The word “information” has many different uses and definitions in the sciences and philosophy. Most of these differ strongly from how laypersons use the word. Some physicists define (or use) the word to make it the case that information needn’t be (in John Searle’s terms) “observer-relative”… In terms of information and its relation to consciousness. Neuroscientist Giulio Tononi believes that consciousness (or experience) simply is information — at least as it is processed by animal brains and even by non-biological “systems”.
The American mathematician, electrical engineer and cryptographer Claude E. Shannon (1916–2001) backed up the words above when he wrote the following:
“It is hardly to be expected that a single concept of information would satisfactorily account for the numerous possible applications of this general field.”
More particularly, the way that some (i.e., not all) physicists define (or simply use) the word “information” (as will be shown later) will make it the case that information need not be, to use the philosopher John Searle’s term, “observer-relative”. On Searle’s own definition, then, the word “information” is defined to make it the case that information must be — or always is — relative to persons (or to minds).
As just hinted at, the most important point to realise is that minds (or observers) are usually thought to be required to make information… information. However, information is also said to exist without minds (or observers). Thus, some (perhaps even many) physicists argue that information existed before there were human minds, and it will also exist after human minds have disappeared from the Universe. (See ‘Why information is central to physics and the universe itself’.)
All this, of course, raises lots of semantic and philosophical questions.
So it may help to compare information with knowledge.
Knowledge requires persons, minds and/or observers. Yet information may not do so.
So it’s certainly the case that some physicists don’t see information in the everyday sense. More particularly, such physicists see such things as particles and fields in informational terms. As for thermodynamics: if there’s an event which affects a dynamic system, then that too can be read as being informational input into the “system”. (In this case, that change can be represented — or modeled - as being a computational system.)
What’s more, in the field called pancomputationalism, (just about) any thing (or at least any object) can be deemed to be information (as it were) concretised. Thus, pancomputationalism ties in very strongly with John Wheeler’s well-known position on information.
John Archibald Wheeler on Information
The theoretical physicist John Archibald Wheeler (1911–2008) believed that everything we discover (at least in science or, perhaps, only physics) is about bits of information. Indeed, Wheeler believed that an object (or what he called an “information-theoretic entity”) is derived from (our?) information. Technically, this is a transformation which Wheeler called “it from bit”.
Thus, we don’t have an “it” (i.e., a physical object) until we firstly have a “bit” (a unit of information).
In more concrete terms, Wheeler once wrote the following words:
“An example of the idea of it from bit: when a photon is absorbed, and thereby ‘measured’ — until its absorption, it had no true reality — an unsplittable bit of information is added to what we know about the world, and, at the same time, that bit of information determines the structure of one small part of the world. It creates the reality of the time and place of that photon’s interaction.”
Wheeler seemed to be arguing that a photon literally gains its “reality” when it’s “absorbed”. Thus, if a particular photon gained its reality only when (or after) it was absorbed, then it mustn’t have had any reality before that absorption.
Surely we can now conclude that there simply was no photon before the absorption!
Basically, then, Wheeler stressed that the absorption can be seen in informational terms. That is, when the photon was absorbed, then “an unsplittable bit of information is added to what we know about the world”. In other words, only when the photon was absorbed could “we” (i.e., experimental physicists) gain information about it. Before that, the photon had zero reality because such physicists had zero information about it.
Here it may be helpful to note a problem with both pancomputationalism and Wheeler’s position as it’s summed up by physicist Christopher Fuchs. As presented by science writer Philip Ball, we have the following argument:
“Fuchs sees these insights as a necessary corrective to the way quantum information theory has tended to propagate the notion that information is something objective and real — which is to say, ontic. ‘It is amazing how many people talk about information as if it is simply some new kind of objective quantity in physics, like energy, but measured in bits instead of ergs’, he says. ‘You’ll often hear information spoken of as if it’s a new fluid that physics has only recently taken note of.’ In contrast, he argues, what else can information possibly be except an expression of what we think we know?”
