Wittgenstein
and Heidegger on Religion and Philosophy
Wittgenstein
on Religion and Ethics
“…a
philosophy which is going to be ethics and metaphysics in one, though
they have previously been so falsely separated, like soul and body.”
(Schopenhauer, in The World as Will and Representation,
1818/1988)
Despite
Wittgenstein’s mysticism and, indeed, his religiosity, he may also
be thought to have had an ambivalent, or even a counter-productive
(in terms of the cause of religion and perhaps ethics),
attitude towards religion and ethics in his later period.
In
his Tractatus he attempted to pave a way for religious, well,
discourse. Though a little later he said:
“I
think that it is definitely important to put an end to all the
claptrap about ethics – whether intuitive knowledge exists, whether
values exist, whether the good is definable” (1929).
So,
unlike religious theologians and possibly Christian ethicists,
Wittgenstein appears to have believed, at this time (the 1920s and
early 30s), that we shouldn't even discuss - not in an intellectual,
philosophical or “theoretical” manner anyway - the issues of
religion and ethics. Such discussions would pollute and defile these
subjects. This attitude, it could be supposed, puts Wittgenstein more
in the mystical rather than the religious camp.
However, Wittgenstein of course conceded that religious and
non-religious ethicists, and straight religious thinkers for that
matter, are saying something with their words. That is, when
we discover that a sentence “has no means of verification”, it
didn't follow, at least for Wittgenstein in the later 1920s and early
1930s, that there is nothing to discover or understand in that
sentence. The very process of not finding an (empirical?)
verification means that we could still understand something
interesting about the sentence. Those people who use such sentences
aren't, as the logical positivists argued, indulging in “meaningless
metaphysics” or simply talking “nonsense”.
Although
this kind of anti-positivism is and always has been to a great extent
commonplace and even de rigueur in continental philosophy, it
will be interesting to see attitudes that were expressed during
Wittgenstein’s own day, and also sometimes in a
quasi-Wittgensteinian manner, that weren't actually part of the
analytic or Wittgensteinian tradition.
For
example, Martin Buber (who's just been mentioned) thought that
logical positivism attempted to relegate ethics, religion and poetry
to the exclusive realm of human emotion. And within this realm there
is, according to the logical positivists, no “true knowledge”.
Buber also thought that such an attitude essentially meant that for
logical positivists there is no “present reality” until that
reality has “become past”. Only then, Buber claimed the
positivists believed, could the “nature of reality” be
circumscribed by our logical and conceptual tools (1990).
Wittgenstein,
in this respect as well, was also articulating a position that had
existed previously (or was at least roughly contemporaneous with the
Tractatus). Rosenzweig, again, talked in terms of the “truth
of the philosophers” and the truth that can indeed be found in
other domains. He said that philosophical truth “could only know
itself”. However, he was also concerned with truth for someone.
He
continued:
“[Truth]
leads over those [scientific, rational] truths for which a man is
willing to pay, on to those that he cannot verify
save at the cost of his life…” (1925)
Despite
this kind of anti-verificationism, Wittgenstein himself also thought,
and this mustn't be forgotten, that if people did talk
about, say, “intuitive knowledge”, or “the real existence of
values”, or whether or not “the good is definable”, then they
had clearly fallen prey to either the philosophical or the scientific
language game (or both). The early late period, as it were,
Wittgenstein said that
“the
essence of the good has nothing to do with facts and hence cannot be
explained by any proposition”. (Wittgenstein, 1930)
Wittgenstein,
unlike Buber and Rosenzweig above (and Heidegger below), believed
that philosophy should be silent on matters of religion,
spirituality, ethics and aesthetics. He wasn’t, however, very
silent on these issues in his private life. Though this may have
simply been the case because he talked about them qua
non-philosopher, rather than qua philosopher.
