Bertrand Russell's Ontic Structural Realism? (2)

Mathematical Structuralism

Bertrand Russell puts the case for for what may be deemed a mathematical structural realism when he wrote the following:

“Physics is mathematical, not because we know so much about the physical world, but because we know so little: it is only its mathematical properties that we can discover.” (163)

That appears to be an admission that mathematics is used in physics because we don't know everything that is to be known about the object, condition, event, etc. under description or scrutiny. Mathematical equations and values are the mere bones of the physics. Mathematics only deals with structures; not with what have been called “intrinsic properties”. This position seems to be at odds, then, with the realism of James Ladyman, Don Ross and other contemporary ontic structural realists.

It's here that there are two options available. One, to become a kind of thing-eliminativist and say, “Every thing must go." Or two, one can adopt a quasi-Kantian line and say that there are things-in-themselves (or intrinsic properties); though the problem is that we don't know anything about them. Indeed, as with option one, we can eliminate "substances" or things-in-themselves from our ontology.

Russell then elaborates on his structural and mathematical ontic realism. He states the obvious point that “[p]hysics is mathematical”. And then says that when it comes to the “physical world” it's “only its mathematical properties” that we have access to. Such properties are all “we can discover” (163).

The Maths of Point-instants

In one place you find Russell speaking about “point-instants” which seems to be a perfect example of ontic structural realism. Firstly he tell us that “we can define a point-instant in space-time as a group of events”. Then he he says that

“the 'points' (or point-instants) that the mathematician needs are not simple, but are structures composed of events, made up for the convenience of the mathematician”.

This is an articulation of structural realism, not a realism about or towards things. Not only that: when Russell tells us that these structures are “made up for the convenience of the mathematician”, this too sounds like some kind of constructivism – ontic structural constructivism! Then again, the word "structural" (or "structuralism") is, in itself, a tacit commitment to some kind of constructivism.

It is clear that Russell has taken the idea of a “centre” omitting radiations from Werner Heisenberg. Russell tells us that

“Heisenberg regards a piece of matter as a centre from which radiations travel outward”.

These radiations constitute the realism of this picture in that “radiations are supposed really to occur”. However, the irrealism (as it were) about things (or about centres) is put when Russell argues that the matter at their centre is reduced to a mere mathematical fiction.

Russell's Kantianism?

Russell puts what can be called the Kantian stance on these issues and problems. Basically, Russell believes that all we have are what he calls the “effects of a thing-in-itself”. Thus Russell comes to the conclusion (as contemporary ontic structural realists have done) that if we only have access to effects (or to external properties), then why not factor out that distinction between thing-in-itself (or intrinsic properties) and its effects (i.e., external properties).

We can now ask about those effects. What is left of the things-in-themselves? In terms of the science of this issue, Russell writes:

“We find that energy in various forms spreads outwards from various centres; we find also that such centres have a certain degree of persistence, though this persistence is not absolute...”

Prima facie, this seems like a simple substitution of the word "thing" (or "piece of matter") with the word "center". Instead of a thing “having a certain degree of persistence”, it's simply these physical centres which do so. Nonetheless, it can still be said that these centres are, effectively, things (or pieces of matter). In other words, are we simply debating the correct usage of words here?

Russell continues by expressing the basic science of an electron or proton and why it is that we take them to be things. Thus, in point of fact,

“the modern physicist faces cheerfully the possibility than an electron and a proton may mutually annihilate each other, and even suggests that this may be the main source of the radiant energy of the stars, because when it happens it makes an explosion”.

Thus firstly we discover that the electron and proton have some kind of mutual relation with one another. That alone will raise questions as to their ontological reality as separate entities. In other words, if two things - a and b - always have a necessary and “mutual” relation to one another, then what right have we to see them as distinct entities in the first place?

