i)
Possibilities as Ghosts
ii)
Natural Laws and Universals
iii)
Absolute Necessity & Natural Necessity
iv)
Why We Need Possible Worlds
v)
Possible Clintons & De Re/De Dicto Necessity
vi)
On Conventionalism
vii)
Ted Sider the Platonic Essentialist
viii)
Why is an Apple an Apple?
ix)
On David Armstrong’s Sparse Theory of Universals
x)
Universals as Sets
xi)
Nominalist Reformulations
xii)The
Conceptualist View of Universals
Possibilities
as Ghosts
Ted
Sider offers us an interesting argument against the existence (or
being or non-obtaining) of possibilities in certain ontologies.
Certain
philosophers believe that possibilities (such as unicorns or Tony
Blair’s being a serial killer) have some kind of being even though
they aren't actual. Are these possibilities ‘ghostly things’? Not
really. Because, in a sense, ghosts exist. They just have a ghostly
existence of, say, intangibility. Or, as Sider puts it:
“Rather
than making it the case that unicorns are possible, the existence of
a ghostly unicorn would just mean that ghostly things are actual.”
Is
Sider saying that a belief in the being of possibilities is also a
commitment to their actuality – even if that actuality is a
little ghostlike? Or is he saying that we shouldn’t see
possibilities as ghostlike entities at all?
How
should we see possibilities? In Sider’s words, “if possibilities
are not ghostly entities, then what are they?” (183). If
possibilities, such as Blair being a serial killer, are not ghostlike
or anything else, what are we talking about when we talk about them?
What is Tony Blair the serial killer or, for that matter, Pegasus or
even the round square?
Natural
Laws and Universals
We
can make sense of natural laws and their necessary nature by bringing
in universals.
Ted
Sider says that according to the universals theory “laws of nature
are from connections between universals” (188). Is there literally
a connection-universal between universals as they are
instantiated in individual particulars – whether objects or events?
We
will find, in addition, that the universals theory of the laws of
nature is essentially coached in terms of causality or the causal
forces of natural chemicals. Sider gives us an example of a chemical
law:
Methane
and oxygen must react to produce carbon dioxide and water.
This
means that methane, oxygen, carbon dioxide and water are treated as
(or are) universals. More specifically,
“these
universals are related to one another in such a way that any
instances of the first two [methane and oxygen] react to produce
instances of the second two [carbon dioxide and water]. In short: the
universals methane and oxygen necessitate the universals carbon
dioxide and water”. (188)
It's
clear that universals, on this account, are like (or simply are)
natural kinds. Or, again, perhaps natural kinds are universals. More
relevantly, it's said that certain universals, when found together,
will necessitate other universals. Thus we have a necessary causal
relation between universals as these universals are found in natural
kinds.
All
the above are examples of necessitation. However, they don't explain what
necessitation actually is. This is like Quine's case of explaining
analyticity by giving examples of analytic statements.
Sider
asks:
“What
does it mean to say that methane and oxygen ‘necessitate’ carbon
dioxide and water?”
We
can now ask:
How
do they necessitate? Why do they necessitate?
Absolute
Necessity & Natural Necessity
There's
a difference between natural necessity
and what Ted Sider calls absolute necessity.
Clearly, absolute necessity is stronger, as it were, than natural
necessity.
Interestingly,
we can say that “even violations of the laws of nature are
absolutely possible, for example” (191). Here again we have a
definition of necessity in terms of possibility. More accurately, we
can say that natural necessity isn't absolute necessity because it's
absolutely possible that natural necessity can be violated. In other
words, our natural laws could have been different. And if they were
different, perhaps a “dropped stone hovering in mid-air” is an
absolute possibility. However, a married bachelor or “a person who
is taller than himself” is an absolute impossibility.
Sider
then defines absolute necessity, again, in terms of possibility:
“The
only things that are absolutely necessary are things whose falsity is
not absolutely possible. It is absolutely necessary that all
bachelors are unmarried, and that it is raining if it is raining.”
