Some Arguments Against Analytic Metaphysics (1)

Laypersons and even many philosophers say that much of what's discussed and stated in analytic metaphysics is ridiculous and/or trivial. That may be true. Though we must have a wider and more historical vision here because isn't it also the case that this sort of thing has been said about many historical philosophical positions – both by laypersons and by philosophers?

Take the common reaction to Bishop Berkeley's "empirical idealism" (e.g., when Dr Johnson kicked the stone). Or the dismay at the seeming truism of Descartes' Cogito. And you don't even need to mention Martin Heidegger's “the nothing nots” (as translated by Rudolf Carnap) to elicit such responses. So, at least to the layperson, is analytic metaphysics really that different to what's gone before?

Perhaps we should also say that some old philosophical positions are now so well-known that it's therefore hardly surprising that many laypersons are no longer shocked or disgusted by them.

On the other hand, philosophical disgust at metaphysics goes back to Kant or further. As Craig Callender puts it:

“Kant famously attacked metaphysics as an assortment of empty sophistical tricks, a kind of perversion of the understanding.”

Then, 160 years or so years after Kant, we had Rudolf Carnap speaking out against metaphysics:

“Most of the controversies in traditional metaphysics appeared to me sterile and useless. When I compared this kind of argumentation with investigations and discussions in empirical science or [logic], I was often struck by the vagueness of the concepts used and by the inconclusive nature of the arguments."

Then again, so too did the just-mentioned Martin Heidegger – in his What is Metaphysics? [1929] - at roughly the same time as Carnap. Not only that: Carnap spoke out against Heidegger's metaphysics – in his The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language [1931] - when Heidegger was himself speaking out against what he classed as “Western metaphysics”. Thus being against metaphysics – at least in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s - became both a sport and a philosophical fashion.

As stated, many positions within analytic metaphysics (sometimes within the entire genus of metaphysics) are deemed by both laypersons and philosophers to be trivial, scholastic and/or oblivious to science.

This, for example, is Craig Callender (in his 'Philosophy of Science and Metaphysics') taking the piss out of analytic metaphysics:

“... when I bend my fingers into a first, have I thereby brought a new object into the world, a fist?”

Despite that, at least according to Callender, such views are nonetheless deemed to be “deep, interesting, and about the structure of mind-independent reality” by such metaphysicians.

Other philosophers have also had a go at analytic metaphysics.

David Chalmers, for example, thinks most of the disputes are primarily “verbal” in nature. Steven Yablo (who's written a lot on metaphysics – including about whether the Turin Shroud and the cloth it's made up of are two different objects) believes that there are no answers to many of the issues or disputes raised in analytic metaphysics. (See his 'Must Existence-Questions have Answers?'.)

Science

When an analytic metaphysician (or indeed any metaphysician) says that metaphysics is concerned with problems which aren't (strictly speaking) scientific (as well as when he says that metaphysics uses analytical, philosophical and logical methods which aren't those of science), then some philosophers may give the obvious reply:

The problems, concepts and tools of metaphysics shouldn't be distinct from science – even if they aren't identical.

Though if you were to take this position too far, then metaphysics will simply become physics/science. Either that or, at the least, it will become a (subsidiary) part of science/physics.

The problem is that no only may such anti-metaphysical philosophers throw out all metaphysics with these demands (i.e., if you follow their logic to its conclusion), it may also be the case that much science will be thrown out too. (This point was famously made against certain positions advanced by the logical positivists in the 1920s and 1930s.)

For example, what about empirically-untestable string theory and multiverses? Are they examples of scientific “neo-Scholasticism”? What about some of the well-known mathematical and logical problems which can simply be seen as “intellectual puzzles” and nothing more?

Again, the major criticism of analytic metaphysicians is that they more or less ignore science. In at least some cases, metaphysicians do so because they believe that metaphysics comes before physics. (Yes, despite the Greek translation of the word.) Thus it doesn't make sense to consult science if science (or at least physics) comes after metaphysics. Nonetheless, Ted Sider (one of the best known analytic metaphysicians), for example, has a sophisticated view on metaphysics' relation to science. Put very simply: he doesn't believe that any metaphysician should ignore science. (However, at least at face value, that position may not amount to much.)

Indeed even when metaphysics does square with science (as 4-Dimensionalism, for example, is said to do), it may still be the case that this just adds to the cogency and value of the metaphysical theory or position. In other words, in terms of 4-D again, metaphysics could survive very well (thank you) without the help of Einstein's theories of relativity. In addition, positions on time in physics and cosmology are also deemed to be secondary to metaphysics by some analytic metaphysicians. It's even the case that such metaphysicians go further than that when they argue that physics and cosmology must be brought into line with metaphysics, not the other way around!

