You
can hear a church bell and not hear it as a church bell.
That is, concepts may not be applied to the sounds you hear.
Similarly, you can see a fridge; though not see it as a fridge. Your visual sensory receptors are stimulated by the
light-waves from the fridge and eventually such data enters
consciousness; though you haven’t applied the concept [fridge] to
the fridge.
Are
these examples of experiences in the strict sense?
It
could be the case that while these sensory stimulations are entering
consciousness, the mind is applying concepts to other things instead. So the
sensory input from the fridge or the church bells are, as it were, in
outer consciousness. The sensations or perceptions aren’t
experiences in that the mind doesn’t infer anything from the church
bell or the fridge (they're not “poised for reasoning”, as Ned
Block puts it). The sensations are cognitively impotent and
irrelevant.
Nothing is derived from the sound of the
church bells or the sight of the fridge because they're not heard as
church bells or seen as a fridge. Indeed no concepts are
applied. They're certainly not an epistemological “given”
because there's no cognitive awareness of the sensations or
perceptions. These sensations - not experiences - can't be the
ground for inferences, knowledge or anything. They are, ultimately,
vacuous. The sensations from the fridge or the church bells aren't
accompanied by a higher-order thought to the effect that there's any
cognitive application of concepts to the sensations.
The
terms of the trade have it that the sensation of hearing the church
bells (though not as church bells), and seeing the fridge
(though not as a fridge), are examples of “phenomenal
consciousness without access-consciousness” (according to
Ned Block). “Access-consciousness” (AC) includes
the application of concepts to “phenomenal consciousness”(PC).
Phenomenal consciousness alone isn't experience or awareness.
John
Searle clarifies things a little here (1990).
He says that we can call the fridge or the church-bell sensations
(not his examples) examples of “peripheral
consciousness”. I wouldn’t also use Searle’s
“inattentiveness” because there may have been no reason why we
should have been attentive to the fridge or the church bells. They
may, however, be in “peripheral consciousness”.
A
better example than the church bell and the fridge would be someone
saying to you, “I’m going to kill you right now!”. The sound-waves from this person’s voice will eventually enter your
consciousness as phenomenal consciousness; though you don’t take
the words in. (That’s why it’s pure phenomenal consciousness.)
You'll have no knowledge of the sentence’s meaning. All you may
have are the sensations: their phenomenal non-cognitive reality.
This example may be an example of peripheral consciousness and, this
time, perhaps also inattentiveness. Though it wouldn’t be an
experience and therefore not the basis of reasoning. (I'm willing to
concede that at some lower level of consciousness the sentence’s
meaning could have been taken on board in a manner which is vaguely
similar to what happens with blind-sight.)
The example of “I’m going to kill you right now!” can’t be
compared to, say, driving on autopilot. If there were genuinely no
access-consciousness or awareness of the ins-and-outs of driving,
then such a person would crash. However, if you'd applied concepts
to - or been access conscious of - the utterance “I’m going to
kill you right now!” (presuming it was a real threat), then you'd
have done something about it. Therefore the auditory sensation of
“I’m going to kill you right now!” was indeed non-conceptual;
though not an experience. Alternatively, driving on autopilot is –
partly – a conceptualised event and therefore an experience: if an
inattentive experience.
I
can quite happily accept phenomenal consciousness as something
distinct from conceptual experience without allowing non-conceptual
experience or, alternatively, phenomenal consciousness without
concepts.
Jennifer
Church cites an example of putative non-conceptual phenomenal
consciousness. She writes:
“Consider
the example of a noise that I suddenly realise I have been hearing
for the last hour. Block uses it to show that, prior to my
realization, there is phenomenal-consciousness without access-
consciousness…” (1995)
The
above doesn’t go against the necessity of conceptual experience
because such phenomenal-consciousness wouldn't be experience in my
(or Kant’s) sense. It would be peripheral consciousness
(Searle) or perhaps it would be in what can be called outer
consciousness. However, Church even denies (or doubts) the
possibility of true peripheral consciousness or
phenomenal-consciousness without access-consciousness. She continues:
“…it
seems that I would have accessed it [the noise] sooner had it been a
matter of greater importance – and thus…it was accessible all
along. Finally, it is not even clear that it was not actually
accessed all along insofar as it rationally guided my behaviour in
causing me to speak louder…”
If
my “I’m going to kill you!” example earlier is a possibility,
then Church’s arguments may go too far and don’t work for my
example. My example is pure phenomenal-consciousness. Church,
therefore, doesn’t give us an argument against the independence and
purity of phenomenal-consciousness from AC. She gives us an example
of something which may appear at first to be independent and pure PC;
but which in fact isn't. She says that she would have “accessed the
noise sooner had it been a matter of greater importance”, which
gives the game away. Not even Ned Block would accept that scenario as
independent and pure PC. This would, I think, simply be a case of
Searle's inattentiveness. Similarly, Church says that all
along she was speaking loudly. So clearly the noise was AC; though
not the center of her attention. Her example doesn't, therefore, work
as an argument against independent and pure PC.
