When
one first comes across a description of an “observation sentence”,
it would seem, prima facie, that such a thing doesn't exist.
How
does Quine describe them? In the following way:
“...
a sentence is an observation sentence if all verdicts on it depend on
present sensory stimulation and on no stored information beyond what
goes into understanding the sentence.” (From
Quine's 1969 paper 'Epistemology
naturalised'.)
Firstly,
there are indeed sentences which we utter that do depend on “present
sensory stimulation”. They also depend on “stored information”.
For
a start, they require the stored information about the meaning of
words and our memories (amongst many other things).
However,
Quine does qualify his definition by the final clause: “beyond what
goes into understanding the sentence”.
That
means that the two things I mentioned (i.e., knowledge of the
meanings of words and memories of, say, the objects and events in the
observation) can be classed as “what goes into understanding the
sentence”.
So
even though these things are included in a Quinian observation
sentence, it's still nonetheless the case that the sentence is about
a current observation. (It's about what a person is a present
experiencing or observing.) Yes, other things are needed in order to
understand the sentence (things which came well before the
observation). However, that doesn't stop the sentence - or what we
utter - being an observation sentence if the content of that
sentence is only about a present observation.
(This
isn't that unlike Kant's acknowledgement that even the knowledge of a
priori statements requires the experience of what words mean,
etc. - and that's obviously, in Kant's terms, a posteriori
knowledge.)
The
sentence
“There
is a rabbit running before me.”
is
about a current observation. Nonetheless, I require previous
knowledge in order to make such a statement. Still, the sentence
isn't about that past knowledge (or those past memories or
experiences). The sentence is about the rabbit. The past knowledge is
simply required to make the statement and understand the observation.
It's not the subject of the sentence.
Quine
himself talks in terms of “stored information”. He writes:
“The
very fact that we have learned the language evinces much storing of
information, and of information without which we should be in no
position to give verdicts on sentences however observational.”
(298)
Quine
stresses his position on observation sentences by writing:
“...
an observation sentence is one on which all speakers of the language
give the same verdict when given the same concurrent stimulation.”
(298)
All
that accepted, there can still be an argument against Quinian
observation sentences. Indeed don't Quine's various arguments for
holism automatically work against the existence of genuine
observation sentences?
Why
Observation Sentences?
The
naturalistic or scientific bonus of observation sentences – at
least according to Quine - is their inter-subjective nature.
(Therefore their scientific nature.) In other words, we've moved
beyond the first-person pronoun of
the aprioristic epistemologist.
As
Quine puts it:
“....
the observation sentences are the sentences on which all members of
the community will agree under uniform stimulation.” (299)
If
inter-subjectivity is stressed, then we must also have moved beyond
experiences, sense-data (in the old style) and other personal mental
happenings and be focusing instead on the world (or on objects and
events in the world). The very fact that there's an element of
communal agreement involved when it comes to observation sentences
(with a stress on the word “observation”) means that “subjective
sensory states” become less relevant or not relevant at all.
Quine
put it this way:
“The
old tendency to associate observation sentences with a subjective
sensory subject matter is rather ironic when we reflect that
observation sentences area also meant to be the intersubjective
tribunal of scientific hypotheses.” (299)
This
alone seems to lead immediately to not only naturalism; but perhaps
also to some form of externalism.
Rabbits
- rather the experiences of rabbits - are now given priority. (Or at
least it seems that way.) Of course the Cartesian/internalist arrived
at rabbits via his experience of rabbits. However, the Quinian still
arrives at rabbits from communal agreement on the experience
of rabbits. So the experiences of rabbits must still be part of the
story. It can be said that we've moved to what Roger Scruton calls
(if in a different context) a “first
person plural” in that it's the grand “we” that
determines the nature of rabbits. No single mind can find the truth
on rabbits by doing, say, some kind of Cartesian (or Husserlian)
reduction.
Clearly
we've moved a long way beyond the “Cartesian subject” here. Yet
the Cartesian subject ruled epistemology from Descartes (17th
century) to the 20th
century.
No comments:
Post a Comment