What, exactly, did Michael Dummett mean by “a theory of meaning”?
Firstly,
it concerns the “implicit knowledge we have of our language”.
Dummett says:
“It must issue in principles which will make explicit the implicit knowledge we have of the language we use, the knowledge we display in our practice, in such a way as to show that these principles do adequately reflect that practice.” (78)
This
is not, then, unlike Chomsky’s enterprise of showing us the
“implicit knowledge” we must have in order to generate an
infinite possibility of grammatical sentences from a limited stock of
linguistic material. This is accounted for, in Chomsky’s theory, by
our “language faculty” which is built into our brains and thus
also our minds.
Dummett
is clearly doing something similar in his theory of meaning. Indeed
we must have implicit knowledge of “the language we use” in order
to account for that use. After all, not many non-philosophers know
about truth-conditions, sense, reference, proper names and so on.
Dummett must be arguing that we do have implicit knowledge of such
things; just as Chomsky argues that we must have implicit knowledge
of what he calls “universal grammar” and the “universals”
contained in that grammar. This knowledge of truth-conditions, sense,
etc. “we display in our practice” (78). Again, we wouldn’t
display what we do display without such implicit or tacit knowledge.
These
“principles”, however, must “adequately reflect that practice”
(78) because Dummett isn't carrying out a normative or revisionary
project. He is uncovering what we must actually know – even if only
implicitly. Thus he mustn't “ascribe to us knowledge we could not
possibly have” (78).
Many
philosophers (for example Gilbert Ryle) have also distinguished “knowing
how” from “knowing that”. The former is non-propositional or
non-theoretical, unlike the latter.
Is
our implicit knowledge of language a case of knowing how or of
knowing that? Passmore writes that
“we have an implicit knowledge, for example, of the physical principles which are manifested in our capacity to ride a bike”. (78)
Didn’t
Ryle and others argue that we couldn't even express or formulate our
implicit knowledge of how we can ride a bike even if we were asked
to? In that case, would knowing how actually be a case of
implicit knowledge at all? Or perhaps we have implicit knowledge
without being able to express of formulate it.
In
Dummett’s case, does he think, or expect, the layperson to express
or formulate his implicit knowledge about his language or does he
still have such knowledge even when he or she can't do so? In that
case, is implicit knowledge, as it were, mechanical and
non-propositional (or non-theoretical)? If that's the case, again,
why is it knowledge at all and not something else? Does it
matter to Dummett whether or not we can express or formulate our
implicit knowledge?
Passmore
reiterates Dummett’s position by talking in terms of our
understanding. He writes:
“A good theory of meaning, then, will be a theory of what it is to understand, of what one knows when one knows a language, so that, for example, ‘Meaning is use’ could serve as a thesis in such theory only if to know the meaning is to know the use – implicitly or explicitly.” (78)
To
put this simply. Why and how is it that we understand what it is we
understand when we hear or read examples of our own language? What
enables us to understand such examples of our language? Another way
of putting this is to ask, “what one knows when one knows a
language” (78). After all, we must know something about our
language and its sentences and words otherwise we wouldn’t
understand our language. And what we know must be more than what
we've learned at school. What we know, in a sense, must have come
before our formal training (or our adult training) otherwise perhaps
we couldn’t have even learned the basics in the first place (never
mind the higher levels of grammar and vocabulary).
Interestingly
enough, Passmore writes that the “meaning is use” thesis could be
a part of Dummett’s overall theory of meaning. However, that would
only be the case if “to know the meaning is to know the use –
implicitly or explicitly” (78). That is, it's still about our
knowledge or understanding of meaning. In this case, what we know is
how we use words and sentences. These uses of words and sentences
provide us with their meanings. Thus use-theory can become a
part of Dummett’s general theory of meaning – that is, if he were
to accept it in the first place.
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