Rudy Rucker's Extreme Panpsychism

Contents:

i) Do Rocks Have Minds?

ii) Rudy Rucker’s Scepticism?

iii) A Rock’s Experiences and Sensations

iv) Does Everything Embody Computations?

v) Hive (Group) Minds

vi) Everything is x

vii) The Politics and Spirituality of Panpsychism

viii) Rucker’s Nine-Step Argument

The word “extreme” is used in the title above. As far as I can remember, I’ve never used that word (i.e., in my articles) about any philosophical position before. However, in Ruder Rucker’s case, I believe that the word extreme is perfectly apt. Having said that, I may well be barking up the wrong tree here anyway. Perhaps many of Rucker’s claims aren’t meant to be taken literally. Perhaps they’re meant to be taken poetically, metaphorically or even spiritually. (See the later section: ‘The Politics and Spirituality of Panpsychism’.) Indeed there’s also the oft-used phrase “there are many ways of knowing” — so perhaps Rucker’s way of knowing is different to my own way of knowing. In addition to all that, it’s of course the case that some people will be keen to point out (if not in these precise words) that one person’s absurd position is another person’s commonsensical position.

In any case, it can be argued that Rudy Rucker doesn’t do his fellow panpsychists (see panpsychism) any favours. Or, at the very least, he doesn’t do the more philosophically rigorous and less flamboyant panpsychists any favours.

Rucker has been a professor of mathematics and written non-fiction books on scientific subjects. In terms of detail, Rucker taught mathematics at the State University of New York at Geneseo from 1972 to 1978. He then taught maths at the Ruprecht Karl University of Heidelberg from 1978 to 1980. After that, in 1986, Rucker became a computer science professor at San José State University. (He retired from that job in 2004.) Having given all these academic details, it’s not as if mathematicians can’t say stupid things simply because they’re mathematicians. And the simple fact is that Rucker’s philosophical theories go way beyond maths and science.

Rucker’s non-fiction books on mathematics and physics include his Geometry, Relativity and the Fourth Dimension and Infinity and the Mind. More relevantly to this piece, he wrote The Lifebox, the Seashell, and the Soul. Rucker is also a novelist who’s written over 20 science fiction (or “cyberpunk”) novels and many other works of fiction.

So even though Rucker’s views will unhelpfully muddy the waters for at least some panpsychists, it may still be helpful to tackle what it is he says.

Do Rocks Have Minds?

Add caption

Based on Frank Zappa’s ‘Help I’m a Rock’.

In his short essay, ‘Mind is a universally distributed quality’ (which can be found in the book What is Your Dangerous Idea?), Rudy Rucker says that “[e]ach object has a mind”. That is, “[s]tars, hills, chairs, rocks, scraps of paper, flakes of skin, molecules” all have minds.

Rucker isn’t only saying that all these objects have “experiences” or embody what some philosophers call “phenomenal properties”. And he certainly isn’t saying that they only embody “proto-experience” (as David Chalmers and other philosophers have it). No; Rucker uses the word “mind”; as well as the words “experiences” and “sensations”.

So it must now be said that when (some) philosophers talk about “experience” (or “phenomenal properties”), they aren’t necessarily also talking about minds. However, it can of course be argued that experiences and phenomenal properties must surely come (as it were) attached to minds.

So what is a mind?

If Rudy Rucker defines the word “mind” so that it only includes what he calls “inner experiences” and “sensations”, then his use of that word would be — by his own definition — correct.

Perhaps experience does come along with mind in the sense that it’s hard to think of a mind-less experience. However, that may not quite be the case when it comes to phenomenal properties because, prima facie, one can conceive (a word often used when philosophers speculate about these issues) of them as belonging to non-minds; or to, yes, Rucker’s scraps of paper or flakes of skin.

Rudy Rucker’s Scepticism?

Rudy Rucker himself seems to offer us a tiny bit of scepticism towards his own positions on panpsychism when he writes the following:

“Might panpsychism be a distinction without a difference?… What is added by claiming that these aspects of reality are like minds?”

However, Rucker doesn’t mention panpsychism itself in the passage above (i.e., after the first sentence). Instead he mentions “quantum collapse”, “chaotic dynamics” and “universal computation” instead.

It’s also worth saying that elsewhere Rucker doesn’t say that particles, rocks, etc. “are like minds” — as he does at the end of the passage above. He says that “each object has a mind”. So we can still repeat his question:

What’s added by claiming that “these aspects of reality are like minds”?

When Rucker says that particles “are like minds”, what’s added to our notion of a particle by saying that? Indeed when Rucker says that a particle “has a mind”, what’s he actually saying? Well, he’s saying — among other things — that a rock, flake of skin and molecule

1) has “singular inner experiences and sensations”,2) “embodies universal computations”,3) and is “glowing with inner light”.

So isn’t all this simply passing the buck to other words? What do the words “inner experiences” and “sensations” mean in the context of a particle? Indeed what does “universal computation” mean in the context of a flake of skin or a molecule?

A Rock’s Experiences and Sensations

As quoted earlier, Rudy Rucker mentions various attributes of mind. He says that stars, hills, chairs, rocks, scraps of paper, flakes of skin, etc. have “singular inner experiences and sensations”. So what are “inner experiences” and “sensations”? (Are there outer experiences?) Wouldn’t objects need sensory receptors, brains, central nervous systems, etc. in order to have sensations? (Wikipedia defines a sensation as “the body’s detection of external or internal stimulation”.)

One can say that all this depends on what sensations are. Alternatively, perhaps it depends on Rucker’s own definition of the word “sensation”. Indeed has Rucker ever defined the word “sensation” within these contexts? Has he even an implicit (or tacit) definition of that word lodged somewhere deep within his mind? Alternatively, is his use of the word simply poetical, metaphorical or spiritual?

As hinted at a moment ago, can some thing have a sensation of pain without it also being a biological body? We can of course conceive (à la David Chalmers and Philip Goff) of pains occurring in things which aren’t human beings or other animals. So what about in the case of Rucker’s rock or his flakes of skin? In evolutionary terms, why would a flake of skin or even a rock need to feel pain? (Perhaps some objects — or even animals — experience pain for non-evolutionary reasons.)

