Let's
firstly state how literal the panpsychical idea can actually be. Take
David Chalmers saying that “we can expect a quark’s experience to
be much simpler than an experience of redness”. Yes, Chalmers is
saying that quarks may well experience things. He mitigates that by
saying that “[w]e are not in a position to say much about what
microexperience is like”. He adds that a quark's
experience is “much simpler than an experience of redness”.
Chalmers also says that microphysical experience “is almost
certainly much simpler than human experience”.
So
at first glance there's no doubt at all that panpsychism is a bizarre
theory. It just seems so intuitively unbelievable.
On
the positive side, one can argue (perhaps ironically) that Chalmers'
panprotopsychism is more naturalistic (or scientifically kosher) than
many of the physicalist alternatives. After all, if panpsychism is
the position that consciousness/experience is as elemental and
irreducible as space, time and mass (and therefore can found in
single-celled organisms and even in inanimate matter), then
panpsychists have a better explanation of why consciousness 'emerges'
from the brain than many of their rivals. There's a big problem,
however. And that is that there's no reason to believe that
consciousness/experience is elemental. This basic panpsychist
assumption is thoroughly speculative.
Experience
is Everywhere
The
most counterintuitive aspect of Chalmers' position is that he doesn't
take experience to be only an aspect (or part) of human minds or even
of animal minds generally. He believes that experience is something
to be found outside of minds – or “everywhere” (as he puts it).
Take
a mouse. Chalmers writes:
“A
mouse has a simpler information-processing structure than a human,
and has correspondingly simpler experience.” [2010]
So
at least we're still talking about minds here (if the mind of a
mouse).
What
about, say, a thermostat? Chalmers says that
“perhaps
a thermostat, a maximally simple information processing structure,
might have maximally simple experience?”
On
this reading, inanimate objects may have experiences (or have
experience).
Perhaps
none of this should be a surprise if we see experience as a
“fundamental property” - which is just how Chalmers himself sees
it. Experience-as-a-fundamental-property is, by definition,
“everywhere”. That's partly why the word “fundamental” is
used in science. Thus because experience is (or may be) a fundamental
property, Chalmers concludes by saying that
“it would be surprising for it to arise only every now and then; most fundamental properties are more evenly spread”. [1995]
Tiny Minds?
Clearly
a distinction has to be made here between that which is necessary for
experience/consciousness and experience/consciousness itself. The
panprotopsychical position is that what may be responsible for minds
can be found right down the line to basic matter. However, why should
we also say that such things are minds or that they display
“experiential properties”? That's like saying that an individual
brick has something in common with the house it is part of. Or,
alternatively, it's like saying that each brick somehow "contains" the house in miniature. A better example may be to say that each
neuron is a miniature mind. That is, experience or mind can be found
at the level of the individual neuron.
Despite
saying all that, it's clear that Chalmers himself has a pretty
deflationary view (hence the 'proto' in 'panprotopsychism'!) of what
it means to say consciousness/experience pervades the fundamental
levels of matter. He writes:
“There needn't be anything like 'minds' as we usually think of them at the fundamental level, for example -- I'm not suggesting that electrons are having deep thoughts about the protons they're revolving around!”[1998]
So
what is Chalmers suggesting? He's suggesting the following:
“It's
just some sort of very simple, primitive analog of experience, going
all the way down.” [1998]
Of
course stating that “experience itself as a fundamental feature of
the world” seems counterintuitive and even eccentric. That's
primarily because most people hold the view that consciousness is a
consequence of something that's highly complex – i.e., the brain. Thus to
be told that a stone or even a lump of shit can have (or contain)
experience seems unfathomable. Again, a stone or lump of shit can
contain experience because experience itself, according to Chalmers,
is in the same ballpark as mass, charge and space-time.
In
Chalmers' panprotopsychism we move away from the general view that
consciousness is a result of some kind of complexity.
Panprotopsychism, on the other hand, is partly about special
fundamental entities. Chalmers says that
“the view that fundamental entities are protoconscious, that is, that they have certain special properties that are precursors to consciousness and that can collectively constitute consciousness in larger systems.” [2013]
Thus
arguing that everything has a constituent that is necessary for
consciousness/experience isn't the same saying that everything has a
mind. On this reading, then, Chalmers isn't actually a literal (or
true) panpsychist. Chalmers himself puts that point in the following
way:
"In practice, people who call themselves panpsychists are not committed to as strong a doctrine. They are not committed to the thesis that the number two has a mind, or that the Eiffel tower has a mind, or that the city of Canberra has a mind, even if they believe in the existence of numbers, towers, and cities." [2013]
Emergence
and Complexity
However,
various philosophers have given reasons for such emergence. They've
argued that new fundamental physical principles came into being at
certain levels of physical complexity. It's those new fundamental
physical principles which may be responsible for consciousness or
experience.
Chalmers, on the other hand, says that panpsychism is the “view on which the novel properties are somehow inside the microphysical network from the start”. That statement in itself can be seen as an indirect argument against emergentism in that if “novel properties” exist “from the start”, then nothing truly novel can be said to emerge from complexity (or from anything else). Higher degrees of novelty (to carry on using Chalmers' word) may well occur; though since novelty exists from the very beginning it's hard to say that novelty suddenly emerges from complexity. (As with Leibniz's 'monads'?)
This idea is put in another way by Chalmers when he says that “constitutive panpsychism holds that microexperiences somehow add up to yield macroexperience”. So here again we have the idea that complexity may be necessary; though it is “microexperiences” in addition to complexity which are required for human consciousness.
Despite saying all that, there's still a hint at emergence when Chalmers says that we “can allow that macroexperience is not wholly grounded in microexperience”. However, instead of referring to complexity-in-the-abstract, Chalmers says that macroexperience “might be grounded in microexperience along with certain further structural or functional properties”. Again, it's not only microexperiental properties which “ground” macroexperience, we need to take on board “further structural or functional properties” as well.
This idea is put in another way by Chalmers when he says that “constitutive panpsychism holds that microexperiences somehow add up to yield macroexperience”. So here again we have the idea that complexity may be necessary; though it is “microexperiences” in addition to complexity which are required for human consciousness.
Despite saying all that, there's still a hint at emergence when Chalmers says that we “can allow that macroexperience is not wholly grounded in microexperience”. However, instead of referring to complexity-in-the-abstract, Chalmers says that macroexperience “might be grounded in microexperience along with certain further structural or functional properties”. Again, it's not only microexperiental properties which “ground” macroexperience, we need to take on board “further structural or functional properties” as well.
References
Chalmers,
David. (2013) 'Panpsychism
and Panprotopsychism'.
(2010)
The
Character of Consciousness.- (1998) 'Much Ado About Consciousness', Chalmers interviewed by Andrew Chrucky.
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