It's a mistake to conflate positions within analytic
philosophy with the attitude that most analytic philosophers have to
(doing) philosophy itself.
It's
not really necessary for all analytic philosophers to explictly accept, say, that
“beliefs require justification”, “adding ad-hoc
hypotheses to an idea is bad”, or “that philosophers must have
knowledge of logical fallacies” - even if most of them do!
What
makes analytic philosophy superior to other traditions (in my view) is very simple
(i.e., not very sexy): the commitment to argumentation. I suppose that
this is broadly related to the idea that “beliefs require
justification”; though that's a particular position within
epistemology (at least as it's expressed above).
All
statements about analytic philosophy and other traditions will of
course involve generalisations. You can't escape that. All I can do
is give examples of what I mean.
I've
read a bit of Continental philosophy. Most of it doesn't seem to take
argument very seriously at all. In that sense it becomes more like
literature, poetry or political rhetoric than philosophy. Indeed some
philosophers (such as Jacques Derrida) have made this point
themselves.
For
example, I read an article by Jean Baudrillard which is really just one
long list of statements (rather than a piece of augmentation). All
those statements are also expressed in an extremely poetic manner. It
can be said, however, that arguments (or chains of reasoning) might
have led up to those statements; though they aren't contained in the
text itself. (This is also true, at least to some extent, of
Wittgenstein's Tractatus.)
Thus,
again, I would say that argumentation (as well as little rhetoric)
sums up analytic philosophy. Not a commitment to specific positions
within philosophy.
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