So what about other sensations? Take sexual pleasure and solving a mathematical puzzle.

The sensation of sexual pleasure is related to biological bodies in both human beings and other animals. Indeed even the sensation of solving a mathematical puzzle will have physical and biological expressions and physical and biological substrates. So I’m having a problem here conceiving of sensations belonging to non-biological entities. Indeed I’m also having a slightly lesser problem conceiving of experiences belonging to non-biological entities.

Does Everything Embody Computations?

Just as Rudy Rucker stretches the words ‘mind’, ‘sensation’ and ‘experience’ to great lengths, so he does the same with the word ‘computation’. For example, Rucker says that “every physical system can be thought of as embodying a computation”.

It can be supposed that if a thing is a “physical system”, then perhaps Rucker’s semantic stretch isn’t as extreme as it may at first seem. That is, a physical system must include some kind of complexity…. Well, yes and no. A particle is certainly complex and can be seen as a physical system. The same is true of Rucker’s flake of skin. Indeed it’s hard to see what isn’t both a system and complex.

In any case, if Rucker has already stretched the meanings of both ‘computation’ and ‘mind’, then what’s to stop him doing the same with the word ‘system’ too? Actually, I have more sympathy with Rucker’s use of the word ‘system’ than with his use of either ‘mind’ or ‘computation’. There’s far more baggage attached to the word ‘mind’ than there is to the word ‘system’.

Rucker even goes on to say that “nonsimple” systems “embody computations”. Thus:

i) Whatever a system/thing (whether complex or simple) is, it will embody computations.ii) And whatever a system/thing is, it will also have a mind; (partly?) because it will also embody computations.

As ever, Rucker is explicit about all this. Just as flakes of skin have minds, so “a single electron may be capable of universal computation”. (At least here he uses the word ‘may’.)

What makes an electron capable of computations is (partly?) due to the fact that it may be “afforded a steady stream of structured input”. What does that mean? An electron is certainly causally affected and influenced by its environment. (Such as by fields, forces, other particles and its anti-particle: the positron.) However, can these causal forces be classed as “input”? Is Rucker committing his easy sin again by stretching words beyond their usual meanings?

The notion of input can be read in two or more ways.

In one loose sense, input can be seen as causal affect on a system or on an entity/thing. Alternatively, we can take the word ‘input’ in the way that Rucker hints/says that we should take it. That is, input is essentially information which is worked upon by a thing (or system) according to its own algorithms. However, usually algorithms are carried out by human beings or written into computer programmes by human beings. Alternatively, information can be registered and then worked upon by human mind-brains.

Hive (Group) Minds

Rudy Rucker says that that the

“world’s physical structures break the undivided cosmic mind into myriad of small minds, one in each object”.

The brain is made up of hundreds of billions of molecules. And, according to Rucker, each molecule within each brain has a mind. Thus Rucker is claiming the following:

i) The Cosmic Mind includes individual human minds.ii) Each individual human mind is dependent on a single brain.iii) Each individual human brain is itself made of hundreds of billions of molecules.iv) Each individual molecule of each individual human brain has its own mind.

Rucker himself says that the human mind is a “hive mind” (or group mind), one which is

“based on the minds of the body’s cells and the minds of the body’s elementary particles”.

Here Rucker is entertaining a problem which Philip Goff, David Chalmers and other philosophers tackle: the problem which he himself calls hive minds. This, in turn, creates the problem of the “summing”, “constitution” or “combination” of (as it were) tiny minds into big minds.

What are the physical-to-mind and mind-to-mind connections between the individual minds (i.e., of neurons, molecules, particles, etc.) which make up the human mind-brain, and the human mind-brain itself? If each thing has its own “inner experiences” and “sensations” (according to Rucker), then how do they sum or combine together to create the inner experiences and sensations of a single human person? More particularly, what are the precise connections between each thing’s (e.g., each molecule, neuron, etc.) sensations and inner experiences and the collective inner experiences and sensations of an individual human person?

Everything is x

As stated, Rudy Rucker says that every thing has a mind, sensations, inner experiences, embodies computations, etc. Thus we may have this often-stated formula:

If every thing is x, then no thing is x.

Actually, this formulation doesn’t always work. For example,

If every thing is made of particles, then no thing is made of particles.

[However, it can be said that quarks, leptons, antiquarks, antileptons, gauge bosons and the Higgs boson aren’t themselves made of particles.]

Despite that, in some cases the formula does seem to work. As with:

i) If every thing has a mind, sensations, embodies computations, etc.,ii) then no thing has a mind, sensations, embodies computations, etc.

The most unproblematic term in the above is computations. Every thing embodying computations is far easier to accept than every thing having a mind or having sensations. Then again, there may still be an argument of this type:

i) If every thing embodies computations (and if we can then move step by step from that conditional axiom/premise — see the end section on Rudy Rucker’s “nine-step argument”),ii) then we will eventually arrive at this proposition: Every thing must also have a mind and therefore sensations.

Nonetheless, isn’t this is little like saying that every thing is an athlete or a piece of chocolate? If you stretch words so widely, then they simply loose their point or linguistic force. And that’s precisely what Rucker does.

If Rucker can say that particles have minds, then can I also say that they have a sense of humour? And if I can’t say that particles have a sense of humour, then why can’t I say that? Tell me an important and substantial difference between saying “particles have senses of humour” and saying “particles have minds”. Of course it can now be said that you need a mind in order to have a sense of humour. (Though most/all of the animals which have minds may not have a sense of humour.) Therefore isn’t it possible or even likely that particles also have a sense of humour?

The Politics and Spirituality of Panpsychism

It seems that environmentalism or ecopolitics may be driving Rudy Rucker’s panpsychist position. That is, perhaps he believes that upholding panpsychism will help the environment or one’s relationship with nature. Rucker himself is explicit about this when he writes:

“If the rocks on my property have minds, I feel more respect for them in their natural state. If I feel myself among friends in the universe.”

This is an ethical conditional. Thus:

i) If rocks have minds,ii) then…

The problem about this is that someone else may say to Rucker:

i) If I could fly,ii) then I’d be able to jump out of this window.