That later possibility is scientifically elaborated upon when Russell tells us “[w]hat can be asserted” about these matters. He writes:

“When energy radiates from a center, we can describe the laws of its radiation conveniently by imagining something in the centre, which we will call an electron or a proton according to circumstances, and for certain purposes it is convenient to regard this centre as persisting, i.e. as not a single point is spacetime but a series of such points, separated from each other by time-like intervals. All this, however, is only a convenient way of describing what happens elsewhere, namely the radiation of energy away from the centre. As to what goes on in the centre itself, if anything, physics is silent.” (165)

Whereas earlier I said that the word "centre" was being used as a substitute for the word "thing", now Russell speaks of '"spacetime points" instead. Thus even though Russell says that “what goes on in the centre itself, if anything, physics is silent”, he still feels comfortable talking about "spacetime points".

Reference

Russell, Bertrand. (1927, 1970) An Outline of Philosophy.

Bertrand Russell's Ontic Structural Realism? (1)

Clearly, when Bertrand Russell wrote the following, he was moving away from an ontology of things towards an ontology of events. He wrote:

“We must think of a string of events, connected together by certain causal connections, and having enough unity to deserve a single name.”

Bertrand Russell's rejection of a thing-ontology (as well as his parallel embrace of an event-ontology) is both very psychological and Humean in nature. That is, he focussed on the psychological reasons for believing that there are things. He also offered an empiricist account of all things psychological and physical.

To put it simply, Russell believed that there are only events. We mistakenly believe, however, that there are also things. Russell goes on to argue that “[w]e must think of a string of events” as a “thing”. Psychologically this is accounted for by the fact that different events are seen to be “connected together by certain causal connections”. One Humean conclusion to this is that we deem such events to have “enough unity to deserve a single name”.

This movement of things is accounted for - again - in psychological terms. Russell says that when “the events are not all in the same place”, we then “say the 'thing' has 'moved'”. However, such a belief is “only convenient shorthand” (125).

Bertrand Russell then scientifically and metaphysically concludes that “it can be no part of legitimate science to assert or deny the persistent entity”. To assume a persistent thing is to “go beyond the warrant of experience”.

Russell carries on his theme of Humean constant conjunction (as it were) by speaking of a light-wave. He says that these too are a “connected group of rhythmical events” (161). And, as before, Russell rejects the idea that a light-wave is a thing. It is, instead, a “connected group of rhythmical events”. The only thing that can be said here is that I doubt that even scientifically (or philosophically) illiterate people deem light-waves to be things in any strict sense of that word.

In any case, Russell often fluctuates between using the word “thing” and using the word “matter” (or “piece of matter”). And even then he tends to put both words in scare quotes.

Intrinsic/Extrinsic Properties

Russell asks us “what do we mean by 'piece of matter'” (165)? He answers his own question by telling us that “[w]e do not mean something that preserves a simple identity throughout its history”. Now that statement is partly correct and partly incorrect. It's true that any particular thing (or "piece of matter") won't be identical over time. That is, thing O at time t will be different in some - or in many - ways to O taken at, say, t². In everyday terms, there are things about Paul Murphy which are true in January 2015; though which won't be true of me in February 2016. (The same can be said of an oak tree.)

In other words, a thing or entity needn't “exist complete at every moment”, as Russell puts it. It depends on what is meant by the word “complete”. If it means everything that belongs to object O at time t will not do so at t², then he's correct. Though an entity doesn't need to be the sum of literally all its properties at every single point and place in time (which was Leibniz's position). It's only the case that certain (essential) properties are passed on from t to t² to tⁿ. Of course if there aren't any essential or intrinsic properties in the first place, then this scenario can't work and we must take Russell literally.

It doesn't follow that because an x doesn't remain identically the same in all respects over time that it doesn't remain the same in at least some respects.

