Wednesday, 16 November 2022

Why the Advocates of Spirituality and Idealism Hijack the Words of Quantum Physicists

Some readers might have noted the multitude of memes on social media posted by the advocates of spirituality, New Ageism and idealism which include the words of famous quantum physicists. So what’s behind this interest in these selected physicists?

The words in this meme are fake. In fact I penned the words myself. Paul Dirac is, in fact, one physicist who would be very hard to appropriate, commandeer or annex for a spiritual or philosophical cause.
“Science does not need mysticism and mysticism does not need science, but man needs both.”

Fritjof Capra, from his The Tao of Physics

(i) Introduction
(ii) New Age?
(iii) Deepak Chopra and Bernardo Kastrup
(iv) Part Two: Comments on Specific New-Age Memes

The users of Facebook and social media generally might have noted how often “spiritual idealists” (see here) and New Agers quote a handful of passages from German and Austrian physicists spoken (or written) in the first three decades of the 20th century… Or at least those who’re interested in philosophy and science might have noted this.

[See the section on the term “New Age” after this.]

The artfully-selected words of these artfully-selected physicists are quoted to back up various spiritual and (rather less so) philosophical positions.

It’s also worth stressing here that often such physicists are either misquoted or their words are simply made up by the memester. Indeed, when I checked some of these passages, all I could find were other out-of-context quotes of the very same words — without any references or sources.

So New Agers, etc. have created multiple images (or memes) with the words of these physicists embedded within them. The passages quoted are always the same ones. Indeed they’ve been used countless times by such people.

These passages are usually very short — often little more than a single sentence. And, as ever, they’re taken completely out of context.

All this quoting of physicists is usually (or even always) done for one reason and for one reason only:

To advance various spiritual and/philosophical beliefs (often about “cosmic consciousness”).

So spiritual idealists, “anti-materialists” and New Agers often quote and mention various physicists from the early 20th century (as well as beyond) to back up what they already believe anyway.

In other words, when you look into this, it can quickly be seen that virtually no contemporary New Ager, spiritual idealist, etc. became spiritual as a result of his or her research into quantum mechanics or, say, from reading the technical works (i.e., in papers, etc.) of Erwin Schrödinger. Instead, what nearly always happens is that such people became spiritual for exclusively personal reasons — and only then did they look to these physicists for scientific backup.

So most New Agers, etc. have no interest in science (specifically quantum mechanics) other than as a means to advance their spiritual and philosophical beliefs. (Beliefs they held long before encountering the work of these physicists.) This, then, is a kind of argument from authority (or appeal to authority) which basically amounts to the following claim:

If Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Planck, Bohm, etc. believed and said these things, then they simply must be true.

The other point worth making is that although a tiny minority of physicists did say these things (although, as stated, they’re often either misquoted or the quotes are literally made up), these scientists rarely went into much — or sometimes any — detail. More importantly, they rarely made an effort to tie their non-scientific words to their actual physical (i.e., technical) theories. Indeed Erwin Schrödinger, for one, went out of his way to disconnect his interest in (loosely called) “eastern philosophy” from his actual technical physics. (See Walter Moore’s excellent biography: Schrödinger: Life and Thought. Moore goes into much detail on Schrödinger’s interest in Schopenhauer, Vedanta, etc.)

New Agers, on the other hand, do the opposite of this.

Such people go out of their way to connect quantum physics (as well as much else in science) to their prior spiritual and philosophical beliefs.

So why these particular German and Austrian physicists?

One reason for this is that from (roughly) the 19th century (particularly from the period of Arthur Schopenhauer’s strong influence on German and Austrian culture as a whole) to the first three decades (or less) of the 20th century, eastern philosophy (this term, like so many, is disputed) was popular among artists and intellectuals in both Germany and Austria. Thus, these physicists simply reflected the general intellectual milieu and culture of their time. Indeed, as they got older, they often stopped referring to such things…

That said, most of these oft-quoted physicists hardy referred to eastern thought in the first place. Hence the very-few passages which spiritual idealists, New Agers, etc. have access to.

New Age?

The word “New Age” was used throughout the section above. Admittedly, that was largely for convenience’s sake. So it is, indeed, an umbrella term.

Some academics say that the New Age movement is “dead” and that the term itself is “useless”. Other academics say that this movement is “very much alive” and that the term is still useful.

For example, a professor of religious studies, Hugh Urban, wrote:

“According to many recent surveys of religious affiliation, the ‘spiritual but not religious’ category is one of the fastest-growing trends in American culture, so the New Age attitude of spiritual individualism and eclecticism may well be an increasingly visible one in the decades to come.”

So take your pick on whether New Ageism is alive or dead.

At one point in history, New Agers used the term “New Age” themselves — a hell of a lot. Roughly between the 1930s and 1960s, various individuals and groups talked about a coming “New Age” and often used that term (see here). Then, when critics picked up on both the movement and the term itself, many (though not all) New Agers stopped using it.

New Ageism can even be dated back to the 19th century. Historian Wouter Hanegraaff, for one, wrote the following:

“Most of the beliefs which characterise the New Age were already present by the end of the 19th century, even to such an extent that one may legitimately wonder whether the New Age brings anything new at all.”

More relevantly, many New Agers believe in what they call “holism”. They also believe that a “divinity” (or simply consciousness) pervades the universe. This leads — for various reasons — to New Agers rejecting “traditional religion” and the “monotheistic God”. New Agers, instead, emphasise the individual (or “self”) and their own “spiritual authority”.