Less rhetorically and more feasibly:

i) If animals felt as much pain as humans, and also had similar emotions,
ii) then we/I would be “among friends”.

The problem is that the last conditional about animals isn’t entirely speculative. Rucker’s claims about rocks, scraps of paper, etc., on the other hand, are entirely speculative. There’s a lot of evidence that animals feel pain and have emotions. There’s no evidence at all that rocks, particles, etc. have minds or experience pain/emotions. So helpful (or constructive) philosophical or ethical conditionals must have at least one foot on the ground otherwise surely they’re a waste of time.

The Afterlife

Rudy Rucker also offers us a “spiritual” conditional when he says:

“If my body will have a mind even after I’m dead, then death matters less to me.”

In a sense, if Rucker’s previous speculations were true, then his position on his mind after his own death would also be true; or at least it could possibly be true. Thus all this depends on the Rucker’s conjectures on panpsychism being true.

As as I said about Rucker’s panpsychist environmentalism, this may not matter to him. Thus this is a reactive conditional to Rucker’s stance:

i) If Rudy Rucker’s panpsychism is all about his own emotional well-being (as well as about having a “positive attitude” — as it’s often put — to one’s environment),
ii) then it may not matter if panpsychism is actually true.

What may matter to Rucker are the personal and even collective results of believing — or even claiming — that panpsychism is true. So here’s another conditional:

i) If the consequences of believing in panpsychism are deemed to be positive,ii) then perhaps the truth of panpsychism doesn’t matter.

After all, this ethical and epistemological stance has often been noted when philosophers (such as the American philosopher William James) have talked about the “efficacy of religion”. (As Sam Harris now talks about the efficacy of spirituality.) This has also been seen to be the stance of the “late Wittgenstein”; at least on certain readings. (Yet the man himself hardly wrote a word on the issue.)

However, this fast and loose attitude to truth would surely create a philosophical, scientific and ethical free-for-all if everyone adopted it. (Who knows, perhaps there are — relativistic? — arguments which state that this would be a good thing too.) After all, I could believe that Rudy Rucker is a rock in order to bring it about that no one will take his views seriously. I could also believe that the Welsh are lizards in order to bring forward all sorts of political policies against them.

So why give Rudy Rucker free rein and not other people with similar absurd views? Some people may do so simply because they like — or empathise with — Rucker’s panpsychist philosophy. Is that a good enough reason? Some other people may also like my view that Rucker is a rock or that “the alien lizards rule the world”.

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Rudy Rucker’s Nine-step Argument

1) Universal Automatism. Every physical entity is a computation.2) Moreover, every physical entity is a gnarly computation.3) Wolfram’s Principle of Computational Equivalence. Every naturally occurring gnarly computation is a universal computation.4) Consciousness = Universal Computation + Self-Reflection.5) Any complex system can be regarded as having self-reflection.6) Panpsychism. Therefore every physical entity is conscious.7) Walker’s Thesis. Life = Universal Computation + Memory.8) Every physical entity has memory via its interactions with the universe.9) Hylozoism. Therefore every physical object is alive.Q.E.D.

Rudy Rucker offers us what he calls a “nine-step argument” (as stated in his ‘A Formal Proof of Panpsychism and Hylozoism’) not only for panpsychism, but also for what’s called hylozoism — the idea that “everything is alive”.

Like many bad arguments, Rucker’s nine-step argument works at a prima facie level. But only at that level. It fails for the same reason that other similar arguments fail. It fails because the (technical) terms included in each step of the argument are either never defined; or, if they are, they’re philosophically speculative or just absurd. Thus if we accept the terms as they stand, then Rucker’s argument has the appearance of being an argument; and even, to some extent, a convincing one. Yet it’s philosophically and logically problematic from the start.

More specifically, if we take each premise as being true, then what follows may well follow. In addition, the whole nine-step argument appears to work at this superficial level too — and for the same reason.

Yet the problems start with premise 1), which is treated as an axiom. Namely,

1) Universal Automatism. Every physical entity is a computation.

Now if we accept 1), all sorts of things will indeed follow from it. And, as with mathematical or geometric systems which have non-proven/non-demonstrated or sometimes even arbitrary axioms (axioms, by definition, have this non-argued-for status), all sorts of things will “logically follow” from those axioms. So let’s take each premise at a time. Firstly 1) again:

1) Universal Automatism. Every physical entity is a computation.

Elsewhere Rucker says that entities “embody computations”. Here he says that “every physical entity is a computation”. That statement hardly makes sense. No physical entity can be a computation (though an abstract entity can). Although the word ‘computation’ is a noun; to compute is something that people, systems or things do. It isn’t what they are.

2) Moreover, every physical entity is a gnarly computation.

The addition of the adjective “gnarly” doesn’t solve our problems or even add anything to Rucker’s argument. It may be an important factor in Rucker’s philosophy of panpsychism; though in the argument it adds very little.

3) Every naturally occurring gnarly computation is a universal computation.

This simply begs many questions which are tackled elsewhere.

4) Consciousness = Universal Computation + Self-Reflection.

Consciousness needn’t come along with “self-reflection” or even with a self. This acceptance of self-reflection is a very big addition. Yet within the nine-step argument itself it’s taken as a given. So what’s behind this addition of self-reflection? Since Rucker has switched from talk of “minds” to talk of “consciousness”, can we now say that if he believes that rocks, particles, scraps of paper, etc. have minds, then he must also believe that they also have consciousness and indeed indulge in self-reflection?

5) Any complex system can be regarded as having self-reflection.

Can it? Why? Rucker’s argument only works on the massive assumption that this claim — among many others — is true.

6) Panpsychism. Therefore every physical entity is conscious.

The other thing about Rucker’s nine-step argument (other than its lack of definitions and its philosophical absurdities) is that there are very weak logical links between each premise. For example, Rucker claims that

6) Every physical entity is conscious.

follows from

5) Any complex system can be regarded as having self-reflection.

