The madman or religious maniac can be entirely coherent and systematic yet also be completely divorced from the world. His system of beliefs may also be entirely self-contained and even self-generated.
Alternatively, his set of beliefs may be based on certain foundational premises, from which his entire system is derived. However, the foundational premises may be utter nonsense even though their implications and entailments are valid (i.e., valid, though not sound).
For example, one
such foundational premise may be:
“Every statement in
this Holy Book is true.”
Thus not only would he
have numerous statements which he could believe (i.e., the ones in his
Holy Book); he could also believe all the propositions that are
entailed or implied by these statements.
For example, one such
statement in the Holy Book could be:
“Accept everything
that your heart says is true.”
From this statement he
could infer numerous other statements of belief that aren't even
directly connected to the original statements he's accepted in the
Holy Book itself. However, this could also lead him to reject certain
statements in the Holy Book.
For example, his heart
may tell him that certain statements in the Holy Book are untrue. He
would therefore have a tailor-made system of beliefs which both makes
him accept many statements in the Holy Book and yet also allows him to
reject the ones he thinks are untrue (or which he simply dislikes).
Then he'd have a problem
with self-reference. That is, the Holy Book says of itself:
“Everything in this
book is true.”
Though another statement
in the Holy Book also says:
“Accept what your
heart says is true.”
Which
he does. His heart tells him that certain statements in the Holy Book
are false. So according to the Holy Book and the man himself, the
Holy Book says that everything within it is true and that everything
one’s heart says is true. Though the heart says that
certain statements in the Holy Book are false. Thus the Holy Book
says that everything it says is true; though it also accepts a
statement that makes some of its other statements false.
If this man hadn't accepted the foundational statement that
“Everything this book says is true”, he wouldn’t have accepted
the statement that one should accept what the heart says (i.e., even if it
says that certain statements in the Holy Book are false).
We
can say that there are two systems now: the man’s and the Holy
Book’s. The man’s system grew out of the Holy Book; though the
Holy Book allowed him to disregard certain statements within it.
Of
course if the Holy Book says that “Everything in this book is true”
then that statement itself must also be true. Though, again, the Holy
Book contains a statement which allows the possibility that a person
needn't accept everything within it.
There
is also the self-referential problem of the Holy Book referring to
itself. Say that the statement “Everything in this book is true”
was said or written at time t1;
though the work itself wasn't finished until time t2.
Then that statement about
the book (which is within
the book) was written or said before the book was actually completed.
If that's the case, how was it known at time t1
that everything said or written after would be true if there was no
knowledge of such future statements?
There
are two answers to this.
One
is that although the statement “Everything in this book is true”
at the beginning of the book, it mightn't have been
written or said until the end of the book. It may be entirely
coincidental that the book was compiled with the self-referential
statement at the beginning rather than at the end.
Another
answer would be that God created the entire book in one go. Therefore
it's just a fortuitous that the self-referential statement is at the
beginning. In that case, that statement is neither at the end nor the
beginning of the book. All statements came together at the same
moment in the mind of God. Of course we aren't omniscient like God;
therefore our version of the book must contain that statement
somewhere in the work: either at the beginning, the end or even in
the middle. Again, if God is outside of time, then it makes no sense
to say that the statement of self-reference occurs at a particular
time within the book. The Holy Book is an abstract object in the mind
of God and so it doesn't partake of temporal sequence.
However,
isn’t
i) “Everything
within this book is true.”
similar to
ii) “Everything
within this statement is true.”?
However,
they're not identical in form. The first sentence (i) seemingly
refers to something else – viz., “this book”; whereas the
second statement (ii) refers only to itself qua
statement. However:
The book the first
statement refers to is the book that contains the statement that
refers to the book.
So statement (i) is still
self-referential; though not entirely so because there are many
statements in the book other than “Everything within this book is
true”. That statement refers both to itself and every other
statement in the book. If the self-referential statement weren't
true, then neither would all the other statements in the book be
true.
The
second statement (ii) above is more clearly self-referential than the
first statement. Perhaps it only achieves this because it is without
content. It says of itself that everything within itself is true.
However, in a certain sense there's nothing within itself. What is
this “everything” that's “within” the statement? It
quantifies using the term “everything” . Though the only thing
that's in the statement (other than the subject-term) is the
predicate “is true”. How can the clause “everything within
this statement” be true? It's not making a claim about anything
other than itself.
Thus
“Everything
within this statement is true” is true if and only if everything
within statement S is true (its
quasi truth conditions).
Thus
the statement is true if and only if it is true. It doesn't parallel
the form of the T sentence
The sentence ‘Snow
is white’ is true iff snow it white.
because
here the predicate “is true” refers to the sentence that claims
that snow
is white.
Thus there's a reference to both snow
being white
and to the sentence which says “Snow is white”. This is unlike the
truth predicate in the self-referential statement because this truth
predicate applies to both a statement with truth conditions (i.e.,
snow's
being white)
and to the metalinguistic sentence that says “The sentence....' is true iff '....”.
No comments:
Post a Comment