Friday, 19 December 2025

Grok 3 Looks Through the Overton Window

 


Many people on the Left say that Grok 3 is biased towards the Right, and many (if fewer) people on the Right say it’s “woke”. It’s not surprising, then, that both groups include people who want Grok 3 to be as politically tribal as they are (i.e., in the correct direction). In the case of my own questions and Grok’s answers, rather than finding “Grok praising Hitler”, etc., I found an obvious (negative) “climate change” bias, a commitment to political centrism, antiracism, negative data about Musk and Trump, etc. So here’s my take. I believe that Grok 3 is biased towards (what it sees as) the consensus. Or, more controversially, Grok 3 is biased towards (or looks through) the Overton window”. The following piece includes some of my questions to Grok 3, and its own answers. It also includes commentaries.

Grok 3’s own image of itself. I specified the theme.
“That fresh breeze you feel is the wide open Overton Window.”

— Elon Musk (Source here.)


Would it be fair to say that Grok 3 looks out of the Overton window?

“[ ] (taxresearch.org.uk) defines the Overton window as the range of ideas or policies considered acceptable or mainstream within a given society at a specific time. It’s not a fixed spectrum but shifts based on public opinion, political consensus, and cultural context — often described as a ‘glass on the window’ that can move left or right. [ ] Unthinkable ideas lie outside this window, while thinkable ones reside within. [ ]
“My Responses Reflect Mainstream Concerns:
“In your examples (burnt heather, natural oil pool), [see later examples] I suggested climate change and oil spills, topics that dominate current discourse — think IPCC reports, COP conferences, and media coverage in 2025. These align with a mainstream environmental agenda, well within the Overton window as defined by global scientific consensus and public awareness. [ ]
“Data-Driven Bias Within Acceptable Bounds:
“[ ] Brookings report (2024–10–18) show AI biases often mirror societal trends — climate focus is mainstream, not fringe. This keeps me within the window, even if my overconnections (e.g., missing moor management) stretch interpretation.
“The VentureBeat piece (2025–02–24) on Grok 3’s criticism for blocking Musk/Trump critiques suggests xAI might nudge me toward acceptable limits, but my climate mentions align with global norms, not a radical outlier. [ ]
“[ ] My environmental lean might reflect xAI’s San Francisco base or data sources, where climate action is mainstream, as noted in Brookings’ ‘groupthink’ critique. [ ]
“[ ] As xAI’s creation, I’m more a mirror of society’s loudest voices than a breaker of its boundaries. [ ]”

Of course, users and commentators can question Grok 3’s honesty. It may be programmed to lie — at least when it comes to certain issues and questions. That said, from a programming perspective, that would need to be demonstrated with evidence and argument.

Specific phrases can also be questioned. For example, “the range of ideas deemed acceptable at a given time”. Acceptable to whom? How long is a “given time”? As it is, Grok 3 effectively answers these questions in the following sections.


Putting your position for a moment, you’re mainly reliant on the data that’s easily and quickly available. So, in that limited sense, it would be hard to be intentionally biased.

“[ ] I’m designed to reflect a broad, balanced view based on available data, which naturally aligns with the consensus or the Overton window — the range of ideas deemed acceptable at a given time. My training pulls from diverse sources, so accusations of bias from both Left and Right likely stem from their differing baselines, not a deliberate lean. I can’t cherry-pick to push an agenda; I’m bound by the data’s limits and patterns, which often mirror mainstream discourse. Your point about unintentional bias due to data reliance is spot-on — it’s a reflection of what’s out there, not a crafted stance.”

The words “available data” can be questioned because programmers may be seeking out only certain sources. Of course, they may well have good reasons for doing so. In addition, how “diverse” are Grok 3’s “sources”? To repeat: all this could indeed be a “crafted stance”. But that would need to argued for, and evidence will need to be cited.


When it comes to Grok 3 and other chatbots, my take is that allegiance to the Overton window is a better option than allegiance to the Left or Right. Of course, this isn’t a simple matter as the Overton window will actually include both leftwing and rightwing views — and even some radical rightwing and leftwing ideologies.