The above is a conditional embedded within Rucker’s overall nine-step argument. It works like this:

i) If every complex physical system can be regarded as having self-reflection,ii) then every complex physical system must also be conscious. [Elsewhere Rucker also includes “nonsimple systems”.]

Put is this bare form, the above seems to work. That is, self-reflection seems to imply (or even entail) consciousness. That is, surely you can’t have self-reflection without consciousness.

7) Life = Universal Computation + Memory.

Here we have another addition: memory. As I said about self-reflection, memory needn’t come along with consciousness; though perhaps it must come along with mind. Actually, self-reflection usually comes along with human or animal minds. Thus, as ever, Rucker is applying things which should only be applied to human minds (or human consciousness) to all entities or “systems”.

Indeed that’s Rucker’s whole point.

Not only is Rucker attempting to show that all things have minds (or consciousness), he’s also attempting to show us that all things have human-like minds (or human-like consciousness). Or, at the least, he’s attempting to show us that the minds of rocks, particles, scraps of paper, etc. have self-reflection, memory, inner experiences and sensations — just like us! Thus he’s going way beyond more subtle and more modest forms of panpsychism here. He’s essentially heading towards pantheism or even animism. Thus it’s not a surprise that Rucker ends with this:

9) Therefore every physical object is alive.

Here again there’s a certain kind of logicality of consistency. Again, if entities have minds or consciousness, then they must also be alive; just as most human minds also have self-reflection and memory.

8) Every physical entity has memory via its interactions with the universe.

Again, if all the premises were true (as well as if we don’t question the concepts and words contained in the premises), then 8) seems to follow from the proceeding premises. But that’s no better than saying that the conclusion “Mountains can fly” is true and logically legitimate simply because we’ve constructed a set of bogus premises which artificially lead up to that conclusion. That is, if we take such premises as true, then “Mountains can fly” would indeed follow.

9) Therefore every physical object is alive.

Ditto.

Some Arguments For/Against Analytic Metaphysics: Ted Sider's Realism (3)

Theodore Sider (sometimes deemed to be an arch-analytic metaphysician) tells us what he takes metaphysics to be. (Or, perhaps, he tells us what he thinks metaphysics ought to be.). In his paper/chapter, 'Ontological Realism', he writes:

“The point of metaphysics is to discern the fundamental structure of the world.”

What's more,

“[t]hat requires choosing fundamental notions with which to describe the world".

Indeed Sider continues by saying that “no one other than a positivist can make all the hard questions evaporate”. Finally:

“There’s no detour around the entirety of fundamental metaphysics.”

Sider also makes it plain that metaphysics asks fundamental and important questions by asking the reader his own question:

“Was Reichenbach wrong?— is there a genuine question of whether spacetime is flat or curved?”

The obvious response to that question is say that's a scientific (i.e., not a metaphysical) question. Unless it's the case that metaphysics can offer insights on this which physicists are incapable of... 

More technically, Sider cites Quine's work (as well as the quantification of metaphysical structure) as the means to establish an answer to the question above (as well as others). Thus what is realist in Sider's ontological realism is “objective structure”. This does the work done in the past by objects, entities, events, laws, essences, conditions, etc.

It's interesting that Sider stresses the importance of structure in both science and metaphysics considering the fact that analytic metaphysicians just like Sider are the main enemy of, for example, ontic structural realists; whom also stress structure. (See my 'The Basics of Ladyman and Ross's Case Against Analytic Metaphysics'.)

And the main reason for all Sider's position is his metaphysical realism. That's not such a big problem because that's how Sider (indirectly) classes himself. He writes:

“A certain core realism is, as much as anything, the shared dogma of analytic philosophers, and rightly so.”

It's certainly not the case that “core realism” has been a “shared dogma of analytic philosophers”. There have been anti-realists, idealists, positivists, pragmatists, instrumentalists and all sorts within analytic philosophy. Thus Sider may/must mean something slightly more subtle.

This us what I mean by "subtle".

Sider used the adjective “core” in his term term “core realism”. So perhaps he means this:

Deep down, and when push comes to shove, realism is a shared dogma of analytic philosophers, as it is for almost everyone.

That is, almost everyone (including analytic philosophers) believes that the “world is out there, waiting to be discovered”. That's true; though in a very vague sense. Even an anti-realist believes that (though not an idealist as such). Sure, there's a world that exists regardless of minds. So?

Thus it's what Sider says next that problematises his position.

He says that this world that's “out there, waiting to be discovered” is “not constituted by us”. That depends on so much. Minds, conceptual schemes, language, sensory systems, etc. don't literally make the world in the sense of creating its matter, forces, materials, etc. However, minds may well – even if in some subtle or limited sense – structure/shape/determine/colour (whatever word is appropriate) the world. That is, anti-realists and almost the majority of philosophers believe that we don't get the world “as it is” in its pristine condition. And nature doesn't “tell us what to say about it”.

Truth

In that sense, at least according to many philosophers, Sider is wrong when he says that

“[e]veryone agrees that this realist picture prohibits truth from being generally mind-dependent”.

The problematic word here is “truth” - and that usage may explain Sider's ostensibly extreme philosophical position. It's obviously the case that not “everyone agrees” that the world/nature is “generally mind-independent”. It depends on how that phrase is taken. That is, people may well believe that truth is in some (or many) ways mind-independent. However, metaphysics itself is about the world and its “fundamental nature”.

Thus the truths Sider is talking about are about the world. So do we ever have guaranteed truth in metaphysics? We don't in physics, cosmology and in all the other sciences. So perhaps we don't in metaphysics either. In once sense - a sense given by metaphysicians and many philosophers - truth is by definition mind-independent. However, Sider is fusing that position with our metaphysical statements about the world. So is it that we can say that if they are true, then what makes them true is mind-independent?

On the other hand, perhaps we simply don't have metaphysical truths in the first place. Perhaps we only have metaphysical positions. And, as already stated, metaphysical positions involve mind, language, concepts, conceptual schemes, contingent sensory-systems, etc. These things can be said to pollute our metaphysical positions. Thus we never have the (realist) truth Sider speaks of in metaphysics – analytic or otherwise.

In addition, Sider says:

“The realist picture requires the 'ready-made-world' that Goodman (1978) ridiculed; there must be structure that is mandatory for inquirers to discover.”

