|He means WW1, not WW2.|
The Husserlian phenomenologist had the same kinds of problem as the Cartesian epistemic doubter – the problem of a genuinely private language of private states of consciousness (or of private experiences).
In a sense Husserl was right: objects can only ‘display’ themselves in particular ‘profiles’. Not only is the phenomenological display our only access to external objects: that display itself must also be a profile (or mode of presentation) of some kind. Thus, despite all of Husserl’s objectivism and strong anti-psychologism, he still painted the subject as essentially trapped within his own consciousness; or as necessarily determined by - and dependent upon - displays which are themselves perspectival.
It's primarily scientists who don't accept such displays "as they appear". Husserl said that we must do. Thus, in that sense alone, the scientist is surely more of an objectivist than a Husserlian phenomenologist.
It's still only the reduced conscious state that tells us the truth about what is displayed. A non-bracketed conscious experience could indeed tell us lies about itself or its objects. It would do so, according to Husserl, because the present conscious state would be weighed down with past empirical and scientific knowledge; which, Husserl argues, simply distorts conscious states, their acts and objects. We need, therefore, a clean slate of consciousness to get to the truth of the matter.
To the phenomenologist:
objects and acts appear - as they are
objects appear - not as they are
Husserl’s philosophy is ethico-philosophical in the sense (like Heidegger, Levinas and Derrida) that he believed that man’s moral position (or 'being') must be the subject of Ethics as First Philosophy. In Husserl’s case, instead of emphasising the social or moral nature of man, he emphasised man’s subjective experiences. Here too science is the offender. Husserl believes that science had “progressively cut off subjective experience from the life-world”.