That passage can be read as arguing that stuff (as it were) gives off information, rather than stuff actually being information in and of itself. Yet (as already stated) this conflicts with what some philosophers and physicists believe. That is, they believe (as Fuchs himself seems to put it) that information is in no way mind-dependent. That is, they believe that information is information regardless of minds, persons, observers, experiments, tests, etc.
It seems that Fuchs is (at least partly) at one with John Searle in rejecting this reification of information.
Thus, information may well become (what Searle calls) information-for-us for such physicists. However, it’s still regarded as information before it became information-for-us.
Now, the way Integrated Information Theorists (see ‘Integrated information theory’) use of the word “information” receives some (or even much) support in contemporary physics.
So what about consciousness and its relation to information?
Giulio Tononi on Information (Integrated Information Theory)
We can cite the neuroscientist and psychiatrist Giulio Tononi (1960 — ) as an example of someone who believes that consciousness (or experience) simply is information. Or, perhaps more accurately, information as it’s processed by brains and non-biological “systems”.
Thus, if that’s a statement of identity, then can we invert it and say this? -
information is (=) consciousness
Yet Tononi believes that consciousness doesn’t equal just any kind of information. However, any kind of information (embodied in a system) may be conscious (at least to some degree).
Indeed, according to Tononi, the mathematical measure of that information (in an informational system) is symbolised by φ (phi).
Technically, not only are systems more than their combined parts: those systems have various degrees of “informational integration”. Thus, the higher the informational integration, the more likely that system will be conscious.
Interestingly, Swedish-American physicist, cosmologist and machine learning researcher Max Tegmark (1967 — ) uses IIT to distinguish conscious matter from other physical systems such as gases, liquids and solids. Indeed, he virtually replicates Tononi when he tells us that consciousness is dependent upon “the information, integration, independence, dynamics, and utility principles”.
The problem (if it is a problem) with arguing that consciousness (or experience) is information, and that information is everywhere, is that (as has just been said) even very simple objects (or “systems”) instantiate (or contain) a degree of information. Therefore, such basic objects must also have a degree of consciousness. Or, in the language of Integrated Informational Theory (IIT), all such objects (or systems) have a “φ value”. (This value is the measure of the degree of information — therefore consciousness - in the system.)
Clearly, then, we’ve entered the territory of panpsychism here.
Not surprisingly, Tononi’s position does seem to tangentially touch on panpsychism (i.e., even if his position isn’t identical to many panpsychists). That said, Tononi’s has written conflicting things about this particular philosophical ism.
For example, he has written the following:
“Unlike panpsychism, however, IIT clearly implies that not everything is conscious.”
What’s more, most IIT theorists and experimentalists emphasise complexity and integration, and they also focus almost entirely on biological brains.
So how can these facts square with panpsychism?
Thus, linking IIT to panpsychism seems — at least at first sight — to be all wrong.
Giulio Tononi himself has little time for the purely philosophical theories of consciousness. Indeed, he has argued that they “lack predictive power”.
Despite all that, IIT has it that even basic objects have a nonzero degree of Φ, which (again) is Tononi’s unit of measurement for consciousness (see here). This would mean that consciousness is almost everywhere — if only to a rudimentary degree (as with the “proto-experience” of panpsychists).
In any case, the argument that IIT is not a kind of panpsychism is at odds with what the philosophers David Chalmers and John Searle believe. They do take IIT to be a form of panpsychism. (See here and here.) What’s more, the German-American neurophysiologist and neuroscientist Christof Koch (Tononi’s co-worker) has even claimed that IIT is a “scientifically refined version” of panpsychism.
To slightly change the subject.
The philosopher Searle (again) has a problem with the overuse of the word “computation”.
John Searle on Information and Computation
John Searle (1932 — ) cites the example of a window as a (to use David Chalmers’ words) “maximally-simple” computer. Searle writes:
“[T]he window in front of me is a very simple computer. Window open = 1, window closed = 0. That is, if we accept Turing’s definition according to which anything to which you can assign a 0 and a 1 is a computer, then the window is a simple and trivial computer.”
Searle’s basic point is that just about any thing (or at least any object) can be seen as a computer.
Indeed, Searle believes that computers are everywhere .
So does a window contain (or instantiate) information?