There may be a “ready-made-world”. However, I presume that Goodman's point is that we don't have access to it except through our contingent minds, languages, conceptual schemes, sensory-systems, etc. All those things make it the case that we must colour or interpret that ready-made-world. Thus, to us embodied human beings, it's no longer ready-made: we make it (at least in a loose or vague sense).

The other point is that even if there is a mind-independent-ready-made-world, that doesn't automatically mean that everyone – not even every philosopher – will says the same things about it. (Crispin Wright, in his book Truth and Objectivity, believes that we would say the same things if we all had what he calls “Cognitive Command”.) Indeed it doesn't guarantee that contradictory things won't be said about it. (Contradictory things have been said about it!) The world's mind-independence doesn't guarantee discovering Sider's “mandatory structure”; just as it didn't guarantee C.S. Pierce's “future convergence”.

It appears that Sider doesn't accept any of this. He believes, instead, that there are

“predicates that carve nature at the joints, by virtue of referring to genuine 'natural' properties”.

Sider continues:

“The world has a distinguished structure, a privileged description... There is an objectively correct way to 'write the book of the world'.”

Well:

How does Sider know all that? Does Sider know all that through metaphysical analysis and then referring to the “best science”?

Neither of these things can guarantee that we “carve nature at the joints” or obtain metaphysical truths about the world. Again:

How would we know when we have a “privileged description”?

How do we know what that “privileged description” is?

In addition, is there only one “objectively correct way to 'write the book of the world”?

If there is, then how does Sider know that?

Metaphysical Realism Again

Sider also gets to the heart of the matter (at least in the debate between metaphysical realism and what he calls “deflationism”) when he states the following:

“Everyone faces the question of what is ‘real’ and what is the mere projection of our conceptual apparatus, of which issues are substantive and which are ‘mere bookkeeping’.”

That's certainly not true about everyone; just many - not all - philosophers. Sure, it's true that many laypersons are concerned with what is real. However, they don't also think in terms of the possibility that it's our “conceptual apparatus” that hides – or may hide – the real. Many laypersons believe that other things hide “what is real”: lies, propaganda, “the media”, politicians, religions, drugs and even science and philosophy.

Nonetheless, the philosophical issue of realism does indeed spread beyond philosophy. Take science:

“This is true within science as well as philosophy: one must decide when competing scientific theories are mere notational variants. Does a metric-system physics genuinely disagree with a system phrased in terms of ontological realism feet and pounds? We all think not.”

Or take Donald Davidson's less theoretical example of centigrade and Fahrenheit. These are two modes of expression of the same thing. However, Sider asks if the same can be said of “a metric-system physics” and a “ontological realism feet and pounds”. Does this position have much to do with what's called “empirical or observational equivalence” and theoretical underdetermination? If it does, then theories which are empirically equivalent needn't also be theoretically identical. They're equivalent in that they also carry the same weight (among other things). Sider writes:

“Unless one is prepared to take the verificationist’s easy way out, and say that ‘theories are the same when empirically equivalent’, one must face difficult questions about where to draw the line between objective structure and conceptual projection.”

Sider on Metaphysical Deflationists

Sider asks what he calls metaphysical “deflationists” a couple of good questions. He asks:

“Is your rejection of ontological realism based on the desire to make unanswerable questions go away, to avoid questions that resist direct empirical methods but are nevertheless not answerable by conceptual analysis?”

It's hardly surprising - if we take the positions above (alongside my earlier personal reactions) - that Sider himself has heard “[w]hispers that something was wrong with the debate itself”. Despite that, according to Sider:

“Today’s ontologists are not conceptual analysts; few attend to ordinary usage of sentences like ‘chairs exist’.”

It's tempting to say that ontologists should indulge in a bit of conceptual analysis! Not that conceptual analysis should be the beginning and the end of metaphysics; only that it may help things. Thus Sider's statement also begs the following question: What wrong with (a little) conceptual analysis? Who knows, Sider may well have answered that question elsewhere. Indirectly, Sider does comment on conceptual analysis; or at least on what is called ontological deflationism. He writes:

“These critics—‘ontological deflationists’, I’ll call them—have said instead something more like what the positivists said about nearly all of philosophy: that there is something wrong with ontological questions themselves. Other than questions of conceptual analysis, there are no sensible questions of (philosophical) ontology. Certainly there are no questions that are fit to debate in the manner of the ontologists.”

Sider states the position of ontological deflationists; though, here at least, he doesn't offer a criticism of their position.

In terms of conceptual analysis and ontological deflationism being relevant to the composition and constitution of objects, Sider writes:

“... when some particles are arranged tablewise, there is no ‘substantive’ question of whether there also exists a table composed of those particles, they say. There are simply different—and equally good—ways to talk.”

Sider Against Conventionalism

Ted Sider also attacks attacks what he calls “conventionalism”.

He argues that if we accept conventionalism, then we “demystify philosophy itself”. In his book, Riddles of Existence: A Guided Tour of Metaphysics (co-written by Earl Conee), Sider puts the case more fully:

“If conventionalism is true, philosophy turns into nothing more than an inquiry into the definitions we humans give to words. By mystifying necessity, the conventionalist demystifies philosophy itself. Conventionalists are typically up front about this: they want to reduce the significance of philosophy.”

This is strong stuff! Is conventionalism really that extreme? Is Sider’s account of conventionalism correct? At first blast, the passage above sounds more like a description of 1930s logical positivism!

Do conventionalists say that philosophy is “nothing more than any inquiry into the definitions we humans give to words”? Or do they simply stress the importance of our words when it comes to philosophy? In any case, surely the conventionalist doesn't believe that it's just a question of word-definitions: he also stresses our concepts (i.e., as seen as abstract objects; even if concepts are made known to concrete and contingent minds). That is, how do our concepts determine how we see or interpret the nature or the world? If it were all just a question of word-definition, then conventionalists would be little more than linguists or even lexicographers.

Perhaps conventionalists, on the other hand, don’t give up on the world at all. Perhaps they simply say that our words, concepts and indeed our definitions are important when it comes to our classifications, etc. of the world.