Most New Agers also reject some (or all) of the following: materialism, rationalism, the scientific method, empiricism, etc. However, that doesn’t stop them from also using concepts and terms from science and particularly from what has been called the New Physics. In the later respect, New Agers often mention David Bohm and Ilya Prigogine. All this has also largely been down to Fritjof Capra’s The Tao of Physics (1975), as well as Gary Zukav’s The Dancing Wu Li Masters (1979).

Finally, if you reject the spiritual and philosophical claims of New Agers, they will often accuse you of being “dogmatic”, “old-fashioned” and state that, for example, materialism is a 19th century philosophy. (A small number of New Agers use the words of Werner Heisenberg to back this claim up. See my Was Quantum Physicist Werner Heisenberg an Idealist?’.)

Now for some examples of the appropriation, annexation or commandeering of the words of physicists by New Agers, spiritual idealists, etc.

Deepak Chopra and Bernardo Kastrup

Take these words from the spiritual idealist Deepak Chopra:

“The possibility of a mental universe has a strong lineage going in the quantum era, but present-day physicalists (physicists who accept the physical nature of reality as a given) feel free to dismiss or ignore figures as towering as Max Planck, Werner Heisenberg, and John von Neumann.”

Now take these words from an idealist (see here) who believes that he has (to use his own word) “proved” that heaven exists (as in his book, Proof of Heaven) — Dr Eben Alexander. He wrote:

“We live in a mental universe, projected out of consciousness, just as Heisenberg realized [].”

More technically, we also have the idealist Bernardo Kastrup’s long and wild jump from Werner Heisenberg’s stress on measurements to his very own “transpersonal mind” (see the ‘transpersonal movement’). As Shawn Radcliffe writes (in a website called Science and Nonduality):

“For Kastrup and his colleagues, these types of measurements [in quantum mechanics] can only be performed by a conscious observer. They write that inanimate objects like a particle detector can’t truly measure a particle. With the double-slit experiment, ‘the output of the detectors only becomes known when it is consciously observed by a person,’ writes Kastrup. Extending this to all of reality, he argues that a ‘transpersonal mind’ underlies the material world.”

A large part of all this (scare-quoted) “interest” in quantum physics boils down to the rejection of what spiritual idealists and New Agers often call “materialism”.

Take Bernardo Kastrup again and his broad sociological and political take on materialism. Kastrup wrote the following words (as taken from his book Materialism is Baloney) on materialism:

“A big part of the motivation for our culture’s current embrace of materialism is the observed regularities according to which reality seems to unfold.”

[It can be taken as given here that Kastrup means Western culture by “our culture”. That is, he means European, British and American culture.]

So clearly it isn’t just getting the metaphysics of “reality” right which concerns Kastrup and other self-styled “anti-materialists”. Kastrup is also concerned with what “our culture embrace[s]” and the fact that it (in his eyes) embraces materialism. And that may at least partly explain Kastrup’s words “materialism is baloney”; as well as Deepak Chopra’s similarly intemperate remarks on materialism.

It’s worth noting here that some spiritual idealists can be very vain, egotistical, aggressive and intolerant. New Agers also often conflate materialism with consumerism, rather than seeing materialism as a metaphysical position. So it’s odd that many New Agers are perfect consumerists who also consume large amounts of New-Age merchandise.

But is “our culture” really materialist?

The fact is that there are big chunks of our culture that certainly do not embrace materialism — from the large numbers of religious and “spiritual” people, to New Agers, to the lovers of the arcane. Now add to that the many political activists and political theorists who do not embrace materialism. And, last but not least, take on board the many idealists, realists, spiritual-but-not-religious people, etc. who’re strongly against what they describe as “materialism”. (See ‘Spiritual but not religious’.)

So our culture — at least as a whole — clearly does not embrace philosophical materialism. That’s unless Kastrup simply means that everyone in our culture unconsciously embraces materialism by osmosis or that most folk just catch it in the air. (This would be Kastrup’s very own version of the notion of “false consciousness”.)

In any case, the fact that Kastrup and other idealists believe that our culture does embrace materialism may well also explain why they (rhetorically) claim that the commitment to (philosophical) materialism is based on “faith” or even that materialism is a “religion” held (it seems to them) by literally dozens of millions (or more) of people.

*************************

Part Two: Comments on Specific New-Age Memes

Max Planck’s words (in meme form) are posted all the time on Facebook and social media generally. It’s even possible that they are fake. Or, if not fake, then doctored to some extent… But perhaps not.

That said, there is nothing spiritual or even idealist about Max Planck’s words. The stress on consciousness (or mind) is similar to the stress on experience (or sense impressions). This is largely an empiricist position which dates back (in various strong or weak forms) to the ancient Greeks and which achieved an historical importance with the British Empiricists of the 18th century.

So, of course, everything we gain access to is done through our minds — or through “consciousness”. We have no other access to the world. However, empiricists, realists, materialists, etc. believe that too. So it’s what is derived from that which is important. And idealism — let alone spiritual idealism — is simply a single option. What’s more, it’s a position which Max Planck himself almost certainly didn’t uphold.

