To the American philosopher Theodore Sider, a concept or definition is correct if it captures reality. (That position may seem obvious and true… at first.) Thus, if a (in this case) definition doesn’t match reality, then he believes that “[w]e should instead reject the proposed definition”. Sider goes further and says that “[t]hose who accept that definition are in a sense conceptually confused”. The concepts which Sider tackles in the following essay include [man] and [free will]. Later, David Chalmers tackles [conscious experience].
A Boy’s Incorrect Definition of ‘Man’
Take Theodore Sider’s stance on “the concept of a man”. According to Sider,
“This boy thinks it is part of the definition of the word ‘man’ that men never cry.”
We can immediately ask if a young son would ever think about the definition of the word “man” at all. Similarly, would he ever think that part of the singular definition of “man” would include “men never cry”. The boy may have some kind of view about what makes a man a man without ever relying on definitions or even kind kind of strict criteria. Of course, Sider could argue that the definitions and concepts this boy has are tacit. [See tacit knowledge.] Yet even if tacit, Sider may still not be right here.
In any case, the story Sider concerns himself with is that this young boy has two beliefs about his dad: (1) “[H]is belief that his father is a man.” (2) “[H]is belief that his father is crying.” On the surface, there’s no conflict here. However, in the case of this boy, Sider says that there is because the son is supposed to believe that a man never cries too.
Sider concludes that the boy “should clear up his conceptual confusion about the nature of manhood”. Now, since Sider is concerned with the adherence of concepts to reality, is he saying that it is part of the nature of manhood that men do cry? Some men do cry. Some men don’t cry. Yet does it automatically follow that this boy is conceptually confused?…
Not really.
Concepts are partially normative. Thus, concepts aren’t completely determined by reality. After all, it surely can’t be the case that all the people who adhere to the boy’s — supposed — concept [man] have never seen a man cry. Similarly, is the concept [justice] or [sexy] completely determined by reality? Thus, the concept [man] may not be completely determined by reality either.
More broadly, Sider himself is being normative here. However, not in the same respect. Rather than admitting the normative nature of the concept, say, [justice] or [man], Sider takes a normative attitude toward the use of concepts. He believes that their job is to match reality.
Sider’s Correct Concept of Free Will?
Sider is pretty categorical about concepts being either correct or incorrect. For example, he says that, in some cases, “we misunderstand the concept of freedom”. In detail:
“If ‘free’ meant ‘uncaused’, then the conflict would be real. But that’s not what ‘free’ means.”
That’s not what ‘free’ means!
That statement is very categorical. Sider believes that there is one, and only one, correct definition of the word “free”. Even within this limited debate on free will, surely that can’t be right.
In terms of the debate on determinism.
It “seems to conflict with freedom only because we misunderstand the concept of freedom”. Thus, there’s always a correct concept waiting for us in the ether. If we discover it, then we have the correct concept. And in Sider’s metaphysically-realist picture, it’s correct because it matches reality.
This raises an obvious question. How does Sider, or anyone else, know that the former definition is false, or that it doesn’t capture reality? Now there are two further questions: 1) How does Sider know that his own metaphysical account is correct? 2) Even if Sider’s metaphysical account is correct, are concepts and definitions exclusively about matching reality?
Sider can’t argue that concepts simply describe the world — perhaps he doesn’t — because his entire metaphysics contains a strong normative dimension. Thus, even Sider’s (possibly) correct concepts and definitions tell us how we ought to reason and classify.
We can say that Sider’s position aligns with the “classical analytic view” of concepts. In that view, Sider believes that correct concepts are definable in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Yet those conditions can still be taken to include criteria. Following on from that, they must have (or contain) normative force. [See note 1.]
Sider on Concepts
It’s not only that Sider believes that concepts are of vital importance in philosophy. It’s rather his take on concepts themselves. After all, he states that philosophy “investigates the essences of concepts”.
A good way of tackling Sider’s take on concepts is to investigate his strong position against what he sees as conventionalism. According to Sider, conventionalists believe that “these investigations ultimately concern definitions”. Not only that, according to the conventionalist, “[i]t seems to follow that one could settle any philosophical dispute just by consulting a dictionary!”.
Clearly, Sider doesn’t believe that metaphysical investigations ultimately concern definitions. Instead, reality should determine our definitions. Thus, investigations ultimately concern reality.
Sider also gets to the heart of the matter (at least in the debate between metaphysical realism and what he calls “deflationism”) when he states the following:
“Everyone faces the question of what is ‘real’ and what is the mere projection of our conceptual apparatus, of which issues are substantive and which are ‘mere bookkeeping’.”
Since the 1960s, and probably before, what is ‘real’ has indeed been deemed to be a projection of our conceptual apparatus by many philosophers. Sider is reacting against that tradition.
Sider on Conceptual Analysis
Sider is against any overstress on what came to be called conceptual analysis. Indeed, according to Sider:
“Today’s ontologists are not conceptual analysts; few attend to ordinary usage of sentences like ‘chairs exist’.”
Sider also comments on what he calls “ontological deflationism”. He writes:
“These critics — ‘ontological deflationists’, I’ll call them — have said instead something more like what the positivists said about nearly all of philosophy: that there is something wrong with ontological questions themselves. Other than questions of conceptual analysis, there are no sensible questions of (philosophical) ontology. Certainly there are no questions that are fit to debate in the manner of the ontologists.”
