observe the consciousness (or phenomenal properties) of, say, a rock or an electron. Goff then says that we can’t observe the consciousness of another human being either. As far as it goes, Goff is correct.

Goff sets out his argument in the following manner:

“But given that consciousness is unobservable, we wouldn’t expect to observe consciousness in particles, whether it was there or not. Nor can we observe consciousness in brains. We know about consciousness not through observation and experiment but through the immediate awareness each of us has of her or his own conscious experience.”

We assume other human beings are conscious even if we can't “observe” their consciousness. And because they share so much with us, we then assume (though for many good reasons) that they must be like us in terms of consciousness or mind too. Yet that doesn't apply to rocks or atoms. Sure, there's also much that is unobservable in psychology and physics; though that doesn't mean we should embrace the unobservable phenomenal properties of atoms or rocks. These cases are hugely dissimilar.

It's also speculative and controversial position to lump unobservable Little Subjects in with such things as quarks, electrons, etc. There are very different standards applied to the unobservables of physics and the unobservables of metaphysics. For one, quarks or electrons aren't observable; though the effects of their interactions certainly are. Can the same be said of the phenomenal properties of a carbon atom or a rock?

In the proceeding post in his blog ('Can Panpsychism be Tested and Does It Matter?') Goff again tackles some of the same issues; specifically the nature of observability in scientific and metaphysical theories. For example, he writes:

“You can’t look inside an electron to see if it has experiences, but neither can you look inside a brain and see a person’s feelings and experiences. We know about consciousness not because of any observation or experiment, but because each of us is immediately aware of her or his own experiences.”

This was touched upon earlier in that it was accepted that we don’t literally observe consciousness in other human beings. Still, as with the “other minds” argument, we do observe the behavioural and linguistic expressions of consciousness. (Note: zombie and sceptical arguments still apply here.) Not only that: as Goff himself has put it, “consciousness is a datum in its own right”. Yet none of this can be applied to rocks or electrons. The cases are hugely dissimilar.

Absence of Evidence

Goff seems to accept the following (his word) “slogan”:

Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

More accurately, Goff says this slogan is “sometimes” true and sometimes false. And he’s logically correct to say so.

After all, the possibility of conscious electrons is yet another example of what is logically possible; alongside a tree with arms, zombies, a “mile-high unicycle” (David Chalmers' example), etc. And Goff, like David Chalmers, gets much mileage out of the logically possible.

In the case of panpsychism, the logically possible has provided Goff with the means to construct an entire metaphysical position – i.e. panpsychism.

In this specific case of absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, we can say that Goff believes the following:

The lack of evidence for conscious electrons

is not the same as evidence that

Electrons don’t have consciousness.

And, again, Goff cites the fact that consciousness is unobservable in terms of other human beings too. So, to follow through, the absence of evidence when it comes to the consciousness of another human being is not also evidence of a lack of consciousness when it comes to that other human being.

Despite that, Goff is also correct to argue that the absence-of evidence slogan is precisely the reason why Daniel Dennett believes that “humans are just complicated mechanisms”.

So, in these respects, Goff’s closing words are correct. Thus:

“As Descartes appreciated over 300 years ago, the existence of our consciousness is known with greater certainty than anything else. The reality of consciousness is a datum in its own right, over and above the data of observation and experiment.”

Are Panpsychists Closet Theists?

In passing, Goff mentions the fact that many people (not only John Horgan) believe that “that panpsychism has something to do with theism”. Goff disputes that charge and says (in parenthesis) that in his experience

“most panpsychists are atheists just looking for the best scientific account of consciousness”.

Goff must surely realise that this is only true of the professional analytic philosophers who’ve embraced panpsychism. (That’s if it’s even true of them.) Outside this very small domain, virtually all panpsychists have religious or spiritual motivations - which they freely and often express. Sure, analytic philosophers may not concern themselves with people who aren't fellow professional analytic philosophers; though I firmly believe that most people get their panpsychism from people who aren’t analytic philosophers.

Goff could also claim ad hominem. That is, he can argue that the motivations or religious beliefs of panpsychists are irrelevant when it comes to the arguments Goff himself and other panpsychists offer us. That’s partly true. However, discovering the motivations of panpsychists and context of panpsychism can also help us understand the arguments themselves.