Is this a genuine quote? As ever, when I Googled this passage, all I could find was other out-of-context quotes (most in images or memes) of the very same words — without any context, references or sources. But I did find the following from Werner Heisenberg:

“The kinship between the ancient Eastern teachings and the philosophical consequences of the modern quantum theory have [sic] fascinated me again and again.”

If this claim is genuine, then it seems to be an acknowledgment that quantum mechanics came first (or at least Werner Heisenberg’s own work came first) and only then were there these “conversations about Indian philosophy” carried out. That said, anything can be connected to anything. It also seems that Heisenberg was saying that Indian philosophy may simply be of some help when it comes to understanding quantum physics. And so too is learning some mathematics. In addition, metaphors and analogies are often (very often) used when discussing quantum mechanics.

That probably is a genuine quote from David Bohm. However, it has very little to do with his actual physics. That is, it has little to do with Bohm’s technical physics as expressed in his papers. Sure, it may have something to do, on the other hand, with his interpretations of his own work.

It can be accepted that, like many other intellectuals, Bohm did read Indian religious texts, etc.

Apart from that, the passage above reads like a poeticism, not as science or even as philosophy.

Erwin Schrödinger’s words are, again, basically poetic.

So the passage above can be read as being as statement exclusively about nature’s fundamental laws, constants, forces, etc. and the omnipresence of energy. Or, alternatively, it can be read in an exclusively spiritual or idealist way. Whichever way it is read, the statement itself doesn’t belong to physics — quantum physics or otherwise.

This passage is also often quoted. It’s a basic statement of one aspect of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.

It’s very hard to see why it’s spiritual or even idealist in content. So it can only be supposed that the reasoning is the following:

If nature depends on human observations and human questions, then it must also depend on minds (or on consciousness). Thus, surely nature itself must be mental (or constituted by consciousness).

Of course this is bizarre. But this is a good way of making sense of why this passage is quoted so many times by New Agers, spiritual idealists and anti-materialists.





Friday, 11 November 2022

The Politics, Spirituality and Sexy Craziness of Panpsychism: Rudy Rucker and Philip Goff

Not all brands of panpsychism can be tied to spirituality, religion and/or politics. However, some (perhaps many) brands can be. This issue is complicated by those panpsychists who, in one breath, play down these connections; yet, in the very next breath, emphasise them. This essay, however, isn’t a critique of religion, spirituality or the politics of panpsychists. It’s simply an attempt to demonstrate these clear — indeed obvious — connections.

Philip Goff and Rudy Rucker
“Each object has a mind. Stars, hills, chairs, rocks, scraps of paper, flakes of skin, molecules — each of them possesses the same inner glow as a human, each of them has singular inner experiences and sensations.”

— Rudy Rucker

[See source here.]

“There are superficial cultural associations between panpsychism and spiritual stuff, but most of the people defending it are atheists [].”

— Philip Goff

[See source here.]

[Personally, I only know of a handful — or even less — of panpsychists who’ve used the word “atheist” to describe themselves. It also has to be remembered that many of those who class themselves as “spiritual” also frequently state that they don’t believe in the “traditional God”. Philip Goff himself makes much of this distinction.]

[Note: The word “craziness” — in the title — is borrowed from the panpsychist Philip Goff. He wrote an article called ‘Panpsychism Is Crazy, but It’s Also Most Probably True’, in which he compares panpsychism to Albert Einstein’s (supposedly) equally “crazy” (at least as seen at the time of its creation) Special Theory of Relativity. The very idea of a metaphysical thesis being “probably true” — as well as the comparisons with Einstein’s Relativity — won’t be discussed in the following essay.]

Introduction

It’s worth noting straight away that this essay only features two panpsychists who tie panpsychism to spiritual and political issues and positions. There are, of course, many others. For example, there are over 15 pages of search results (on Google) which contain numerous links to papers, articles and books which explicitly tie panpsychism to religion and spirituality (if in various ways). Hardly a single one of these links takes you to any critic of panpsychism attempting to (well) disingenuously connect panpsychism to spiritualism and religion. (That serious charge can, of course, be aimed at this essay.)

So readers can find Rupert Sheldrake tying panpsychism to what he himself calls “spirituality” (see here). A paper called ‘Panpsychism and Spiritual Flourishing’. Articles which tie panpsychism to “eastern mystics” (see here) and historical Native Americans (see here). Another article called ‘Why a Panpsychist Should Adopt Theism: God, Galileo, and Goff’. A book called Panpsychism and the Religious Attitude. Lots of pieces on “spiritual science”, which often mention panpsychism (see here). Finally, panpsychism has even morphed into an explicit spiritual position called panspiritism (see this article).

All that said, it’s not being argued here that all panpsychisms (i.e., in the plural) are, well, crazy or wacky. Some (though very few) panpsychists offer metaphysical theses which they argue for, and which can then be tackled by people who aren’t themselves panpsychists — even if, ultimately, they reject them.

Nonetheless, a philosopher like Philip Goff started off as simply offering technical papers and arguments (as expressed in academese in philosophy journals), but now he too is heading off in a crazy and/or wacky direction. And he’s doing so — at least partly — for the very same reasons as Rudy Rucker: politics, spirituality and ethics.

But, firstly, let’s concentrate on Rudy Rucker

Rudy Rucker

A young Rudy Rucker.

In his short essay, ‘Mind is a universally distributed quality’ (which can be found in the book What is Your Dangerous Idea?), Rudy Rucker (1946-) states that “[e]ach object has a mind”. He believes that “[s]tars, hills, chairs, rocks, scraps of paper, flakes of skin, molecules” all have minds.