(191)
(Wittgenstein’s
tautologies.) It's not possible for necessary things to be otherwise
or to be false. It's absolutely impossible for absolutely necessary
things to be otherwise or to be false. If you deny an absolute
necessity you get something that is logically contradictory; such as
a married bachelor or a male who is also female or someone who is
both 5ft 9 and 6ft 2.
Interestingly
enough, Sider seems to accept and take for granted a de re or
essentialist account of necessity. In other words, that bachelors are
unmarried has nothing to do with the analyticity of the
statement ‘All bachelors are unmarried’; or the fact that
‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are synonymous terms. Instead
a bachelor not being married man is necessarily a fact about the
world and not a fact about our language. Its truth is de re,
not de dicto. Surely if we say that “If it is raining it is
raining” that isn't a de dicto or analytic necessary truth.
It's a fact about the world. However, we would say that if someone
says
“If
it is raining, it is not raining.”
we
would simply say that he or she is misusing language; though not
necessarily misunderstanding the true nature of the world. However,
perhaps both misunderstandings can't be disconnected. We use language
because of the way the world is. And we can also say that the way we
understand the world (at least to some degree) is a product of our
language. These two realities of understanding the world can't be
disunited.
Why
We Need Possible Worlds
Ted
Sider talked earlier about possibilities being ‘ghostly entities’.
It's because philosophers thought of possibilities (as well as
necessities) this way that David Lewis took away the ghostly aspect
of possibilities and made them real (or gave them being) at possible
worlds. According to these possible worlds, our possibilities are
sometimes their actualities:
The
best thing about Lewis’s theory is that it thoroughly demystifies
absolute necessity and possibility. Lewis has no use for ghostly
possibilities. He firstly confines flying pigs and other
possibilities to their own possible worlds; so that they don't infest
ours. Then he removes their ghostly status by claiming that they are
just as real as the objects in our world.
We
certainly had a problem with defining and explaining possibility and
necessity without possible worlds. Where are they? Now, in a sense,
we can tell people where they are. Necessities and possibilities are
at possible worlds. Necessities are the case (or true) at all
possible worlds (or at least at the worlds to which they apply). And
possibilities are the case (or are true) at at least one world. Thus
necessities and possibilities are in some cases concrete and in
others abstract. Thus it's acceptable according to quantificational
logic, of which it can be seen as its extension. Perhaps we can now
also see modal logic as fully extensionalist – at least in
certain cases. What this means is that flying pigs and other
possibilities are real according to the worlds which contain them. To
our world, they are mere possibilities. According to the possible
worlds in which they exist, they are actualities.
To
reiterate. According to Sider's David Lewis,
“we
do have a reason to believe in his possible worlds: only by believing
in them can we demystify necessity and possibility” (193).
In
that case, Lewis might have argued that Hume and other empiricists
were right to have rejected necessities (and possibilities) – after
all, they didn't believe in (or know about) possible worlds. Without
possible worlds, necessity and possibility wouldn't have made any
sense.
Despite
all that, Sider still has his own qualms about possible worlds.
However, if they are seen as theoretical constructs or posits (as it
were), then we can see where Lewis is coming from. That is, “it is
sometimes reasonable to postulate things for theoretical reasons”
(193). For example, “no one has ever directly perceived an
electron”; though physicists “postulate electrons to explain the
results of the experiments they perform” (194). Of course, to Lewis
himself possible worlds aren't theoretical constructs – they are
real. To Lewis, in order to work and explain things, possible worlds
must have real existence; not just theoretical or even pragmatic
existence.
Possible
Clintons & De Re/De Dicto Necessity
The
concept [essence] is then directly broached by Ted Sider by thinking
in terms of possible Bill Clintons or of Bill Clinton’s
counterparts.
