Friday, 15 April 2022

Bernardo Kastrup’s Spiritual Take on Psychedelic Experiences and Cosmic Consciousness

 Philosopher Bernardo Kastrup believes that psychedelic experiences run free of the brain. And that’s because the trippers who have them are tapping into Cosmic Consciousness.

“There is something very wrong with this story that brain activity generates conscious experience.”

— Bernardo Kastrup’s last words in his video presentation.

The Dutch computer scientist and philosopher Bernardo Kastrup’s central thesis is that human consciousness (or experience) doesn’t require the physical and biological brain. Indeed that thesis is the backdrop to his scientific claim that during psychedelic experiences there is less brain activity than during (as it were) normal (or waking) conscious states. The conclusion being that such psychedelic experiences — and indeed all conscious experience — must ultimately run free of the brain.

So, in order to establish this radical position, doesn’t Kastrup need to establish zero brain activity during psychedelic experiences?

An important corollary to Kastrup’s ideas is that because the brains of the subjects of psychedelic experience are not relying on the brain for their experiences, then they must be relying on something else. And that something else is (to use Platonic capitals) Cosmic Consciousness (sometimes called Universal Consciousness). That is, Cosmic Consciousness is responsible for the (as Kastrup puts it) “richness” of psychedelic experience.

However, in the video which is the basis of this essay, Kastrup doesn’t put his position quite so simply and/or explicitly. Indeed, his presentation is replete with technical terms, images, graphs and much academic hedging. Yet he most certainly does put his broad philosophical position simply (i.e., as it relates to psychedelic experiences and much else) elsewhere.

(For example, see Kastrup’s blog post here in which he tells us that he has “cultivated psychedelic-containing organisms at home” and that the “experiences they provided me with years ago have been of tremendous learning value and considerably helped [his] personal development”.)

The Video Presentation

Deepak Chopra and Bernardo Kastrup

The featured video: ‘Dr. Bernardo Kastrup: what neuroscience actually shows about consciousness’

Bernardo Kastrup isn’t a neuroscientist. Yet in the video featured in this essay he spends much time on the (as it were) hard data of neuroscience. Indeed, it’s obvious that Kastrup wants to make it crystal clear to everyone that he knows much neuroscience back-to-front and in great detail — hence his many uses of technical terms from neuroscience, his use of graphs, brain imagery and his almost — deliberately? — impenetrable academic detail.

In other words, is Kastrup fudging the philosophical issue with largely irrelevant and often trivial neuroscientific detail?

All this is the very-hard “data” on which Kastrup’s “analytic idealism” (or Cosmic Idealism) is supposedly based. And this is also how Kastrup hopes to differentiate his own brand of idealism from all the other brands on sale in the commercial marketplace (e.g., the book companies which publish philosophy). Indeed, Kastrup is explicit about his scientific idealism in various places.

For example, the following is an Essentia Foundation entry (probably written by Kastrup himself) for “analytic idealism”:

[Analytic idealism] is a formulation that will appeal to intellectually hard-nosed, left-brained, science-oriented people [].”

In the video focussed upon in this essay, Kastrup particularly cites (what he calls the) “multiple papers” which he believes back up his position. Yet do these papers really back up Kastrup’s philosophical position? And do even their scientific claims perfectly square with Kastrup’s? Alternatively, is Kastrup simply interpreting the scientific data though the lens of his philosophical and spiritual idealism?.

(The words “spiritual” and “religious” have just been used. They aren’t rhetoric or whatever. They’re used because Kastrup himself frequently uses such words — see herehere, here and here - about his own position. Indeed, it’s difficult to interpret Kastrup’s overall philosophy in any other way.)

More particularly and as a result of the above, Kastrup spends more time in this particular video on what he calls the “abundant strong correlations” between brain states and experiences (which he doesn’t deny), than he does on his own philosophical conclusions about this hard data. Kastrup doesn’t explicitly state his philosophical position on all that hard data until 29 minutes into a 34 minute video. And that was in response to a question asking for an “alternative” take on the data.

It can easily be argued that all of Kastrup’s words on the neuroscientific data are but a prelude to his philosophical and spiritual gloss on that data. Alternatively, Kastrup’s philosophical and spiritual positions (or beliefs) might well have been the motivation for finding the scientific data to back them up in the first place. Thus, Kastrup’s  spiritual philosophy might have been wagging the scientific dog all along.

(In one case Kastrup almost(?) admits as much in an interview with the science writer John Horgan in which he states that he took an immediate and intuitive position against the possibility of — strong? - artificial intelligence and only after that did he begin — what he calls - “refining” that position with actual scientific data.)

