He means WW1, not WW2. |
The
Husserlian phenomenologist had the same kinds of problem as the
Cartesian epistemic doubter – the problem of a genuinely private
language of private states of consciousness (or of private
experiences).
In
a sense Husserl was right: objects can only ‘display’ themselves
in particular ‘profiles’. Not only is the phenomenological
display our only access to external objects: that display
itself must also be a profile (or mode of presentation) of some kind.
Thus, despite all of Husserl’s objectivism and strong
anti-psychologism, he still painted the subject as essentially
trapped within his own consciousness; or as necessarily determined by
- and dependent upon - displays which are themselves perspectival.
It's
primarily scientists who don't accept such displays "as they appear".
Husserl said that we must do. Thus, in that sense alone, the
scientist is surely more of an objectivist than a Husserlian
phenomenologist.
It's
still only the reduced conscious state that tells us the truth about
what is displayed. A non-bracketed conscious experience could indeed
tell us lies about itself or its objects. It would do so,
according to Husserl, because the present conscious state would be
weighed down with past empirical and scientific knowledge; which,
Husserl argues, simply distorts conscious states, their acts and
objects. We need, therefore, a clean slate of consciousness to get to
the truth of the matter.
To
the phenomenologist:
objects and acts appear - as they are
objects appear - not as they are
Afterword
Husserl’s
philosophy is ethico-philosophical in the sense (like Heidegger,
Levinas and Derrida) that he believed that man’s moral position (or
'being') must be the subject of Ethics as First Philosophy. In
Husserl’s case, instead of emphasising the social or moral nature
of man, he emphasised man’s subjective experiences. Here too
science is the offender. Husserl believes that science had
“progressively cut off subjective experience from the life-world”.
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