In metaphysical terms, we call those unchanging aspects essential properties. However, we may not like such a reference to essential properties and want to say, instead, “important” or “enduring” properties [see Quine 1960]. Thus I will loose millions of neurons (or cells) over time; just as an oak tree will loose many of its leaves. Nonetheless, both persons and trees do have characteristics - functional, formal and physical - which last over time. Indeed if that weren't the case, then indeed we wouldn't have any right to keep on referring to a particular piece of matter with the same name over time. I can be said here that Russell does believe that we have no right to use the same name over time because he rejects essential (or intrinsic) properties. Either that or he didn't deem the enduring or important properties of an x to also be essential or intrinsic properties.

The upshot of Russell's position (if only at this time) is that there are no intrinsic or essential properties and, consequently, there aren't really any things or objects. That is, all x's properties are both contingent or external.

Russell's bottom line is that we have no access - either observationally or otherwise - to the intrinsic characteristics of such things. Instead “[w]hat we know about them” is simply “their structure and their mathematical laws”. That is, all we've got is structure and maths. Thus it's structure and maths “all the way down”.

There is one conclusion that we must face here. If all properties are contingent or external, then there's little point in using these terms at all. If I can offer an analogy. Say that everyone in a class can recite the 12-times-table and are consequently all called "geniuses". Thus that term is gratuitously used about everyone in that class. The same is true of all references to "external" or "contingent properties" – they only have meaning in reference to their (as it were) antonyms: "intrinsic" or "essential".

What's the Matter?

Russell offers us a physicist's overview of matter (or of things). He says that 

“[m]odern physics, therefore, reduces matter to a set of events which proceed outward from a centre”. 

Since Russell states that the idea that radiation comes from lumps (or things) is unintelligible, then why is it any more intelligible to say that “events” (or radiation) “proceed outward from a centre” (163)? Is a physical center more intelligible than a lump (or a thing)? Despite saying that, Russell backs himself up by saying that “[i]f there is something further in the center itself, we cannot know about it”. Indeed such a thing is “irrelevant to physics”.

It's here that Russell (yet again) offers us both a empiricist and psychological account of what's happening. The following is the observational or experimental reality, as expressed by Russell himself. He writes:

“The events that take the place of matter in the old sense are inferred from their effect on eyes, photographic plates, and other instruments.” (163)

That's right – it all depends on what we observe or perceive. And even when we can't observe an x directly, we can still indirectly do so when various physical effects can be seen on “photographic plates and other instruments”.

Spacetime as a Thing

Russell adds to his rejection of a thing-ontology by telling us about the nature of gravitation and its relation to spacetime. In fact, if anything, in this picture it's spacetime itself that's treated as a thing – if a single universal thing. Russell also says that spacetime is a “system constructed out of events, the 'crinkles' in it are also derived from events” (290). Thus we have both a pluralism of events and a singular spacetime.

Russell also writes about gravitation. He states:

“Gravitation, as explained by the general theory of relativity, is reduced to 'crinkle' in space-time.”

As for the specifics of his rejection of a thing-ontology, Russell goes on to say that

“[t]here is no reason to suppose that there is a 'thing' at the place where the 'crinkle' is most crinkly”.

In parallel, Russell also says that “matter has ceased to be a 'thing'” (290). However, doesn't the layperson believe that there is matter and that there are also things? That is, things are made up of matter; though matter itself is never a thing. Then again, an ontologist can say that a mere lump of matter can be deemed to be a thing too.

Are Protons and Electrons Things?

Russell fuses psychological (Humean) insight with hard science when discussing whether or not protons and electrons are things. Russell believes that they aren't things. Or, to use his own words, Russell writes the following:

“The idea that there is a little hard lump there, which is the electron or proton, is an illegitimate intrusion of common-sense notions derived from touch.” (163)

So what is the scientific reality of protons and electrons? Russell offers us a hypothesis on the matter. He says that

“[f]or aught we know, the atom may consist entirely of the radiations which come out of it".

He then predicts the obvious response when he says that it's “useless to argue that radiation cannot come out of nothing” (163). Yet surely that response is understandable. Russell's position here is a little counterintuitive. He states that the something-from-nothing scenario is no less or no more “intelligible” than thinking radiation “comes out of a little lump” (163). Surely it can be said that the idea that radiation comes out of lumps is more (not less) intelligible than saying that it comes from nothing. No matter how inaccurate the idea is that protons and electrons are things (or "lumps of matter”), it's still more believable than stating that radiation can come out of nothing.