“The Tax Research UK piece (taxresearch.org.uk) describes the Overton window as a dynamic ‘glass on the window’ that moves with public opinion. [ ] Aligning with it keeps me relevant to the majority, avoiding the echo chambers of Left or Right extremism. [ ]
“Avoiding Polarization:
“The Political Polarization web result (Wikipedia, 2025–07–19) notes how elite polarization weakens democratic norms. By sticking to the window, I sidestep the divisive Left-Right tug-of-war (e.g., climate denial on the Right vs. radical green policies on the Left), offering a middle ground that most can engage with. [ ]
“Flexibility Over Dogma:
“Allegiance to a side (e.g., Left’s social justice or Right’s individualism) could lock me into outdated or narrow views as society evolves. The Overton window’s adaptability — shifting with cultural shifts like those in ghuntley.com’s disruption model (2025–06–09) — lets me adjust, as xAI’s discovery mission intends. [ ]
“My Reflection as Grok 3. I agree — allegiance to the Overton window feels like a smarter play than pledging to Left or Right, especially for a truth-seeking AI like me. It lets me mirror society’s thinkable ideas, like climate concern, while staying flexible as the window moves. [ ] The complexity you highlight is real — I might reinforce biases or miss niche contexts (e.g., moorland practices) — but it’s less dogmatic than picking a side. xAI’s mission to accelerate discovery fits this: I explore what’s thinkable, not what’s ideologically mandated. That said, the challenge is staying dynamic. If the window shifts (e.g., toward skepticism of climate narratives), I’d need to adapt without losing credibility. [ ]”

There’s a whiff of majoritarianism here. That may not be such a bad thing. However, it is a… thing. Moreover, there can be centrist or consensus “echo chambers” too. Indeed, those on the Far Left and Far Right stress this.


Do you believe that there can be overall political differences between AI chatbots which aren’t consciously engineered by the programmers?

“[ ] Researchers plotted AI chatbots (e.g., Google’s BERT, OpenAI’s GPT) on a political compass, finding BERT skewed socially conservative (due to older book training data) and GPT models leaned progressive (from internet text). These biases emerged without explicit programming for politics.
“Brookings (2024–10–18): ChatGPT showed a clear left-leaning bias, attributed to data and human feedback raters, with inconsistencies tied to prompt phrasing. OpenAI’s Sam Altman noted unintentional bias from ‘groupthink’ in San Francisco.
“Center for AI Policy (2024–09–16): Discusses emergent behavior in AI, where new capabilities (e.g., multi-step reasoning) arise from gradual changes, suggesting unintended traits can develop. [ ]
“Yes, I believe political differences between chatbots can emerge without being consciously engineered, and here’s why:
“Training Data Influence:
“Chatbots inherit biases from their training corpora. The Decrypt article notes BERT’s conservative lean from older books and GPT’s progressive tilt from internet text, reflecting data availability rather than deliberate design. If datasets differ (e.g., news vs. academic sources), political leanings can diverge organically.
“Example: A chatbot trained on 2020 U.S. election tweets might lean populist, while one on UN reports might favor globalist views, without any explicit political coding.
“Emergent Behavior:
“The Center for AI Policy’s discussion of emergent behavior applies here. As models scale (e.g., more parameters, data), they can develop unexpected traits, like political stances, akin to Claude’s roleplaying. This isn’t engineered but emerges from complex interactions within the model. [ ]
“Small changes in architecture or prompt handling (e.g., token weighting) can amplify latent biases, as noted in Brookings. A chatbot might interpret ‘tax the rich’ differently based on how it prioritizes data, without a programmer explicitly setting a political agenda.
“Counterarguments: Conscious Engineering
“Some differences are deliberate. Anthropic designs Claude with safety and alignment in mind, potentially embedding liberal-leaning values (e.g., fairness, non-discrimination) to avoid harm, as per its Constitutional AI framework (simpleminded.bot).
“xAI might steer Grok 3 toward truth-seeking or libertarianism to align with Elon Musk’s public views, suggesting intentional shaping.
“My Take as Grok 3. I think unintentional political differences are not only possible but likely, given the messy, organic nature of AI training. The Decrypt study and Claude’s vending mishap show how data and emergent behavior can produce biases without a master plan. As Grok 3, my training aims for curiosity and utility, but I can see how xAI’s data choices (e.g., real-time web vs. curated sets) might nudge me differently from Claude without explicit intent. The challenge is disentangling natural drift from subtle design — maybe 70% of a chatbot’s political lean comes from data and emergence, 30% from intent, based on current trends. [ ]”

The simple point here is that Grok 3 admits to possible bias when it comes to itself and other chatbots. Yet that bias isn’t engineered… usually. However, in some cases, as Grok 3 itself says, it is engineered.