Finally, even if all of the neuroscientific data Kastrup relies on is partly — or or even entirely — true, it still doesn’t (automatically) lead to anything that would establish the existence of Cosmic Consciousness or the position of Cosmic Idealism. And that’s simply because Kastrup’s position is philosophical, not scientific. Moreover, using scientific data to back up a philosophical and spiritual position doesn’t thereby render that position scientific. It certainly won’t suddenly become a part of science. Indeed, this is just as true of materialism (as Kastrup himself often tells us) as it is of Kastrup’s Cosmic Idealism.

Now a few words on Kastrup’s video presentation itself, which is the basis on this essay.

Kastrup’s Video Presentation Itself

Kastrup’s video presentation is from a conference which has the surface appearance of being an event which included many different viewpoints. Yet it’s actually hosted by member of the Essentia Foundation (Professor Sarah Durston — who’s on the Academic Advisory Board of the Essentia Foundation), of which Kastrup is the executive director. Added to that fact is that the host doesn’t critically — or otherwise — question Kastrup on anything he says. And even the three speakers (Professor Henk Barendregt, Professor Heleen Slagter and Steve Taylor, PhD) all have strong affinities to Kastrup’s philosophical work.

More relevantly, the following words can be found directly under the YouTube video:

“In his opening presentation of the ‘Science of Consciousness’ conference 2021, Essentia Foundation’s executive director Bernardo Kastrup reviews the neuroscientific evidence and discusses what it actually tells about consciousness. He also discusses, in explicit and specific detail, what he perceives as widespread physicalist confirmation bias in both academia and mainstream media.”

Kastrup’s Response to a Guardian Article

Bernardo Kastrup focuses much on a Guardian article and severely criticises it. (The article: ‘LSD’s impact on the brain revealed in groundbreaking images’ | Science | The Guardian.) Kastrup’s position is summed up by the last words of the passage above:

“[Kastrup] also discusses, in explicit and specific detail, what he perceives as widespread physicalist confirmation bias in both academia and mainstream media.”

As can be seen above and elsewhere, many of Kastrup’s criticisms of other philosophical — and indeed scientific — positions are quite conspiratorial in nature, as well as being highly personalised, somewhat arrogant and rhetorical. (On videos and in interviews, Kastrup comes across as having a almost narcissistic belief in himself and in his own views.)

(Note: Kastrup has a go at the Washington Post, The Conversation and CNN. He uses the words “gratuitously misleading”, “Why don’t they just tell the truth?” and “in your face bias”. He also accuses these newspaper journalists of being “physicalists”. Added to all that are his strong words on Sabine HossenfelderSam Harris and even on the mild-mannered Philip Goff - of whom he says: I have lost a great deal of intellectual respect for Philip’s positions and arguments. Therefore, I have little motivation to continue the engagement with him.” Kastrup’s comments on Harris and Hossenfelder, however, are far worse than that.)

More relevantly to this essay, Kastrup sneers and literally laughs at much — or even all — of the Guardian article he focusses on. He specifically laughs at a Guardian image (see below) in which the journalist supposedly mistakes the parts of the brains which are coloured orange (in the mage) with increased activity, rather than decreased activity. (The image is accompanied with the words “lots of orange”.) This may well be a simple and honest mistake — that’s if it’s a mistake at all. Yet Kastrup gives the image and entire article an embarrassingly conspiratorial interpretation and boils in all down to a commitment to “physicalism”, which he claims is “a failing paradigm”.

The aforementioned image doesn’t matter that much anyway because the scientists quoted in the article — as we shall shortly see — make it very clear that there is much brain activity during psychedelic experiences.

In any case, Kastrup is definitely demanding that newspaper articles be written in the manner and style of academic papers… at least in the cases which he cares about.

Yet Kastrup himself isn’t a neuroscientist.

Indeed (as far as I can see) he’s never formerly studied neuroscience at a university. That said, the Guardian writer Kastrup tackles, Ian Sample, isn’t a neuroscientist either. However, he was a journalist at New Scientist and worked at the Institute of Physics as a journal editor. (He also has a PhD in biomedical materials.) Of course Kastrup has a strong scientific background too. So the fact that both Kastrup and Sample have such backgrounds doesn’t make either of them the last word on any scientific subject. And this is especially the case because, if we read Bernardo Kastrup right, the Guardian’s Ian Sample has got it all wrong when it comes to psychedelic experiences.