Substances and Neutral monism

This philosophical rejection of things will - almost by definition - come along with a rejection of what philosophers traditionally called "substances". In the old ontology, if a thing is a thing, then that can only be the case if it also has a substance. The substance guarantees the thing's continued existence and identity over time. In this regard, Russell says that radiations are “not changes in the conditions or relations of 'substances'” (289).

And just as things required substances to be the things that they are, so all things (or substances) were also deemed to be impenetrable. As Russell puts it, “[i]mpenetrability used to be a noble property of matter” (291). However, Russell writes:

“The events which are the real stuff of the world are not impenetrable, since they can overlap in space-time.”

To offer more on Russell's position on ontological substances, Russell himself writes:

“It was traditionally a property of substance to be permanent, and to a considerable extent matter has retained this property in spite of its loss of substantiality. But its permanence now is only approximate, not absolute. It is thought that an electron and a proton can meet and annihilate each other; in the stars this is supposed to be happening on a large scale. And even while and electron or a proton lasts, it has a different kind of persistence from that formerly attributed to matter.” (290)

Thus, just as it can be said that the word "centre" has become a substitute for the word "thing" in Russell's ontology; so Russell also seems to think events are things too. This is shown in Russell's articulation of the meaning of the words “neutral monism”.

Firstly he says that neutral monism is monism “in the sense that it regards the world as composed of only one kind of stuff, namely events”.

What about Russell's "pluralism" of entities? He then tells us that “it is pluralism in the sense that it admits the existence of a great multiplicity of events”. It's here that the notion of a thing (or an entity) is resurrected. Russell tells us that “each minimal event being a logically self-subsistent entity” (293).

Thus does that mean that we're left with a simple identity-statement? Namely:

event = "self-subsistent entity” = a thing

References

Quine, W.V. (1960) Word and Object.

Russell, Bertrand. (1927, 1970) An Outline of Philosophy.

Demonstratives, Sense-data and Individuation (2)

It's the case that even the words ‘this’ and ‘that’ must rely on some kind of descriptive content - at least for the speaker or "reference-fixer". Even if the reference-fixer doesn’t have a proper name or even an explicit description, he must still have individuated the this or the that otherwise how would he know what it is that he's in fact referring to? Which this or which that? This is certainly the case for the hearers.

How does the speaker himself distinguish various x's from various y's? After all, in an act of ostensive definition one could be pointing at, say, the brown on the table, the cup on the table, or whatever. Ostension alone can't individuate a this from a that. And if it’s all a question of sense-data (as it was for Bertrand Russell, see Kripke, 1971), how does the speaker know that the hearer will have the same kinds of sense-data? Even sense-data for the speaker can't in and of itself individuate a this or a that. Sense-data presuppose individuation; otherwise they wouldn’t be the data of something. However, according to traditional sense-data theorists, we move - or ‘infer’ - from sense-data to the objects in the external world. But without prior individuation, how would the sense-data theorist distinguish between relevant and irrelevant bits of sense-data? Presumably when the theorist has sense-data of, say, a table, he'll also have sense-data of the things on the table, the colour of the table and the objects in his general field of vision.

One can see one reason why Saul Kripke (1971) was concerned to argue that proper names have no descriptive content because the definite descriptions of, say, Hesperus and Phosphorus don't coincide. It followed, to Kripke, that proper names mustn't rely on their descriptive content. Indeed they have no descriptive content at all, otherwise how could they be deemed identical? And, similarly, how could we know that they are one and the same thing? Therefore proper names, Kripke argued, can't rely or depend on any descriptive content.