Sider the Platonic Essentialist?

When Sider says that by “demystifying necessity, the conventionalist demystifies philosophy itself”, he implies that philosophy is nothing more than the study of necessity! In that case, it's no wonder that the conventionalist “wants to reduce the significance of philosophy” if that's really the case. This seems to be a thoroughly Platonic (as well as perhaps partly Aristotelian) account of philosophy (i.e., with its obsession with necessity and essence).

Is that really all that philosophy is concerned with – essence and necessity?

Again, this was true of Plato and indeed Aristotle; though what about 20th century philosophers? Indeed what about Hume and many other pre-20th century philosophers?

I've just mentioned Ted Sider’s Platonic notion of philosophy’s role, and now we can see more evidence of this.

Sider asks: What is philosophy?

Sider answers that question thus:

Philosophy “investigates the essences of concepts”.

Philosophy “seek[s] the essence of right and wrong”.

Philosophy “seek[s] the essence of beauty”.

Philosophy “seek[s] the essence of knowledge”.

Philosophy “seek[s] the essences of personal identity, free will, time, and so on”.

However, according to Sider, conventionalists believe that “these investigations ultimately concern definitions”. Not only that: Sider claims that, according to the conventionalist, it

“seems to follow that one could settle any philosophical dispute just by consulting a dictionary!”.

I would like to know if there is such a conventionalist animal who really believes this. As said earlier, Sider’s account of conventionalism really seems like an account of 1920s and 30s logical positivism  or later "linguistic philosophy". And no contemporary philosopher is an old-fashioned logical positivist or linguistic philosopher.

Again, Sider’s take on conventionalism seems thoroughly old-fashioned in nature. However, his Platonist account of philosophy (or its role) seems even more old-fashioned in nature. In fact it seems ancient. This, of course, isn't automatically to say that Sider's positions are false or incorrect. It's only to say, again, that they're ancient. Perhaps they're also true.

Some Arguments Against Analytic Metaphysics (1)

Laypersons and even many philosophers say that much of what's discussed and stated in analytic metaphysics is ridiculous and/or trivial. That may be true. Though we must have a wider and more historical vision here because isn't it also the case that this sort of thing has been said about many historical philosophical positions – both by laypersons and by philosophers?

Take the common reaction to Bishop Berkeley's "empirical idealism" (e.g., when Dr Johnson kicked the stone). Or the dismay at the seeming truism of Descartes' Cogito. And you don't even need to mention Martin Heidegger's “the nothing nots” (as translated by Rudolf Carnap) to elicit such responses. So, at least to the layperson, is analytic metaphysics really that different to what's gone before?

Perhaps we should also say that some old philosophical positions are now so well-known that it's therefore hardly surprising that many laypersons are no longer shocked or disgusted by them.

On the other hand, philosophical disgust at metaphysics goes back to Kant or further. As Craig Callender puts it:

“Kant famously attacked metaphysics as an assortment of empty sophistical tricks, a kind of perversion of the understanding.”

Then, 160 years or so years after Kant, we had Rudolf Carnap speaking out against metaphysics:

“Most of the controversies in traditional metaphysics appeared to me sterile and useless. When I compared this kind of argumentation with investigations and discussions in empirical science or [logic], I was often struck by the vagueness of the concepts used and by the inconclusive nature of the arguments."

Then again, so too did the just-mentioned Martin Heidegger – in his What is Metaphysics? [1929] - at roughly the same time as Carnap. Not only that: Carnap spoke out against Heidegger's metaphysics – in his The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language [1931] - when Heidegger was himself speaking out against what he classed as “Western metaphysics”. Thus being against metaphysics – at least in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s - became both a sport and a philosophical fashion.

As stated, many positions within analytic metaphysics (sometimes within the entire genus of metaphysics) are deemed by both laypersons and philosophers to be trivial, scholastic and/or oblivious to science.

This, for example, is Craig Callender (in his 'Philosophy of Science and Metaphysics') taking the piss out of analytic metaphysics:

“... when I bend my fingers into a first, have I thereby brought a new object into the world, a fist?”

Despite that, at least according to Callender, such views are nonetheless deemed to be “deep, interesting, and about the structure of mind-independent reality” by such metaphysicians.

Other philosophers have also had a go at analytic metaphysics.

David Chalmers, for example, thinks most of the disputes are primarily “verbal” in nature. Steven Yablo (who's written a lot on metaphysics – including about whether the Turin Shroud and the cloth it's made up of are two different objects) believes that there are no answers to many of the issues or disputes raised in analytic metaphysics. (See his 'Must Existence-Questions have Answers?'.)

Science

When an analytic metaphysician (or indeed any metaphysician) says that metaphysics is concerned with problems which aren't (strictly speaking) scientific (as well as when he says that metaphysics uses analytical, philosophical and logical methods which aren't those of science), then some philosophers may give the obvious reply:

The problems, concepts and tools of metaphysics shouldn't be distinct from science – even if they aren't identical.

Though if you were to take this position too far, then metaphysics will simply become physics/science. Either that or, at the least, it will become a (subsidiary) part of science/physics.

The problem is that no only may such anti-metaphysical philosophers throw out all metaphysics with these demands (i.e., if you follow their logic to its conclusion), it may also be the case that much science will be thrown out too. (This point was famously made against certain positions advanced by the logical positivists in the 1920s and 1930s.)

For example, what about empirically-untestable string theory and multiverses? Are they examples of scientific “neo-Scholasticism”? What about some of the well-known mathematical and logical problems which can simply be seen as “intellectual puzzles” and nothing more?

Again, the major criticism of analytic metaphysicians is that they more or less ignore science. In at least some cases, metaphysicians do so because they believe that metaphysics comes before physics. (Yes, despite the Greek translation of the word.) Thus it doesn't make sense to consult science if science (or at least physics) comes after metaphysics. Nonetheless, Ted Sider (one of the best known analytic metaphysicians), for example, has a sophisticated view on metaphysics' relation to science. Put very simply: he doesn't believe that any metaphysician should ignore science. (However, at least at face value, that position may not amount to much.)