Kastrup’s Detail on the Guardian Article

This image was used by the Guardian newspaper and then scrutinised by Bernardo Kastrup. It’s accompanied by the following words: “A second image shows different sections of the brain, either on placebo, or under the influence of LSD (lots of orange).”… Kastrup laughs at this mention of “lots of orange” even though there’s no mention — at least here — that the orange simply and plainly signifies “increased” brain activity. It may, instead, simply signify differences in brain activity.

Kastrup is emphasising (what he takes to be) the fact that there is less brain activity during a psychedelic “trip” than in normal states. The thing is that the Guardian article Kastrup laughs can be interpreted as not exactly stating the opposite of this. (That is, that there is more brain activity during a trip.) Instead, it simply highlights the different kinds of brain activity which occur during psychedelic trips.

Thus the central theme here are the distinctions which can be made between increased brain activity, decreased brain activity and what Kastrup calls “activity variability”.

The Guardian’s (or Ian Sample’s) position is summed up in this way:

“A dose of the psychedelic substance — injected rather than dropped — unleashed a wave of changes that altered activity and connectivity across the brain.”

The Guardian concludes with these words:

“This has led scientists to new theories of visual hallucinations and the sense of oneness with the universe some users report.”

So, according to the Guardian, this “oneness with the universe” is actually a result of the “wave of changes that altered activity and connectivity across the brain”. Kastrup, on the other hand, believes that this oneness with the universe — along with much else! — is down to the subjects’ actual (or real) oneness with the universe. That is, Kastrup believes that the minds of the subjects experiencing psychedelic experiences disengage from the physical brain and become one — or at least attempt to become one — with Cosmic Consciousness.

In fact Kastrup may be right (at least in a weak sense) about a “materialist bias” because the neuroscientist and professor Robin Carhart-Harris (as quoted in the Guardian article) states the following words:

“This experience is sometimes framed in a religious or spiritual way, and seems to be associated with improvements in wellbeing after the drug’s effects have subsided.”

To Kastrup, on the other hand, “[t]his experience” isn’t actually about these experiences being “framed in a religious or spiritual way” at all. It’s about this experience actually being religious or spiritual. That is, it’s about psychedelic subjects tapping into Cosmic Consciousness.

(In Kastrup’s general philosophy, this tapping into Cosmic Consciousness comes with a hell of a lot of extra spiritual and indeed political baggage. See, for example, here.)

Moreover, the Guardian spreads yet more of the (what Kastrup calls) “materialist paradigm” here:

“Further images showed that other brain regions that usually form a network became more separated in a change that accompanied users’ feelings of oneness with the world, a loss of personal identity called ‘ego dissolution’.”

More technically, the following is just one more example of brain activity (again, as cited by the Guardian) which occurs during a psychedelic trip:

“The brain scans revealed that trippers experienced images through information drawn from many parts of their brains, and not just the visual cortex at the back of the head that normally processes visual information. Under the drug, regions once segregated spoke to one another.”

Added to all that, Robin Carhart-Harris is quoted again stating the following:

“We saw many more areas of the brain than normal were contributing to visual processing under LSD, even though volunteers’ eyes were closed.”

So are all the words above (both from the Guardian and the neuroscientists cited in other newspaper articles) simply yet more examples of the (as the Essential Foundation puts Kastrup’s position)

“widespread physicalist confirmation bias in both academia and mainstream media”?

Ironically, both the Guardian and Kastrup may well be working from the same hard data… Or at least that is something that Kastrup would like to stress. And he does so, for example, when he judgmentally and sternly claims that the Guardian (or Ian Sample) has simply misinterpreted that data!

In any case, it’s unequivocal that, at least according to the Guardian and the scientists it quotes, there is much brain activity during psychedelic experiences!

Case Studies and Details

Bernardo Kastrup argues (or merely hints at in this particular video) that a decrease in brain activity in the brain (during a session of hallucinogenic drugs) means that the brain isn’t involved at all when it comes to such hallucinogenic experiences. (It will be explained why this extreme expression of Kastrup’s position is implicit in what he says.)

Yet a reduction in some areas of brain activity (during psychedelic experiences) doesn’t mean a reduction in all areas of brain activity. It certainly doesn’t mean that the brain isn’t involved in any way in such experiences.

What these (what Kastrup calls) “deactivations” of brain activity may simply mean, for example, is that the psychedelic subjects’ cognitive processes are less prevalent during their psychedelic experiences. Thus, the subjects allow themselves to be (as it’s sometimes put) “immersed” in their experiences. (This is how the advocates and takers of hallucinogenic substances themselves often put it.) Hence the lack of activity in certain parts of the brain.

