At first I simply responded to a
post by Sufian Moin which presented Asadullah Ali al-Andalusi's
argument. Later, Andalusi himself joined in the discussion and
defended his position.
Asadullah
Ali al-Andalusi is described (in The
Andalusian Project) in this way:
“Asadullah
Ali al-Andalusi is an international speaker for the Muslim Debate
Initiative and Intellectual Wisdom Malaysia on the subject of Islamic
thought and civilization. He holds a B.A. in Western Philosophy, an
M.A. in Islamic Philosophy, Ethics, and Contemporary Issues, and is
currently pursuing his PhD on the topic of the misapplications of
Shariah Law in the modern world. He has lectured primarily on the
phenomenon of contemporary atheism and has pioneered new arguments
against atheists’ central tenets and beliefs. He also specializes
in topics related to the philosophy of science, Islamic political
thought, Liberalism, terrorism, and other issues regarding the
current struggles of the global Muslim community.”
In
terms of the specifics of the debate on naturalism, atheism and theism,
Andalusi can be seen and heard discussing these issues in his
'Understanding
Atheism' videos.
Introduction
Sufian Moin presents Asadullah Ali al-Andalusi's argument in the following way:
“A
supposedly new argument that makes theism rational and renders
naturalism false has been formulated by a Muslim philosopher whose
name is Asadullah Ali Al-Andalusi. This is his argument:
P1)
If meaning (and explanation) can only be derived from the natural
world, then all conceptions of reality are derived from the natural
world
P2)
If all conceptions of reality are derived from the natural world,
then they must be a coherence of meaningful experiences
P3)
People believe that there is a meaningful transcendental reality
(God) that shares no properties with the natural world
P4)
“If P1 and 2, then P3 is a conception of reality derived from the
natural world, which content is a coherence of meaningful experiences
P5)
“No number of meaningful experiences can direct one to consider the
possibility of something meaningful beyond said experiences
C)
“Therefore, P3 is not a conception of reality derived from the
natural world
“This
argument was presented in a lecture series that Asadullah gave in
Malaysia...”
Sufian
Moin goes into more detail by explaining the above in this way:
“P1
and P2 simply state the naturalistic worldview. 'Coherence of
meaningful experiences" simply means meaningful experiences that
are logically consistent. An example of a "non meaningful
experience" is that of a round square, or a married bachelor.
“P3
just states a belief people hold (note: the argument is not arguing
for the existence of God, so there is no presupposition here).
“P4
follows from P1 and P2.”
Naturalist/Empiricist
Combinatorialism
Combinatorialism
is usually seen as a philosophical position which refers to the
combination of universals or elements/parts (e.g., resulting in a
possible - rather than an actual – molecule). In other words, it's
not usually taken to be about the combination of different
experiences or different concepts (as in Andalusi's argument).
However, it can indeed be applied to – or used in – this
discussion.
So
what does it mean to “imagine” the possibilities in Andalusi's
argument? When people imagine such things, what, exactly, are they
imagining?
When
Andalusi says that the
that means virtually nothing until I know what it is he's imagining and why he takes it to be an imagination of something real/actual and not simply an imaginative act.
“mind is capable of imagining and conceiving of possibilities that the external world does not offer through direct experience”
that means virtually nothing until I know what it is he's imagining and why he takes it to be an imagination of something real/actual and not simply an imaginative act.
Al-Andalusi
says that “the mind is not constrained by concepts”; and yet he
doesn't explain what that means. It's simply a statement as it stands
and there's no reason for anyone to accept it. (It is like me
saying “the body moves beyond the physical” and leaving it at
that.)
In
any case, there are naturalist (as well as plain old empiricist)
explanations of the “mind [being] capable of imagining and
conceiving of possibilities that the external world does not offer
through direct experience”. The fact is, the mind doesn't really
move beyond experience in these instances (though it may in others).
It simply plays with experiences and juxtaposes them to create
something that doesn't itself exist in experience.
All
sorts of philosophers have tackled this issue.
Take D.M. Armstrong's paper 'The Nature of Possibility' (1986). He sums of what happens with a single word: 'combinatorialism'.
Take D.M. Armstrong's paper 'The Nature of Possibility' (1986). He sums of what happens with a single word: 'combinatorialism'.