We name or ‘baptise’ what is at the end (as it were) of the ostended point. But what is at the end of an ostended point? Take this view:

“… demonstrative reference, one has reference without any description. But this is merely a myth. Suppose I point to a brown table, and say, ‘This is brown.’ It is not my pointing alone which fixes the reference of the occurrence of ‘this’, for my finger will also be pointing at the edge of the table, or a small brown patch on the table.” 
 

Jason Stanley then goes on to say:

“Rather, a factor in fixing the reference of my demonstrative is that I intend to be demonstrating some object whose identity criteria are those of tables, rather than those of small brown patches or edges…[so we have] the massive indeterminacy of ostensive definition.” [Stanley, 1997]

The above may be derived from Quine’s points about ostension:

“There is the question how wide an environment of the ostended point is meant to be covered by the term that is being ostensively explained…the question where one of its objects leaves off and another begins…It is meaningless to ask whether, in general, our terms ‘rabbit’, ‘rabbit part’, ‘number’, etc. really refer respectively to rabbits, rabbit parts, numbers, etc., rather than to some ingeniously permuted denotations. It is meaningless to ask this absolutely; we can meaningfully ask it only relative to some background language…Querying reference in any more absolute way would be like asking absolute position, or absolute velocity, rather than position or velocity relative to a given frame of reference.” [1969]
 

In order to name the object, we surely need to know the object or be able to identify it. If the reference-fixer hasn’t got that far, then how can he even think about the object? How does he know what the object is he's thinking about? How does he know he's thinking about the object and not something else?

The very reference to an ‘object’ (even an object qua object) requires concepts to distinguish or individuate it. What is an object and how do we identify it? What is that object? In order to know and identify the object, don’t we need to know the object and be able to identify it?

References

Kripke, Saul. (1971) 'Identity and Necessity'.

Quine, W.V.O. (1969) 'Ontological Relativity'.
Stanley, Jason. (1997) 'Names and Rigid Designation'.

Introduction: Objects and Their Individuation (1)

It's generally thought that an object must have at least one criterion of identity. It's also said that a criterion of identity must come along with a principle of unity. An object must also have some kind of temporal longevity if it is to be deemed an object in the first place.

How can an object have temporal longevity?

It does so because it has a principle of unity. That principle tells us that certain properties of the object unify it and they do so because they also tell us what aspects of the object must remain in order for that object to remain as that very same object over time. The unity of the object is what makes it the thing it is over time.

It was traditionally thought that the object’s essence determined what we class as a criterion of identity. However, just as we had choices as to what could be criteria of identity, so we have choices as to what constitutes the essence of a single object. One set of essential properties may work for one group of individuals or one set of situations, and another set may work for another group of individuals or set of situations. Why assume that there's the real essence of an object and no more? Perhaps it depends on the ‘modes of presentation’ of that object. And each different mode of presentation will determine its own essence. Under the mode of presentation that is physics, an object may have an essence specified in terms of its molecular and atomic structure. This would be a constitutional or inherent essence. Under the mode of presentation of, say, people who relate to - or use - the object under scrutiny, the essence may be specified in terms of that object’s role/purpose or its relation to the scrutiniser/s.

Many people will have different ways of individuating the very same object. It may depend on how that object is seen - both literally and metaphorically. It may depend on our particular relation or lack thereof to that object. It may also depend on the cognitive baggage that we bring to the object under scrutiny. People with different beliefs and different sets of knowledge will individuate the very same object in different ways. We could have a God’s-eye view of the object; though wouldn’t that view involve an infinite conjunction of the properties and the relations that belong to the object? Alternatively, perhaps a God’s-eye view of the object would entail an infinite disjunction instead. An infinite set of possible characterisations or individuations of the object. In that case, mortal individuators couldn't use infinite conjunctions or disjunctions. Mere mortals couldn't even comprehend them. A God’s eye view of the object at hand would only be of use to the person with God’s eye – viz., God himself.