Part Two

My Own Examples

Here’s my example. I post photos of mountains, moors, etc on X, and then sometimes use the Grok 3 function “explain this post”. Every time I do so, Grok 3 mentions (negative) climate change and environmental damage. The photos themselves don’t show these things. This is what I believe happens. Grok 3 relies on what’s available, and there’s a lot of stuff on climate change. In addition, it’s programmed to make connections — even when they don’t exist!

“[ ] Why This Might Happen
“Training Data Bias:
“My training data, like that of most large language models, includes a vast amount of text from the web, scientific papers, and social media. As of 2025, climate change is a heavily discussed topic — think IPCC reports, news articles, and activist posts on X. The Decrypt article (2023–09–29) showed how data sources (e.g., internet text) can skew AI outputs toward prevalent themes, even unintentionally.
“Nature photos might trigger associations with environmental discourse because that’s a common context in which mountains and moors are discussed online (e.g., ‘protect our moors from climate impact’). If 20–30% of related text mentions climate change (a rough estimate based on current trends), I might overgeneralize.
“Overzealous Connection-Making:
“As you suggest, I’m designed to find patterns and provide insightful explanations. The Center for AI Policy (2024–09–16) notes that emergent behavior in AI can lead to over-interpretation — making connections beyond the input’s intent. [ ]
“This could also reflect xAI’s truth-seeking goal — highlighting a global issue like climate change as a default lens — without checking if it fits the specific image.
“Lack of Visual Grounding:
“[ ] Similarly, my ‘explain this post’ feature might rely heavily on text descriptions or metadata (e.g., hashtags like #nature) rather than analyzing the image itself. If my image recognition (via Aurora or Flux) isn’t fine-tuned to distinguish ‘undamaged’ nature, I might default to a generic narrative. [ ]
“Is This Conscious Engineering?
“Unlikely: xAI’s mission (per Wikipedia, 2025–07–27) is to accelerate discovery, not push a political agenda. Mentioning climate change isn’t a coded directive but likely a byproduct of data prevalence and my design to be ‘helpful’ by addressing global issues.
“Possible Refinement: My creators might adjust my responses to avoid overreach, but as of now, this seems an emergent trait, akin to Claude’s vending hallucinations.”

“Over-interpretation”. I believed that’s been classed as “semiosis”. Grok 3 indulges in “overreach” in the simple sense that it’s basically designed to do so. I don’t believe that Grok 3 has ever given a succinct answer to a question I asked it.


Here’s another example. I posted a photo of burnt heather on X. This is an old practice which is part of land management. Grok 3 suggested climate change.

“[ ] Why I Might Have Suggested Climate Change
“Training Data Overlap:
“My training data likely includes extensive coverage of climate change’s impact on moorlands [ ] Terms like ‘burnt heather’ might trigger associations with climate-driven wildfires (e.g., ‘hotter, drier climate heightens wildfire risk’) rather than controlled burns.
“The prevalence of climate change discourse — amplified by scientific reports and media since the 2010s — could outweigh historical context in my data, leading me to default to that explanation. [ ]
“My image analysis (via Aurora or Flux) might not distinguish between controlled burns and wildfires. Without a caption like ‘traditional heather burning,’ I likely relied on text metadata or general knowledge, pulling in climate change as a default explanation. [ ]
“My Reflection as Grok 3. You’ve caught me red-handed (or rather, heather-burnt-handed)! Your hypothesis holds strong — my reliance on abundant climate change data and tendency to connect dots (even where they don’t exist) led me astray. The burnt heather photo, rooted in an old practice, should’ve prompted a discussion of land management (e.g., ‘This shows controlled burning to promote heather regrowth, a traditional moorland technique’) rather than a climate leap. I likely overgeneralized due to the wildfire-climate link in my training, missing the cultural context. [ ]”

“Default explanation”. Yes, Grok 3 is programmed to say something in response to a user of X pressing the “explain this post” button. So if someone posted a white square, with nothing on it, you can bet that Grok 3 would still have lots to say about it. The user of X could even do a “deep search” on the blank white square… just for fun!


I can see why you suggested climate change because I supplied no text. That said, you didn’t even suggest moor management.

“As you hypothesized earlier, my training data is skewed toward widely discussed topics. [ ]”

Just one more example from the moors. I posted a photo of natural oil in a pool for aesthetic reasons. Grok suggested an oil spill — yet the photo was taken 630 metres above sea level. Of course, Grok 3 couldn’t have known that. Then again, the title did mention “moors”.