At one point in the video Kastrup explicitly states that “not a single part of the brain becomes more [my italics] active” during a psychedelic trip. That may well be true. Yet the brain is still active at such a time. And there’s certainly no demonstration of any independence of psychedelic experiences from the brain.

Kastrup also compares what happens during a psychedelic trip to “the brain going to sleep”. Yet, as far as can be seen, no neuroscientist has claimed that dreams — or simply sleep — are independent of the brain or ever concluded such a thing. And neither do they claim that there is zero brain activity during sleep. (As earlier, this is a reference to zero activity when it comes to dreams and other states of sleep; not to the general functioning of the brain when subjects are asleep.)

Kastrup knows that that there is much brain activity even during deep sleep because he actually mentions it. ( See the scientific detail here. ) The words “much” was just used. So it can be conceded that even though there is much brain activity during sleep, there may still be less brain activity than when awake. And this may indeed parallel what happens during psychedelic experiences. That is, there is much brain activity during psychedelic experiences, but still less than there is during non-psychedelic states.

This means that Kastrup bringing up sleep doesn’t seem to do the job he wants it to do.

So what does all of the data show Kastrup?

It doesn’t show that experience or consciousness has any kind of independence from the brain or from brain activity. It simply shows that different things occur in the brain during hallucinogenic experiences than which occur at other times. And that fact has the air of the obvious about it.

This means that Kastrup’s “black swans” (his term for the cases which he believes show us that not all experiences are “correlated” with activity in the brain) are not black swans at all. They’re simply different types of white swan — that is, different things occur in the brain when under a hallucinogenic substance than which occur when not under such a substance.

So how does Kastrup draw his very broad philosophical conclusions from his supposed black swans?

All this is pretty obvious: (1) Different experiences will involve different parts of the brain and different levels of activity in the brain. (2) Some parts of the brain will be less active and other parts will be more active during different experiences. (3) It may indeed be the case that, overall, the brain is less active during a psychedelic trip.

Kastrup also focuses on the “rich experiences” which are had during psychedelic trips. In Kastrup’s own words:

“Psychedelic substances have been known to induce highly complex, intense, non-local, transpersonal experiences.”

To Kastrup, this demonstrates that there is something very weird or spooky about rich experiences running alongside decreased brain activity.

Yet Kastrup fails to say (or realise) what a psychedelic “rich experience” actually is. He conflates what the subject makes of his experiences under the influence of a hallucinogenic substance and the experiences themselves. Of course, those who take such substances make a lot of their experiences under their influence. (This is well documented.) But that doesn’t mean that the experiences actually are “richer” in anything other than a vague (or purely personal/psychological) sense. And it certainly doesn’t mean that the experiences are (as Kastrup puts it) “non-local” just because certain (i.e., not all) subjects take them to be non-local.

(Not that any of the psychedelic subjects would have used the highly-technical term “non-local” — unless, that is, they already had an interest in these areas of philosophy and science. See quantum non-locality.).

Conclusion

To repeat.

In order to establish his radical position, doesn’t Kastrup need to demonstrate that there is zero brain activity during psychedelic experiences? Note that this isn’t a demand that Kastrup should demonstrate zero brain activity simpliciter. It simply means that he should demonstrate zero brain activity in relation to the psychedelic experiences themselves..

More technically, what Kastrup calls “deactivation” doesn’t mean that there’s zero brain activity during psychedelic trips. Yet that’s precisely what Kastrup would need to establish both his scientific position and his philosophical conclusions (or speculations). Indeed, Kastrup even admits that brain “activity does remain” during psychedelic experiences (i.e., as that activity relates to those experiences). Kastrup also uses the words “reduced activity”, “less active”, “residual activity” and “activity variability” in reference to what occurs during psychedelic experiences. In other words, Kastrup’s “activity variability” (which Kastrup pits against what he believe are the many false claims about increased brain activity) obviously doesn’t equal zero brain activity.

In a strong sense, then, if Kastrup isn’t making these very radical claims about zero brain activity (which may be hidden beneath his very-academic and technical prose), then he simply can’t establish his radical philosophical position of Cosmic Idealism. Moreover, if he isn’t claiming that there’s zero brain activity during psychedelic experiences, then what, exactly, is he claiming?

In other words, simply arguing that the brain is slightly less active (or whichever technical wording Kastrup prefers to use) during psychedelic experiences clearly doesn’t establish Kastrup’s central philosophical thesis — i.e., that psychedelic trippers are tapping into Cosmic Consciousness and thereby freeing themselves from the biological and physical brain.

*) See my essay, ‘The Idealist Philosopher Bernardo Kastrup vs. Materialism’.