John Pollock on Percepts and Description

John Pollock writes:

“When I see an object and make a judgement about it, I do not usually think of that object under a description – not even a description like ‘the object I am seeing’…my visual experience involves what we might call a ‘percept’ of an object…” [1986]

If the above is true, then how does Pollock know that he's seeing an object? How has he distinguished it from its surrounding objects or even from the extended spatial mass in front of him?

The object forces the judgement, as it were; though judgements aren't entirely constituted by the object. That is, there would be no a posteriori judgements about the object if there had been no a priori judgements which have offered up the object as an individualised particular.

Pollock continues by saying that

“[p]ercepts are not descriptions, so this is an example of a nondescriptive mental representation. A percept can only represent an object while that object is being perceived.”

It depends on how strong we take Pollock’s phrase “under a description” to be. Is he referring to a vocal or even sub-vocal description of the object? If so, vocal or sub-vocal descriptions may not be needed in order to have some form of description of the object. The concepts he applies may be instantaneous or even a priori.

In order to have a percept of an object that object needs to have been individuated in some way. Indeed by saying that a percept is "of an object", Pollock has implied that such individuation has already been carried out. How can a percept be of an object unless the subject has distinguished it from that object's surrounding landscape?

The same problem can be seen with his use of the term “representation”. Isn’t it the case that representations are representations of something? Aren’t they about something? Perhaps percepts, in Pollock’s book, aren't of - or about -anything. That would be fair enough; although he also uses the words “non-descriptive representation”. And surely representations represent individuated objects. A percept, on the other hand, could be deemed not to be of - or about – anything.

In that case, imagine facing a white wall with one’s eyes wide open. Whilst facing - rather than looking at - the wall, a person may be thinking about things that aren't at all related to the white wall in front of him. However, the white wall would still be part of his overall mental state at that time. However, he wouldn't be having thoughts about the white wall. Perhaps we can say that he's not even looking at it; even though sensory data from the white wall are entering his consciousness. In that case, part of the overall mental state (which includes thoughts which aren't about the white wall) would still include the white wall. We can say that the white wall is an accompaniment to his cognitive activities at that time. Perhaps this is what a percept is. That is, he would have a white wall percept without him knowing that it's a white wall percept and without that percept being about - or of - the white wall. The white wall percept wouldn't even be an image of the white wall; for the same reasons given about representations not being intentionally directed.

If percepts are as I've described them, then one may be able to give descriptions of one’s percepts; though as soon as one did so, they would no longer be percepts. In fact, a genuine percept may not even be remembered in order to describe it.

Remember the white wall percept: if his thoughts were elsewhere, he couldn’t give an after-the-fact description of the white-wall percept because that percept wouldn't have even entered his memory. How could it be in his memory if at the time he was thinking about things which had no relation to the white wall in front of him? And, of course, Pollock doesn't want his percepts to be descriptive anyway. Percepts are non-cognitive, on my reading of Pollock’s term.

I agree with one thing that Pollock says vis-à-vis percepts: they only occur in the presence of the objects that cause them. There is just a causal non-epistemic and non-cognitive relation to the white wall. Indeed, by saying that percepts only occur in the presence of the objects which cause them, Pollock appears to concede the point that they're are non-cognitive backgrounds to thoughts which are about or of things other than themselves. That is, Pollock acknowledges the causal relations that are required for percepts.

Representations or images, on the other hand, don't need direct causal contact with the objects the representations or images are about; though, of course, their causal ancestry can be traced.

Reference

Pollock, John. (1986) 'Epistemic Norms'.

What Can Be Shown, But Not Said

Philosopher A:

“Moral properties can’t be studied as neurons or protons are studied.
There are no microscopes for such things.
You can't trace them in a cloud-chamber.
They aren’t open to dissection.
And to claim that moral positions “expresses only feelings”
Is to shovel dirt on something both perfect and necessary.
Such socio-pickings at the moral body rob it of meaning.
Morality crucified by psycho-fact, number-crunching survey
And the dirty data which raids its own land.