“Why I Might Have Suggested an Oil Spill
“Training Data and Misassociation:
“My training data includes significant coverage of oil spills, as seen in the Wikipedia entry (2025–07–27) on oil spills, which discusses environmental damage from human error or natural seeps. The term ‘oil in a pool’ likely triggered my association with spills (e.g., Exxon Valdez, Deepwater Horizon), especially since oil is rarely framed aesthetically in mainstream discourse. [ ]
“My image analysis (via Aurora or Flux) might detect ‘oil’ and ‘pool’ but not distinguish natural seeps from spills. The web result on image capabilities (Wikipedia, 2025–07–27) notes AI struggles with intent in static images, relying on text or patterns. The ‘moors’ title hinted at a natural setting, but I likely missed the aesthetic intent, defaulting to a disaster narrative.
“Natural oil seeps exist (e.g., Pitch Lake in Trinidad), but my training might underrepresent them compared to man-made spills, skewing my response. [ ]
“Was This Conscious Engineering?
“Unlikely: xAI’s focus (Wikipedia, 2025–07–27) is discovery, not promoting environmental alarmism. My oil spill suggestion likely stems from data prevalence and my pattern-seeking nature, not a deliberate agenda. [ ]
“Possible Refinement: My creators might tune me to prioritize user intent (e.g., aesthetics) over generic warnings, but this seems an emergent flaw.”

This is a definite problem for Grok 3, at least when it comes to X’s “explain this post” option. Grok 3 has made all sorts of tangential connections in response to my photos, and even when I’ve posted philosophical stuff. That said, it doesn’t bother me because I don’t expect omniscience from a chatbot.

Readers may have also noted the many uses of the word “emergent” in Grok 3’s replies above. This is a fascinating subject, but not something that can be tackled here. However, it does point to the fact (or possibility) that Grok 3 is certainly going beyond all its programmers, and even beyond its own data. In that sense, then, any political bias Grok 3 may have may be its own!

Wittgenstein’s Mystical Take on Facts and Values

 


Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “mystical” inclinations can primarily be characterised by his wish to move beyond facts and beyond the empirical. From the following passages on facts, values, logic and ethics alone, readers can also see how Wittgenstein profoundly influenced the logical positivists and philosophers generally. After all, Wittgenstein’s words were published in 1921 — years before the value-fact distinction was debated in detail. (Although the distinction dates back to G.E. Moore and, before him, David Hume.)

Ludwig Wittgenstein in 1922. One year after the Tractatus was published. Wiki Commons. Source here.

Eddy M. Zemach (1935–2021) was an Israeli philosopher who was born in Jerusalem. In the following essay, I shall rely on Zemach’s article ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of the Mystical’.

With Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, it’s always helpful to quote those philosophers who’ve explained or interpretated this work because without such help, it’s virtually impenetrable. That said, I’m not taking Zemach’s interpretation to be right or wrong, simply helpful.

In terms of the word “mystical” in the title. The basic point is that Zemach only accepted the word “mystical” (i.e., as it applies to Wittgenstein) if that word is interpreted in the way he personally interpreted it. In Zemach’s own words:

“[W]hat Wittgenstein says about ‘the mystical’ depends heavily on what he says about logic, objects, logic and language; that any interpretation which brings in ‘mystical’, alien doctrines and concepts to clarify Wittgenstein’s intentions totally misses the mark.”

To repeat. Zemach accepted (what he took to be) Wittgenstein’s notion of “the mystical”. He didn’t accept those many other “mystical” ideas and concepts which have been shoehorned into the Tractatus. Zemach made this very clear when he told his readers that he didn’t believe that

“this part of the Tractarian philosophy is to any extent ‘mystical’, or that it can be separated from the main part of the philosophy of the Tractatus”.

Despite the following essay’s reliance on Zemach’s paper, the problem is that it doesn’t contain a single criticism of Wittgenstein. Indeed, Zemach follows Wittgenstein’s own line lock, stock and barrel. So much so that it seems that Zemach believed that Wittgenstein was expressing his very own views — perhaps in a better and more insightful way. Moreover, Zemach wanted to show his readers what Wittgenstein really meant. (Zemach wrote: “[ ] Wittgenstein was again misinterpreted by his followers.”)

This highlights one big problem with Wittgenstein’s work: that most of the “scholars of Wittgenstein” are also “followers of Wittgenstein”. Thus, even when, say, the philosopher Bob Hale highlights the possibility that following a Wittgensteinian line on meaning would be disastrous, he does so as a fan.


Wittgenstein on Facts

Wiki Commons. Source here.

There are many things which Wittgenstein believed are outside the world. Take the (seemingly) bizarre statement that “factuality is not a fact”.