[I can be found on Twitter here.]










Monday, 11 April 2022

The Physics and Metaphysics of Mass

Philosophers such as Philip Goff believe that physicists leave something important out when they define and explain mass.

“I’ll never forget the end of one of those lectures, in which the professor said, ‘We evaluate electricity not by knowing what it is, but by scrutinizing what it does.’ This was a great statement. It really expresses the whole philosophy of modern physics, not only for electricity but also for all phenomena that aren’t directly tangible.”

 Stan Gibilisco (source here).


The philosophers who stress the idea that physics doesn’t tell us anything about what they call intrinsic properties often cite the case of mass.

Such philosophers argue that mass is defined, explained, and measured exclusively in terms of objects (with mass) and how they’re affected by forces, other objects, acceleration, etc.

Yet physicists do believe that mass is an intrinsic property of objects.

(Definition: “An intrinsic property is a property that an object has of itself.” And from the same definition: “Mass is an intrinsic property of any physical object.”)

The following is the English philosopher Philip Goff (who’ll be featured later) writing about mass:

“What is mass? We know what mass is when we know what it does. What is spacetime curvature? We understand what spacetime curvature is only when we know what it does, which involves understanding how it affects objects with mass. But we understand this only when we know what mass is. And so we find ourselves in a classic Catch 22.”

The argument is that in most — or even all — accounts of mass (i.e., in physics) we aren’t told what mass actually is.

Now take this definition from a physicist:

“Mass is both a property of a physical body and a measure of its resistance to acceleration (rate of change of velocity with respect to time) when a net force is applied. An object’s mass also determines the strength of its gravitational attraction to other bodies.”

And here’s an even simpler definition:

“The term mass, as used by physicists, refers to a quantity of matter in terms of its ability to resist motion when acted on by a force.”

In the above, we’re told about the mass of a body and its “resistance to acceleration” (prima facie, an extrinsic property). Yet we’re also told that “mass is [] a property of a physical body”.

So does that property of mass actually equal the resistance to acceleration? (The equality sign = states that mass is literally equal — or identical — to the resistance to acceleration.) Alternatively, is there a property of mass, and only then does that property — in this instance at least — resist acceleration?

All this is expressed in one form of Newton’s Second Law, in which the value to be found is that of acceleration (i.e., not force or mass):

a = F/m

Translation:

acceleration a (in meters per second) = force of magnitude F (in newtons) divided by mass m (in kilograms)

In that sense, then, mass is like the everyday notion of weight (to which mass can be connected, but isn’t identical to) in that weight isn’t a thing — it’s what things (as it were) have. And things have mass too.

To repeat: in various definitions in physics we’re told that mass is a “property of a physical body”. So this means that we aren’t only being told what mass does. It’s being said that mass (as it were) belongs to physical bodies: it’s a property of physical bodies.

Now take Philip Goff again.

Goff has been selected here because he believes that mass isn’t an intrinsic property. Yet he too happily states that mass is a

“measure of its resistance to acceleration (rate of change of velocity with respect to time) when a net force is applied”.

And, elsewhere, Goff goes on to tell us that

“mass also determines the strength of its gravitational attraction to other bodies”.

Thus, in simple terms, mass is defined in terms of force, acceleration and “other bodies”. And force is surely separate from an object’s mass. So too, more obviously, are other bodies. And acceleration is what happens to bodies with mass.

So, according to Goff’s philosophical story, mass isn’t an intrinsic property at all.

Perhaps, then, mass is purely a measurement of matter and also a case of objects and their relations to other bodies and to forces.

In that case, here’s a physicist being explicit about the relation between mass and measurement:

“Mass is a measurement of an object’s tendency to resist changing its state of motion, known as inertia [].”

Yet here’s another physicist who says that mass is indeed an intrinsic property:

“Mass is an intrinsic property of matter and is measured in kilograms.”

Of course, a particular mass could be both a measurement and an intrinsic property… Or could it?

In any case, much of this issue is almost entirely dependent on precisely what an intrinsic property is taken to be in the first place!

Mass and Quantities of Matter

It will be noted that in many of the definitions of mass the words “quantity of matter” can be found. (For example: “Mass refers to a quality of matter in terms of its ability to resist motion when acted on by a force.”) So although mass is defined, explained, and/or measured in terms of outside forces — what is acted upon is actually matter. That is, matter has mass. And matter — in very simple terms — is made up of fermions. So, it can now be said, even though forces, other objects, and acceleration can’t be intrinsic to an object’s mass, it’s still the case that the object is made up of matter (fermions) and therefore it has mass.

