Selected (mainly critical) responses to my essays on Medium — and my replies to them. (3)
[Editorial square brackets have been added to make things clearer.]
Intelligence and Consciousness
I wrote:
“I mentioned the fact in the essay that people define ‘intelligence’ and ‘consciousness’ in many different ways. And you’re using the word ‘intelligence’ in a very particular way. I would say that you’re using the word in a way that’s at odds with how it’s used in everyday language or by most people. But that doesn’t really matter at all. I presume that you’re using the word as some scientists or theorists use it.”
Cristóbal de Losada wrote:
“[] for that to be the case, a basic algorithmic intelligence must be present, such as, ‘sense light, move toward (or away from) it’.”
My reply:
“These examples are simply programmed or genetic responses to the environment, And, in terms of any given species, every individual in that species will ‘move away’, etc. from the light in more or less the same way. And that alone means that the word ‘intelligence’ is being used in a way in which most people don’t use it.
“But why must something as rudimentary as that be accompanied by consciousness? I say that because earlier you wrote that this movement must be ‘accompanied by some sort of minimal subjective experience’. Not really. This level of response isn’t that different to a thermometer responding to changes in temperature or even a (security) light sensor in a garden responding to movement.”
Cristóbal de Losada wrote:
“[Consciousness] was selected for because it proved advantageous in Darwinian-fitness terms. And for that to be the case, a basic algorithmic intelligence must be present, such as, ‘sense light, move toward (or away from) it’.”
My reply:
“[] there’s no obvious reason why (as you put it) Darwinian ‘fitness’ requires consciousness. Indeed many philosophers and scientists have argued that it doesn’t. (Hence all the arguments about consciousness — or at least qualia — being ‘epiphenomenal’.) Thus, on this reading, consciousness is a superfluous cream on the cake. Other people, on the other hand, have argued that consciousness is ‘advantageous’ from an evolutionary perspective — but certainly not for the rudimentary examples you’ve cited.”
Cristóbal de Losada wrote:
“There can be sporadic spontaneous appearances of consciousness in basic organisms here and there (after all, that must be how the whole thing started), but if they confer no evolutionary advantage, they will not spread.”
My reply:
“Not really. Not if consciousness is largely the result of crossing a threshold of complexity (though not complexity alone) and a high level of relevant ‘causal powers’. Perhaps consciousness only kicks in at certain levels — not at all levels. Thus your position resembles that of panpsychists in that they argue that it makes sense to argue that consciousness was there all along — or that even things as basic as particles or single-celled organisms must have a rudimentary level of consciousness. They say this otherwise the ‘sudden appearance of consciousness’ in higher animals and human beings would be a ‘mystery’. Also, there’ll never be any evidence that what you call ‘basic organisms’ had instantiated consciousness in the past or even that they do so today.”
Cristóbal de Losada wrote:
“Those cases could be examples of consciousness without intelligence, or at least of consciousness decoupled from any intelligence that the organisms involved might have.”
My reply:
“But didn’t you argue (above) that when basic organisms react to light (by moving toward or away from it) that this is an example of intelligence? This is what some plant scientists who are panpsychists also argue.”
Cristóbal de Losada wrote:
“Thus I think it’s possible, in principle, to have conscious experiences without anything we’d typically call intelligence associated with it.
“As to whether some sort of human-like consciousness can spontaneously arise from the sheer complexity and sophistication of some software programs (as some suggest), I think that’s absurd. Since high-level consciousness doesn’t just arise in animals (it has to be selected for by natural selection in a gradual, iterative, and ‘deliberate’ way and for very specific purposes), there’s no reason to think it would in AI.”
My reply:
“I don’t think even AI theorists would ever say that it would simply be a result of ‘complexity’. It would be, to them, a result of the right algorithms, etc. After all, ants are physiologically and structurally very complex — but we needn’t posit that they are conscious in a ‘human-like’ way or in any way at all. Complexity alone isn’t the whole story.
“Although many would argue that consciousness has resulted from ‘natural selection’ — it doesn’t at all follow that it must be. For example, up until the 1940s, every calculating machine was a human brain (if we rule out things like the abacus, etc.). And then along came computers.”