Indeed even when metaphysics does square with science (as 4-Dimensionalism, for example, is said to do), it may still be the case that this just adds to the cogency and value of the metaphysical theory or position. In other words, in terms of 4-D again, metaphysics could survive very well (thank you) without the help of Einstein's theories of relativity. In addition, positions on time in physics and cosmology are also deemed to be secondary to metaphysics by some analytic metaphysicians. It's even the case that such metaphysicians go further than that when they argue that physics and cosmology must be brought into line with metaphysics, not the other way around!

How can we respond to this Metaphysics First position?

It can be said that before the rise of modern science it was indeed philosophers who investigated “the fundamental structure and nature of physical reality” (as it's often put). However, after the rise of modern science, many philosophers now argue that metaphysicians shouldn't still be doing metaphysics without the help or findings of science.... at least not in 2017!

As a consequence of all that, such naturalistic philosophers are against what's often called “a priori metaphysics” or the search for “a priori truths”.

Prima facie, however, it's hard to believe that there's a 21st-century metaphysician who would claim to be engaged in an entirely a priori pursuit. (Though perhaps I'm wrong.) In fact I'm not even sure what the words “a priori metaphysics” (i.e., if taken literally) mean or whether it would be achievable even in principle.

Anyway, if such a priori metaphysics does exist, then the philosophers James Ladyman and Don Ross, for example, class it as “neo-Scholasticism”.

Thus I'll now concentrate on their position against analytic metaphysics.

Ladyman & Ross's Case Against Analytic Metaphysics

Sometimes James Ladyman and Don Ross's (who are self-described “ontic structural realists”) main criticisms of analytic metaphysics seem a little rhetorical – at least as they stand. For example, in their book Everything Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, they argue/state:

i) That metaphysics "contributes nothing to human knowledge”.

ii) That metaphysicians are "wasting their talents”.

iii) That metaphysics “fails to qualify as part of the enlightened pursuit of objective truth, and should be discontinued”.

It's also the case that Ladyman and Ross are arguing that metaphysicians should be scientifically-literate holists who should attempt to show us “how everything fits together” (as Nelson Goodman once put it).

In other words, the “ontological structure” of the universe is the domain of physics and science generally. Metaphysics, on the other hand, should attempt to find a unified and “cross-disciplinary” philosophical synthesis of how the sciences tell us the universe/reality is structured. (Put that way, this is similar to Quine's position; though he didn't really emphasise cross-disciplinary unification as such.)

Intuitions?

It's extremely ironic that in view of the counterintuitive positions advanced in analytic metaphysics that the enemies of such positions claim that metaphysicians rely too much on what they call “intuitions”.

I suppose that there may be a simple answer to that. Namely, intuitive positions – or intuitive beginnings (as it were) – can take one in very counterintuitive directions; just as the intuitively-true premises of logical arguments can take one to extremely counter-intuitive or even paradoxical conclusions.

In any case, it's notable how important the criticism of the analytic metaphysicians' reliance on intuitions is. It's also true that some philosophers have acknowledged - and then relied upon - intuitions; though many others haven't.

Having said all that, it's almost impossible not to begin one's philosophical pursuits without utilising one's intuitions to some extent - or even to a large extent. (All this, of course, entirely depends on the definition of the word 'intuition'.) And it may follow from this that if one's intuitions are acknowledged as a starting point, then that starting point is bound to have an affect on much of what follows (i.e., in terms of reasoning and actual philosophical conclusions).

On the other hand, it's also prima facie ironic that metaphysicians rely at all on intuitions. Isn't it far more likely that an epistemologist or a philosopher of mind (for reasons I hope are obvious) would (or even should) stress or rely on intuitions?

In any case, there are many arguments in favour of intuitions... and not all of them use intuitions to defend intuitions.

For example, you must start from somewhere. And the best - or even the only - place to start from in philosophy (as in most things) is from one's own intuitions. Indeed it's hard to even make sense of the idea of starting from anywhere else. And if you start from your own intuitions (I stress the word start), then it may be equally - or more - wise to take on board collective/social (as it were) intuitions too.

Bearing all that in mind, it's hardly a cardinal sin if metaphysicians begin their reasonings by using phrases such as "it is intuitive that" or "it is counter-intuitive that" when, presumably, such philosophers won't end their philosophical pursuits with such phrases (or, indeed, with a continued reliance on intuitions).

You can also defend the existence and utilisation of intuitions without using the phrase (which I noted in Ladyman and Ross) “the faculty of intuition”. That sounds like the kind of reification which Gilbert Ryle warned against (though he referred to intelligence, will, mental events, etc.) some seventy years ago. Indeed if people do believe in such a faculty, the it may well take on a role similar to that of Kant's a priori categories or even been seen as a module (or part) of the brain. In that case, just as philosophers could have asked Kant why he thought that the mind's concepts or categories were a-historical and universal; so a contemporary critic can ask why (some) metaphysicians think that our faculty of intuition is reliable and/or static from (say) an evolutionary/biological point of view.

However, our intuitions needn't be seen as a priori, a-historical or even as constituting a faculty as such.

It would be wise, then, to say that when contemporary metaphysicians appeal to intuitions, they don't (or, at least, they ought not to) refer to some magical ability which only they possess. 

Others on Intuitions

If an “experimental” or “naturalist” philosopher says that intuitions aren't scientific data, then a metaphysician may simply say: “Yes, I know. And?”

On the one hand it may be understandable to argue against intuitions regarding, say, quantum mechanics, cosmology or the nature of DNA. On the other hand, many mathematicians and scientists (ranging from Kurt Gödel and Alan Turing to Roger Penrose) have happily stressed the importance of intuitions in both mathematics and physics. (Though, admittedly, perhaps not in quite the same way these guilty metaphysicians do.)

In any case, what are now called “experimental philosophers” have a problem with (much) analytic metaphysics for this reason. As stated, they believe that they place too much emphasis on intuitions and their corresponding “thought experiments”. Of course speculation and even thoughts experiments are of vital importance in science too – especially in physics. However, experimental philosophers have something else in mind here. It's not that physical experiments are wrong: it's that thought experiments are wrong. In physics, speculations are eventually tested via experiment, observations, etc. This isn't the case when it comes to metaphysics. In analytic metaphysics, experiments or observations don't – or may not - make a blind bit of difference. Such metaphysical theories usually stand or fall regardless of experiments and even regardless of science taken more generally.