Rucker isn’t simply arguing that all these objects have “experiences” or instantiate what some philosophers call “phenomenal properties”. And he certainly isn’t arguing that they only instantiate (as some other philosophers call it) “proto-experience”.

All that said, perhaps Rudy Rucker’s own panpsychism — particularly — is a bad target because I have a very strong feeling that he knows that his ideas are crazy-wacky and that his crazy-wackiness is part of the point, and, indeed, part of the appeal. After all, Rucker describes himself as a “cyberpunk” and he does seem to cultivate a certain image which appeals to New Agers, hippies, tribal environmentalists, etc.

[I’m not sure how cyberpunk and its “dystopian societies” square with Rucker’s panpsychist environmental ethics. However, I’m not an expert on cyberpunks.]

So Rucker’s crazy-wacky beliefs are tailor-made for a tiny niche of society. His books also sell very well (see here). And, as almost everyone knows, there’s nearly always a guaranteed (if sometimes small) market for sexy, titillating and crazy-wacky stuff.

All this means that perhaps many (or even most) of Rucker’s claims aren’t meant to be taken literally. Perhaps they’re meant to be taken poetically, politically or even spiritually.

It’s not a surprise, then, that Rucker never supplies any arguments for his panpsychism (there is a ‘nine-step formal proof of panpsychism’): he simply makes categorical (often oracular) statements. (He once strung them together and called them a “proof”.) And that ties in with all of what’s just been said. After all, arguments, data and facts may unweave Rucker’s rainbow or unspool his craziness-wackiness.

Indeed don’t we have the phrase “there are many ways of knowing” to deal with here? So perhaps Rucker’s very own way of knowing is different to my own way of knowing. It may also be different to the ways of knowing of most readers of this essay. That said, it’s of course the case that some people will be keen to point out (if not in these precise words) that one person’s crazy-wacky position is another person’s truth.

It must also be stated here that Rucker doesn’t seem to do — at least some of — his fellow panpsychists any favours. Or, at the very least, he doesn’t do the more philosophically rigorous and less flamboyant panpsychists any favours. (There aren’t many panpsychists who fit this description.)

In my view, then, spirituality, sexy philosophy and politics constitute the primary appeal of panpsychism when it comes to at least some (or even many) panpsychists and their followers. The hard analytical or philosophical work — which only exists in tiny academic niches — may well only arrive (as it were) after that fact.

The Spirituality and Politics of Rucker’s Panpsychism

It seems that radical environmentalism (perhaps alongside ecocentrism) and politics may be driving Rudy Rucker’s panpsychism. And now that seems to be the case with Philip Goff too. (See the last section.)

Both Rucker and Goff believe that upholding panpsychism will help the environment, our relationship with nature and the political state of society and the world generally.

Rucker himself is explicit about this when he wrote:

“If the rocks on my property have minds, I feel more respect for them in their natural state. If I feel myself among friends in the universe.”

As far as I know, Goff hasn’t delved into the afterlife yet. Rudy Rucker has.

Rucker offers us a spiritual, psychological and emotional take (actually, a conditional) on the afterlife when he stated the following:

“If my body will have a mind even after I’m dead, then death matters less to me.”

If Rucker’s previous speculations were true, then his position on his “mind” after his own death would also be true; or at least it could possibly be true. Thus, all this depends on the Rucker’s conjectures on panpsychism being true. (As stated in the opening square-bracketed note: metaphysical theories aren’t ideal candidates for truth.)

Yet Rucker’s panpsychist environmentalism and its lack of truth, fact or data may not matter to him. Thus, this is a reactive reply to Rucker’s general stance:

i) If Rudy Rucker’s panpsychism is all about his own emotional well-being (as well as about having a “positive attitude” to one’s environment),
ii) then it may not matter if panpsychism is actually true.
(“The point is to change the world, not interpret it.”)

What seems to matter to Rucker are the personal and even collective results of believing — or simply advocating — panpsychism as a philosophical and political position.

So here’s another conditional to get that point across:

i) If the political, social and/or ethical consequences of believing in panpsychism are deemed to be positive,
ii) then perhaps the truth of panpsychism doesn’t matter.

Something similar to this ethical and pragmatic stance on truth has often been noted by philosophers and other commentators when it comes to religion. For example, many philosophers (such as the American philosopher William James) have talked about the “efficacy of religion”. (Sam Harris now talks about the efficacy of spirituality.) This has also been seen to be the stance of the “late Wittgenstein”; at least on certain readings. (Yet the man himself hardly wrote a word on the issue.)

Yet this fast-and-loose attitude to truth, fact and data would surely create a philosophical, scientific and ethical free-for-all if everyone adopted it. (Who knows, perhaps there are — relativist? — arguments which state that this would be a good thing too.) After all, I personally could believe that Rudy Rucker is a rock in order to bring it about that no one will take his views seriously. I could also believe that the Welsh are crabs in order to bring forward all sorts of negative political policies against Welsh people.

So why give Rudy Rucker free rein, but not other people with similarly absurd or extreme views? Some people may do so simply because they like — or empathise with — Rucker’s panpsychist philosophy. But is that a good enough reason? Some other people may also like my view that Rucker is a rock or someone else’s view that “alien lizards rule the world”.