How can we respond to this Metaphysics First position?

It can be said that before the rise of modern science it was indeed philosophers who investigated “the fundamental structure and nature of physical reality” (as it's often put). However, after the rise of modern science, many philosophers now argue that metaphysicians shouldn't still be doing metaphysics without the help or findings of science.... at least not in 2017!

As a consequence of all that, such naturalistic philosophers are against what's often called “a priori metaphysics” or the search for “a priori truths”.

Prima facie, however, it's hard to believe that there's a 21st-century metaphysician who would claim to be engaged in an entirely a priori pursuit. (Though perhaps I'm wrong.) In fact I'm not even sure what the words “a priori metaphysics” (i.e., if taken literally) mean or whether it would be achievable even in principle.

Anyway, if such a priori metaphysics does exist, then the philosophers James Ladyman and Don Ross, for example, class it as “neo-Scholasticism”.

Thus I'll now concentrate on their position against analytic metaphysics.

Ladyman & Ross's Case Against Analytic Metaphysics

Sometimes James Ladyman and Don Ross's (who are self-described “ontic structural realists”) main criticisms of analytic metaphysics seem a little rhetorical – at least as they stand. For example, in their book Everything Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, they argue/state:

i) That metaphysics "contributes nothing to human knowledge”.

ii) That metaphysicians are "wasting their talents”.

iii) That metaphysics “fails to qualify as part of the enlightened pursuit of objective truth, and should be discontinued”.

It's also the case that Ladyman and Ross are arguing that metaphysicians should be scientifically-literate holists who should attempt to show us “how everything fits together” (as Nelson Goodman once put it).

In other words, the “ontological structure” of the universe is the domain of physics and science generally. Metaphysics, on the other hand, should attempt to find a unified and “cross-disciplinary” philosophical synthesis of how the sciences tell us the universe/reality is structured. (Put that way, this is similar to Quine's position; though he didn't really emphasise cross-disciplinary unification as such.)

Intuitions?

It's extremely ironic that in view of the counterintuitive positions advanced in analytic metaphysics that the enemies of such positions claim that metaphysicians rely too much on what they call “intuitions”.

I suppose that there may be a simple answer to that. Namely, intuitive positions – or intuitive beginnings (as it were) – can take one in very counterintuitive directions; just as the intuitively-true premises of logical arguments can take one to extremely counter-intuitive or even paradoxical conclusions.

In any case, it's notable how important the criticism of the analytic metaphysicians' reliance on intuitions is. It's also true that some philosophers have acknowledged - and then relied upon - intuitions; though many others haven't.

Having said all that, it's almost impossible not to begin one's philosophical pursuits without utilising one's intuitions to some extent - or even to a large extent. (All this, of course, entirely depends on the definition of the word 'intuition'.) And it may follow from this that if one's intuitions are acknowledged as a starting point, then that starting point is bound to have an affect on much of what follows (i.e., in terms of reasoning and actual philosophical conclusions).

On the other hand, it's also prima facie ironic that metaphysicians rely at all on intuitions. Isn't it far more likely that an epistemologist or a philosopher of mind (for reasons I hope are obvious) would (or even should) stress or rely on intuitions?

In any case, there are many arguments in favour of intuitions... and not all of them use intuitions to defend intuitions.

For example, you must start from somewhere. And the best - or even the only - place to start from in philosophy (as in most things) is from one's own intuitions. Indeed it's hard to even make sense of the idea of starting from anywhere else. And if you start from your own intuitions (I stress the word start), then it may be equally - or more - wise to take on board collective/social (as it were) intuitions too.

Bearing all that in mind, it's hardly a cardinal sin if metaphysicians begin their reasonings by using phrases such as "it is intuitive that" or "it is counter-intuitive that" when, presumably, such philosophers won't end their philosophical pursuits with such phrases (or, indeed, with a continued reliance on intuitions).

You can also defend the existence and utilisation of intuitions without using the phrase (which I noted in Ladyman and Ross) “the faculty of intuition”. That sounds like the kind of reification which Gilbert Ryle warned against (though he referred to intelligence, will, mental events, etc.) some seventy years ago. Indeed if people do believe in such a faculty, the it may well take on a role similar to that of Kant's a priori categories or even been seen as a module (or part) of the brain. In that case, just as philosophers could have asked Kant why he thought that the mind's concepts or categories were a-historical and universal; so a contemporary critic can ask why (some) metaphysicians think that our faculty of intuition is reliable and/or static from (say) an evolutionary/biological point of view.