He
states, for example, that “all mere possibilities are
recombinations of actual elements”.
However,
I don't need to rely on this naturalist or empiricist position. My
questions come before that. These are the questions:
i)
What does it mean to imagine Allah existing in a place beyond time
and space?
ii)
What constitutes that act of imagination? Was it its content? What
is being imagined?
The
basic fact is that Allah and a place beyond time and space may not be
imagined in the first place. Some x's are imagined, sure;
though there's absolutely no reason to believe that what's imagined
are actually Allah and a place beyond time and space.
Simply
repeating the mantra that the “mind [being] capable of imagining
and conceiving of possibilities that the external world” doesn't
get us anywhere.
Andalusi
himself expresses a perceived limitation with the combinatorialist
position:
“The
idea of something being 'beyond' is not the result of direct
experience from the natural world -- rather it is a projection.”
If by "going beyond" Andalusi means that such composite entities don't
actually exist, then that's correct. However, what makes up the
composites aren't beyond anything. The composite is exactly
that. Indeed the word 'composite' itself suggests that it doesn't
actually exist in the natural world (or perhaps anywhere else).
Empiricists
or naturalists have no reason to reject composites or
combinatorialism.
Conceiving Allah in a Place Beyond Time and Space?
Sufian
Moin explains Andalusi's argument by stating the following:
“It's
P5 that Asadullah really defends. Imagine you're a fish in a fish
tank. Can you, with your little fish brain, come up a concept of the
universe as we humans have?”
The
fish analogy doesn't work because fish probably don't think at all.
Or, at the very least, they have no imaginative capacities.
Human beings do have imaginative capacities: hence the Ontological
Argument; which Andalusi's argument seems very indebted to.
We
don't need to apply a British Empiricist position to Andalusi's
argument. We can simply ask:
What
do you mean when you say you imagine Allah and his being beyond time
and space? What is it, exactly, that you imagine?
There's
no need to give Asadullah Ali al-Andalusi the benefit of the doubt.
That is, if we assume that he does imagine Allah and his being in a
'place' beyond time and space, then how do we account for that? Why
not simply say? -
He
doesn't imagine or conceive such things in the first place. Sure, he
conceives something. Though what he conceives is not an x outside time and space.
Now we
could say (if we wanted to) that what al-Andalusi conceives is
entirely determined by his experience. Though we don't even need to
go that far.
Andalusi
puts what he deems to be one aspect of the naturalist position:
“I
can't think of a better way to make it clearer, but the claim is in
effect like saying if my experiences determine everything I believe,
then I would never be wrong about what my experiences commit me to.”
In
Andalusi's case, experiences may well determine everything he both
believes and conceives. However, that doesn't stop him from being
committed to believing that he conceives of Allah and his
being in a place beyond time and space. What he conceives is a x and he takes that to be Allah existing outside time and space.
Andalusi
writes:
“....
we shouldn't be able to think of infinity or limitlessness, because
both these concepts do not exist in our surroundings.”
These
are all very familiar arguments.
Do
people really “think of infinity” or imagine it? What does that
mean, exactly? You can use the word “infinity” and even tackle the
notion or concept [infinity]. However, since this argument depends on
conceivability, I can ask the
questions I asked earlier.
Perhaps; though none of these things, strictly speaking, capture infinity; let along imagine it.
What does it mean to “think of infinity”? What are you thinking of? Are you thinking about George Cantor's statements, a set of equations, a visual image of vast space, etc.?
Perhaps; though none of these things, strictly speaking, capture infinity; let along imagine it.
In
terms of infinity as tackled in mathematics, this can't be what this
writer is talking about because that wouldn't deliver what he wants.
You can't get infinite space, (non-mathematical) infinity or
Allah out of mathematics alone.
And,
in a similar vain, he writes:
“We
can think of Allah being outside time and space (to an extent) and
being beyond merciful and beyond kind, et cetera.”
So
what was said about infinity applies to that statement as well.
What
does it mean to “think of Allah being outside time and space”? It
doesn't by definition mean that we do think of an actual Allah
and an actual 'place' (which word can I use?) outside time and space.
