1)
Modal Logic From the Beginning?
An
argument is valid
if “the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the
conclusion”.
So
how does that actually work?
Regardless
of the truth (or otherwise) of the premises and conclusion, what is
the relation (in a valid
argument)
between premises and conclusion? Is it a necessary connection? Is it
semantic? Is it syntactic? Or is it logical – full stop?
Moreover,
what precisely is meant by the word “guarantee” (it doesn't seem
like a word from logic)?
Similarly
with the word “impossible” (as in “it's impossible for the
premises to be true and the conclusion false”)? What does the modal
word “impossible” mean in this context? Is it natural
impossibility?
Or, again, purely logical (i.e., syntactic)?
Similarly,
how do we recognise the soundness
and validity of arguments? Again, through semantic connections or
through logical (syntactic) form alone? More interestingly, does the
logical (syntactic) run entirely free of the semantic?
Modal
logic
is implied by propositional
logic
and
predicate
logic
(or
first-oder logic).
That is, with words such as “necessarily” and “possible”,
aren't we moving beyond propositional and predicate logic?
For
example, if I say,
It
couldn't be possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
false.
that
introduces possibility.
(Indeed even the world “couldn't” has modal import.)
Similarly,
If
the premises are true, then necessarily the conclusion must be true.
That
introduces necessity.
Finally,
I can say:
It
is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be
false.
That,
again, introduces possibility.
2)
The Cogito and Implicit/Hidden Premises
Some
arguments may only have one premise. Thus we move from that single
premise to a conclusion.
This
seems to be the case with Descartes'
Cogito:
“I think. Therefore I am.”
It
follows, then, that in order for the argument to valid (if not true),
the single premise may - or must - have hidden content. That's
certainly the case with the Cogito.
The
“I think” leads to the conclusion “Therefore I am” because
that “I think” has implicit/hidden/co
premises
(or hidden content). So what is its hidden content?
It's
this: “Anything that thinks, must exist.” Then it can be said
that “I think. Therefore I am” is effectively a tautology in that
the “I think” itself contains the notion of the speaker's (or
thinker's) necessary existence. In other words, existence is implied
in the premise - “I think”. Thus:
i) I, a living and
existing being, think.
ii) Therefore I am.
Or
the implicit premise can be even more detailed or broad. Thus:
i) If a thing thinks,
ii) then it must exist.iii) I think.
iv) Therefore I am.
Thus
we have two conditionals (or one conditional within another
conditional). Thus:
i)
If a thing thinks,
ii)
then it must exist.
and
then:
i)
I think.
ii)
Therefore I exist.
There
are other examples of a one-premise argument.
For
example,
i)
The world is flat.
ii)
Therefore the world is not mountainous.
Or:
i)
Jim is a gay.
ii)
Therefore, Jim's not heterosexual.
This
is because, again, there are implicit premises involved. Thus in the
following
I)
Jim is a bachelor.
ii)
Therefore Jim's an unmarried man.
the
implicit premise is:
No
bachelor can also be married.
Similarly
with 'gay' and 'heterosexual', as well as with 'flat' and
'mountainous'.
Whereas
'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' can be deemed synonyms,
that's not the case with 'flat' and 'mountainous'. In this case we
have antonyms
rather than synonyms. However, it isn't really the case the
'mountainous' is the antonym of 'flat'. A more accurate antonym of
'flat' would be, say, 'bumpy'. Or, more logically, the purest antonym
of 'flat' is, in fact, 'not flat' (except, of course, that antonyms
don't usually simply negate the source of the antonym).
3)
Validity Without Soundness
An
invalid argument can have a true conclusion.
To
put it simply: if the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises,
then it doesn't matter if it's true or false because, well, it
doesn't follow from the premises.
That
argument itself works as a conditional.
Thus:
i)
If a conclusion doesn't follow from the premises of an argument,
ii)
then it doesn't matter – logically - if the conclusion is either
true or false.
If
a conclusion genuinely follows from false premises, then the
conclusion can come out false. Again, that would only be the case if
the logical moves from the premises to the conclusion are valid. In
other words, in this scenario falsity is passed on from premises to
conclusion.
What
about the case in which the premises are true yet the argument is
invalid? In that case, false premises can lead to a true conclusion
if the argument is invalid because any conclusion (as already stated)
can follow an invalid argument.
The
obvious point to make is that because content (or even truth) is
unimportant when it comes to recognising a logical form, you can
create bizarre arguments which are nevertheless valid (though not
sound).
For
example,
All
corbetts are bricks.
All
bricks can solve equations.
Therefore
all corbetts can solve equations.
The
importance of this lack of a connection between premises and
conclusion (or between validity and soundness) can be shown with the
example of a true conclusion which follows an invalid argument. Or,
more likely, one may not immediately believe that the conclusion is
true because of the invalid argument. Thus one may look for a flaw in
the argument which led to it. However, even if the argument is
invalid, the conclusion can still be true.
4)
Either/Or Arguments
The
following argument is valid because it's impossible for the premises
to be true and the conclusion to be false:
i)
Either Corbett eats Cornflakes or he eats Ready
Brek.
ii)
Corbett doesn't eat Cornflakes.
iii)
Therefore Corbett eats Ready Brek.
Of
course the obvious question is: Why
is this an either/or case?
Couldn't Corbett eat neither
Cornflakes nor Ready Brek? Sure. However, that would be a factual
matter and not the concern of logic. Corbett may eat neither
Cornflakes nor any other cereal. Again, that would be irrelevant from
a logical point of view. What matters here isn't content or fact, but
logical
form.
More precisely, it's the relation between a disjunctive
premise
(as in “...or...”) , a premise which is a existential
negation
(“... does not...”) and a conclusion (“Therefore...).
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