However, our intuitions needn't be seen as a priori, a-historical or even as constituting a faculty as such.

It would be wise, then, to say that when contemporary metaphysicians appeal to intuitions, they don't (or, at least, they ought not to) refer to some magical ability which only they possess. 

Others on Intuitions

If an “experimental” or “naturalist” philosopher says that intuitions aren't scientific data, then a metaphysician may simply say: “Yes, I know. And?”

On the one hand it may be understandable to argue against intuitions regarding, say, quantum mechanics, cosmology or the nature of DNA. On the other hand, many mathematicians and scientists (ranging from Kurt Gödel and Alan Turing to Roger Penrose) have happily stressed the importance of intuitions in both mathematics and physics. (Though, admittedly, perhaps not in quite the same way these guilty metaphysicians do.)

In any case, what are now called “experimental philosophers” have a problem with (much) analytic metaphysics for this reason. As stated, they believe that they place too much emphasis on intuitions and their corresponding “thought experiments”. Of course speculation and even thoughts experiments are of vital importance in science too – especially in physics. However, experimental philosophers have something else in mind here. It's not that physical experiments are wrong: it's that thought experiments are wrong. In physics, speculations are eventually tested via experiment, observations, etc. This isn't the case when it comes to metaphysics. In analytic metaphysics, experiments or observations don't – or may not - make a blind bit of difference. Such metaphysical theories usually stand or fall regardless of experiments and even regardless of science taken more generally.

The other thing is that experimental philosophers are questioning the intuitions and thought experiments of analytic metaphysicians from a scientific or experimental point of view. That is, they use the empirical studies found in psychology and cognitive science to cast doubt on the efficacy or truth of human intuitions and philosophical thought experiments. Such empirical research on human subjects shows them that its very unwise to trust intuitions and what follows from them.

Of course metaphysicians and some philosophers aren't too keen on the views of these new kids on the block – the experimental philosophers (such as Jesse J. Prinz, etc.). Timothy Williamson (in his 'Philosphical intuitions and scepticism about judgement'), for example, believes that although intuitions can be taken as being very basic; they can also be - at least in some cases - the end result of previous high-level reasoning. This must mean that intuitions are actually the products of implicit/tacit prior knowledge. (They may also have value from an evolutionary point of view.) Even the imagination, according to Williamson, is a good guide to reality, at least if it's used correctly. (Of course Descartes said this about the mind and reason itself – i.e., if you use your mind and reason as God intended you to use them, then you can't go wrong.)

In the senses stated above, then, intuitions aren't really... well, intuitions at all. These judgements, positions or premises may simply have the phenomenological feel (as it were) of intuitions. However, this is also problematic in that it ties seemingly intuitive judgments, positions or even a priori premises to the subject's history and perhaps also to his/her sociological position within that history. Either way, we can ask whether intuitions come out well after all this.

Kantianism

The metaphysical realism of (some/all?) analytic metaphysicians (though it's not necessary for an analytic metaphysician to be a metaphysical realist) has been challenged since the beginning of philosophy.

Take the position of John Locke.

John Locke believed that it may be permanently impossible for us to ascertain the true nature of the world or reality (i.e., his “something, I know not what”). In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke writes:

“…it is impossible for us to know, that this or that quality or Idea has a necessary connection with a real Essence, of which we have no Idea at all, whatever Species that supposed real Essence may be imagined to constitute.” 

That's also partly why Bishop Berkeley turned towards empirical idealism; as well as away from scientific materialism and the scepticism it engendered. In his Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley wrote:

“.... the whole issue can be allowed to rest on a single question: is it possible to conceive of a sensible object existing independently of any perceiver? The challenge seems easy enough at first. All I have to do is think of something so remote—a tree in the middle of the forest, perhaps—that no one presently has it in mind. But if I conceive of this thing, then it is present in my mind as I think of it, so it is not truly independent of all perception.”

Then Kant brought noumena into the debate. The Kantian problem of noumena caused various later philosophers to embrace (Kantian) transcendental idealism once again – and so did many late 19th-century and early 20th century scientists (e.g., Mach, Helmholtz, Boltzmann, Hertz, early Einstein, etc.).

A semi-Kantian position is also offered – here in the 21st century - by Mauro Dorato. He writes (as quoted by Ladyman and Ross):

“.... the concept of unobservable entities that are involved in the structural relations always has some conventional element, and the reality of the entities is constituted by, or derived from, more and more relations in which they are involved.”

