At a prima
facie level,
integrated information theory (IIT) is utterly Cartesian. Sure, it's Cartesianism in a contemporary
scientific guise; though Cartesian nonetheless.
This isn't to say that IIT simply reasserts, for example, the Cogito
or Descartes' seemingly deductive style of reasoning. Though, despite that, the
Cogito etc. can also be said to be resurrected (in contemporary terms) in IIT. However, Descartes moved from (his) mind and journeyed to his body and then to the external world. IIT moves from consciousness to the brain. At least as viewed from one angle. 1
On
one hand, IIT inverts many 20th century (Anglo-American) ways of dealing with consciousness in that
it's said that it moves from consciousness to arrive at the physical; rather than starting with the physical in order to attempt to arrive
at consciousness. It can also be that IIT moves to the physical only
after it's got its Cartesian house in order.
The
Cogito, of course, was the starting point of Descartes' enterprise.
On
the other hand, what is certainly not Cartesian is that it's also
said (or implied) that IIT begins with neuroscience/the brain and then journeys
to consciousness. This, of course, directly contradicts what was said
in the last paragraph.
In
which case, if IIT also sees conscious states (or experiences) as
“immediate and direct”, then how can neuroscience come first?
This may depend on what's meant by the idea that neuroscience must
(or does) come first. Even if a given neuroscientific basis (or
reality) were necessary and sufficient for consciousness, that still
wouldn't mean (philosophically) that such a reality must come first.
Thus coming first or second may not matter. As long as consciousness
(its immediacy, directness and phenomenology) and the neuroscience
are both seen as being part of the same problem or reality; talk of
the primary and the secondary can't be that important.
To
get back to Descartes.
Let's
take the use of the words “axiom” and “postulate” in IIT to
begin with.
This
implies a kind of Cartesian deductivism; though, in IIT's case, I
find the words a little strained in that the moves from the axioms
of consciousness to the postulates of its physical mode (or is it a
substrate?) are never, strictly speaking, logical.
IIT's
first Cartesian axiom is “the axiom of existence”. This is seen
as being “self-evident”. Giulio
Tononi
describes
the first axiom:
“Consciousness
is real and undeniable; moreover, a subject’s consciousness has
this reality intrinsically; it exists from its own perspective.”
[2015]
The
only non-Cartesian aspect of the above (as it seems to me)
is the claim that consciousness “exists from its own perspective”.
Indeed it's hard to work out exactly what that means; at least as
it's expressed in this bare form.
In
any case, it's clear that the nature of IIT is, again, explicitly
Cartesian. Tononi, for example, also says that
“consciousness
exists: each experience is actual—indeed, that my experience here
and now exists (it is real) is the only fact I can be sure of
immediately and absolutely.” [2015]
Isn't
this the Cogito written in a more contemporary manner? In other
words, that which many 20th century scientists and philosophers have out-rightly denied (or seen
as "unscientific") is here at the very beginning of the philosophical
enterprise.
Tononi
then takes the Cogito in directions not explicitly taken (or written
about) by Descartes himself. That is, Tononi says that his
“experience
exists from its own intrinsic perspective, independent of external
observers (it is intrinsically real or actual)”.
[2015]
In
this internalist/individualist manner, Tononi speaks of consciousness as being “independent
of external observers”.
Functionalism
If
you take this Cartesian approach to consciousness, then one
automatically rules out certain alternative theories of mind which
have been alive and well in the history of the philosophy of mind (at
least in the late 20th century).
For
example, IIT rules out functionalism.
Functionalism
(or at least functionalism at its most pure) has a notion of mental
functions and behaviour which effectively rules out experience; or,
at the least, it rules out (or ignores) the phenomenological reality of consciousness.
The
major and perhaps most obvious problem with functionalism (at least
vis-a-vis consciousness and phenomenology) was best expressed by
Christof Koch
in 2012.
He claimed that much work in the philosophy of mind utilised “models
that describe the mind as a number of functional boxes”.
That's fair enough as it stands; except for the fact that these boxes
are “magically endowed with phenomenal awareness”. Sure, the
functional boxes may exist, and they may have much explanatory power
(in the philosophy of mind); yet what about such things as Koch's
“phenomenal awareness” and the controversial qualia?
One
functionalist problem with an entirely Cartesian position on mind (or
consciousness) is that it's indeed the case the consciousness seems
to be direct and immediate. However, to some functionalists,
this is only a “seeming”. (Daniel Dennett
would probably call it an illusion.)
In other words, simply because a conscious experience (or state)
appears to us to be direct and immediate, that doesn't automatically
mean that it is direct and immediate.
According
to some functionalisms, even this immediate and direct phenomenology
doesn't need to go beyond functionality (or mental functions). In
other words, it's still all (or primarily) about functions. More
clearly, this sense of immediacy and directness is itself a question
of mental functions. In this case, the mental function which is our
belief - and our disposition to believe - that consciousness is
immediate and direct!
That belief also needs to
be accounted for in functionalist terms. (In the way that the
immediacy and directness of an experience itself may require a
functionalist explanation.) That is, why is it the case the an
experience seems direct and immediate to us? What function does that
belief (or experience
of an experience)
serve?
A
conscious state (or experience) may seem to be direct and immediate simply because we
believe
that it's direct and immediate. Moreover, we also have a long-running
disposition to believe that it's direct and immediate. Or, again, the
sense that an experience (or a mental state) is direct and immediate
(or the experience
that an experience
is direct and immediate) doesn't automatically mean that it is.
Doesn't
this position leave out the phenomenological factors (or reality) of
an experience (or conscious state) which are above and beyond their
being direct and immediate? On the one had, there's the
phenomenological reality of an experience. And, on the other hand,
there's its apparent (or real) directness and immediacy. The two
aren't the same even if they always occur together.
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Note
1 It can be said, in retrospect, that it would have been more
accurate for Descartes to have said that he started with
consciousness rather than with the “existence of the self” (or
the “I think”). After all, the self/I is much more of
a postulation than brute consciousness.
References
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