This essay is a commentary on Rudolf Carnap’s ‘The Elimination of Metaphysics’, written in 1932. It’s critical, but not as much as many other retrospective commentaries have been. As with W.V.0. Quine, I sympathise with the spirit of logical positivism, if not the letter. So many readers will know about the flaws and failings of logical positivism. Indeed, it often seems that philosophers and others are keener to point them out than those of any other philosophical “school”. (Alternatively put, more people than usual have found logical positivism distasteful.) Yet most philosophical *isms* have just as many flaws and failings. So it can be assumed that logical positivism touched a nerve.
Aren’t metaphysics and Christianity the bedrock — if in various circuitous ways - of Western civilisation? Didn’t they also “give birth to science”? (Let’s forget here that science still contains metaphysical elements.) Rudolf Carnap’s own slant on these questions was to ask his own question about metaphysics:
“[H]ow could it be explained that so many men in all ages and nations, among them eminent minds, spent so much energy, nay veritable fervour, on metaphysics if the latter consisted of nothing but mere words, nonsensically juxtaposed? And how could one account for the fact that metaphysical books have exerted such a strong influence on readers up to the present day, if they contained not even errors, but nothing at all?”
Even if readers are critical of metaphysics, the words “consisted of nothing but mere words, nonsensically juxtaposed” seem extreme and even gratuitous. Indeed, can any word (one that’s actually used in any way) be a mere word? What could that even mean? In addition, the words “nonsensically juxtaposed” seem equivalent to randomly juxtaposed.
Readers should realise that all this is the case only according to Carnap’s own philosophy — with its various stipulations and fixed rules of usage. Outside of that domain, it can be argued that Carnap’s own words on metaphysics seem like mere words nonsensically juxtaposed…
But this isn’t necessarily a criticism.
It’s simply to say that in order to eliminate metaphysics (or to create any philosophical system) one must adopt various technical positions, make various stipulations, and fix the rules of that system. Many philosophers before Carnap had done exactly that too. This kind of thing has to be done in almost all philosophical enterprises, and not only when it comes to the elimination of metaphysics.
In any case, Carnap explained the quoted passage above. Yet, in a sense, he backtracked a little when he conceded that metaphysics isn’t just about mere words nonsensically juxtaposed. He said that “metaphysics does indeed have a content; only it is not theoretical content”.
What does that mean?
To Carnap, it meant that the
“(pseudo)statements of metaphysics do not serve for the *description of states of affairs*, neither existing ones (in that case they would be true statements) nor non-existing ones (in that case they would be at least false statements)”.
So what purpose do metaphysical statements serve? They
“serve for the *expression of the general attitude of a person towards life*”.
The first quote directly above is something that metaphysicians could hardly disagree with. Metaphysics doesn’t describe states of affairs: it tells us what states of affairs are. Moreover, metaphysicians would admit that their statements aren’t true or false in any empirical or fact-stating sense.
What metaphysicians may disagree with (at least some of them) is that metaphysical statements serve for the expression of the general attitude of a person towards life. This is hard to decide upon. It depends on the metaphysician concerned. It’s certainly true of some philosophers. However, the words the expression of the general attitude of a person towards life may still seem a little poetic and even vague. Nonetheless, they do seem to fit philosophers like Soren Kierkegaard, the existentialists, etc. They may even fit Martin Heidegger. The question is: Were the former metaphysicians, as well as philosophers? Heidegger has been seen as a metaphysician. Indeed, that’s how Carnap himself saw him [see here].
As it is, Carnap gave his own example of an expression of a general attitude towards life. He cited the “dualistic-heroic attitude towards life in a dualistic system”. Here it’s as if Carnap was discussing poets or musicians, rather than metaphysicians. (He did mention Beethoven.) He explained why we may mistake metaphysicians for philosophers, rather than artists. The metaphysician
“selects language as the medium of expression and declarative sentences as the form of expression”.
On social media, and elsewhere, there is a host of declarative sentences to be found from amateur philosophers. Indeed, this is their favourite mode of expression. Thus, you get expressions such as “Consciousness is…”, “Truth is…”, etc. Carnap himself compared this to what the “lyrical poets do”. The difference being that lyrical poets, unlike metaphysicians, don’t “succumb[] to self-delusion”. In simple terms, they don’t take their statements (even if declarative) to be metaphysical in any strict sense. [See note 1.]
A History of Anti-Metaphysicians
In the first half of the 20th century, six anti-metaphysicians were born before each breakfast. Carnap was well aware of that. Indeed, he traced this “tradition” back to the “empiricists of the nineteenth century”, and even further back to the “Greek sceptics”. Many of these examples were empiricists, if in a watered down way. Such philosophers “declared the doctrine of metaphysics false, since it contradicts our empirical knowledge”. According to Carnap, other anti-metaphysicians have believed that metaphysics is “uncertain, on the ground that its problems transcend the limits of human knowledge”. Yet others simply argued that metaphysics is “sterile”.