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Neuronal Inferences?
Robert Thibadeau wrote:
“On the topic of inference fields the new data is mainly from fMRI studies. I cover these in my book on lying (in terms of giving references to the evidence). There is a link to that book and the basic Cartesian arguments here.”
My reply:
“The problem here is that your have your own expertise [neuroscience or the brain] and I have mine [logic a an abstract discipline and logic as used by human persons]. And the two only vaguely interlock. Indeed this lack of a shared language often occurs when people from different disciplines interact — despite the sometimes superficial ‘inter-disciplinary’ cross-border communications.
“Thus your fine detail isn’t really about the philosophy of logic (which is the subject of the main essay I posted [and which you responded to]) — but about your own knowledge of neuroscience, Sejnowski, etc. So I had a problem tying all your detail to my precise points. []
“Just a taster. Your and other people’s use of the word ‘inference’ when it comes to what occurs at the neuronal level — which I mentioned in my first reply to you. I know that some neuroscientists, etc. use this word in this context — but it’s still odd to me. I suppose it’s similar to how some physicists use the word ‘information’ [or ‘observation’] in contexts that have nothing to do with semantics, human knowledge, observations or even minds. Perhaps my position is ‘linguistically conservative’ [or conceptually conservative] — except that I’m not against new uses of old words. I just believe that it should all be made clear — especially to those on the outside! Scientists and experts shouldn’t assume that everyone knows that they’re using old words in very-new ways.”
Robert Thibadeau wrote:
“[] our neural network systems today achieve quite powerful inferences which are fundamentally inductive. They achieve this by being radically overdetermined. Instead of making an identification with sparse inductive evidence, they can draw evidence for a discrimination or classification from many more sources than classical, efficient, statistics would ever computationally allow.”
My Reply:
“I presume that you’re talking about non-conscious ‘inferences’. As you’ll know, this is a long way from Descartes and any formal logic [mentioned by Robert and in the essay]. Though it can be argued that such neuronal processes [physically underpin and] replicate the inferences of formal logic — or vice versa!”
Robert Thibadeau wrote:
“Both deductive and inductive systems are termed inference for a reason. Both, today, can be completely certain. Both have weak presuppositions overcome by strong process yielding surprising conclusions.”
My reply:
“What do you mean by saying that ‘inductive inferences’ can be ‘completely certain’? Do you mean that those who use them become psychologically certain that their inferences are correct/true or that such inferences [themselves] are completely certain — full stop? Also, I’m not sure what the words ‘both have weak presuppositions overcome by strong process yielding surprising conclusions’ mean.”
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Photons and Time
Ken Swisz wrote:
“Could it be that an individual photon does not experience time like other particles because it is fundamental and does not degrade or separate into other particles?”
My reply:
“That may be the case — but putting it in that bare form doesn’t explain why that’s the case. That is, a photon’s fundamental nature doesn’t automatically explain its timelessness. And this would also mean that electrons and quarks are timeless because they aren’t made up of other particles either. That said, there’s also the Leibnizian argument that if an object doesn’t change, then it can’t take part in time. However, even though photons don’t ‘degrade’ and are fundamental, they’re still involved with interactions, etc. — and [perhaps] therefore they ‘take part’ in change/s.”
Ken Swisz wrote:
“The fact that it takes time for it to travel is not so much the property of the photon but rather is our observation of it.”
My reply:
“Good point. [] That said, what is a photon when taken in complete separation from all observations, measurements, etc? How is the photon’s timelessness cashed out in other ways?”
Ken Swisz wrote:
“A photon is the same regardless of where it’s going or where it’s from — it just vibrates depending on how it was created and goes on its way until something absorbs its energy.”
My reply:
“Yes — a photon [is said — by some — to have] an ‘intrinsic nature’ in that it has specific properties regardless of its interactions, etc. Yet doesn’t it ‘go’ in time? Doesn’t it ‘vibrate’ in time? Doesn’t it exist in time even before it’s absorbed or emitted?
“Anyway, thanks for your good questions and points. Many responses to my essays are written by people who never mention a single argument, idea or even syllable of the essay they’re supposed to be responding to.”
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