Saul
Kripke claims that the statement
“Aristotle
might not have been a philosopher.”
isn't
necessarily false because at other possible worlds Aristotle might
have been born in an environment that banned any kind of philosophy.
Kripke, on the other hand, takes the statement
“Aristotle
might not have been Aristotle.”
to
be necessarily false at every possible world because Aristotle at all
worlds would have been Aristotle (even if not a philosopher). This is
the case because our name ‘Aristotle’ is what Kripke calls a
‘rigid designator’. Rigid designators designate the same
individual at all possible worlds at which that individual exists.
Thus the statement ‘Aristotle might not have been Aristotle’ is
false – necessarily false. Kripke still uses the past tense
in his example. That is, “Aristotle might not have been a
philosopher” is true at some possible worlds because at these
worlds Aristotle might have been born (as we have said) in a world
which banned or didn't even have philosophy. Though “Aristotle
might not have been Aristotle” is false because at every possible
world at which Aristotle exists he would have been born as, well,
Aristotle.
The
rigid designator ‘Aristotle’ still applies to Aristotle at every
possible world. It does so because it's not a ‘description’, like
our ‘is a philosopher’. Thus, in essentialist terms, ‘Aristotle’
doesn't pick out Aristotle descriptively or conceptually, but
essentially. And if ‘Aristotle’ picks out at all, it only does so
because it picks out Aristotle’s essence. This essence can't be
anything to do with any of our descriptions of Aristotle – not even
“is a philosopher”. Instead ‘Aristotle’ picks out or
designates the object Aristotle. Not only that: because descriptions
have been banished from the reference-relation ‘Aristotle’ must
only refer to Aristotle’s essence; as Quine, in Ruth Marcus [1990],
argues. Thus the Kripkean position on proper names entails a parallel
commitment to essences.
According
to this analysis, when Marcus says that Quine mistakenly fuses or
conflates rigid designators with essences, she's wrong. According to
Quine, the Kripkean theory is a commitment to the idea that rigid
designators pick out essences. According to Marcus, on the other
hand, Quine believes that Kripkean proper names are themselves
essences (as it were). Perhaps, however, what Quine meant wasn't that
proper names are themselves essences but that they entail, on
Kripke’s theory, a necessary commitment to essences. Indeed surely
Quine can’t have believed that proper names are taken by Kripke to
be essences. A name, in and of itself, couldn't be an essence or an
essential property of a person or object, not even according to Quine
(or anyone!). However, the way that Marcus puts it, Quine’s
position does seem strange. According to Marcus,
“for
Quine, the trouble… came down to essentialism… [it] suggested to
him that objects have their proper names necessarily [1990]”.
Instead
of believing, on Kripke’s reading, that
Objects
have their proper names necessarily.
Quine
meant:
Kripkean
proper names (or the belief in them) entail that they necessarily
designate the essences of the objects named by them.
It's
not, then, Quine’s belief that an object has its proper name
necessarily. Again, how could Quine think this? On a de re
reading, to call an object’s name essential is to speak nonsense.
Perhaps, however, on a de dicto reading we can say that
there's a semantic relation between names and their objects in which
that relation is necessary (or essential). And that's what Kripke, of
course, thinks. Though Quine doesn't believe that objects have their
proper names necessarily. This would mean that Quine might have
confused the de re with a de dicto reading of Kripke.
That is, instead of objects having essences in the ontological sense
of properties, he applies the same de re to the names of
objects. That is, objects essentially (not necessarily) and literally
have their names, as it were, ‘in’ them or ‘attached’ to
them. Perhaps, however, it's not Quine who made this mistake; but
Marcus. She has read Quine as mistaking a de re reading of
Kripke with a de dicto reading. Perhaps Marcus means all this
when she says that Quine believes that Kripke argues that “objects
have their proper names necessarily” [1990]. So what she means is
that Quine believes that objects have their proper names essentially.
Kripke
himself makes a de re/de dicto distinction in this way:
de
dicto = the relation between proper names (or the use of them) is
that they name their objects necessarily.
de
re = objects have their properties essentially.
Quine
could accept the fact that Kripke evidently makes this distinction.
That proper names can't be essential to objects; but that they are
involved in the necessary relation named as de dicto above.
Quine accepts these Kripkean distinctions. He may think that Kripke
himself misuses the distinction between the de re and the de
dicto above. He doesn't confuse or conflate them; though he does
fuse, and therefore misuse, them. Thus:
Proper
names designate their objects necessarily for all name-users. They
aren't the essences of the named objects.
Because
of this distinction Kripke also believes, Quine thinks, that proper
names designate the essences of the objects they name. Kripke does
believe this. He does so because, as we've already shown, Kripke
argues that “Aristotle might not have been a philosopher” is true
because of his aforementioned modal arguments. He believes that
“Aristotle might not have been Aristotle” is false precisely
because the name ‘Aristotle’ designates Aristotle’s essence,
not the contingent properties specified by descriptions or concepts.
Thus there's a strong logical relation and connection set up between
Names
and the naming-relation are necessary and constitute the necessity
of the reference-relation.
and
The
relation between named object and name/namer in the
reference-relation is necessary. The name and the naming process
pick out only their named object’s essence, not its contingent
properties specified and picked out by contingent descriptions and
concepts.