In terms of conceptual analysis and ontological deflationism being relevant to the composition and constitution of objects, Sider writes:
“[W]hen some particles are arranged tablewise, there is no ‘substantive’ question of whether there also exists a table composed of those particles, they say. There are simply different — and equally good — ways to talk.”
Obviously, Sider isn’t arguing that we should dispense with concepts. (How could he?) Instead, he’s arguing that concepts (or “ways to talk”) aren’t the entire picture. (This will seem obvious to laypersons.) More importantly, Sider believes that reality should determine our concepts.
Sider Against Stipulative Definitions?
In a sense, the only different between a stipulative definition and an ordinary definition is that the former says, “Let X mean Y”. The word “let” gives the game away here. The stipulator is being upfront about the normative nature of his definition. He’s telling us how we should use the term X. Yet the use of everyday definitions contain normative rules too — ones which aren’t explicitly stated.
In this case, then, the stipulative definition of X isn’t just reflecting a norm — it’s imposing it. (One may wonder, however, if anything can be classed as a norm if it’s just about a single stipulator saying, “Let X mean Y.”)
The following is an even more obvious stipulative definition:
For the purposes of this fight, define ‘atom’ as the word we must use to end the fight.
To recap. Let’s be explicit about the implicit normativity in Sider’s metaphysical analyses of concepts. Sider is implicitly stating the following:
This is how you ought to use the term ‘free will’.
Sider is being normative because he’s criticising — or even excluding — the misuses of certain concepts.
Let’s now side-track a little.
David Chalmers on Stipulation
The Australian philosopher David Chalmers often mentions what he calls “stipulation”. The basic point is that if we stipulate what we mean by a particular word, then the answers to any questions about facts, data, what x is, etc. must — at least partly — follow from such stipulations. Of course, some people will be horrified by the argument that acts of stipulation are decisive when it comes to what we take to be matters of fact…
But it’s not that simple.
There is a problem with over-stressing the importance of stipulation, or even with simply emphasising the importance of stipulation at all. Chalmers sums up this problem with a joke. He writes:
“One might as well define ‘world peace’ as ‘a ham sandwich.’ Achieving world peace becomes much easier, but it is a hollow achievement.”
As it is, Chalmers only applies his joke to a single case: consciousness. So perhaps it can be applied to other cases (such as free will, man, etc.) too. Clearly, even someone who argues that stipulation is important won’t also accept that we can define the words “world peace” as “a ham sandwich”. In turn, some philosophers and laypersons will feel just as strongly about claiming that a, say, “computer virus is alive” or that “bacteria learn”.
Here’s another question from Chalmers:
“Does a mouse have beliefs?”
If we stipulate what we mean by the word “belief”, then the answer to that question must — at least in part — follow from the stipulation.
To simplify, if x, y and z constitute what it is for something to be a belief, then if a mouse displays x, y and z, then it has a belief. Of course, this is a simplified story. That’s because agreement will have to be made on x, y and z, and then on whether not x, y and z are necessary and sufficient for belief. But however complicated this story turns out, stipulation will still remain part of it.
Chalmers is keen to accept the importance of stipulation when it comes to such decisions. He believes — at least as I see it — that much that passes for metaphysics is merely verbal dispute too. However, it’s still the case that in some examples (or in one example!) at least there’s a fact of the matter which makes some statements, concepts or theories just plain wrong.
Take Chalmers’ own final question:
“Does a mouse have conscious experience?”
In this case, it isn’t all about stipulation or verbal dispute. That is:
“Either there is something that it is like to be a mouse or there is not, and it is not up to us to define the mouse’s experience into or out of existence.”
So it’s not always a case of all the debaters agreeing on the facts, data, evidence, etc. though still disagreeing on what they say about them. This time — at least according to Chalmers — the debaters are also disagreeing about the facts. In this example, it’s about whether or not “a mouse [actually has] conscious experience”. Chalmers believes that “we cannot stipulate [] away” whether or not the mouse has conscious experience or not.
Conclusion
Sider states the following:
“If conventionalism is true, philosophy turns into nothing more than an inquiry into the definitions we humans give to words. [ ] Conventionalists are typically up front about this: they want to reduce the significance of philosophy.”
That is strong stuff! But, again, Sider isn’t against definitions. (How could he be?) Instead, he believes that definitions must adhere to reality.
Is conventionalism really that extreme? (At first blast, Sider’s passage above sounds more like a description of 1930s and 1940s logical positivism!)
Do conventionalists (if they exist at all) really argue that philosophy is “nothing more than any inquiry into the definitions we humans give to words”? Or do conventionalists simply stress the importance of our words and our conventions when it comes to philosophy?
Moreover, surely the conventionalist doesn’t believe that it’s only a question of the definitions of words: he also stresses our concepts. In other words, he asks questions about how our concepts determine how we see, conceive of, or interpret the world. Indeed, if it were all just a question of the definitions of words, then conventionalists would be little more than linguists or even lexicographers.
Perhaps conventionalists, on the other hand, don’t give up on the world at all. They may simply argue that our words, concepts, conventions, and indeed our definitions are important when it comes to our classifications, descriptions, analyses, etc. of reality or the world.
Note:
(1) Perhaps Sider would rely on physics to establish that correct concepts are definable in terms of the necessary and sufficient conditions of what is is that the concept applies to. He certainly wouldn’t limit his position to conceptual truths.