In any case, let's move on to Philip Goff, who’s far less crazy-wacky than Rudy Rucker. He is, after all, a tenured professor who specialises in analytic philosophy.

Part Two: Philip Goff

“Other[s] will identify as ‘spiritual but not religious’. The purpose of this article is simply to point out that there is a third option that many are not aware of, and that some may find attractive: religion without belief.”

— Philip Goff (See source here.)

“I’m exploring the position that there is some kind of teleology or goal-based activity at the fundamental level of the universe [] Like isn’t the universe conscious itself?”

— Philip Goff (See source here.)

Professor Philip Goff uses the experiments and research on plants (carried out by the ecologists Professor Monica Gagliano and Professor Suzanne Simard) to advance his panpsychism. That is, he interprets that research and the experiments in various political and philosophical ways.

Monica Gagliano

It can provisionally be accepted, then, that the experiments of Monica Gagliano and Suzanne Simard are scientifically kosher. And their papers, too, may well abound with mathematical equations and an infinity of footnotes and references. However, Goff’s political and philosophical interpretations of these experiments are what matters here.

That said, both of Monica Gagliano and Suzanne Simard themselves do foist philosophical and political baggage onto their own experiments and research. That philosophical and political baggage goes way beyond the actual science itself.

Indeed all this is a very good example of the common phenomenon of scientists — as well as philosophers and political activists — using scientific data or experiments as ammunition to advance their own political and/or spiritual beliefs, causes and goals.

Philip Goff’s Anthropomorphism

Philip Goff offers us some clear examples of anthropomorphism, which he uses to back up his prior panpsychism.

For example, Goff uses the words “associate”, “meaningless”, “preferential treatment”, “for their young”, “mother”, “kin”, “prejudice”, “reciprocal support”, “passing along” “egalitarian redistribution” and “dinnertime” when he refers to plants and their behaviour.

[The word “behaviour” is tricky when used in this context. For a start, the way that this word is sometimes used about plants — i.e., mainly by those who want to get a larger ethical, political or environmental point across — can also be used, with almost no change, about smoke alarms, light sensors and even wind turbines. However, all that can’t be tackled here.]

Perhaps the most extreme example of all is Goff’s use of the word “wisdom”. He uses that word when he says that “mother trees [] pass on their wisdom to the next generation”.

Now this is a professional analytic philosopher using the word “wisdom” about trees without even hinting at it being a metaphor or a poeticism… But that’s because he’s not using the word “wisdom” metaphorically or poetically.

Now it must be said that it’s of course the case that anthropomorphic words and phrases about plants or trees can be — and often are — used poetically and metaphorically, as well as to enable understanding. And, in that simple sense, such uses aren’t anthropomorphic in a literal sense at all. So this means that the least a philosopher or scientist can do is make it clear to his audience that he’s using such words (or phrases) in a poetic or metaphorical way. That said, in Goff’s case and as already said, it’s clear that he’s not using these word and phrases metaphorically, poetically or to enable understanding: he’s using them literally.

So take this passage as an example of this:

[W]e now know that plants communicate, learn and remember. I can see no reason other than anthropic prejudice not to ascribe to them a conscious life of their own.”

It’s ironic that Goff mentions “anthropic prejudice” when he himself is clearly indulging in gross forms of anthropomorphism. (Many scientists, philosophers and laypersons have a problem with anthropomorphism even when it comes to animals, never mind plants.)

Readers may now wonder why anthropomorphism is seen to be somehow better than what Goff calls “anthropic prejudice” (i.e., anthropocentrism). Yet don’t both positions share the same (as it were) ánthrōpos toward plants? Thus, aren’t both positions equally suspect?

Of course Goff doesn’t believe he’s being anthropomorphic at all.

Goff uses anthropomorphic ways of speaking when his examples can even be made to work against his own political take on plants.

And that highlights a problem here.

As noted, Goff does indeed refer to scientific research on plants.

However, exactly the same data, evidence or experiment about — or on — trees and other plants (as well as animals) can be used as ammunition to advance just about any political position. (See underdetermination of theory by data/evidence.) Indeed, historically, this has often been the case. (Think about how some 19th-century Darwinists and 20th-century fascists relied on the animal world to advance their politics.) More specifically, Goff’s talk of “quid pro quo relationship[s]” in the plant world could be used to advance political positions which are diametrically opposed to his own.

Finally, on the words “wisdom”, “egalitarian”, etc. as used by Goff.

The simple argument here is that Goff is using these terms in ways that are massively at odds with how they’re used by laypersons when they refer to human individuals, institutions or societies. That is, he’s using them in his own panpsychist and political way. What’s more, such terms pick out behaviours which are displayed by every member of a plant species — at least in a given environment.

Yet that simply isn’t the case with human beings.

The word “wisdom”, for example, is always used in a relative or contextual way. That is, it’s rarely used to refer to every single human being in all circumstances dating back tens of thousands of years (as must be true of most plants). That is, person, institution or society x is (or was) wise in comparison with other persons, institutions or societies who or which were unwise.

As for Goff’s word “egalitarian”: if every plant of a given species is egalitarian, then no plant of that species is egalitarian. Like wisdom, a tree can only be egalitarian if there’s the possibility that this tree (or the entire species it belongs to) can choose not to be egalitarian. Again: the word “egalitarian” implies that an individual, institution or society chooses to be egalitarian. In other words, the word “egalitarian” has moral or normative content and also involves various degrees of choice. That isn’t the case with the plant species Goff artfully selects. According to Goff (though he doesn’t explicitly state this), every plant of that species — and perhaps all plants! — is wise and egalitarian.