Heidegger’s
General Religious Attitude
“The
primary existential structure of Dasein
is its Being-in-the-world, its holistic unity that includes not
independent objects (as in Husserl’s notion of intentionality) but
rather the whole world, ‘the worldhood of the world’. It is a
world that cannot be ‘bracketed’, a world that is not so much
there ‘for us’ as one from which we cannot distinguish ourselves
(Heidegger sometimes writes dramatically of our ‘being thrown’
into the world). The idea of a world known by us which is distinct
from the one in which we act…is unintelligible, and another primary
structure of Dasein,
consequently, is care,
a generalised notion of ‘concern’ which refers to the necessity
of our engagement in the world.” (Continental
Philosophy Since 1750: the Rise and Fall of the Self, Solomon,
pg. 162)
Although
Heidegger, like Wittgenstein, had a somewhat ambivalent attitude
towards religion and theology (at least towards Christianity), he
nevertheless used language that resonated with both direct and
indirect religiosity, spirituality and mysticism. In Being and
Time, 1926, for example, he has this to say about the world at
that time:
“We
have said that the world is darkening…the flight of the gods, the
destruction of the earth, the standardization of man, the
pre-eminence of the mediocre” (Heidegger, 1959 trans).
It
could be said, however, that there are certain non-Christian, or even
unchristian, phrases in the passage that I've just quoted.
For
example, the “standardization of man” can be seen as more of an
existentialist than a Christian utterance on Heidegger’s part.
Despite that, I can see the possibility of certain interpretations of
that passage that would square with a Christian vision (or at least
certain existentialist Christian visions). Also, and in a
similar vein, his reference to the “pre-eminence of the mediocre”
is even more Nietzschean than it is existentialist. Again, perhaps
this too could be seen to square with certain Christian viewpoints
(of which, of course, there are possibly enough to encompass any
ostensibly non-Christian position). In terms of his reference to the
“destruction of the earth”, this parallels Wittgenstein’s own
vision, mentioned earlier, of a world made safe for war by science
and the flight from God.
Despite
the no doubt deep and profound though definitely aggressive
controversies that surround Heidegger’s penchant for National
Socialism, all I can say is that I find just as many Heideggerian
correlations with Nazism than I do with the Christianity I've just
mentioned. Indeed, despite Derrida’s (amongst others) protestations
and defences, I do see similarities between, say, Heidegger’s
“attacks on realism” and Nazism. And there are other connections
between Heidegger and Nazism that are worth commenting upon for the
simple reason that they all also have a bearing on Heidegger’s
religious and mystical beliefs and attitudes.
These
shared similarities with Nazism include: an interest in mysticism, an
interest in the early medieval period (shared with, amongst others,
the English Catholic fascists of the early 20th century),
anti-intellectualism (or intellectual anti-intellectualism, as
in the case of Heidegger and, well, Joseph Goebels), a distaste for
modern civilisation science and technology (which can quite easily go
alongside the use of technology, as was the case with the
Nazis and is the case with our Islamic fundamentalists),
anti-Enlightenment attitudes, “thinking with the blood”, an
idealisation of peasant life, an ambivalent attitude towards
Catholicism (to less of an extent, towards Protestantism), a
connection with Nietzscheanism (positive in the Nazi case, less
positive in Heidegger’s), and so on.⁹
It
must be said, there were anti-Semitic aspects to Wittgenstein’s
personality (despite the fact that he was, of course, Jewish “by
blood”). This too bears on the issues of this essay. For example,
Wittgenstein had a traditional Austro-German distaste for what had
been called “pernicious Jewish theological rationalism”.
So
to get back to Heidegger’s stance on religion and theology. It can
be said that Heidegger never really escaped from theology (and
metaphysics). The philosopher and pragmatist Sydney Hook got it just
right when he referred to Being and Time:
“…there
is a mystical doctrine of creative emanation at the bottom of
Heidegger’s thought…Heidegger is really asking theological
questions.” (1930)
Heidegger
had a love-hate relationship with metaphysics, religion/theology and
philosophy generally. He couldn’t decide whether to be a part of
one - or all - of these traditions, or to live apart from one – or
all – of them. Indeed perhaps he wanted to be both a part of and
apart from these traditions at one and the same time:
“…what
Heidegger really wanted to do was to find a way of getting himself
out of from under theology while still keeping in touch with what
theology…had been about…Like Plato and Plotinus before him, he
wanted to get away from the gods and the religion of the times to
something ‘behind’ them. So, although in one sense he is indeed
still asking theological questions, in another sense he is trying to
find better questions that will replace theological (or, as he was
later to say, ‘metaphysical’) questions.” (Rorty,
1983)
This
love-hate relationship was also expressed, in a way, by Heidegger
himself when he wrote that “we are too late for the gods, and too
early for Being”.