So why is this Kantian? Ladyman and Ross (again) write:

“... an epistemic structural realist may insist in a Kantian spirit... there being such objects is a necessary condition for our empirical knowledge of the world.”

This is a good description of the noumenal grounding of Kant's metaphysics and indeed his epistemology. You can sum it up with a simple Kantian question:

If there are no noumenal objects (which ground our representations, etc.), then what's it all about?

If we can now come up to date, Frank Jackson says that “we know next to nothing about the intrinsic nature of the world”. Indeed we “know only its causal cum relational nature”.

Scientific & Metaphysical Structuralism

One way out of this impasse (of noumena and the consequent embracing of idealism) is to become some kind of metaphysical or scientific structuralist. Thus Peter Unger, for example, argues that “our knowledge of the world is purely structural”. What's more, Peter Unger adds that

“things in themselves [i.e., noumena]... are idle wheels in metaphysics and the PPC imposes a moratorium on such purely speculative philosophical toys”.

However, there is indeed a major philosophical problem with this 21st century "anti-realism"; which may be highlighted by some metaphysical realists.

Even if our representations, models, "posited objects", etc. don't somehow “mirror” - or even represent - nature or reality (or if we didn't have the noumenal grounding in the first place), then surely we have precisely nothing. Or as Ladyman and Ross put it (almost quoting Kant word-for-word):

“...there being such objects is a necessary condition for our empirical knowledge of the world.”

So, again, we may not mirror nature or things; though we must capture something. Then again, how can we represent - let alone mirror - something as strange as Kantian noumena? How would that work?

This is when structuralists say:

Yes, we capture structure.

Yet that response won't quite work because metaphysical realists believe they're capturing (if not mirroring) determinate reality. Structuralists may not think that; though structure is real. That's why Ladyman and Ross, for example, appear to make what can be seen as the obvious conclusion when they write:

“.... we shall argue that in the light of contemporary physics... that talk of unknowable intrinsic natures and individuals is idle and has no justified place in metaphysics. This is the sense in which our view is eliminative...”

One can conclude that because we can't get at things and reality in their pristine metaphysically-realist state: then, if that's a necessary truth, we may as well say that “structure is all there is”. This ties in nicely with the structuralist position that Kantian noumena may as well also drop out of the picture. Or, as Wittgenstein put it in his Philosophical Investigations (though about something else), things or noumena are

“wheels which can be turned though nothing else moves with them is not part of the mechanism”.

To put the case very simply, there's an argument which one can adopt here:

i) There are things and a determinate reality, though we can never access them as they are “in themselves”.

ii) And if we can't access reality and things as they are in themselves, then why not drop the notion of a determinate reality completely from the philosophical picture?

It can be said that ii) follows from i); though it can't also be said (strictly speaking) to logically follow from i).

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*) See my 'Some Arguments Against Analytic Metaphysics: Realism (2)'.

On Definitions of 'Consciousness': Merriam-Webster Dictionary (3)

“Consciousness. 1 a: the state or fact of being conscious of an external object, state, or fact.”

The definition above gives what philosophers call “intentionality” a key role within consciousness. Intentionality is basically about how consciousness is directed outwards towards external objects, events, etc.; or inwards towards mental states, emotions, images, thoughts, etc. (Intentionality can also be called directedness or aboutness.)

As you can see, this definition may be seen as a characterisation of a property of consciousness; rather than a characterisation of consciousness itself. Despite that, we can solve that problem by saying the following:

The very awareness of external objects, etc. constitutes consciousness.

This means that instead of “predicates of consciousness”, we have a partial “is of identity” here:

intentionality = (or is partly constitutive of) consciousness

Nonetheless, some philosophers may see this distinction between consciousness and its properties/functions as being bogus. It may not make much sense to characterise consciousness other than by mentioning its various properties. Daniel Dennett, for example, also takes a parallel (see my 'On Definitions of “Consciousness”: Dennett and Others') position in that he argues that consciousness simply is the set of properties (e.g., functions, processes, behaviour, overt speech, etc.) which we call 'consciousness'.

In opposition to that view we have those philosophers who stress consciousness “as it is in itself”. They talk about “qualia”, “phenomenal properties”, “what it is like”, etc. However, can't these things also be seen as properties of consciousness rather than being consciousness itself? Again, perhaps this simply shows us that we're searching for a ghost (“in the machine”?) when we discount all these so-called properties of consciousness. That is, we may be treating consciousness as what philosophers once called a “substance” (or, perhaps, a Kantian noumenon).