The same is true of Goff’s use of the words “prejudice” and “reciprocal support” when he refers to plants.

Do these plants have the choice to actually embrace prejudice instead?

Do such plants ever go against the reciprocal support Goff highlights?

And say that there are indeed some exceptions (which is doubtful — unless in cases of genetic and/or environmental anomalies) displayed by the plants of a given species — would they be morally flawed to display prejudice or reject reciprocal support?

So what’s the point of using these anthropomorphic words at all?

Such words have almost zero connection to how they’re used by laypersons — and probably even by Goff himself when he uses them in all other (i.e., non-panpsychist and non-political) contexts.

So that point must be political, spiritual or ethical — probably all three. What’s more, it can be argued that, when it comes to panpsychists like Rudy Rucker and Philip Goff, it really doesn’t matter if their claims are true (or if the terms they use are conceptually confused or simply deceitful) because they believe that embracing this way of looking at plants — and much else besides — is a means to change the world in a better political direction.

Finally, these brands of panpsychism are obviously not science. And perhaps most of them aren’t even philosophy either. Instead, they’re a type of politics and/or ethics which simply uses the findings of both science and philosophy to help bring about certain very specific social and political ends.

Friday, 4 November 2022

The Fact that Philosophy Isn’t Physics Annoys Some Popular Physicists

Some best-selling physicists really dislike philosophy and see it as a complete waste of time. Is this largely down to the very-simple fact that philosophy isn’t… well, physics?

(i) Introduction 
(ii) Philosophers Aren’t Physicists 
(iii) Stephen Hawking 
(iv) Lawrence Krauss and Sabine Hossenfelder 
(v) Some Physicists Have Been Right About Philosophy 
(vi) History

Some physicists (especially the ones who write best-selling books) have a big problem with philosophy. That problem is that they don’t like the fact that philosophy isn’t physics.

Of course they never put it quite so simply or honestly.

And, yes, such physicists have also given reasons for their anti-philosophy stances. Indeed a handful of the reasons they’ve given are subtle. However, most are crude and ignorant…

Yet it’s still essentially all down to philosophy not being physics.

The claims above may themselves seem as simplistic as the anti-philosophy positions of the aforementioned physicists. However, if you read the actual words of these physicists on this issue, then you’ll quickly note the lack of names of any actual philosophers or any details about what they argue.

The anti-philosophy physicists’ other big problem (which, of course, follows from their main big problem) is that philosophers aren’t physicists.

Philosophers Aren’t Physicists

One can guess (i.e., from the overall context) that the claims of anti-philosophy physicists basically amount to the fact that (most? all?) philosophers don’t understand the mathematics of physics and all the precise technical details involved in physical theories.

To put it more simply. Anti-philosophy physicists are basically saying that philosophers don’t know as much about physics as they do.

Of course no single physicist knows all the maths and all the technical details of physics either. Indeed most physicists have extremely narrow specialisms.

In addition, if philosophers knew as much about physics as physicists do, then they’d probably actually be physicists.

So it can be argued that such anti-philosophy physicists are replicating sociologist Steve Fuller’s own position against… physicists and biologists. (Specifically, against Murray Gell-Mann, Roger Penrose, Steven Jay Gould, etc.)

Steve Fuller’s basic problem (at least as I see it) is that physicists and biologists aren’t as emersed in sociology (or the social sciences generally) as he is.

Fuller wrote the following:

[T]o a sociologist, it will be apparent that many of the ‘deep puzzles’ that these scientists brood over could be solved, or at least dissipated, by a dose of social science [].”

So that can be rewritten in this way:

To a physicist, it will be apparent that many of the ‘deep puzzles’ that these philosophers brood over could be solved, or at least dissipated, by a dose of physics and science generally.

Indeed some physicists have said precisely that!

Fuller also stated this:

[T]he most disturbing feature of these interviews is that despite their interdisciplinary pretensions, none of the scientists ever feels the need to refer to theories or findings of the social sciences (except for a few derogatory remarks about economists). When [Steven Jay] Gould wants to flaunt his well-roundedness, he quotes Horace and Shakespeare, not Marx and Weber [].”

This can also be rewritten as follows:

The most disturbing feature of philosophers is that none of them ever feels the need to refer to the theories or findings of physics (except for a few derogatory remarks about [this is my addition] the lack of philosophical sophistication of physicists).

So Fuller himself is (if implicitly) asking his readers why biologists and physicists aren’t as immersed in sociology as he is. And anti-philosophy physicists are (more explicitly) asking their readers why philosophers aren’t as immersed in physics as they are.

In terms of Steve Fuller’s stance.

If physicists were as immersed in sociology as Fuller himself is, then they’d basically be sociologists.

In more detail.

Fuller mentioned various artfully-selected theories which his targeted biologists and physicists didn’t themselves mention or didn’t know anything about. And then Fuller went on to simply assume ignorance on the part of his targeted scientists for not knowing — or simply mentioning — these things…

So doesn’t that sound familiar?

It can now be said that there’ll be many other (relevant) things which these biologists and physicists know (or knew), and which Fuller himself doesn’t know. So perhaps such scientists show now repay the compliment and arbitrarily namedrop the theories and ideas which Fuller himself doesn’t know.