That was Carnap’s brief history of anti-metaphysics. Yet he finished off with these confident words:
“Whether or not these questions can be answered, it is at any rate unnecessary to worry about them; let us devote ourselves entirely to the practical tasks which confront active men every day of their lives!”
Retrospectively, it seems that Carnap and the logical positivists only really concerned themselves with science and physics, not with the “practical tasks [of ] active men”… Unless, that is, he meant the practical tasks of scientists. After all, the logical positivists rarely moved beyond analysing science and criticising traditional philosophy. There were exceptions, of course, such as Otto Neurath, who was active politically as a socialist. Then again, Neurath’s political activism might well been over and above his logical positivism [ see here].
Carnap on Meaningless Statements
Most people are offended by the claim that what they say is “meaningless”.
In a previous article called ‘The Logical Positivists’ Use of the Word ‘Meaningless’: A Retrospective’, I argued that the logical positivists used the word “meaningless” in a strict technical way. It’s possible that I was wrong about that. Or, at the least, when it comes to Carnap, I might have been wrong. The following passage is something I might well have missed:
“In saying that the so-called statements of metaphysics are *meaningless*, we intend this word in its strictest sense.”
Despite all that, Carnap did say that he was talking about the “statements of metaphysics”, not everyday statements. Carnap distinguished metaphysical statements from other statements. In the latter case, he conceded that
“[i]n a loose sense of the word a statement or a question is at times called meaningless if it is entirely sterile to assert or ask it”.
This isn’t about a statement being false: it’s about it being “sterile”.
That still leaves open the issue as to what Carnap meant by “this word in its strictest sense”.
Again, it was metaphysical statements that were deemed to be “meaningless” by Carnap. He went into detail on this in the following passage:
“In the domain of metaphysics, including all philosophy of value and normative theory, logical analysis yields the negative result *that the alleged statements in this domain are entirely meaningless*.”
It isn’t just a case that metaphysical statements are meaningless: they don’t stand as statements at all. They don’t stand as statements because they’re incapable of being either true or false. And even if we forget about Carnap and other logical positivists, philosophers can independently argue that, strictly speaking, metaphysical statements are neither true nor false. That’s because they aren’t statements at all.
Yet even though the projects of logical positivism have long since died, philosophers are still taking similar positions on metaphysical statements. The difference being that they don’t employ the precise “logical analyses” which Carnap used to come to his positions.
Carnap’s Logical Analysis of Metaphysical Statements
Carnap asked, “What, now, is the meaning of a word?”
Much of what Carnap wrote about this issue will be ignored. Instead, I’ll just give a slight flavour of his logical analysis.
When it comes to a sentence which includes a word whose meaning is being established, Carnap offered the following formulations:
“(1) What sentences is S *deducible* from, and what sentences are deducible from S?
(2) Under what conditions is S supposed to be true, and under what conditions false?
(3) How is S to be *verified*?
(4) What is the *meaning* of S?”
Formulation (1) highlights the importance of logic to the logical positivists. (As it stands, it says nothing about the semantic content of S.) (2) ties S to ways of establishing its truth or falsehood. Prima facie, (3) is linked to (2). (The truth “conditions” which make S true are also the source of S’s verification. Yet a truth condition alone isn't also a verification.) Finally, (1), (2) and (3) are the means of establishing the “meaning” of S. This was deemed to especially the case when it came to (2). All that said, (1), (2), (3) and (4) have often been tackled independently.
Carnap extends the logic of (1), (2), (3) and (4), but he does so later on in his text. Here again he dealt with a sentence and a word contained within it.
If ‘a’ symbolises a word, and ‘S(a)’ a sentence with that word within it, then we have the following formulations from Carnap:
“(1) The *empirical criteria* for ‘a’ are known.
(2) It has been stipulated from what protocol sentences ‘S(a) is *deducible*.
(3) The *truth-conditions* for ‘S(a)’ are fixed.
(4) The method of *verification* of ‘S(a)’ is known.”
At least as it stands, (1) is a little vague. (2) is similar to (1) above and, again, highlights the use of logic. (Carnap used the word “stipulated”, and, as will be seen, this is a vital part of his general philosophy. In addition, “protocol sentences” will also be covered in a moment.) One way in which (3) is related to (2) is by virtue of the word “fixed”. When protocol sentences are stipulated, then the truth conditions for S(a) become fixed. Finally, (4) is related to the earlier (3). Verification is a method (or a process), unlike a truth condition. This raises the question: By which kind of process is any given S verified?
For Carnap, what was the point of all this technical work? It was to show that
“[m]any words of metaphysics, now, can be shown not to fulfil the above requirement, and therefore to be devoid of meaning”.
Earlier, Carnap used the word “stipulated”. It can now be said that in order for the words found in metaphysics to have meaning, Carnap stipulated that they must fulfil the above requirements. That is, they must abide by rules (1), (2), (3) and (4).