That
is, “we are too late for the gods” because theology and
metaphysics itself can no longer have any purchase on the European
mind. Though, unfortunately, most of us are also “too early for
Being”. That is, too early for Heidegger’s very own
“onto-theology” (or “ontic-theology”).
Early
Heidegger as Mystic and His Spiritual Dasein
“This
is a God to whom man can neither pray nor offer sacrifice [i.e., the
“God of the philosophers”]. Before the causa
sui man cannot fall on his
knees in awe, nor can he sing and dance before this God.”
(Identität und Differenz, Heidegger, 1957)
Master
Eckhart (1260 – c. 1327), who started out as a Dominican monk, is
generally regarded as the greatest representative of German
mysticism. The mystic had a strong effect on the young Heidegger
(along with Duns Scotus). More particularly, it was Eckhart’s
concept of not knowing anything (Eckhart, in Erich Fromm,
1976) that initially inspired Heidegger. Eckhart himself once wrote:
“…we
say that a man ought to be empty of his own knowledge, as he was when
he did not exist…” (1976 trans)
The
early Heidegger opposed what he took to be traditional metaphysics
with a “meditative” alternative. At times he called this
meditative alternative simply “thinking” or “letting be”, a
term he adopted from Meister Eckhart. Heidegger also used the German
word Gelassenheit. This is a term for thinking “without
why”. A way of thinking that placed restraints on “the demands of
the will”. According to Heidegger at that time, meditative thinking
“lets things” show themselves, rather than be shown
or circumscribed by the inquiring mind.
The
mystic Angelus Silesius also influenced him at this time. It's
Silesius’s “rose” that, according to Heidegger, lives “without
reason” or “without why”. (It's interesting to note here that
the writings Heidegger composed under the influence of Silesius and
Meister Eckhart have often been compared to texts in certain Buddhist
traditions.)
Heidegger’s
most important concept, or, perhaps I should say, notion
(according to Heidegger, it's not a concept), Dasein, has
itself a mystical or spiritual dimension. That is, the Being of
Dasein is “to be” (zu sein) “there” (da)
in the world. In a basic sense, this appears to stress the
essentially non-rational or non-intellectual nature of Dasein.
That is, to be rather than to think or to do or
to have. (We may as well note here that the later Heidegger was
also to put the “question of Being” forward as the
“spiritualising” part of the National Socialist revolution.)
Heidegger believed that his notion of Dasein is not a notion
of knowing. Instead Dasein is always in the background
each time we know, acquire knowledge and contemplate the world.
Heidegger’s
most important notion, or anti-concept, that of Dasein, has
been explained and described, by Caputo, in essentially religious
terms. Caputo writes: “In a manner strongly reminiscent of
Augustinian and Lutheran spirituality, Heidegger describes Dasein…”
(Caputo, 1998). Yet, in a strange way, Heidegger’s notion of Dasein
is also his most “anthropocentric” (to use a term often
applied to the late Wittgenstein) notion. That is, it captured, to
use Robert Brandon’s words again, “the ontology of the social”.
*
There
is no reason to believe that ontological “anthropocentrism” and
spiritual or religious Heideggerian “concern” can’t be found
within the same philosophical package. Think here of one of
Heidegger’s variations on Dasein: “Dasein ist Mitsein”
(“To exist is to be together with others”).
Wittgenstein
too tried to square his “anthropocentrism” with an essentially
religious or mystical attitude. That is, even though there is a
strong Hebraic religious element in his work, this element still
seeks to return us to the “common world”.
On
the other hand, we must also remember the other Wittgenstein. This
Wittgenstein tells us that we need to control ourselves, to have a
critical attitude towards metaphysics, to indulge in philosophical
therapy instead of old-style metaphysics, and to accept that the
human world is really the only world.
Back
to Heidegger.
The
German philosopher was also deeply influenced by the Lutheran
religion (despite the fact that he was a Catholic who lived in
Catholic Bavaria) and medieval Catholic philosophy (particularly Duns
Scotus).