And that’s what anti-philosophy physicists sometimes do when criticising philosophy. (“You comment on physics, yet you haven’t mastered differential geometry, multilinear algebra, manifold theory and functional analysis!”)

To change tack a little.

A YouTube video called ‘Scientists vs Philosophers’ opens up with the host (a Steve Paulson) asking this question:

“Why is it that so many physicists are bashing philosophers nowadays?”

So now let’s single out the well-known case of Stephen Hawking.

Stephen Hawking

Stephen Hawking one stated that “philosophers haven’t kept up with physics”. Indeed (in his book The Grand Design) Hawking went into more detail in the following passage:

“Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge.”

Stephen Hawking is actually both a bad and an ironic example of an anti-philosopher. That’s for the simple reason that what he said about philosophy is very naive. That’s the bad part. More ironically, Hawking offered the world his very own philosophical position on physics, which he called model-dependent realism. Indeed Hawking even borrowed a technical term from philosophy — “realism”.

(“Realism” isn’t a term of — or in — any branch of physics I know. However, it is sometimes used in the interpretations of quantum mechanics.)

Now how bizarre is all that?

So here’s a taster of Hawking’s very own philosophy:

“There is no picture- or theory-independent concept of reality. Instead we will adopt a view that we will call model-dependent realism: the idea that a physical theory or world picture is a model (generally of a mathematical nature) and a set of rules that connect the elements of the model to observations. This provides a framework with which to interpret modern science.”

Sure, it might have been the case that Hawking didn’t see his model-dependent realism as a philosophical position. He might have seen it as, say, a simple description of “the facts” or a description of the methodologies of physics. Yet that too would have been very naïve.

In addition, since Hawking classed himself as “a positivist” on more than one occasion, then his complete rejection of philosophy was even more ridiculous and naïve that so far characterised.

Many of the words above may also apply to Lawrence Krauss.

Lawrence Krauss and Sabine Hossenfelder

In an interview with Ross Anderson, American theoretical physicist and cosmologist Lawrence Krauss (1954-) said:

[T]he worst part of philosophy is the philosophy of science; the only people, as far as I can tell, that read work by philosophers of science are other philosophers of science.”

Despite that, Marcus Munafo (a professor of biological psychology) and George Davey Smith (the director of the MRC Integrative Epidemiology Unit at the University of Bristol) have written the following words:

“Richard Feynman once claimed that the ‘philosophy of science is as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds.’ We disagree.”

Sure, that’s an example of only two scientists mentioning the philosophy of science. That said, perhaps I don’t need any examples for my general argument here.

In any case, perhaps physicists would pick up on the fact that these two pro-philosophy scientists aren’t physicists. (Biological psychology isn’t physics and epidemiology isn’t physics either.) So are such anti-philosophy physicists Sheldon Cooper-type characters in that they too have very little respect for any discipline — other than mathematics — that isn’t theoretical physics? (Shelden Cooper is — or was — a young and “eccentric” theoretical physicist in the American sitcom The Big Bang Theory.)

This state of affairs was also perfectly captured by the German theoretical physicist and YouTube presenter Sabine Hossenfelder.

Hossenfelder wrote an article (called ‘Electrons Don’t Think’) on the philosophical position of panpsychism. In that article she doesn’t quote a single panpsychist, tackle a single argument in support of panpsychism or even paraphrase a single panpsychist’s words. (See my ‘Sabine Hossenfelder Doesn’t Think… About Panpsychism’.)

Hossenfelder may argue that she hasn’t the time to do any research on panpsychism or on philosophy generally. Yet she had the time to write this article on panpsychism.

Some commentators and readers may also argue that it’s only the philosophy of science that physicists like Krauss and Hossenfelder have a problem with. Yet that obviously doesn’t apply to Hossenfelder’s words on panpsychism.

So if Krauss and Hossenfelder already believe that “philosophy hasn’t kept up with science” (and therefore that philosophy has nothing to offer science/physics), then no wonder they have such a naïve view of philosophy. That is, Krauss and Hossenfelder are taking part in some kind of self-fulfilling prophecy here:

i) Because Kraus and Hossenfelder already believe that philosophy has nothing to offer science,
they never read philosophy.
ii) And because they never read philosophy,
they consequently believe that philosophy has nothing to offer science.

That said, it can be assumed that both Kraus and Hossenfelder would argue the following (though perhaps they wouldn’t even bother doing so):

Because we’ve already read philosophy, then that’s why we believe that philosophy has nothing to offer science.

There are many reasons to strongly believe that isn’t the case. (Some of those reasons are mentioned in this essay.)

Thus, all Krauss and Hossenfelder are really showing us here is their own ignorance of philosophy. They aren’t showing us that (all? some?) philosophers are ignorant of physics and science generally.

To sum up.

One gets the impression (which can be backed up with fact) that people like Krauss and Hossenfelder simply haven’t read much — or even any — contemporary philosophy. What’s more, at various places and at various times (if in roundabout ways), they’ve freely admitted this! After all, why should Krauss, Hossenfelder and other anti-philosophy physicists read philosophy if they already believe (as just argued) it’s a waste of time?

Some Physicists Have Been Right

Not to be entirely one-sided and biased, it’s worth stating that some of the criticisms of philosophy from physicists have been worthwhile, apt, and… philosophical.

