“…we
see the array
.
. .
.
. .
.
. .
.
. .
as three
columns of dots rather than as four rows.” (1983)
There's
no reason, prima facie, that we shouldn’t see four rows
rather than three columns. This seems to suggest that concepts (of
columns, perhaps) are determining our “sensations”. I don’t know
about the empirical research on this particular array; though I
suspect that there must be someone who does indeed see four rows
instead of three columns. The point is, however, that the sensations
alone don’t determine the experience. Indeed if it were just a
question of sensations alone, it wouldn’t be an experience.
Experience is “under an aspect”.
The
same applies to another Peacocke example.
One
person may see the object which we call a “sphere”; though not apply
the concept [sphere] to it. Another person will indeed apply the
concept [sphere] to that same object. However, and more likely, he won’t
apply the concept at all. The concept will belong (as it were) to the
spherical object. He'll non-cognitively experience a
sphere as a sphere. The person without the concept [sphere]
will still, however, either apply a concept to the sphere or a
concept will belong to the sphere (as in the other example).
Peacocke
himself says that “sensational properties do not determine
representational content”. No; concepts are part of the story too.
Peacocke
goes on to say that “grouping properties [the arrays into columns
not rows] are sensational rather than representational”. Peacocke
admits that the array example
“seems
to suggest that we are concerned with representational, not a
sensational, property: the concept of a column enters the content”.
The
problem is Peacocke’s argument that “grouping [is a]
sensational property”. Of course “grouping” will rely on
sensations; though they won't wholly determine the grouping.
Peacocke is making a distinction between grouping
(which I think is conceptual and he doesn’t) and sensations.
Indeed he's saying that grouping isn't conceptual (or
“representational”). On this particular aspect, Peacocke
doesn’t go into detail. He says himself that in “switches of
aspect the sensational properties…[remain] constant”.
Martin
Davies spots a dualism in Peacocke's position. He
says that the idea is that there's “a sensational
(non-representational) substrate upon which the representational
superstructure…is erected” (page 324).
Or
>)
Representational superstructure
>)
Sensational (non-representational) substrate
As
with Ned Block’s “access-consciousness” and
"phenomenal-consciousness”, Davies quite happily accepts
“non-representational properties of experience without embracing
the idea of a sensational substrate”.
Colin
McGinn points out the position represented by philosophers like
Peacocke. They accept
“prerepresentational
yet intrinsic level of description of experiences: that is, a level
of description that is phenomenal yet noncontentful…”
(1989)
Perhaps
the problem is that Peacocke thinks in terms of “protopropositional
content” (1992, pg. 79) – i.e., nonconceptual content. This is
almost – or indeed literally – an acceptance that content prior
to “propositional judgement” can’t be conceptual. Propositions
almost literally make concepts. That is why “protopropositional
content” is nonconceptual content. Though if we don’t accept an entirely linguistic basis for concepts, then we needn't believe in
Peacocke’s non-conceptual content.
Davies
points out that Peacocke is obviously happy to accept the
conceptualisations of “sensational properties”. He says that
Peacocke shows us examples of “pairs of experience with the same
sensational properties but different representational properties”
(1996). Yet Peacocke also shows us “pairs of experiences with the
same representational properties but different sensational
properties”. Does this, however, show us that these “different
sensational properties” are nonconceptual? It seems to hint at the
fact (or possibility) that they aren't representing anything. Though
I've attempted to show (based on my reading of his ‘Sensations
and the Content of Experience’ paper) that this doesn’t
seem to work.
At
least this is the case with Peacocke’s array example. The other
cases are based on technical empirical psychological research on
subjective experience, which is difficult to comment upon.
Peacocke,
however, appears to make an obvious mistake. He says that a person
“waking up in an unfamiliar position or place [will have] minimal
representational content” . Unfamiliarity doesn’t entail lack of
conceptual content. This person will still conceptualise his
“unfamiliar position or place”. This only displays Peacocke’s
linguistic or propositional bias. Of course this person may not be
able to describe or form “propositional judgements” about the
unfamiliar position or place; though that may be irrelevant to
conceptual and/or representational content. When the place or
position becomes “rich” with “representational content”,
this may simply be a case of applying “descriptive labels…to the
array” (Michael Tye, 1990).
Propositions and propositional judgements are simply additions to
the conceptual content that already exists. Tye says that “computational
routines [propositional judgements] process this activity and
assign an appropriate descriptive term”.
I
suspect that Peacocke’s propositional or linguistic bias causes
problems for various of his positions. However, I doubt that even
Peacocke would deny his linguistic or propositional bias (though he
wouldn’t use the word “bias”). The bias itself wouldn’t
cause problems in his eyes. It's simply the reality of conceptual
experience, I assume, to Peacocke. (Someone like Peter Geach was explicit
about his propositional or linguistic bias vis-à-vis concepts. See
his 1959.)
According
to Tye, “phenomenal content” is by definition nonconceptual . He
too gives us his own dualism between “phenomenal content” and
belief:
a)
“A content is classified as phenomenal only if it is nonconceptual
and poised [for use by the cognitive centres].”
against
b)
“Beliefs…lie within the conceptual arena, rather than providing
inputs to it.”
This
is almost foundationalist in that “phenomenal content” is seen as
input to be worked upon later (if only split seconds later). Beliefs,
on the other hand, are outputs. And if this is truly foundationalist,
then a) above would be “the Given”. It certainly seems
foundationalist when Tye makes the epistemic point that phenomenal
content is “poised for use by the cognitive centres”. That is, it
comes (epistemically) before such use.
Tye
makes the strange point that phenomenal content is
“representational”. How can this be? How can something
represent “that there are such and such co-instantiated locational
and nonlocational features” without concepts?
References
Block,
Ned, ‘Begging the
Question Against Phenomenal Consciousness’, from Behavioural
and Brain Sciences, 15, 1992, 205-206
- ‘On
a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness’, from
Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 18, 1995Davies, Martin, ‘Externalism and Experience’, from Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness and Reasoning, 1996
Geach, P, Mental Acts and Their objects (1957)
McGinn, Colin, Mental Content, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989
Peacocke, Christopher, A Study of Concepts, Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press, 1992
- ‘Sensation and Content of Experience’, from Sense and Content, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983
Tye, Michael, ‘A Representational Theory of Pains and Their Phenomenal Character’, from Philosophical Perspectives, Vol.9, 1990, 223-239
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