All we may be doing is simply using the words “I imagine Allah
outside time and space” and that's it! Just because we utter the
words that doesn't mean that something must match the words we utter.
I can
utter the words "round square". A round square is logically impossible; though
I still uttered those words. What about the words “I imagine Allah
outside of time and space”? That situation isn't logically
impossible (as such) – though that doesn't mean my words refer to
anything specific. And if they do refer to something, it may not be
to an x and that x's being outside of time and space.
Whatever goes on in this writer's (or mystic's) mind when he says he
can imagine “Allah outside time and space”, that doesn't mean
that he has literally imagined Allah and his being outside time and
space. His might have simply imagined what he deems to be Allah
outside time and space.
Andalusi
backs up his argument by saying:
“But,
responding to the contention, a unicorn is just a combination of
things that do exist in the real world.”
Yet
you could say more or less the same about the locution “I imagine
Allah outside time and space” as you would say about statements
which refer to unicorns.
One,
that imaginative act may indeed include things which “do exist in
the real world”. Anything over and above that (such as a place or
an existence outside time and space) isn't imagined at all – it's
only spoken about. Either that, or some proxy is imagined instead.
My
point is blatantly simple:
People may believe that they do so; though believing that you do x doesn't mean that you do x. That is, no one conceives or imagines Allah beyond time and space. That which they do imagine will be proxies for Allah and a place beyond time and space. And those proxies may well be derived from their experiences of the natural world.
It may be that no one “travels beyond the limits of the external world”.
People may believe that they do so; though believing that you do x doesn't mean that you do x. That is, no one conceives or imagines Allah beyond time and space. That which they do imagine will be proxies for Allah and a place beyond time and space. And those proxies may well be derived from their experiences of the natural world.
This
isn't Andalusi's attempted proof of Allah's existence as such. If
anything, it's an attempted proof that we have knowledge of Allah and
Allah's existing beyond time and space – beyond the natural world.
Yet there's no such proof because it all depends on the assumption
that people do conceive of Allah 'in' a place beyond time and space.
It is that which must be tackled.
Conceiving Allah Beyond Time and Place?
Andalusi
now makes a distinction between the words 'conceive' and 'imagine' He
wrote:
“Let's
not reduce my argument to only one of the terms I used:
'imagination'. I also used the word 'conceive'.”
They
may not be synonyms. However, everything that's been said about
Andalusi's use of the word 'imagination' can also be applied to his
use of the word 'conceive'. Exactly the same problems arise.
Despite
that, Andalusi explains the distinctions which can be made between
conceiving and imagining. He writes:
“Imagination
is the the result of experiences and the minds ability to mold them
into different forms or to conclude connections between them. It
takes two to tango in this regard. Conception is more abstract and
doesn't require external experiences at all.”
Nonetheless,
imagination may still be required to juxtapose or 'tango' with one's
'conceptions'. If conceptions (does Andalusi mean concepts?)
are abstract entities, it will still require the imagination to
juxtapose or use them. And Allah and a place outside of space and
time aren't deemed to be abstract entities or concepts themselves.
Terms
used in the Argument
Now
I'll make some very short points about the (philosophical) terms Andalusi uses in his argument.
So
let's take each premise one at a time:
P1)
“If meaning (and explanation) can only be derived from the natural
world, then all conceptions of reality are derived from the natural
world.”
Meaning
isn't derived from the natural world. I believe that Andalusi means
significance (at least in this context) when he uses the word
'meaning'. However, let's take it that he's using these words as
(near)synonyms.
Conceptions
of reality aren't only derived from the natural world – they are
applied to it. Though conceptions themselves can be seen as being
part of the natural world.
What
is meant by 'conceptions' anyway? Here again I believe that Andalusi
means concepts by 'conceptions'. Concepts can be seen as
abstract entities or mental items. Conceptions are usually seen as
the result of mental acts. For example, you can form a conception of
the concept [liberty] or [truth].
P2)
“If
all conceptions of reality are derived from the natural world, then
they must be a coherence of meaningful experiences.”
Again,
does Andalusi mean significant experiences when he says
“meaningful experiences”? What does he mean by “meaningful
experiences” anyway? Is Andalusi doing ethics or theology or is he
talking about the semantic content of experiences regardless of what
he calls 'meaningfulness'? (I think the former is the case.)
