How
does E.O. Wilson explain science’s relatively new-found interest in ethics (or
in what he calls “ethical precepts”)? Wilson
writes:
“The
objective meaning of ethical precepts comprises the mental processes
that assemble them and the genetic and cultural histories by which
they evolved. Those who think that an is/ought gap exists have not
reasoned through the way the gap is filled by mental process and
history.” (70)
This
is a very interesting passage from Wilson. Indeed it's almost a
confessional one. Clearly it's purely descriptive in nature, not
normative. Perhaps it follows from this that it's not ethics at all:
it's the study of human ethics (or of ethical precepts). It's
“objective” simply because these
“ethical
precepts comprises [of] the mental processes that assemble them and
the genetic and cultural histories by which they evolved”.
Thus
this is what we (whoever ‘we’ are) take to be ethical
precepts - not what ethical precepts are or what they should
be. This is similar to what naturalised epistemology is to
traditional epistemology. Here, instead, we have a naturalised
ethics. Though if ethics is intrinsically normative, then perhaps it
can’t be (fully) naturalised (though no doubt natural processes will come into the equation).
Isn’t
ethics about how we should live, not how we do live? In
that sense, this isn't ethics at all. It's the sociological or
psychological study of human ethics or of ethical precepts. More
concretely, if Wilson thinks that ethics is the study of the “genetic
and cultural histories by which [ethical precepts] evolved”, then
we can't do anything about such causal aetiologies of our ethical
standards and principles because such things have (as it were)
already happened. Therefore this is simply a causal account of what
we believe and what we do in the ethical sphere.
The
study of the “mental process that assemble [our ethical precepts]”
isn't in itself the domain of ethics: it's the domain of
neuroscience, the philosophy of mind and empirical psychology.
How
is the is/ought gap bridged simply by reasoning about this “mental
process and history”? This is still the realm of the is, not
the ought. Just because we can fill the gap (as Wilson puts
it) between the original causes of our beliefs and principles and the
beliefs and principles themselves, that doesn't take us into the
normative or from the is to the ought (even
if the gap is filled with “mental processes and history” or
whatever else). By filling in the causal gaps between causes and
their effects (ethical precepts in Wilson’s book), we don't take
the ethical from the is to the ought or from the
descriptive to the normative. I'm simply not sure why Wilson believes
that the is/ought gap has been bridged or ‘filled’.
Julian
Baggini sees these problems as well. How will acquiring knowledge of
the causes of our ethical precepts tell us whether or not our
precepts are the right or wrong ones? The causal or scientific facts
of genetics or whatever may help us understand why we hold our
ethical precepts; though not why we should (still) hold them.
Baggini
writes:
“The
idea here seems to be that ethical precepts – for example, the
incest taboo – have their roots in particular genetic and cultural
histories. It is clear that understanding such histories will be a
useful tool in making ethical judgements. What is less clear is that
this is a way out of the is/ought problem. After all, I ask [Wilson],
are there not circumstances in which we will do well to struggle to
behave in ways that might seem contrary to our natural instincts, as,
for example, with respect to ethical precepts rooted in a mistrust of
strangers or in aggression responses?”
We
will indeed learn much from the aetiology of the incest taboo. Though
we won't learn whether that taboo is right or wrong from its “roots
in particular genetic and cultural histories”. This knowledge, of
course, may help us in other ways. It will tell us, for example, that
it wasn't passed down from heaven or that it's not a non-natural
precept which we somehow ‘intuit’. That knowledge will indeed
have an affect on our “ethical judgements”; though it will not,
on its own, determine the conclusions of our judgements.
What
will?
Wilson
seems to be saying that we can derive what we ought to do from
what is (or what was) the case. That is, if it's
genetically or culturally inscribed, then it must be a correct
ethical precept. That clearly doesn’t follow. Our natural
instincts, for example, may be bad instincts, as Baggini argues when
he says that when
“we
will do well to struggle to behave in ways that might seem contrary
to our natural instincts, as, for example, with respect to ethical
precepts rooted in a mistrust of strangers or in aggression
responses”.
Of
course certain “natural instincts” may also be good instincts. It
just depends.
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