Perhaps
it's the case that Heidegger was more religiously literate, at least
in terms of the history of Christian philosophy and theology,
than Wittgenstein. Indeed Wittgenstein, a one-time denizen of
Catholic Vienna, doesn't seem to offer us much of his religious views
and knowledge, at least not in any direct sense. This isn't
surprising considering his views on the relation between philosophy
and religion (as I've already commented upon). He did, however, have
quite a lot to say in his private life (as I’ve also said). With
Heidegger, on the other hand, his ecclesiastical knowledge is obvious
both within and outside his strictly philosophical work.
The
New Mysterians Against Late Wittgenstein’s Anthropocentrism
“....
there are desires and sentiments prior to reason that it is not
appropriate for reason to evaluate...” (Nagel, The
Last Word, 1997)
David
Pears and Tom Nagel (amongst many others) have accused Wittgenstein
of being an “anthropocentric philosopher”. This is very ironic
and strange if one considers - even for just a moment -
Wittgenstein’s mystical tendencies, his profound distaste for
scientific dominance, and, say, his championship of religious
language games. It seems, however, that Pears and Nagel have simply
never considered the possibility that Wittgenstein might well have
quite easily squared his “anthropocentrism” with his religious or
mystical beliefs (as Heidegger did).
Perhaps
they should also consider the possibility that Wittgenstein might
equally have often returned from esoteric theory to mundane practice;
and also possibly from heavenly ecstasies to everyday life. Indeed
the mystical Eckhart believed that such coming and going between the
“heavenly sublime” and the earthly ridiculous is a good example
of his own “last and highest parting”.
In
Wittgenstein’s case at least, religious belief and critical
thought both provided an escape from the masterful objectivism
and objectualism that, according to both Wittgenstein and Heidegger,
had so dominated the Western philosophical tradition. Wittgenstein’s
religious beliefs and his critical thoughts actually gained him
freedom by letting him view theory only as an instrumental tool and
not as a dogmatic weapon. And yet Wittgenstein’s religious beliefs
and critical thought were indeed both, in their own senses, deeply
“anthropocentric”.
The
fact is that Wittgenstein’s prime motive throughout his
philosophical career was religious and ethical. Indeed it might well
have been the case that Wittgenstein wanted to bring us back to
Jewishness (despite his distaste for “rationalist Jewish theology”)
and away from Gnostic intellectualism and metaphysical grandeur. That
is, he wanted us also to return to a “common life” in which the
practical and the ethical were both of primary importance.
It
is even stranger if one reads the following Wittgenstein-like
passage from the anti-Wittgensteinian philosopher mentioned and
quoted above. That is, Tom Nagel himself writes:
“It
may be true that some philosophical problems have no solution. I
suspect that this is true of the deepest and oldest of them. They
show us the limits of our understanding.” (1979)
Elsewhere
Nagel wrote that Wittgensteinians must
“acknowledge
that all thought is an illusion…the Wittgensteinian attack on
transcendent thought depends on a position so radical that it also
undermines the weaker transcendent pretensions of even the least
philosophical of thoughts.” (Nagel, 1986)
Of
course people may find it strange that I call the first passage above
“Wittgenstein-like”. That is, late Wittgenstein might not have
said, it may be argued, that “some philosophical problems have no
solution”. He might instead have said that some philosophical
problems are in fact non-problems. However, he might have seen
them as non-problems precisely because he also saw them as
insoluble (perhaps in principle). And, of course, Wittgenstein
also, like Nagel, was interested “in the limits of our
understanding” (especially, though not exclusively, in the
Tractatus).
Despite
that, I suspect that these “limits” would be seen by Nagel as
limits imposed on us by the a priori nature of the mind and
the necessary factors of the non-human world. Wittgenstein, on the
other hand, might have accepted limits; though these limits are
contingent limits imposed (or not, in fact, imposed, if they are
self-created) on us by our linguistic practices and our
contingent concepts.
The
New Mysterians (including Colin McGinn) would probably not accept
Wittgenstein’s view on the human nature of our human limitations;
though they may well accept Nagel’s. There are of course many
philosophers who are not Mysterians (or even anti-Wittgensteinians);
though who nevertheless are deeply troubled by late Wittgenstein’s
radical proposals and positions.¹º
