Why
is the brain-mind (intentionally) connected to its surroundings?
That
question seems very fundamental.
However,
I have a feeling that what are called “biological naturalists”
(or at least some of them) may see it as a “pseudo question” in
that biology itself provides the answer. In other words, brains are
(intentionally) connected to the environment because that was the next
evolutionary step up from simply reacting – physically - to stimuli
in the environment. (That can't be “intentional” - or can it?)
So
here we're back to the why of intentionality and therefore the why of
consciousness.
Causal
Powers
How
do John Searle's “causal powers" fit into all this?
Searle's
talk about causal powers refers to the fact that a certain
level of complexity is what's required to bring about those causal
powers which are necessary for intentionality, mind and
consciousness.
Searle
never never says that biological brains are the only things capable -
in principle - of bringing about consciousness and intentionality
(therefore semantics, in Searle-speak). He says that biological
brains are the only things known which are complex enough to do so.
It really is all about the biological and physical complexity of
brains and therefore their causal powers.
Dualism?
Searle
actually accuses those who accuse him of being a “dualist” of
being, well, dualists (or at least some of them, depending on
their overall philosophy of mind).
His
basic position on this is that if computationalists or
functionalists, for example, dispute the physical biology of brains
and exclusively focus on syntax, computations and functions (the
form/role rather than the physical embodiment), then that will surely
lead to a kind of dualism. What I think he means by that is that
there's a radical disjunction created between the actual physical
reality of the brains and how these philosophers explain and account
for intentionality, mind and consciousness.
Searle
doesn't believe that only brains can give rise to minds. Searle's
position is that only brains do give rise to minds. He's emphasising
an empirical fact; though he's not denying the logical and
metaphysical possibility that other things can bring forth minds.
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