We
can change the nature of Clinton a lot. However, there are certain
things which we can't do to him (as it were). That is, we can't take
away what is essential to him. Sider writes:
“He
might have had electric blue hair. But now: could he have been a
flower?” (194)
Why
couldn’t Clinton have been a flower? I suppose it depends on what
or who Clinton actually is. What, or who, is Clinton? He’s a
politician. Surely Clinton would still be Clinton if he weren't a
politician. In fact, at this moment in time, for all I know, he may
not be a politician anymore. That wouldn’t mean that he has cased
to exist as a man or, indeed, as Bill Clinton. Ah! As a man. Could
Clinton be Clinton if he weren't a man? Possibly. Cut off his
bollocks and drain out his testosterone and see what we get. Perhaps
it’s what’s in his head that matters.
Must
he be a human being in order to be Clinton? Could a flower or a stone
be Clinton (or vice versa)? Clearly not. What about an elephant?
Again, it depends on what or who Clinton is. Either that, or it
depends on how we define Clinton (or that which Clintonizes).
Sider, however, settles for Clinton’s being a human being:
“In
short, Clinton could not have been anything other than a human being.
That is, it is an absolutely necessary truth that Bill Clinton is a
human being.” (195)
Why
couldn’t Clinton “have been anything other than a human being”
(195)? Why is it “an absolutely necessary truth that Bill Clinton
is a human being”?Sider gets his point across by rejecting the
analytic or de dicto account of necessity. For example,
“All
bachelors are unmarried.”
is
necessarily true because it is analytically true. This isn't the case
with
“Bill
Clinton is necessarily (or essentially) a human being.”
The
above isn't analytically true. As Sider explains:
“…
the sentence
‘Bill Clinton is a human being’ does not seem to be true by
definition, for unlike the word ‘bachelor’, which carried a
definition (unmarried male), the name ‘Bill Clinton’ has no
definition. It just stands for Bill Clinton. We all know that Bill
Clinton is a human being, but this isn’t built into the meaning of
the name ‘Bill Clinton’ by definition.” (195)
So
if
“Bill
Clinton is a human being.”
is
necessarily true, it's not true analytically. It's not true by
definition. The definition ‘human being’ is not built into the
proper name ‘Bill Clinton’. Indeed the name ‘Bill Clinton’,
according to Sider, doesn't have any definition (or sense!). So
either it's necessary that Clinton is a human being (non-analytically
necessary); or it's not necessary that Clinton is a human being. It
seems, intuitively, to be necessary in some way.
The
questions is, then: What kind of necessity would this be?
It
must be something about Clinton himself that makes it necessary that
he is a human being. That is, it is part of his essence that he's a
human being. He has the essential property: being a human being.
We
can also conclude (or infer) from this that if the name ‘Bill
Clinton’ has no definition (or sense), and thus can't be a part of
a necessarily true analytic statement, then the name ‘Bill Clinton’
must refer, instead, to Clinton’s essence. It must directly refer
to his essence; not indirectly via definitions, concepts, or Fregean
senses. It “just stands for Bill Clinton” the physical and
psychological being. It stands for a res, not a dicto.
On
Conventionalism
Ted
Sider then attacks conventionalism’s own attack on de re (as
it were) modalities.
He
argues that if we accept conventionalism, at least on this issue,
then we “demystify philosophy itself” (196), not just modality:
“If
conventionalism is true, philosophy turns into nothing more than an
inquiry into the definitions we humans give to words. By mystifying
necessity, the conventionalist demystifies philosophy itself.
Conventionalists are typically up front about this: they want to
reduce the significance of philosophy.” (196)
This
is strong stuff! Is conventionalism really that extreme? Is Sider’s
account of conventionalism fully correct? At first blast, this does
seem like a certain kind of conventionalism – viz., logical
positivism!
Do
conventionalists say that philosophy is “nothing more than any
inquiry into the definitions we humans give to words” (196)? Or do
they simply stress the importance of our words when it comes to
philosophy? In any case, surely to the conventionalist it's not just
a question of word-definition; but one also of our concepts. That is,
how do our concepts determine how we see or interpret the nature of
the world? If it were all just a question of word-definition, then
conventionalists would be nothing more than linguists or even
lexicographers.