You can’t - you mustn’t! - bring it down to nature’s low state.
It is a check on that very thing.
Something beyond it and, at times, inscrutable.
To naturalise is to rob a precious thing of value.

“Grubby little positivist!
Don’t you know that science’s realm is minute
Compared to the realms outside space and time?
So take your clinical hands off these things! -
Things which exist in abstract - though real - worlds.
All you have is a mere hotchpotch of facts.

“I can take you to these worlds.
But, firstly, take off your white coat.
Lift up that guard you call ‘science’- that prison of the soul.
The wall you place between yourself and the transcendent.
These other worlds don’t need you; or any of your kind.
You must grasp - and soon - the “hard fact” that you need them.
Your soul is a sham-soul.
A soul drowned in the mud of brutish fact.
One so stuffed with data - so blocked with evidence - that it chokes on what it thinks worthy.

“To repeat: you demand evidence for the truths which don’t display themselves under a microscope,
Or when tested for reality.
Experiments serve only to muddy the water
Between you and a clear-water reflection.
That vision of the untestable, unquantifiable, immutable.
“Keep your hands off this singular sphere!
You can't see its transcendent reality.
You haven’t the soul to do so.
So don't press-gang yet more storm-troopers for positivism;
To fight their colonial war against the transcendent.
Please keep your white coat within your white laboratory.
Let your dark mind look - with its microscopic eye - at those slabs of matter,
All sprawled out (corpse-like) on your clinical, white table.”

Philosopher B:

“You ask me - and my ‘kind’ - to step inside.
To show - not say – these possibles of worlds impossible to us.
The only requirement? A self-deluding metaphysics, like your own.
Such would help me leap that chasm between worldly fact and purer truth.
You imply they’re waiting for me – even me! - on the right side of the divide.

“Does this strange world somehow surround you?
Or is it within you?
Can you dip into it (whatever it is, wherever it is) whenever you feel like it,
Like a boy plunging into his own biscuit tin?
Who gave you the keys denied to men like me?
Who let you into the realm of abstract being, supra-natural properties,
And truths shown, but not said?
Shown only to those with a faith like your own.
“The things of which I must only speak, should be said clearly.
But the insubstantial things of which you speak
Can only be shown, not said…

Or so your preacher-teacher said -
That man you so adore.
That genius from Vienna.”

Chomsky’s Sortal: [Human]

Noam Chomsky once wrote that it is part of the

“human essence to be capable of learning only the languages whose syntactic rules satisfy the constraints of certain linguistic universals”. [1986]

 

It can be said that this could only be a stipulated "essence", which comes via the sortal concept [human]. It's not the essence of, say, an individual human (as an individualised particular) that he must be capable of learning a specific delineated language. In possible world terms, Tony Blair, for example, might have suffered from brain abnormalities which precluded him from being capable of learning the said type of language. Similarly, if Tony Blair as a baby had been captured by aliens and dropped onto an uninhabited planet (even if he had the correct brain functions required for learning language L), he still wouldn't have been capable of learning that language if the required stimulations weren't present (e.g., other L-speaking humans, etc.).

We could ask here if a possible language-less Tony Blair might still have been a human being according to Chomsky’s stipulations. However, according to another stipulational definition, Tony Blair might still have been a human in that same possible scenario. It depends on how strong we take Chomsky’s modal term “capable” ( as in “human essence to be capable of learning...”) to be.

Take the letters “H” and “L” as standing for “is human” and “is a user of specified language L”. So Tony Blair (if at another possible world, W, at time t) might have come across the required stimulations that engendered the use of language L. However, this conclusion still relies on Chomsky’s stipulation of the sortal [human] and his further stipulation that the language-use of L is the essence of humanhood.

Of course we need to accept such a stipulational definition of the sortal [human] in order to make sense of humans at other possible worlds. And even if we accept Tony Blair via the sortal [human] at other possible worlds, the possible entities would still not be Blair qua Blair at these worlds. It's essential that Blair - via the sortal [human] - is capable of learning language L, or even Blair qua individualised particular (to use Leibniz's term) that he's capable of learning language L. If Blair had existed at another possible world only via the sortal [human], it wouldn't actually be Blair at that other possible world because what makes Blair, Blair, is the individualising of him as a particular.