In any case, there's a contemporary position on this debate that's worth mentioning here. This is the position called “phenomenal intentionality”. Here is a broad account of this position:

“While many contemporary theories of intentionality attempt to account for intentionality in terms of causal relations, informational relations, functional roles, or other 'naturalistic' ingredients, PIT aims to account for it in terms of phenomenal consciousness, the felt, subjective, or 'what it’s like' (Nagel 1974) aspect of mental life.”

Even here I suspect that all we have is old philosophical ground which has been re-christened with a neologism (or Derrida's 'sign-substitution') – i.e., “phenomenal intentionality”. Nonetheless, that doesn't stop it from being old ground with a (slightly) new emphasis.

“1 b : the quality or state of being aware especially of something within oneself.”

The notion of intentionally is continued in this part of the Merriam-Webster definition.

In this case it's said that consciousness is “being aware especially of something within oneself”. This can be deemed to be internal intentionality in that this “something” is “within oneself”. In other words, there's no reference here to external objects/events/conditions/facts/etc.; or even to any mental “representations” of external things.

It can also be argued here that these are higher-order descriptions of mental states which incorporate both a notion of a self and what's called self-consciousness. In addition, a human subject can be conscious of an external object (or an internal thought/emotion) and also be aware that he or she is so.

In this case, self-consciousness needn't necessarily about a self as a “substance”. In David Hume's book, for example, the self is simply whatever occurs within a person's mind or what "runs through" his or her consciousness (i.e., as long as there's some kind of “awareness” of what runs through the consciousness).

It can be said that most animals don't have this higher-order capacity. Nonetheless, do human animals always need to be aware (however that word is cashed out) of their consciousness of an external objects and internal states? Or are these things higher-level additions to consciousness?

“2: the state of being characterized by sensation, emotion, volition, and thought.”

This part of the Merriam-Webster definition appears - on the surface - to bring on board what philosophers call qualia. Or, at the least, it adds sensations and “how things feel” into the pot. In opposition to the intentionality mentioned above, there's no reference here to external objects, states or facts. Nonetheless, when a human subject is conscious of such things, then that may also include sensations, emotions, etc. However, such mental states or properties aren't themselves representations of – or about - objects, states or facts; and neither are they, strictly speaking, thoughts.

Thus when one is conscious of the flowers in a garden, one will also be aware of all the colours and smells of those flowers. The colours and smells are (as it were) over and above the flowers in the garden. And just as flowers have the properties of colour and smell, so one's consciousness of those flowers will made up of sensory properties (or qualia). However, various kinds of philosopher and scientist (from idealists to realists) may question that bifurcation between the properties of flowers and the properties of those consciousness states which are of (or about) the flowers. This has been called “the phenomenological fallacy”. (There is also a parallel - ontological - question about the bifurcation between properties and the objects which have properties.)

In addition, that consciousness of a flower garden may be accompanied by an emotion; which is also above and beyond the conscious representation itself.  Therefore what are called the “intentional objects” of consciousness (flowers in this case) are fused with emotions or feels; which can themselves be described as - or broken down into - qualia.

This total package-deal of consciousness is the subject of part 3 of this definition:

“3: the totality of conscious states of an individual.”

Here it can said that even though conscious states (or a single conscious state) can be broken down phenomenologically, they can still be regarded as as wholes. In addition, perhaps it hardly makes sense to speak of a single mental state. This means that just as every part of a single mental state makes up a seamless whole; so each mental state is hardly distinguishable form both previous and forthcoming mental states. However, in terms of a philosophical (or phenomenological) analysis, it is indeed possible to break mental states down. This is done when a philosopher (as it were) circumscribes a single mental state and then describes – in words – what's often called (by philosophers) its “content”.

On Definitions of 'Consciousness': Dennett and Others (2)

The first thing that many people may say about Daniel Dennett's definition/s of the word 'consciousness' (or what he takes consciousness to be) is that he doesn't define the word at all. He either tells us what it's not or talks about something else entirely: things like functions, brain processes, behavior, "verbal reports", evolution, engineering, and the like.

However, Dennett (as a “scientistic” Rylean) has much support for his position in neuroscience and science generally.

For example, here's Alexander Luria (in Consciousness and Self-Regulation) also arguably and paradoxically ignoring what it is he's talking about. Thus:

“Modern views... regard human conscious activity as consisting of a number of components. These include the reception and processing (recoding) of information, with the selection of its most important elements and retention of the experience thus gained in the memory...”