Perhaps
conventionalists don’t give up on the world at all. They simply say
that our words and concepts, and indeed our definitions, are
important when it comes to our classifications, etc. of the world.
When
Sider writes that by “demystifying necessity, the conventionalist
demystifies philosophy itself” (196) he implies that philosophy is
nothing more than the study of necessity! In that case, it's no
wonder that the conventionalist “wants to reduce the significance
of philosophy” (196) if that's really the case. This seems to be a
thoroughly Platonic (or perhaps also partly Aristotelian) account of
philosophy in its obsession with necessity, and according to Sider
again (on the previous page), with essence. Is that really all that
philosophy is concerned with – essence and necessity? Again, this
was true of Plato, and to a lesser degree of Aristotle; but what
about 20th century philosophy? Indeed what about Hume and many other
pre-20th century philosophers?
Ted
Sider the Platonic Essentialist?
I've
just mentioned Ted Sider’s Platonic notion of philosophy’s role,
and now we can see yet more evidence of this.
What
is philosophy? Sider answers this question thus:
- it ‘investigates the essences of concepts’.
- It ‘seek[s] the essence of right and wrong’.
- It ‘seek[s] the essence of beauty’.
- It seek[s] the essence of knowledge’.
- It ‘seek[s] the essences of personal identity, free will, time, and so on’. (195)
Again,
Sider’s take on conventionalism seems thoroughly old-fashioned in
nature. However, his Platonist account of philosophy (or its role)
seems even more old-fashioned in nature. In fact it seems antiquated
and ancient.
Take
his view of aesthetics as just one example.
Sider
claims that aestheticians “seek the essence of beauty” (195).
Plato, his friend, searched for the essence of beauty; but I doubt
that many contemporary aestheticians would do so (except, perhaps,
philosophers like Roger Scruton).
Why
is an Apple an Apple?
We
may say that three red apples have nothing absolutely in common;
although they may well be similar. Thus, the nominalist concludes,
universals in this and all instances do not exist. These apples,
however, must have at least one thing in common. Not only that: the
nominalist, surely, must agree that they have one thing in common:
they are all apples. Even dissimilar apples would still be
dissimilar apples.
Now
we can also conclude “that they have in common the property being
an apple” (156). However, who says that they are all apples? The
nominalist will argue that all they actually share is the name
‘apple’ – nothing more. In addition, if they're all apples,
they must be so in virtue of properties other than the property being
an apple. The property being an apple is surely not enough
to share. They must be apples in virtue of other properties which
determine the fact that they are apples.
Perhaps
being an apple is a higher-order property under which fall
lower-order properties such as being red, having
chemical/molecular constitution X, being sweet, etc. In
other words, an apple wouldn’t be an apple if it weren’t for
these lower-order properties. Being an apple isn't enough.
Thus if we accept the property being an apple (indeed perhaps even if
the nominalist accepts this property), we must also accept other
lower-level properties and thus, perhaps, other universals.
In
terms of shared properties between entities of the same kind, Sider
gives us the electron as an example.
Again,
what do all electrons share in virtue of which they are all electrons
and thus all instantiate the universal electron or the
property being an electron? According to Sider:
“Physics
tells us that all electrons have exactly the same charge. So
according to physics the electrons have this property in common.”
(156)
There
is more to it than that. Because “all electrons have exactly the
same charge” (156), physics concludes that it “plays a basic role
in extremely well confirmed physical explanations of much of what
happens in the world” (156).
So
universals seem to come to the aid of elementary physics. More than
that: physics actually studies universals.
And
if an electron (or being an electron) is a universal, perhaps
the electric charge of each electron is also a universal – after
all, electrons must be more than their electric charge. In that case,
perhaps many universals constitute an electron! Alternatively, the
electrical charge of an electron may be its only essential property.
Thus even if electrons have other properties, these properties will
only be contingent in nature. If the electric charge of an electron
is its only essential property, then we can say:
electron
= electric charge X
That
is, an electron just is [an] electric charge (or charge X).