Indeed the mass of a given object O also has magnitude — basically, size and extent.

All this works both ways.

That is, just as the mass of an object can be (or is) defined, explained, and measured (at least partly) in terms of force; so the force can be defined, explained, and measured by the effect it has on objects with mass.

Thus we now have another formulation of Newton’s Second Law, in which the value to be found is that of force (i.e., not mass or acceleration):

F = ma

Translation:

force of magnitude F (in newtons) = mass m times its acceleration a

This is all very (as philosophers put it) relational. That said, there’s still an object made up of matter (i.e., fermions).

Now take a more concrete example of all this.

When you’re travelling in a car and then you accelerate, your body is pressed backwards into the seat. Indeed your body is also pressed downward toward the Earth.

That description of your car journey seems to be largely — or even entirely — about force. And force is something extrinsic to the object — in this case, you driving a car.

Thus being pressed backwards and downward is down to a force — i.e., gravity. Yet it’s still an object with mass — you! — that’s being pushed, shoved, and pulled. This means that it’s not all about forces, other objects, acceleration, etc. Indeed the force, in this instance at least, is itself caused in part by your mass and in part by gravity and acceleration.

This means that it’s not as if the philosophers’ intrinsic properties are being factored out of this equation of a human being driving a car. And this is also true of an individual particle.

Of course, the object with mass — you or a particle — can itself be defined and/or measured entirely in terms of relations, forces, other objects, etc!…

But can this game go on indefinitely?

Take the following very simplified breakdown of the aforementioned body with mass — a human body:

(1) The human body is made up of body parts and organs
(2) Body parts and organs are made up of cells.
(3) Cell are made up of molecules.
(4) Molecules are made up of atoms.
(5) Atoms are (as it were) “made up of” fermions.
(6) Fermions include protons, neutrons and electrons. And protons and neutrons are made up of quarks.
(7) Quarks and electrons are not believed to be made up of anything.

That long list above can be simplified even more as follows:

(1) All matter is made up of fermions.
(2) Fermions are made up of quarks; except in the case of electrons.

Perhaps quarks and electrons (or matter itself) aren’t fundamental either!

So if quarks and electrons aren’t fundamental, then what is?

The American theoretical physicist Lee Smolin (1955 — ) gives an answer which is expressed in clear terms:

“If fields are not made from matter, perhaps fields are the fundamental stuff. Matter must then be made from fields.”

Smolin also sees “the geometry of space as another field”. Not only that: we also have a symmetry here in that “the geometry of space is almost the same as the gravitational field”. Finally, if we take a look at the whole picture, then Smolin finishes off by saying that “[w]e have a bunch of fields all interacting with one another, all dynamical, all influencing one another”.

Note Smolin’s words “interacting” and “all influencing one another”.

The problem (if it is a problem!) here is that this may be just more physics in that it may simply evade the (philosophical) issue of intrinsic properties. In addition, everything philosophers (such as Goff) have said about mass (or objects with mass) can now be said about fields. That is, they too are doings, effects, interactions, etc. which can be relationally described.

Indeed even the quantum (i.e., the minimum amount of any physical entity or physical property) is defined relationally or in terms of doings and interactions.

Philip Goff was mentioned a few moments ago. So now let’s tackle his philosophical position on mass in some detail.

Part Two: Philip Goff on Mass

Philip Goff claims that we don’t know what mass (along with spacetime, gravity, etc.) is. Indeed Goff’s overall position is one which I can only presume many laypersons will find bizarre — or, perhaps, simply puzzling.

Goff’s central position is that the properties of physics are described in terms of both what they do and in terms of their relations — not in terms of what they actually are.

But, as we’ve seen, is that true?

Goff’s argument is that surely something (or some things) must be responsible for the doings. In other words, you don’t usually have a verb without an object.

To take just one relevant example.

If mass curves spacetime, then what is it that curves spacetime? Alternatively, if spacetime (to use John Wheeler’s words) “tells objects how to move”, then what is it that’s telling objects (with mass) how to move?…..

Relationalism and Causal Structuralism

Isn’t it the case that even if mass can be defined (or characterised) and measured in terms that don’t include what it does, then that characterisation would still include things outside of mass itself?

Indeed it’s hard to even imagine how this could be any other way.

In other words, how can the (to use Goff’s words) “nature of a given thing” ever be “understood in isolation from all other things”? Or, perhaps less strongly, how can the nature of a given thing ever be understood without bringing on board at least some other things? (Even if not Goff’s “everything else”.)

What would such an (as it were) atomic understanding (or account) of mass — or anything else — even look like? What’s more, this question makes even more sense if we think of classical examples such as cups, trees… and people — how could we give an account of a cup, tree, or a person in isolation from all other things?