What
about Block himself?
For
a start, I’m not quite sure what Block means by “aware” in his
“You were aware of the noise all along” (1992).
It seems to be an idiosyncratic usage of that word. However, the
implication must be that concepts (of some shape or form) were
applied - or belonged - to the noise all along: otherwise how would he
have known that it was a noise before he was AC of it at noon? If he
wasn’t applying concepts, then how did he know it was a noise
before such a realisation? The atomic concept [noise] is just as much
a concept as the molecular concept [the noise of a drill]. The atomic
concept [drill] may have been applied to the atomic concept [noise]
at t², but at t¹ the atomic concept [noise] was still applied (or
belonged) to the noise (vis-à-vis Ned Block himself). Consequently,
how could it have been pure and independent PC of the noise if all
these assessments are correct?
Indeed
Block himself (a paragraph later) comes up with an alternative way of
describing this putative before-noon pure and independent example of
PC: “P-consciousness without attention.” I would say, perhaps
only as a paraphrase, PC with inattentive AC; which doesn’t
rule out AC and, therefore, the deployment of concepts. To use
Searle’s term, the noise before noon was “peripherally
conscious”; though not an example of pure and unadulterated PC.
Block
does say that although PC and AC are distinct, they often (or
always?) do occur together. Block’s example of “P-consciousness of
the noise” and “A-consciousness of it” isn't quite as clearly
defined as he thinks (in the noise example, that is). It now remains
to be seen whether the conceptual experience before noon does
actually entail – limited – AC (in Block’s sense).
Strangely
enough, while writing the above there was a noise outside my flat. I
didn’t pay attention to it. I was inattentive. It was in
peripheral consciousness (or in my topographical outer-consciousness). However, I knew all along that it was a noise. Indeed
I knew it was a car alarm. If the car alarm’s noise had seamlessly
turned into a woman’s scream (if you can imagine such a thing), I
would have been attentive to the scream. This simply means that a
different concept [a woman’s scream] was applied or belonged to a
seamless change to another noise: the car alarm. The car alarm’s
noise was no less conceptual, only the concept [a woman’s scream]
would make me attentive; whereas the concept [a car alarm] made me
indifferent.
Perhaps
concepts are applied (or belong) to all noises. Therefore all noises
are AC for Darwinian reasons. If we didn’t deploy or notice what
kind of noises the sounds were (or apply or notice their conceptual
content), we wouldn’t be ready for an unexpected attack or
suchlike. We'd be unprepared. That’s why I would notice the woman’s
scream and seemingly ignore the car alarm. If car alarms were
infrequent, I wouldn’t ignore them either. The fact is, however, I
didn’t ignore the car alarm completely: I was simply inattentive.
Prima
facie, PC on its own can’t be conceptual. Could we say that
“what something is like” is conceptual? Would that even make
sense? The same may be true of PC states like hearing, smelling,
tasting and the having of pains. All these seem non-conceptual – at
first. They aren't about anything in and of themselves.
(Alternatively, we could say that they aren’t representational or
intentional.) Some philosophers call these things “intrinsic”.
The idea of a pain (say, a toothache) as conceptual seems strange.
Similarly with the smell of beer. However, there’s nothing to stop
concepts being applied to them. Or, more likely, these
phenomenal properties may come along with conceptual baggage. We can
still accept that PC is distinct. A toothache has a feel - a “what
it’s like” - that’s hard to describe in words. However, concepts
are applied (or sometimes come with) pains. These
concepts aren’t always descriptions.
For
example, [a toothache] is itself a concept made-up of two atomic
concepts [tooth] and [ache]. The first concept [tooth] isn't
descriptive of pain; though the concept [ache] is. We could ask what sort of
concept or description it actually is. It’s not much of one. It’s
not descriptive like “The King of France”- it’s a single concept. It’s
like a pointer to what it’s like without actually describing
what it’s like. It’s also like a name or noun and
unlike a definite description or ostensive definition. The concept
[ache] may get its identity from non-linguistic comparisons with
other previous toothaches or other aches. It would be an imaginative
rather than a linguistic concept.
Block
writes:
“Even
pain typically has some kind of representational content. Pains often
represent something (the cause of the pain? The pain itself?) as
somewhere (in the leg).” (1992)
Similarly
with smells, tastes, sounds, sights, etc. They aren't intrinsically
conceptual. They're indeed distinguishable from AC or concepts.
However, they come with concepts and concepts are applied to them.
Therefore PC states become the objects of concepts. (Or PC properties
do.) Block says that “P-consciousness is often representational”.
Representations are conceptual. Concepts make-up representations.
Representations are intentional – they're about something.
References
1)
Block, Ned, 'Begging the
Question Against Phenomenal Consciousness' (1992)
2)
Church, Jennifer, 'Fallacies
or Analyses?' (1995)3) Searle, John, 'Who is computing with the brain?' (1990)
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