Of course if someone argues that Luria is ignoring consciousness in the above, isn't that simply to beg the question? The assumption here is that consciousness is something over and above the “reception and processing (recoding) of information”, etc. Who says so? There are philosophers and even psychologists who say so. Here's the American psychologist Ulric Neisser (in his Cognition and Reality):

“The treatment of consciousness as a processing stage is unsatisfactory in a still more fundamental way. It does justice neither to the usages of the word 'consciousness' in ordinary discourse nor to the subtleties of experience.”

Despite that, the assumption (if that's what it is) that functions, processing, behaviour, etc. aren't examples of consciousness (or even consciousness itself) needs to be defended. Indeed we can indulge in some sceptical psychologising here and quote Dennett himself (as found in John Horgan's The End of Science). According to Dennett, “mysterians” really “don't want consciousness to fall to science”. What's more,

“They like the idea that this is off-limits to science. Nothing else could explain why they welcome such slipshod arguments.”

And here's another definition of 'consciousness' – by the neuroscientists Robert Thatcher and Erwin Roy John (in their Foundations of Cognitive Processes) - which Dennett would approve of. (Or, at the least, he'd approve of the spirit of the definition, if not every letter.) Thus:

“Consciousness is a process in which information about multiple individual modalities of sensation and perception is combined into a unified multidimensional representation of the state of the system and its environment, and integrated with information about memories and the needs of the organism, generating emotional reactions and programs of behavior to adjust the organism to its environment. The content of consciousness is the momentary constellation of these different types of information.”

Indeed the thesis that “multiple individual modalities of sensation and perception” which are “integrated” into a “momentary constellation” is very much in tandem with Dennett. Consciousness, to Dennett, is what happens when it “all comes together”. Yes, there's no “place where it all comes together”.

Bernard Baars (in his A cognitive theory of consciousness) also argues that

“consciousness as a set of messages posted on a large blackboard for all cognitive subsystems to read”.

It's true that there are problems with these kinds of definition. For example, Alvin Goldman (in his paper 'Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science') writes:

“We can easily conceive of a (nonhuman) system in which informative representations are distributed to all subsystems yet those representations are totally devoid of phenomenal awareness.”

We can also say that this passage doesn't tell us about consciousness itself either. It does tell us that we could have a “system” which is functionally very like a human subject, yet which doesn't have consciousness. It is, in fact, a take on the question: Why is there consciousness at all? Thus, in our context, it's beside the point. Indeed we can say that Baars, Dennett, etc. are simply changing the subject. What's more, they may be evading the issue entirely. Goldman seems to agree with this position. Or, at the least, he puts this position when he says that his own

“discussion strongly suggests that only the phenomenal notion of consciousness is the one intended in common usage”.

To get back to Dennett's ostensibly negative definitions of the word 'consciousness'. We can say that defenders of consciousness (or qualia) also often tell us what consciousness isn't, not what it is. For example, Thomas Nagel (in his well-known 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?') writes:

“It is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states, since they could be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though they experienced nothing.”

A Dennettian could of course reply:

Who says that consciousness “is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states”? Indeed I can say that even if I also believe that it's indeed the case that “they could be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though they experienced nothing”.

So is Nagel also begging the question here? Simply because robots or zombies can be described functionally (also intentionally?), that doesn't automatically mean that human consciousness can't be so described. For one, perhaps biological (or human) functionality (as with John Searle) is simply different to non-biological functionality. And even if it is the same, the fact that robots or zombies can also be described functionally doesn't automatically mean that consciousness isn't a matter of functions, processes, behaviour/action, systems and whatnot.

George Rey, along with Nagel, also tells us (in his paper 'A Question about Consciousness') what consciousness can't be. Thus:

“... whatever consciousness turns out to be, it will need to be distinguished from the thought processes we ascribe on the basis of rational regularities.”

This seems to be an even more extreme position than the functionalist one just discussed in that thought itself (i.e., not only “the content of thought”) is rejected as being a possible component of consciousness.

Here again we have a negative take on consciousness when David M. Rosenthal (in his paper 'A Theory of Consciousness') tells us that “[w]e cannot explain consciousness in terms of what is not mental”. Then he trumps this by concluding that “explaining consciousness in terms of conscious states will be trivial and uninformative”! This sounds like another hint at Kantian noumena; or, perhaps, a hint at “intrinsic [phenomenal] properties” - the inexplicable, unanalysable and primitive!

Alvin Goldman recognises this problem of defining consciousness in terms of what it's not. He writes (in the paper already quoted) about three such positions:

“Each [position] tries to explain the consciousness of a state in terms of some relation it bears to other events or states of the system: (1) its expressibility in verbal behaviour, (2) the transmission of its content to other states or locations in the system, or (3) a higher-order state which reflects the target state.”