David
Armstrong’s Sparse Theory of Universals
It
can easily be seen that universals seem to proliferate indefinitely
in number. Especially if it's the case that there is a “different
universal every time there is some apparent difference in the way of
things” (169). So, according to David Armstrong, we need to cut
down the inhabitants in the world of universals. How does he do this?
–
“There
are no negative universals, such as not
being an apple and non-self-instantiation… David Armstrong,
a leading contemporary proponent of the sparse universals idea, holds
that only properties used in scientific explanations are genuine
universals.” (169)
For
a start, if there were negative universals, we would have one for
every (positive) universal. For example, not red(ness), not
happy, not being a book, etc. Clearly, predicates for some
of these negative properties already exist.
That
may mean that their universals already exist. Thus
not
happy = sad
not
tall = small
not
heavy = light
This
isn't the case for the negative properties not red or not
being an apple. Clearly there's no word for not being an
apple, etc.
If
negations can have universals, what about the negation of a negation,
such as not not being an apple or not not being a book?
However, perhaps we can say that
not
not being a book = being a book
not
not being an apple = being an apple
Are
double negations identical to positives in the world of universals?
Is
not
not being an apple = being an apple
the
same as
true
= not false?
Now
for another aspect of Armstrong’s sparse universals theory. He
argues “that only properties used in scientific explanations are
genuine universals” (169). So what about these questions? -
1)
What if science hasn't discovered certain properties yet?
2)
What if science has discovered a property which is a genuine
universal; though which it doesn’t accept as a genuine scientific
property?
3)
What if certain non-scientific properties are genuine universals even
if science doesn't accept them as genuine?
For
example, the properties/universals beauty, wisdom,
sexiness and even truth are certainly not scientific
predicates or properties. More to the point, hardly any, if any at
all, of Plato’s much-loved and discussed universals would be seen
as genuine scientific properties today. Yet it was Plato who
discovered (as it were) universals and past them down to Western
philosophy as a whole, including to David Armstrong.
Ted
Sider goes on to say that the notion of negative universals is
problematic as well; not just their existence. Some negative
predicates seem thoroughly acceptable. Other simply don't use the
negative particle ‘non’ or ‘not’. He writes:
“For
instance, the predicate ‘unoccupied space’ sounds very negative.
But what about ‘empty space’? That seems to mean the same thing,
without being at all clearly negative. And what about ‘pure space’?
That seems to mean the same thing again, while sounding positively
positive.” (169/70)
I
don’t think that these predicates are analogous or the same as not
being an apple and the rest. In the former case, we would
get
‘space’
– ‘non-space’
or
‘space’
– ‘not being space’
not
‘space’
– ‘unoccupied space’
or
Sider’s
‘space’
– ‘empty space’
They
don’t seem the same at all (not just because of the omission of the
particles ‘not’ and ‘non’); though we can indeed say that
‘unoccupied space’ and ‘empty space’ are negative in a
certain sense. They are negative without being negations. That is,
‘empty space’ is not a negation of ‘space’ and neither is
‘unoccupied space’. And ‘pure space’ certainly isn’t a
negation of ‘space’.
Sider
then makes a point similar to one already made. What if “there is a
fully legitimate science that turns out to be mistaken?” (170) In
that case we should ask if “predicates in a mistaken scientific
theory identify genuine universals” (170).
There
are more problems.
We
can argue that
“maybe
no current scientific predicate identifies a universal, because we
may not have any scientific theory that is entirely correct” (170).
The
problem for Armstrong is that it is only through science (or physics)
that he (or we) can identify the genuine universals. However, science
is always in a state of change. So perhaps we shouldn’t accept any
universals. Not because universals don’t exist; but because we
don’t know which are the genuine universals – at least not yet.
Universals
as Sets
Some
philosophers claim that universals are simply sets. That is, “each
universal is identical to a set of things” (172). More precisely,
the universal being red “is the set of things that are red”
(172).