What kind of metaphysical words did Carnap have in mind?
The following are Carnap’s own examples: “God”, “the Idea”, “the Infinite”, “the being of being”, “non-being”, “thing in itself”, “absolute spirit”, “objective spirit”, “essence”, “being in itself”, “being-for-itself”, “emanation”, “primordial basis”, “the absolute”, “the unconditioned”, “the autonomous”, “the self-dependent”.
Why did Carnap choose those particular examples?
Some are well-known historical examples. The words “the being of being”, “being in itself”, “being-for-itself” are references to the work of Martin Heidegger (later taken up by Jean-Paul Sartre).
According to Carnap, all these words are “devoid of meaning”. They are so according to (1), (2), (3) and (4) above. Or in ordinary prose:
“The metaphysician tells us that empirical truth-conditions cannot be specified; if he asserts that nevertheless he ‘means’ something, we show that this is merely an allusion to associated images and feelings which, however, do not bestow a meaning on the word.”
Carnap claimed that the metaphysician “tells us that empirical truth-conditions cannot be specified”. Isn’t it actually the case that the metaphysician is more likely to say that his words don’t have empirical truth-conditions in Carnap’s strict sense?
Prima facie, there doesn’t seem to be anything wrong about claiming that meanings can be linked to “associated images and feelings”. Except, of course, that if this were the case, then such “meanings” can’t be publicly available. In other words, private images and feelings cannot be the basis of public words and a public language. Thus, the logical positivists (along with Wittgenstein) started the tradition which emphasised the public manifestability of meanings [see here]. More relevantly to Carnap’s project, metaphysics is replete with words which rely on associated images and feelings. In other words, there’s no scientific or even public (i.e., inter-subjective) way of establishing what they really mean.
Carnap then paid homage to David Hume when he stated that only “analytic propositions” and statements within “empirical science” have “sense”. Metaphysical statements, on the other hand, are “devoid of sense”. This, more than anything, highlights the categorical and stipulatory nature of Carnap’s philosophy. This isn’t to say that it’s wrong or has no value: only that it’s a philosophical system which attempted to make sense of metaphysic’s many flaws and failings.
Carnap on the Given
The technical terms “the given”, “protocol sentences” and “basic sentences” are linked to each other in Carnap’s text. In simple terms, what is given in consciousness (or the mind) becomes the basis for Carnap’s protocol sentences.
The logical positivists took different positions on what protocol sentences are, as Carnap conceded. In 1932, the situation was as follows:
“At times the position is taken that sentences about the given speak of the simplest qualities of sense and feeling (e.g. ‘warm’, ‘blue’, ‘joy’ and so forth); others incline to the view that basic sentences refer to total experiences and similarities between them; a still different view has it that even the basic sentences speak of things.”
In colloquial terms, the upshot here is that the logical positivists believed that they had to start from somewhere. So some of them decided to start with the simplest qualities of sense and feeling. Others settled for total experiences and the similarities between them. The rest argued that we must start from things (or objects).
Carnap didn’t believe that these differences mattered too much. What mattered to him was that “a sequence of words has a meaning only if its relations of deducibility to the protocol sentences are fixed”. This means that what matters is deducing further sentences from protocol sentences, which, in turn, are based upon the simplest qualities of sense and feeling, total experiences and the similarities between them, or on things.
If we invert all that, a word or sentence is “significant” only if it’s “reducible to protocol sentences”.
Conclusion: Carnap’s Philosophical System
It seems like a statement of the obvious to say that what Carnap argued about metaphysics can only be accepted if one also accepts his own system - with all its technical analyses, stipulations and rules. Thus, when he stated that “meaningful metaphysical statements are impossible”, readers must be aware that they’re only impossible according to Carnap’s own philosophical system. Similarly when it comes to meaninglessness. If we accept that “the meaning of a statements lies in the method of its verification”, then, abracadabra, metaphysical statements become meaningless.
Carnap didn’t eliminate metaphysics.
Indeed, even if everything he claimed were true, correct or whatever, it’s still wise to assume that metaphysics would have carried on regardless — for precisely the reasons that Carnap himself highlighted.
As the philosopher John Cottingham put it in Western Philosophy (writing in 1996):
“The direction future metaphysics will take remains unclear; what seems certain is that, in some form or other, fundamental questions about ‘being’ and reality’ will continue to remain at the centre of philosophical inquiry.”
Carnap might well have responded by saying, Of course people will keep on asking these questions, just as they keep on believing in various religions, killing each other, having sex, and whatnot. This is especially true since, as Carnap himself claimed, metaphysics is more akin to “lyric poetry” than it is to science or even to philosophy itself.
Note:
(1) For example, “Beauty is truth” isn’t meant to be a metaphysical statement that’s also true. (This claim has been disputed.) It’s a poeticism. On the other hand, the statement “Consciousness is…” or “Truth is…” is often meant to be a metaphysically true statement. [See my ‘Consciousness is…’]
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