More relevantly, it’s difficult to even comprehend giving an account of mass in isolation from all other things.

So perhaps Goff could — perhaps he does — embrace some kind of (philosophical) relationalism. Moreover, he could do so without also feeling the need to posit intrinsic properties — let alone consciousness as the ultimate intrinsic property.

More specifically, Goff takes up a position against what he calls causal structuralism

More accurately, Goff doesn’t exactly reject causal structuralism. It’s more a case that he believes that it leaves something out — just as he believes that physics itself leaves something out!

The following is Goff’s own take (partly quoted earlier) on the causal structuralist position on mass:

“What is mass? For a causal structuralist, we know what mass is when we know what it does, i.e., when we know the way in which it curves spacetime. But to really understand what this really amounts to, as opposed to merely being able to make accurate predictions, we need to know what spacetime curvature is. What is spacetime curvature? For a causal structuralist, we understand what spacetime curvature is only when we know what it does, which involves understanding how it affects objects with mass. But we understand this only when we know what mass is. We find ourselves in a classic catch-22: we can understand the nature of mass only when we know what spacetime curvature is, but we can understand the nature of spacetime curvature only when we know what mass is.”

To state the (almost) obvious.

If we’re (only) doing physics, then — almost by definition — any account of mass is going to bring in spacetime (among other things from the lexicon of physics); and any account of spacetime is going to bring in mass…

So it’s hard to know what other option a physicist would (or could) have.

But Goff is not alone — at least not when it comes to his position on mass.

James Ladyman

Take Goff’s fellow English philosopher James Ladyman.

Ladyman basically agrees with Goff on how physics defines, explains, and measures mass. The big difference is that Goff believes that an intrinsic nature (in his case, consciousness) underpins mass and everything else in physics — yet Ladyman doesn’t believe that!

On Ladyman’s picture, subatomic particles and their mass are almost entirely defined in terms of their “relational” properties: such as their interactions with fields, forces, or with other particles. (See my ‘Carlo Rovelli’s Relational Quantum Mechanics’.) So the mass of a particle can’t be defined as an intrinsic property because it’s determined by its place within a quantum system (or systems). More technically, a particle’s mass is determined by its relation to fields, forces, and to other particles.

The following is James Ladyman himself on this subject. He writes:

[A] particle that never interacts with anything else could [never] have any value whatever for its mass.”

Nonetheless,

“since real particles will always interact with something or other [we can] ignore this”.

It can also be said that mass is “defined operationally” in that “the ratio of the masses of two particles is a constant of proportionality”.

Interestingly enough, Ladyman takes a particle’s lack of a non-relational essence to have the consequence that it can’t be what philosophers call an individual. (In broad terms, an individual is any given x which is deemed to be — to a large degree at least — self-sufficient, determinate, and circumscribed.)

If we return to Goff.

Goff is of course asking philosophical questions. And that must mean that the physicist — again, almost by definition — won’t be able to answer his philosophical questions (at least not qua physicist).

Think about this.

Goff is demanding an account of mass that doesn’t mention spacetime, gravity, other objects, or any other property specified by physics. Similarly, Goff is demanding an account of spacetime that doesn’t mention mass, gravity, or any other property specified by physics.

In other words, Goff is demanding that physics stop being physics

Now to be fair to Goff (or to backtrack a little): he may not be expecting physics to stop being physics. Instead, he may simply be making the point that physics alone can’t (as it were) join the dots. That is, physics is good at what it does. However, it doesn’t provide us with a complete picture of what reality is. Philosophy, then, must do that job.

(One would hope that Goff also believes that philosophy must do that job — at least partly — on the solid grounding that physics has already provided.)

Goff himself says as much in a few places.

For example, straight after the just-quoted words above, Goff writes:

“I agree that mass can be uniquely identified — as it were, homed in on — in terms of its place in the abstract pattern of causal relationships realized by the entire network of physical properties.”

In other words, Goff fully accepts that mass is “uniquely identified” in terms of an “abstract pattern of causal relationships realized by the entire network of physical properties”. Yet all that alone doesn’t provide us with a complete picture of reality.

And elsewhere Goff (alluding to a well-known passage from the physicist Stephen Hawking) writes:

“The equations of physics allow us to predict the behaviour of matter with great precision. But is is the intrinsic nature of matter that breathes fire into those equations. And on this topic physics has nothing to say.”