(1) to (3) are opposed to

“[o]ur ordinary understanding of awareness or consciousness seems to reside in features that conscious states have in themselves, not in relations they bear to other states”.

Indeed Goldman goes one step further (though he's stating Ned Block's position here) and says that

“at least one sense of 'consciousness' refers to an intrinsic (rather than a relational) property, called phenomenal consciousness”.

Again, wouldn't Dennett say that consciousness is (at least partly) “expressibility in verbal behaviour”, “the transmission of its content to other states or locations in the system” and so on?

In addition, what does it mean to talk about the “features” which “conscious states have in themselves”? This makes such features sound (again) like noumena. And if they are noumena, then perhaps a Dennettian may say: No wonder we can't say much - or anything - about them! What is it for a feature of a conscious state to be “intrinsic”, rather than “relational”? Can we so much as grasp that distinction or those terms?

To get back to Dennett himself.

Take his well-known and often-repeated claim that “there is no single central place (a Cartesian Theater) where conscious experience occurs”. Now, obviously, that's not a definition of consciousness. It doesn't tell us what consciousness is either. Instead it tells us where conscious experience doesn't occur. Thus isn't consciousness simply assumed in this part of Dennett's definition?

An addition to the “multiple drafts” explanation is more helpful. Dennett tells us that there are "various events of content-fixation occurring in various places at various times in the brain". This may mean that consciousness amounts to these “various events” whose “content-fixation occurring in various places at various times in the brain”. However, the question still remains:

What are these various events? Are they constitutive of consciousness?

If so, does that mean that these brain events are consciousness? Or do they simply underpin consciousness? If this is all about brain events, processes, functions, behaviour, etc., then many would argue that Dennett simply isn't talking about consciousness. He's talking about, well, brain events, functions... Nonetheless, A Dennettian may simply reply by saying that such people are – again! - simply begging the question against his position. That is:

Why are you simply assuming that brain-events, functions, processes, behaviour/action, etc. can't be – or aren't – constitutive (or examples) of consciousness?

On Definitions of 'Consciousness': Introduction (1)

There have been countless definitions of the word 'consciousness'. Indeed there have also been hundreds of books on consciousness. It's a debate that's hot and trendy. However, it's also often pointless. The main reason for this is that people are nearly always talking about different things when they talk about consciousness. More relevantly, they define the word 'consciousness' in very different ways. Moreover, many who talk or write about consciousness never actually get around to defining the word 'consciousness' at all. True, they may have their own tacit or unexpressed pet definitions deep within their minds; though they never explicate or articulate such definitions precisely or in any detail.

As a result of all this, perhaps it would be wise to adopt a deflationary view of the word 'consciousness'. That's what the English philosopher Kathleen Wilkes did when she wrote that

"perhaps 'consciousness' is best seen as a sort of dummy-term like 'thing', useful for the flexibility that is assured by its lack of specific content".

We can agree with Wilkes and also see the word 'consciousness' as a bundle-term. It is so because it has so many meanings, definitions and connotations.

Though if the word 'consciousness' is indeed a dummy- or bundle-term, then surely spending any time on definitions may seem a little pointless. Then again, in the case of Wilkes' other example of the word 'thing',  if we can even define that word to some degree of approximation and detail, then surely we can do the same with 'consciousness'.

The psychologists James Ward and Alexander Bain (writing at the end of the 19th century and as quoted by Edward Titchener) took a strong line against the ostensible liberalism (or pluralism) of people like Kathleen Wilkes. Ward and Bain believed that it's precisely the fact that the word 'consciousness' is a dummy- or bundle-term that traps us in the mud. They wrote:

“'Consciousness' is the vaguest, most protean, and most treacherous of psychological terms.”

With words like that, one can see how it didn't take long for behaviorism to take up its hegemonic position in psychology and philosophy in the 1920s and beyond.

In addition, judging by Professor Ward's use of the word 'protean', one can also conclude that not only did he believe the word 'consciousness' to be vague, he also believed that it could be made to mean what any writer, philosopher or layperson wanted it to mean. (Think here of the “spiritual” uses of the word 'consciousness'.)

Thus, as a result of all this, William James (writing at roughly the same time as Ward), didn't offer his readers a single definition of the word 'consciousness' in his well-known book Principles of Psychology.

Thus, in 1913, John B. Watson had this to say (in his paper 'Psychology as the Behaviorist Views it'):

“The time seems to have come when psychology must discard all references to consciousness... This suggested elimination of states of consciousness as proper objects of investigation in themselves will remove the barrier from psychology which exists between it and the other sciences.”