By that I don’t mean the information that may exist in a window’s material and mechanical structure. (According to the physicists discussed at the beginning, a window — being a physical object — must contain information.) I mean to ask whether or not a window has information qua a technological device which can be both opened and shut.
Yet Searle believes that a window is only an example of information-for-us.
Searle has more to say about information. He writes:
“[Koch] is not saying that information causes consciousness; he is saying that certain information just is consciousness, and because information is everywhere, consciousness is everywhere.”
Searle concludes:
“I think that if you analyze this carefully, you will see that the view is incoherent. Consciousness is independent of an observer. I am conscious no matter what anybody thinks. But information is typically relative to observers. []
“[] These sentences, for example, make sense only relative to our capacity to interpret them. So you can’t explain consciousness by saying it consists of information, because information exists only relative to consciousness.”
David Chalmers’ Thermostat as an “Information-Theoretic Entity”
The philosopher David Chalmers (mentioned in parenthesis earlier) tells us that “information is everywhere”. He also informs us about the difference between “complex information-processing” and “simpler information-processing”. (This distinction is relevant when discussing panpsychism.)
I suppose that in the case of a thermostat (which Chalmers cites as an example of an object which carries out simple information-processing), we can take some guesses as to what (its?) information is.
Basically, heat and cold are bits of information. However, are heat and cold information for the thermostat? Indeed, does that even matter?
Or is it the case that the actions (or cases of processing) which are carried out on the heat and cold (by the thermostat) constitute information? More likely, perhaps it’s the physical nature of a thermostat (its mechanical and material innards) that constitutes its information.
In any case, Searle has something to say on thermostats too. He writes:
“I say about my thermostat that it perceives changes in the temperature; I say of my carburettor that it knows when to enrich the mixture; and I say of my computer that its memory is bigger than the memory of the computer I had last year.”
This means that this is Searle’s way (as with Daniel Dennett) of taking an intentional stance towards thermostats. That is, we can treat them — or take them — as intentional (though inanimate) objects. We can also take them as as-if intentional objects.
On Searle’s view, then, the as-if-ness of windows and thermostats is derived from the fact that these inanimate objects have been designed to (as it were) perceive, know and act. However, this is only as-if perception, as-if knowledge and as-if action. Indeed, it’s only as-if information. Thus, such things are dependent on human perception and human knowledge. Yet such as-if perception, knowledge and action require real — or “intrinsic” — intentionality. This means that Chalmers’ thermostat and Searle’s window have a degree of as-if intentionality, which is derived from (our) intrinsic intentionality.
Finally, despite all these qualifications of as-if intentionality, Searle still believes that as-if intentionality is “real” intentionality.
Conclusion: Is it All About Semantics?
Perhaps all the above mainly boils down to the various and many definitions and uses of the word “information”.
To repeat. The way that some physicists define (or use) the word “information” will make it the case that, in John Searle’s terms, information need not be “observer-relative”. On Searle’s definition, on the other hand, the word “information” is defined to make it the case that information must be — or always is — relative to persons (or minds).
Is there anything more to this debate other than rival definitions?
Perhaps not much more.
However, there is one vital distinction to be made here. If information (or at least information-processing by brains and systems) also equals consciousness or experience, then information not being dependent on human beings (or on their minds) makes a big difference. It means that such information is information regardless of what human beings observe or think. It will also mean that information can exist in non-biological systems regardless of what human beings observe or think.
This (again) is basically (at least) part of the panpsychist view. However, the physicists just mentioned (i.e., those who accept that information need not be observer-relative) don’t necessarily also accept that information (or information-processing) is the same as consciousness or experience. Indeed, most physicists do not accept that.
To sum up, then. This essay has outlined the following three basic positions:
1) Information is relative to observers. (John Searle’s position.)
2) Information exists regardless of observers. However, information (or its processing) isn’t equal to consciousness or experience. (The position of some physicists and philosophers.)
3) Information exists regardless of observers. Information (or information-processing) is also identical (or equal) to consciousness or experience. (Arguably, Chalmers’ and Tononi’s position.)
Whatever position one adopts (even if one rejects all three), it’s fairly clear that the nature of information can’t be ignored by either physicists or philosophers.
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