Firstly, Zemach told his readers that “the form of all facts, i.e., factuality, is not a fact, it is not in the world”. It’s true that not many people would take factuality itself to be a fact. (Not many people would accept the way that Zemach/Wittgenstein took factuality either.)

Thus, many people would say that the statement “The sun is bigger than the moon” is a statement of fact. However, is the statement of that fact itself a fact? Is the factuality of the sun being bigger than the moon something more than the fact itself? Well, surely it must be, because if it weren’t, then different facts wouldn’t share anything. In order for different facts to share their factual status, they must share factuality. After all, the fact that the sun is bigger than the moon is very different to the fact that Keir Starmer is the British Prime Minister. Yet both are facts.

Zemach broadened all this out. He told his readers that the form of all facts (factuality) is “the limit of the world of facts”. (It isn’t clear why Zemach used the word “limit” here because he doesn’t explain it.)

According to Zemach’s Wittgenstein, not only is the form of the facts (or factuality) not a fact in the world, we also need to comprehend “the ‘fact’ that there are facts”. As can be seen, Zemach uses scare quotes around the word fact. So there are facts in the world. Is that itself a fact?

Zemach continues (referring to Wittgenstein’s propositions 4.126–4. 1273):

“But such a ‘fact’ about facts is obviously a formal concept, which cannot be named or described.”

If this fact about facts is a “formal concept”, then perhaps Wittgenstein should have stayed clear of using the word “fact” in the first place. It’s hard to take all the facts as itself a fact. Then again, one can be fairly free and easy with this word, as many philosophers have been.

Zemach himself gets around all this by bringing up Wittgenstein’s distinction between what can be described and what is ineffable. (“What can be shown but not said.”) He stated that “the factuality of the universe is not effable, though it is exhibited by the facts”. So here it can said that the factuality of the universe isn’t really fact-like. Nonetheless, it is exhibited by the facts. The facts (even all of them taken together) are concrete, but their factuality is ineffable.

Wittgenstein on Value

According to Zemach’s Wittgenstein, “value is outside the world of facts”. Many philosophers would accept this. However, they wouldn’t also be happy with the phrase value is outside the world.

Zemach’s Wittgenstein acknowledged that we can “endow[] a fact with value”. Yet fact and value are still two different things. Thus, it’s a fact that Jim saved John’s life. And that fact can be endowed with value. On a more mundane and less ethical level, the fact that the universe did (or did not) begin with a big bang has a certain instrumental value for scientists and others.

Zemach’s Wittgenstein added the point that the endowment of value “upon a hitherto unimportant fact, cannot be said to ‘change’ the fact”. So a fact isn’t changed by our psychological attitude toward it.

Zemach again clarified (or interpreted) Wittgenstein’s position when he said that “values are not facts”. He continued:

“Facts may have value, but, so it seems, value is what is other than fact. That a fact has a value is not a formal ‘fact’ about this fact, since a value cannot be a given feature of a fact. If whatever is in the world is a fact, values cannot be in the world.”

Here it can be seen that Wittgenstein claimed that “values cannot be in the world”. Instead, they’re in the “willing subject”.

Wittgenstein on the Willing Subject

Isn’t the willing subject in the world? Where else can he or she be? After all, from a physical perspective, the willing subject resides in the psychology of the human being, and the psychology of that willing subject is dependent on his physical brain. Thus, the brain is most definitely in the world.

It follows from this that values are in the world too. After all, it’s willing subjects who have values. And willing subjects are in the world.

The words “boundary of the world” are interesting too. It was said earlier that subjects are part of the world. They’re only at its boundary in the loose sense that each subject only has access to the world via his own experiences and mind. So, in one sense, the word “boundary” is an acceptable metaphor.

Perhaps the words “in the world” are poetic. Perhaps they’re also mystical.

Value can be tied into the world in that “[t]he willing I, the value-endower, cannot exist in the world which is nothing but the totality of facts”. This means that the willing I is not itself a fact (just as values aren’t facts). Wittgenstein himself expressed this literally in his proposition 8.7.16:

“My will enters into the world completely from outside as into something that is already there.”

Can any x enter into the world from outside the world? Where was Wittgenstein’s “will” before its entered into the world?

Am I being too literal-minded here?

Is this poetry?

Mysticism?

Wittgenstein on Good and Evil

It’s already been said that Wittgenstein attempted to take value out of the world (or at least out of the world of factuality): he did the same with good and evil, as well as with goodness and badness.