Firstly,
in the case of certain universals, this would mean, effectively, that
universals are concrete or even extensional in nature. That is, if
the universal horse is the set of horses, and horses are
concrete, then the universal horse is itself concrete because it's
nothing more than the members which make up the set of horses.
This wouldn't work for abstract entities like numbers or properties
like being blue.
For
example, the set of numbers, if there is such a set, can't be
concrete and therefore the universal number (or numbers)
can't be concrete or even extensional.
What
about being red?
We've
already talked about the set of things that are red. We can
say that the things that are red may well be concrete. Is the
property itself, red, concrete or is it abstract? Perhaps if
the universal being red is the set of red things, and
if red things are both concrete and with the abstract property (i.e.
red), then the universal being red must be both concrete and
abstract if it's determined by the set of red things.
There
may be a problem with identifying universals with sets.
If
sets are all about membership, then what if a set has no members? It
becomes a member of the null set. That is, the set of
Devil-dealing Salem witches and the set phlogiston contain no
members. Thus both are actually members of the null set;
despite the different predicates ‘phlogiston’ and ‘Devil-dealing
Salem witches’.
If
we believe that universals aren't identical to sets, we can keep the
universals being a Devil-dealing Salem witch and being
phlogiston and maintain their differences even though there are
no Salem witches and there is no such thing as phlogiston. In the
case of sets, however, they were both null sets (or members of the
null set) and thus were indistinguishable.
Surely
they are distinguishable? As Sider asks: “how could there be just
one universal here?” (173). Even if there were no witches of Salem,
surely we can say that witches are very different from phlogiston!
And yet according to set theory, they both constitute the very same
class – the null class.
Nominalist
Reformulations
When
we say
“Blue
is a colour.”
we
appear to be referring to a thing or a property as it is in itself.
It's the subject-term of the sentence. ‘Blue’ is a noun – if an
abstract noun or an abstract singular term. Or, as the universalist
would put it: the sentence “seems to be about the universal being
blue” (175). Nominalists don’t like this sentence precisely
because it implies, or even entails, the existence of the universal
being blue. What do they prefer? This:
“Each
blue thing is a coloured thing.”
Here
the subject-term is not ‘blue’ but ‘blue thing’ (or ‘blue
things’). So the colour blue isn't as it were separated from all
blue things or itself the subject of the sentence. Instead we're
talking about things (say, cats or cups) that just happen to be blue.
Thus in terms of grammar, ‘blue’ is now an adjective; not a noun.
How
does this solve the problem of the reference to a universal? After
all, the words ‘blue’ and ‘coloured’ are still used, even if
only as adjectives. How does giving a word adjectival status stop it
from referring to a universal? Don’t adjectives like ‘blue’ and
‘coloured’ also refer to universals? Indeed aren’t the
properties being blue and being coloured both
instantiations of the universal blue and the universal colour
or coloured?
No
universalist ever said that universals can’t belong to other
objects which are themselves universals. The blue of a cat isn’t
any less of a universal because it's a property of a cat. Indeed
property-universals must belong to things – they are the properties
of other things.
So,
again, how does the reformulation get rid of reference to universals?
Sider
spots a similar problem with another nominalist reformulation. Take
this:
“Sloth
is a vice.”
Clearly
the subject-term could refer to the universal sloth or to
being slothful. Not only that: isn’t the word ‘vice’
also a reference to a universal? So what does the nominalist offer
us? This:
“Every
slothful thing is a vicious thing.”
How
can this be a reformulation if it doesn't refer to a thing or to
things at all? Its subject is sloth, not the slothfulness
of things. It's telling us that every slothful thing is a vicious
thing. There's no reference to things that are slothful at all in the
original. Even if it is not taken as a universal, the word ‘sloth’
in the former sentence is a reference to a property; it's not a
reference to things which have that property. What if every thing
died, would the property or universal sloth (or being
slothful) immediately cease to exist? Perhaps only God still
exists. Couldn’t He still say, to Himself, that ‘Sloth is a vice’
even though there would be no persons to actually be slothful?
Sider
spots his own problem with
“Every
slothful thing is a vicious thing.”