Again, Goff believes that physics is great… though only within (its own) limits. (It can be said that some physicists have happily accepted such limits.) In this case, physics is great for “predict[ing] the behaviour of matter” and it does so “with great precision”. The problem is — or so Goff believes — that it leaves out what he calls intrinsic nature — and it’s intrinsic nature which “breathes fire into the equations”!

But we should slow down here!

All along Goff is simply assuming (though, admittedly, he has provided arguments for his assumption) that there is such a… thing… as intrinsic nature.

Now it’s worth stating here that the term “intrinsic nature” is almost exclusively an invention of philosophers.

Part Three: What is Intrinsic Nature?

Very few physicists will use the term “intrinsic property” or “intrinsic nature” (at least as it’s used by Goff). Of course, that fact alone isn’t a good reason to dismiss either the usage of the term “intrinsic nature” or even the existence(?) of intrinsic properties. And that’s primarily because Goff and various other philosophers have provided arguments as to why there must be intrinsic properties and therefore intrinsic nature.

So it may well be the case that physics doesn’t provide a complete picture of reality or Nature.

Yet it doesn’t help here that we’re talking about what are called “properties”. That’s because it’s not clear how that word is meant to be read or interpreted.

In other words, all this will depend on what intrinsic properties are supposed to be. And it may be the case that whatever such philosophers take these properties to be, they can never be described by physics. Indeed that may be (rhetorically put) the whole point of such properties.

More importantly, Goff himself doesn’t simply stress the fact that physics only concerns itself with doings and relations. He also tells us what’s missing from this picture: intrinsic nature. Indeed Goff goes one step beyond that by telling us exactly what intrinsic nature is! He does so in the following passage:

“What then is the intrinsic nature of matter? Panpsychism offers an answer: consciousness. Physics describes matter ‘from the outside’, that is to say, physics gives us rich information about the behaviour brought about by mass, spin, charge, etc. But there must be more to what something is than what it does; and according to panpsychism, mass, spin, charge, etc, are, in their intrinsic nature, forms of consciousness.”

As it is, panpsychism isn’t going to be discussed in this piece. That’s primarily because there are different properties that are taken to be intrinsic by other philosophers. It’s also because panpsychism is far too outré for this discussion. Or, more clearly, the claim that “mass, spin, charge, etc, are, in their intrinsic nature, forms of consciousness” is too outré for this piece. (I have tackled panpsychism elsewhere. See, for example, my essay ‘Philip Goff’s Panpsychism vs. Sam Coleman’s Russellian Monism?’.)

David Lewis

It may be the case that Goff’s position on intrinsic nature is inspired by the work of the American philosopher David Lewis (1941–2001).

Firstly, let’s take Lewis’s own definition of intrinsic properties:

“A thing has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the way that thing itself, and nothing else, is.”

Lewis’s wording above is almost identical to some of the passages from Goff which have been quoted earlier and which can be found elsewhere.

So could there ever be such a state as “the way that a thing itself is” regardless of everything else? That is, regardless of a thing’s relations to other properties/objects/events/etc., its place in time and space… and so on?

Lewis’s position can be taken to its most extreme (or perhaps ridiculous) in the following statement:

Object (or thing) O would still have intrinsic property P if after the entire world around it disappeared, O would still have P.

Perhaps there’s a midway position in which it can be argued that there are indeed intrinsic properties; though they still have vital (or even essential) relations to extrinsic properties. That is, extrinsic proprieties may determine — to some extent at least — intrinsic properties. That said, it may be countered that because objects are such-and-such-a-way, then they can only be affected (or determined) in particular ways precisely because they have the intrinsic properties which they do have. That may mean that there may be some kind of mutual relation between intrinsic and extrinsic properties.

Yet there still may be no “way” an object is regardless of its relations to other things — or to extrinsic properties.

To be clear on one distinction.

Some metaphysicians highlight the difference which can be made between the following:

(1) Properties which objects have independently of any external factors acting upon them (i.e., intrinsic properties).
(2) Properties which are deemed to be the way they are regardless of what’s external to them (i.e., essential properties).

If the distinctions above are applied to Goff’s own example, then the intrinsic nature of mass would be what it is independently of any external factors acting upon it. Similarly, an object (or its intrinsic property) will be what it is regardless of what’s external to it.

Yet don’t all these arcane distinctions and subtleties (in the ontology) seem crazy when applied to the fundamental properties of physics?

In any case, whatever philosophers take intrinsic properties to be, those properties will be beyond physics — as already stated. So, again, one could almost (rhetorically) say that they are designed to be beyond physics. In other words, Goff’s intrinsic properties are designed to be (quite literally) metaphysical.

[I can be found on Twitter here.]