Indeed many philosophers have themselves claimed that philosophy is dead (if not in those precise words).

Why “dead”?

Again, it’s because some (i.e., not all!) philosophers haven’t kept up with physics and science generally. (As stated, however, it depends how the words “kept up with science” are read.)

Ontic structural realists are a clear example of this. (They too don’t have every philosopher under the sun in mind.)

And a few other philosophers (such as Daniel Dennett — see here) are also critical of philosophers for many of the same reasons cited by anti-philosophy physicists.

On a related theme.

One can understand how certain physicists are irked by philosophers if the American philosopher of physics, David Z. Albert, was correct when he stated (in the video cited above) the following:

“There have been instances of philosophers telling physicists that they’re not doing their jobs properly.”

That may explain why these anti-philosophy physicists get so pissed off by philosophers. At least David Albert’s words may offer us a partial explanation of that.

So now take on board the following passage (which is in tune with what Albert just said) from the philosopher of science, Wesley Salmon. He wrote:

“While the philosopher of science may be basically concerned with abstract logical relations, he can hardly afford to ignore the actual methods that scientists have found acceptable. If a philosopher expounds a theory of the logical structure of science according to which almost all of modern physical science is methodologically unsound, it would be far more reasonable to conclude that the philosophical reasoning had gone astray than to suppose that modern science is logically misconceived.”

The host of the previously-cited video debate also tells us that physicists claim that “philosophers don’t add any knowledge to the world”. That’s very ironic because it was philosophers themselves (e.g., the logical positivists and Ludwig Wittgenstein — see here) who first made precisely that point in the 1920s and 1930s.

Yet this also means that in order for physicists to claim that philosophy doesn’t add any knowledge to the world, then surely they must do some philosophising themselves. Among other things, anti-philosophy physicists must do the following:

1) Explain what they mean by the word “knowledge”.
2) Tell us why philosophical claims aren’t examples of knowledge.
3) Tell us why scientific knowledge is actually the only kind of knowledge. 
4) And finally tell us why scientific knowledge (or science itself) must have such a preeminent status in society.

None of the positive or negative answers to those questions will be scientific in nature. And they certainly won’t be part of physics!

One would hope, then, that anti-philosophy physicists won’t argue that such questions shouldn’t even be asked.

However, if any physicists did argue (or simply believe) that these questions are a waste of time (i.e., precisely because they’re philosophical), then that extreme position would itself need to be philosophically defended and backed up. And if such scientists didn’t defend it (or if they believe that they aren’t required to defend it), then that stance will — again — need a philosophical defence.

Ironically, it can just as easily be said that much physics is dead because physicists haven’t kept up with philosophy.

History

Historically, it was the case that nearly all scientific advances had their roots in philosophical ideas and theories. And as a consequence of that, it can now be said that the revolutionaries of physics have always been both philosophically inclined and aware of much philosophy.

So although there have indeed been critical remarks about philosophy from physicists, there haven’t been as many as some readers may think.

Albert Einstein, to take just one example, owed a strong debt to Ernst Mach, Immanuel Kant and Baruch Spinoza (as well as others). Even Isaac Newton was well-schooled in philosophy and his own physics was called (as is often pointed out) “natural philosophy”.

In terms of contemporary — as well as somewhat less recent — philosophical physicists and physicists who don’t diss philosophy (though they do, of course, diss particular philosophical positions or theories), we have Lee Smolin, Roger Penrose, Carlo Rovelli, Murray Gell-Mann, Sean Carroll, Brian Greene, Julian Barbour, Paul Davies, Freeman Dyson, John Wheeler, Martin Rees, Steven Weinberg, etc. But if we go back in history, there’ve been many other philosophical physicists (from Isaac Newton to Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg); many of whom were also very knowledgeable about philosophy.

One must also admit here that being a philosophical physicist doesn’t necessarily mean that such a physicist must also be a very-big fan of philosophy. They don’t need to, say, keep bang up-to-date with all the top academic philosophy journals.

In any case, many physicists have only ever mentioned dead philosophers (i.e., not contemporary ones). The American philosopher and journalist Jim Holt, for example, tells us that when the philosophy of science is brought to the attention of physicists, they always say: “Oh, you mean Karl Popper?”

So is that (at least partly) why these anti-philosophy physicists believe what they believe about philosophy? That is, perhaps they believe that philosophy of science = Karl Popper. Indeed was Popper himself an example of one of those philosophers who (to use Wesley Salmon’s words again) “ignore[d] the actual methods that scientists have found acceptable”?

As stated earlier, it’s very hard to say because most (or all) anti-philosophy physicists rarely cite any details about the philosophy they dislike or see as being “irrelevant”.

In addition, none of the above is to claim that the physical theories of these philosophical physicists were actual examples of philosophy.

Some critics of philosophy have been keen to point this out. Yet the statement that theories in physics aren’t themselves expressions of philosophy is a statement of the obvious.

In detail.

Critics of philosophy (i.e., not only physicists) have felt the need to point out to me the irrelevance of the “context of discovery”. One such critic cited Albert Einstein as an example of this.

He pointed out that Einstein loved playing the violin and that this hobby didn’t impact on his actual physics.

Sure!

But what about Einstein and philosophy?

As if Einstein’s philosophical positions and influences were equivalent to his playing the violin, drinking wine while theorising about physics or being a penniless member of the bourgeoisie.