Of course Watson wasn't that concerned with the definitions of the word 'consciousness'. Instead he had a problem with consciousness itself. That problem was its non-scientific status (or even its metaphysical reality). However, there's a connection here. Perhaps the definitions of the word 'consciousness' are both so multifarious and vague precisely because of the non-scientific (i.e., private) nature of consciousness. If consciousness were as intersubjective a phenomenon as a cat or a neuron, then we wouldn't have such many multifarious and vague definitions.

Now let's move forward to the late 20th century.

We can also say that the spirit (if not the letter) of behaviourism was revived by eliminative materialists.

On the one hand, behaviourists didn't necessarily claim that consciousness isn't a feature of the human mind; they simply believed it to be non-scientific. Some/all eliminitive materialists (or at least Patricia Churchland), on the other hand, believe that “consciousness [might] go the way of 'caloric fluid' or 'vital spirit'”. Thus some people may think that eliminitive materialists simply want to eliminate “propositional attitudes” and the “folk psychology” which has partly been built on them. However, they may want to eliminate consciousness (or at least references to 'consciousness') in the long run too.

This would also explain why definitions of 'consciousness' are so vague and multifarious. Indeed, if consciousness doesn't so much as exist (at least as it's seen by many people), then of course the definitions of it will be vague and multifarious!

What Consciousness Does/Seems

One major problem with definitions of consciousness is that many philosophers, scientists or laypersons often fixate on what may only be a single aspect (though sometimes aspects) of consciousness and then go on to more or less ignore – or even deny – the rest. This is one reason why we have a vast of amount of sexy, titillating and pseudo-scientific theories of consciousness. That is, the philosopher, scientist or layperson overplays his angle on consciousness seemingly without realising that it may simply be precisely that: a single aspect.

In extremely broad terms, this can be seen in the debate between those who say that “consciousness is what consciousness does” and those who say that “consciousness is how consciousness seems”.

For example, arguably it can be said that the philosopher David M. Rosenthal is concerned with how consciousness seems when he writes (in his paper 'A Theory of Consciousness') the following:

“Intentional and sensory properties constitute the most likely candidate [for a definition of 'consciousness']; all mental states have one or the the other.”

Of course it can be seen that there's a small fusion here. After all, doesn't the intentional have an impact on what consciousness does? Indeed the same can even be said about “sensory properties”. Don't sensory properties (or even qualia) carry information? And if that's the case, then sensory information can result in a person doing x rather than y.

Jerry Fodor has also made this point (in a review of Colin McGinn's The Problem of Consciousness) when he wrote the following:

“It used to be universally taken for granted that the problem about consciousness and the problem about intentionality are intrinsically linked: that thought is ipso facto conscious, and that consciousness is ipso facto consciousness of some or other intentional object... concentrating on intentionality and ignoring consciousness - has proved a remarkably successful research strategy so far.”

On the other hand, John Searle (in his The Rediscovery of the Mind) connects intentionality to consciousness. Thus:

"Only a being that could have conscious intentional states could have intentional states at all, and every unconscious intentional state is at least potentially conscious... [T]here's a conceptual connection between consciousness and intentionality that has the consequence that a complete theory of intentionality requires an account of consciousness.”

Rosenthal connects the dots too. He writes:

“Of course many mental phenomena, such as perceptual states and emotions, have both kinds of property [the “sensory” and “intentional”]; but other mental states exhibit only one of the two.”

As for the former position (i.e., “consciousness is what consciousness does”), this will elicit causal, functional, computational, evolutionary, neuroscientific, etc. definitions of the word 'consciousness'.

It's quite easy for the defenders of the former position to pay little - or even no - attention to the latter... and vice versa. Thus, immediately, we have definitions of the word 'consciousness' which seem to be about different things. And perhaps that's because they are about different things!

We can say, instead, that definitions of consciousness should include both what consciousness does and how conscious seems. Except, of course, that we'll then be in danger of supplying definitions which are far too long or detailed. In addition, some believers in the idea that consciousness is what consciousness does reject the phenomenal (or, say, qualia) outright – or see it as having little importance (at least to science). Similarly, those people who stress experience, subjectivity, qualia, “what it is like”, etc. may underplay what consciousness does; though, in this case at least, they're highly unlikely to ignore (or reject) the functional, neuroscientific, etc. aspects of consciousness.

*) To follow: 'On  Definitions of 'Consciousness': Examples (2)'.