P3)
“People
believe that there is a meaningful transcendental reality (Allah) that
shares no properties with the natural world.”
Andalusi
uses the word 'believe' here. That is, he says that “people believe
that there is a meaningful transcendental reality....” He doesn't
say that “people conceive a meaningful transcendental
reality”. He's talking about people believing in a
“meaningful transcendental reality”.
I can
also add the Kantian point that if something is truly transcendent,
then it can't be either conceived or imagined. (As with Kant's
noumena; which are “beyond experience”.) I also believe
that Andalusi means transcendent when he says
'transcendental'. These two words have different meanings in
philosophy. For example, in Kant again, the transcendental concepts or categories of the mind determine what is transcendent.
More succinctly, things that are transcendent are beyond experience.
The transcendental in Kant, on the other hand, determines
experience; though, in other philosophies, it can determine or
delimit other spheres.
P4)
“If P1
and 2, then P3 is a conception of reality derived from the natural
world, which content is a coherence of meaningful experiences....
P5)
“No
number of meaningful experiences can direct one to consider the
possibility of something meaningful beyond said experiences
Therefore, P3 is not a conception of reality derived from the natural
world.”
If you
ignore all these philosophical and definitional problems, then of
course P5) follows from the rest. Yet you can't have a logical
argument if some of the language is confused or can't be accepted as
it stands. In other words, before you follow through from P1) to P5),
I believe that there's a bundle of assumptions and mistakes in
between. Indeed P1) only follows through to P5) if we don't see those
assumptions and mistakes.
So,
sure, if you ignore all that, then P5) "logically follows" from the
rest.
The
other thing that can be said is that Andalusi doesn't really have a
position on naturalism as such (in the above argument) other than to
hint that naturalism may well (or does) explain things up to the
point that
That could be an acceptance of naturalism up to Allah and the transcendent realm. Thus the argument isn't itself an alternative theory of naturalism.
“people believe that there is a meaningful transcendental reality (Allah) that shares no properties with the natural world”.
That could be an acceptance of naturalism up to Allah and the transcendent realm. Thus the argument isn't itself an alternative theory of naturalism.
Against
Scientism
Andalusi
says that his “main target is scientism”.
If the
main target is scientism, it would have helped if he had said that.
The original argument (of five
premises and a conclusion) doesn't (in itself) read like an
attack on scientism at all. It may be an implicit or tangential
attack on scientism; though the central thrust of the original post
is that we can move beyond the natural world. That is an
attack on naturalism. Unless, of course, Andalusi is using 'the words scientism and
'naturalism' as synonyms. (They aren't synonyms.)
Now we
have what amounts to Andalusi's definition of the scientistic stance:
“It is the belief that 'science is the only way to know anything' or in the very least that 'science is the most reliable form of knowledge about anything'.”
One
can happily believe that “science is the most reliable form of
knowledge about anything” without also believing “science is the
only way to know anything”. How can even hardcore scientists
believe the latter?
For
example, what about maths and logic? (Unless logic and maths are seen
as science.) What about knowledge of past events? The additional
point here is that all these modes of knowledge have naturalistic
explanations and will therefore be acceptable to 'scientistic'
philosophers and scientists.
I
would say that most scientists and even scientistic philosophers
would express their position this way:
Science
is the most reliable form of knowledge about "most things". However, science isn't “the only way to know
anything”.
Clearly,
if we paint our opponents as saying extreme things, then they will
seem extreme.
One
further argument offered by Andalusi - against what he calls
'scientism' - is this:
“....
the Verification principle, it became a full blown ideology that is
still expressed today among the lay masses and even scientists
themselves....”
The
“lay masses” certainly do not adhere to verficationism.
The reason for that is that it's a philosophical notion;
it doesn't belong to any kind of "folk theory" (as it were). So this
is like saying that the lay masses adhere to eliminative materialism
or to transcendental realism. Of course there may be some vague
analogies between what non-philosophers believe and verificationism;
though it can also be said that there are vague analogies between
anything and anything. Indeed even the scientists who accepted
verificationism will have needed to have done so explicitly. And I
doubt that there are any philosophers around today who do so.
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