He
writes that this sentence “is not true”. It's not true because
“[s]omeone
who has the relatively minor vice of sloth may be otherwise so
virtuous that he or she is in no sense vicious” (176).
In
other words, sloth is a vice; though not every slothful thing is a
vicious thing. That is, sloth is just sloth; though a slothful thing
is more than being merely slothful – he may be otherwise virtuous.
Sloth must be a vice. Though even a slothful person is not, as it
were, a vice (or a ‘vicious thing’). Another way of putting this
is that vice, or even the predicate ‘vice’, can be attributed to
– or predicated of – sloth or the predicate ‘sloth’. However,
vice, or the predicate ‘vice’, cannot be attributed to – or
predicated of – every slothful thing because some slothful things
aren't vicious.
Sider
does offer another ‘paraphrase’:
“Every
slothful thing has at least one vice.”
Isn’t
that analytically true or true by definition? If something is
slothful, and sloth is a vice, then that slothful thing must have at
least one vice – namely, sloth. And that vice is sloth or being
slothful! We are back to the property being slothful and
therefore the universal sloth!
The
Conceptualist View of Universals
Ted
Sider now considers conceptualism as an alternative to nominalism
about universals. He says that a concept “is a means by which we
can think of things” (177). This sounds like a Fregean take on
concepts. On this account, concepts are the 'senses' of words and of
truth-valued sentences. The sense determines the reference. It is the
way in ‘which we can think’ of the reference. It is a ‘mode of
presentation’ of a thing or a reference. Thus a Fregean concept
helps us to get at (as it were) a thing (or a reference of a name or
word).
Thus,
on this Fregean account, the word ‘boat’ does not refer to a boat
or to boats generally. According to Sider, “the word 'boat'
[stands] for this concept” (177). Instead of
‘boat’
→ a boat (or all boats)
we
have
‘boat’
→ [boat]
More
specifically, if we allow the word ‘boat’ to stand for the
concept [boat], rather than a boat or all boats generally, Sider says
that “we give the general application to boats that the concept has
built into it” (177). In other words, the word ‘boat’ becomes
general because it stands for the concept [boat].
However,
what exactly has [boat] built into it in order for the word ‘boat’
to have a general application to boats? How does this work? Perhaps
it's a basic or brute phenomenon; or it may require a theory of
reference for general terms like ‘boat’ or for concepts such as
the concept [boat]. Again, why does the concept [boat] - or any other
concept - have “the desired generality” of which Sider speaks?
What
the conceptualist means is that what all boats share is the simple
fact that the concept [boat] has a ‘general application’. This
means that the conceptualist can “deny that any one entity is
shared by all of the boats” (177). This seems like a simple
reworking of nominalism. Instead of saying that the word ‘boat’
has a general application (as the nominalist does), the conceptualist
simply says that the concept [boat] has a general application. What’s
the real difference between nominalism and conceptualism besides the
substitution of concepts for words? They both believe that there's no
single entity shared by all boats themselves. They only share (if
that’s a suitable word) either the word ‘boat’ or the concept
[boat]. Isn’t conceptualism a kind of nominalism (or vice versa)?
Indeed, what is the point of the word ‘boat’ or the concept
[boat] having a general application if what they refer to (that is,
all boats) don't share any properties? What purpose does such a
general applicability serve?
This
is like the predicate ‘blurg’ referred to later by Sider. That
is, the only thing at the end of each act of ostension shares with
other things ostended with the word ‘blurg’ is that they have
been given the same name – namely, ‘blurg’. That’s it.
Literally the only thing they share is the name ‘blurg’ and the
fact they've all been pointed at and then named ‘blurg’. Is that
the case with boats as well? Do all boats only share the word or name
‘boat’ or the fact that they all fall under the concept [boat]
and that’s it? If that's the case, why are they called ‘boat’? Why do they all fall under the concept [boat]?
There must be more to this than the name ‘boat’ or the concept
[boat] (as well as the pointings and stipulations required in the
first place).
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