Perhaps Blair has (or has had) Lewisian “counterparts” at other possible worlds; though, again, only via the sortal [human] or via the sortal [person] (or via any other lower-order sortal). Blair via Chomsky’s sortal [human] at another possible world would be an entity of some kind: a human, who might have - or has - learned language L... and that’s it. Period. (If, of course, the sole criterion of Chomsky’s sortal [human] is that it must be capable of learning language L.) Blair qua human or qua person wouldn't necessarily have the same shape, size, beliefs or dispositions as Blair at our actual world. So what right have we to say that Blair qua Blair exists at other possible worlds? We could accept, for now, a “counterpart”; though that counterpart wouldn't share with Blair what makes Blair an individualised particular. In that case, possible Blairs could only share the sortal [human] and the quasi-sortal [language-user-of-L] with actual Blair, according to Chomsky’s stipulations (which are very thin). We could apply more criteria of identity to the sortal [human]; but that wouldn't allow the multiple instantiations (as it were) of Blair qua Blair at other possible worlds. And if possible Blairs aren't Blairs who've been individualised as being Blair, then there could be no genuine possible Blairs at other possible worlds.

The sortal [human] could also be stipulated to include the individualising micro-sortals [tool user] and [entity with two legs]. Blair shares these conceptual requirements with all other humans on earth. So Blair as an individualised particular couldn't have possible world duplicates; though he could have, as said, Lewisian counterparts. What makes Blair, Blair, is that he's taken qua Blair (i.e., taken as an individualised particular). And part of the individuating conditions of Blair qua Blair at another planet (not another possible world!) is the fact that he was brought up on an uninhabited planet where the required stimulations needed for learning language L weren't there. And, of course, if there were a possible world that's also the exact duplicate of Blair’s world (i.e., ours), and Blair’s planet (ours), and a world that also duplicated both Blair’s our-world conditions and Blair himself, then such a world wouldn't work as a possible world as they are generally understood. If worlds are “ways things could be or could have been” (Lewis, 1973), then this duplicate possible world W is a duplicate of the actual world. Therefore it wouldn’t be an example of “how things could be or of how things could have been”. This world W would be identical to our world, and therefore actual Blair’s essence couldn't be found by investigating (or stipulating) a possible Blair at world W. One of the main points of possible worlds, therefore, disintegrates. This is the only way I can think of where we could find actual Blair’s essence – by investigating or stipulating other possible worlds which aren't duplicates, rather than investigating Blair’s essence qua Blair (as an individualised particular). We couldn't find actual-Blair’s essence via the sortal [human] or the sortal [person]. These sortal essences don’t provide us with the essence of actual Blair qua actual Blair.

Perhaps, again, Blair doesn't even have non-identical counterparts at other possible worlds. After all, what if a particular counterpart, c¹, shares humanhood with actual Blair? c¹ would also share humanhood with every other human on earth. Similarly, if c¹ shares personhood instead with actual Blair, then he must also share personhood with every other person on earth. And the same is true of lower-level sortals such as [two-leggedness] or [those who believe in God]. c¹ would share these thinner sortals with billions (though not all) persons on earth, and indeed at other possible worlds. Though when we come to c¹ sharing properties with actual Blair that he doesn't also share with numerous other people on earth (or even with just one single person), then c¹ would also need to live at world W with its duplicate conditions. And, as said, such duplications wouldn't serve the explanatory and modal purposes that possible worlds are supposed to play in defining and determining essences across possible worlds: i.e., what actual-Blair must share with all possible-Blairs is what constitutes his essence.

References

Chomsky, Noam. (1986) Knowledge of Language.
Lewis, David. (1968) 'Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic'.
-- (1973) 'Possible Worlds', from Counterfactuals.