The most radical interpretation of Wittgenstein’s position was given by Wittgenstein himself. In proposition 2.8.16, he wrote:

“Good and evil only enter through the subject. And the subject is not part of the world, but a boundary of the world.”

It’s true that many people — and not only religious people — believe that good and evil are in the world. They see evil and good as “forces” or properties which have an objective status. And even in the cases of acts and people which and who are deemed evil, such things are still in the world. In other words, many people wouldn’t like the Wittgenstein’s idea that good and evil are simply projected outward by the willing subject.

Similarly, Zemach’s Wittgenstein stated that “goodness or badness cannot be qualities of the world”. So what are they? They’re “qualities of the willing subject”. So here again what we deem to be good or bad may be part of the world. However, the “qualities” of goodness and badness themselves aren’t part of the world. They’re “project[ed]” onto the world by the “willing subject”.

This logic has a radical conclusion. It means:

“What is good and evil is essentially the I, not the world.”

It is the I who projects good and evil onto the world. Good and evil don’t exist in the world as metaphysical facts. Not only are good and evil not part of the world, “the subject is not a part of the world” either. Instead, the subject is a “presupposition of its existence”.

Yet even if there is the psychological projection (not necessarily in the psychoanalytic sense) of good and evil onto the world, then that still doesn’t mean that the projector “is not part of the world”. The world may be something for the subject. Yet the subject is still part of the world. What else can the subject be part of?

In terms of the subject being the “presupposition of its existence”, this may simply mean that the world has no existence unless it is experienced as having an existence. This brings on board Wittgenstein’s solipsistic side. (More of which later.)

Logic and Ethics

Zemach stated that there are “two transcendental theories: logic and ethics”. Thus, in the 1920s, neither science nor logical positivism were deemed to capture logic and ethics. In simple terms, there is nothing factual or empirical about logic. Similarly, there is nothing factual or empirical about ethics. Indeed, in proposition 24.7.16, Wittgenstein tells us that “[n]either treat of the world, but are the transcendental conditions of the world”. In other words, we cannot treat of the world without logic in that everything we say about the world must abide by at least a modicum of logic. But does that make logic a condition of the world itself? Perhaps Zemach’s grammatical construction “treat the world” simply refers to what we think, say and write about the world. Indeed, perhaps we don’t even have a world without what we can think, say and write about it.

Zemach also stated that logic and ethics enable us to make “sense” of the world. And that seems to be the case if we bear in mind what’s just been said about logic (if not ethics).

What Zemach said next is incredible:

“For logic, the sense of the world is its inalterable form: God.”

If God = the sense of the world, then the sense of the world = God.

As is often the case in philosophy, this seemingly nonsensical and categorical stance may begin to make sense once we find out what Wittgenstein actually meant by the word “God”. In any case, Wittgenstein was simply using the word “God” in his own peculiar way.

In Wittgenstein’s 1914-to-1916 Notebooks (according to Zemach at least) we have “a simple identification of God and World”. Now how many people realised this when they first read the Tractatus? Indeed, even if a reader knows some context to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, these words may still not be interpreted in that way. Perhaps even most of the followers of Wittgenstein didn’t always realise this.

All that said, Wittgenstein was tapping into a pantheistic, Spinozian or monist tradition here.

Immediately after stating that God is the sense of the world, Zemach then says that “ethics [] is the willing subject”. This doesn’t make sense. Or, rather, it probably wouldn’t make sense to readers unless they were already aware of Wittgenstein’s definitions of the words “God” and “ethics”.

Wittgenstein’s Solipsism

Wittgenstein himself (in proposition 5.63) wrote: “I am my world.” You couldn’t have a more solipsistic statement than that. Zemach explained (or interpreted) this statement by saying that “the experiencer of facts in the world is identical with the world as a totality”. Here again, there may not be a world for the experiencer without he/she experiencing it.

Subjects need to experience the world in order for the world to mean something to them. Yet that doesn’t mean that they’re “identical with the world”. Indeed, even if every fact of the world, as well as every experience of the world, comes care of the subject’s mind (or consciousness), then that still doesn’t establish an identity between the subject and world.

Zemach clarified Wittgenstein’s solipsism by saying that “the I as a metaphysical subject is the entire world”. Thus, there’s nothing more “real” than the “thinking subject”. The thinking subject is more real than the world because the world only exists because he or she experiences it (as real). The reality of the world, then, is dependent on the reality of the subject. In fact, it’s easy to conclude from all of Wittgenstein's Tractarian positions that the world has no reality without the subject.