Thus
Quine doesn't believe that
Objects
have their proper names necessarily.
which
is what Marcus argues. Kripke may think that they have them
essentially, even if he isn’t aware of this. He may think names are
essential, Quine may argue that this is because he thinks them
necessary, in the way specified as de dicto above. And this
fusion, unknown or known to Kripke, is neither the result of Quine or
Kripke’s conflation and misuse of the de re/de dicto
distinction; but the (unintended) fusion of the two. And this
fusion of the de dicto ‘necessarily’ with the de re
‘essential’ is a philosophical misuse, on a Quinian reading. That
is, Kripke inadvertently (or not) begins with the de dicto
The
reference-relation between proper names (or their use) and their
objects is that they name their objects necessarily.
and
ends with the de re
Objects
have their names essentially.
which
is what Marcus thinks Quine believes. But although Kripke never
states ii) above, Quine believes it (of Kripke!), if implicitly,
because he does believe that Kripkean proper names must be seen to
only pick out the essences of named objects. And one can only believe
this if one also believes that
Objects
have their names essentially.
which
is an unintended (or intended) consequence of believing that the
reference-relation of designating is a necessary one. Thus proper
names are necessary in this de dicto sense and they only
designate the essences of named objects. Again, this may be Quine’s
conclusion. Therefore his reading (right or wrong) of Kripke’s
position because Kripke set up a necessary relation between
The
necessary reference-relation or naming process
and
the fact that
Proper
names pick out or designate only the essences of named objects.
Kripke
did so, as we've seen, because he fused, not confused, the de
dicto reference- or naming-relation and the idea that named
objects have essences, which is a de re idea. The de dicto
relation requires de re essentialism. The necessary
naming-relation is necessary if and only if it designates or picks
out the essences of named objects. The de dicto relation is
only necessary because of the essential properties of named objects.
If named objects didn't have essences, then the reference-relation
couldn't be necessary because it only has this modal property due to
the relation set up between proper names and the essences of named
objects. That relation would only be contingent, Kripke believes, if
names picked out conceptual or descriptive properties (which he in
fact believes). Conversely, if named objects don't have essences,
then there could never be a necessary reference-relation between them
and their names. Indeed there would only be a contingent relation
between named objects without essences and their descriptions or
conceptual predicates (which is what Kripke believes).
Thus
Marcus is incorrect to think that only Quine himself believes that
proper names must be the essential properties of named objects in
Kripke’s scheme. She would be correct, on the other hand, to also
add that Quine only put it this way (if he did put it this way)
because he believes that Kripke himself fused de dicto
necessity with de re essentialism. If Marcus believes that
Quine thinks the former, then it is she herself who confuses the
necessary de dicto with the essential de re; at least
in the case of her reading of Quine. However, as we've said, Kripke
didn't so much as confuse the de re with the de dicto but
fuse them because of the necessary relation set up between proper
names and their named objects. We can conclude that if Kripke,
implicitly or explicitly, accepts the necessary relation between the
de dicto and the de re, then we can argue that, in a
sense, de re essentialism (which is vital to Kripke’s
project) owes much of it power and point due to the necessary
relation between objects (or the essences of objects) with the de
dicto naming process. That is, de re essences could never
be specified or even talked about as being ‘mind-independent’
because all acceptances of de re essences would depend upon -
and be determined by - the necessary de dicto relation between
proper names and essences. Though Kripkean proper names are only
supposed to designate essences (not contingent properties), there
would still be a necessary relation between proper names and
essences. That, in turn, means that any talk of mind-independent
essences would be illegitimate because every essence would be a named
essence set up by the de dicto necessary relation between
proper name and the named object. Thus every spoken-about essence
could never be classed as a ‘mind-independent essence’ because it
would be a named essence, set up by the necessary de dicto
naming-relation – even if that relation is indeed necessary and
named objects are deemed to have essences.
If
my Quine is correct (i.e., that Kripke needed to fuse the de dicto
with the de re), then Marcus is wrong to say that Quine’s
Kripke is a misreading. If she's correct, then Quine does hold the
strange position that proper names are the necessary properties of
Kripkean named objects. Therefore Quine wouldn't argue that Kripke
fuses the de re with the de dicto in thinking that
(though he may still believe this). This doesn't mean, however, that
Kripke doesn't fuse the de re with the de dicto, only
that Marcus’s belief about Quine’s Kripke is correct. However, I
do believe that Kripke may have fused the two. I also believe that
Quine thinks this too; despite Marcus’s position on what Quine
argues (if he does say, or mean, such things).
I don't know if Marcus misread Quine’s position. And I don't know
if she herself conflates or simply fuses the de dicto with the
de re because of her reading of Quine’s Kripke. If she
thinks what she thinks about Quine’s Kripke, as we have interpreted
it, then she wouldn't say what she says about it. Perhaps this also
means that Marcus too either confuses the de re/de dicto
distinction, or she actually fuses it (as (my) Quine’s Kripke
does). Because we've already said that Quine couldn’t think that
Kripkean proper names are ‘necessary’ (therefore essential on
this reading) properties of named objects. If Quine doesn't think
this, then it may be that Marcus didn't only confuse the de re
with the de dicto (and vice versa), but, like Quine’s
Kripke, she fused them too. However, as we've argued, Kripke’s
fusion of the de dicto with the de re doesn't
automatically mean that he also confused them. Perhaps such a fusion
could only have come about because of some other confusion on
Kripke’s part. That confusion might have been the result of the
implicit or explicit fusion of the de dicto with the de re.
Finally,
Kripke may knowingly fuse the two; yet he may not accept our other
conclusion about such a fusion: that it goes against the point and
power of the de re classification and disallows any talk about
the mind-independent essences of named objects.
References
and Further Reading
Kripke,
S – (1971) ‘Identity and necessity’, in Identity and
Individuation, New York, ed. M. Munitz
Marcus,
R. B – (1990) ‘A Backward Look at Quine’s Animadversions on
Modalities’, in Perspectives on Quine, eds. R. B. Barrett
and R. F. Gibson, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp.230-43
Quine,
W. V. O. – (1966) The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays,
Random House