The other thing is that experimental philosophers are questioning the intuitions and thought experiments of analytic metaphysicians from a scientific or experimental point of view. That is, they use the empirical studies found in psychology and cognitive science to cast doubt on the efficacy or truth of human intuitions and philosophical thought experiments. Such empirical research on human subjects shows them that its very unwise to trust intuitions and what follows from them.

Of course metaphysicians and some philosophers aren't too keen on the views of these new kids on the block – the experimental philosophers (such as Jesse J. Prinz, etc.). Timothy Williamson (in his 'Philosphical intuitions and scepticism about judgement'), for example, believes that although intuitions can be taken as being very basic; they can also be - at least in some cases - the end result of previous high-level reasoning. This must mean that intuitions are actually the products of implicit/tacit prior knowledge. (They may also have value from an evolutionary point of view.) Even the imagination, according to Williamson, is a good guide to reality, at least if it's used correctly. (Of course Descartes said this about the mind and reason itself – i.e., if you use your mind and reason as God intended you to use them, then you can't go wrong.)

In the senses stated above, then, intuitions aren't really... well, intuitions at all. These judgements, positions or premises may simply have the phenomenological feel (as it were) of intuitions. However, this is also problematic in that it ties seemingly intuitive judgments, positions or even a priori premises to the subject's history and perhaps also to his/her sociological position within that history. Either way, we can ask whether intuitions come out well after all this.

Kantianism

The metaphysical realism of (some/all?) analytic metaphysicians (though it's not necessary for an analytic metaphysician to be a metaphysical realist) has been challenged since the beginning of philosophy.

Take the position of John Locke.

John Locke believed that it may be permanently impossible for us to ascertain the true nature of the world or reality (i.e., his “something, I know not what”). In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke writes:

“…it is impossible for us to know, that this or that quality or Idea has a necessary connection with a real Essence, of which we have no Idea at all, whatever Species that supposed real Essence may be imagined to constitute.” 

That's also partly why Bishop Berkeley turned towards empirical idealism; as well as away from scientific materialism and the scepticism it engendered. In his Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley wrote:

“.... the whole issue can be allowed to rest on a single question: is it possible to conceive of a sensible object existing independently of any perceiver? The challenge seems easy enough at first. All I have to do is think of something so remote—a tree in the middle of the forest, perhaps—that no one presently has it in mind. But if I conceive of this thing, then it is present in my mind as I think of it, so it is not truly independent of all perception.”

Then Kant brought noumena into the debate. The Kantian problem of noumena caused various later philosophers to embrace (Kantian) transcendental idealism once again – and so did many late 19th-century and early 20th century scientists (e.g., Mach, Helmholtz, Boltzmann, Hertz, early Einstein, etc.).

A semi-Kantian position is also offered – here in the 21st century - by Mauro Dorato. He writes (as quoted by Ladyman and Ross):

“.... the concept of unobservable entities that are involved in the structural relations always has some conventional element, and the reality of the entities is constituted by, or derived from, more and more relations in which they are involved.”

So why is this Kantian? Ladyman and Ross (again) write:

“... an epistemic structural realist may insist in a Kantian spirit... there being such objects is a necessary condition for our empirical knowledge of the world.”

This is a good description of the noumenal grounding of Kant's metaphysics and indeed his epistemology. You can sum it up with a simple Kantian question:

If there are no noumenal objects (which ground our representations, etc.), then what's it all about?

If we can now come up to date, Frank Jackson says that “we know next to nothing about the intrinsic nature of the world”. Indeed we “know only its causal cum relational nature”.

Scientific & Metaphysical Structuralism

One way out of this impasse (of noumena and the consequent embracing of idealism) is to become some kind of metaphysical or scientific structuralist. Thus Peter Unger, for example, argues that “our knowledge of the world is purely structural”. What's more, Peter Unger adds that

“things in themselves [i.e., noumena]... are idle wheels in metaphysics and the PPC imposes a moratorium on such purely speculative philosophical toys”.

However, there is indeed a major philosophical problem with this 21st century "anti-realism"; which may be highlighted by some metaphysical realists.

Even if our representations, models, "posited objects", etc. don't somehow “mirror” - or even represent - nature or reality (or if we didn't have the noumenal grounding in the first place), then surely we have precisely nothing. Or as Ladyman and Ross put it (almost quoting Kant word-for-word):

“...there being such objects is a necessary condition for our empirical knowledge of the world.”

So, again, we may not mirror nature or things; though we must capture something. Then again, how can we represent - let alone mirror - something as strange as Kantian noumena? How would that work?

This is when structuralists say:

Yes, we capture structure.

Yet that response won't quite work because metaphysical realists believe they're capturing (if not mirroring) determinate reality. Structuralists may not think that; though structure is real. That's why Ladyman and Ross, for example, appear to make what can be seen as the obvious conclusion when they write:

“.... we shall argue that in the light of contemporary physics... that talk of unknowable intrinsic natures and individuals is idle and has no justified place in metaphysics. This is the sense in which our view is eliminative...”

One can conclude that because we can't get at things and reality in their pristine metaphysically-realist state: then, if that's a necessary truth, we may as well say that “structure is all there is”. This ties in nicely with the structuralist position that Kantian noumena may as well also drop out of the picture. Or, as Wittgenstein put it in his Philosophical Investigations (though about something else), things or noumena are

“wheels which can be turned though nothing else moves with them is not part of the mechanism”.

To put the case very simply, there's an argument which one can adopt here:

i) There are things and a determinate reality, though we can never access them as they are “in themselves”.

ii) And if we can't access reality and things as they are in themselves, then why not drop the notion of a determinate reality completely from the philosophical picture?

It can be said that ii) follows from i); though it can't also be said (strictly speaking) to logically follow from i).

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*) See my 'Some Arguments Against Analytic Metaphysics: Realism (2)'.