.: Was Wittgenstein a Language-games Relativist?

Wednesday, 7 October 2015

Was Wittgenstein a Language-games Relativist?

In very simple terms, the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) was concerned with whether concepts are useful or not.

At first glance, Wittgenstein’s position on the introduction of new concepts into different (what he called) language-games (or Sprachspiel) seems very pragmatist or even instrumentalist in nature. (See ‘Wittgenstein and Pragmatism’ and ‘Wittgensteinian instrumentalism’.)

So one may now ask how can such concepts be useful if the entities they refer to don’t in fact exist or have any reality. In other words, doesn’t the usefulness of such concepts depend on — or presuppose — the existence or reality of what it is they refer to? (Wittgenstein specifically wrote about Sigmund Freud’s “subconscious thoughts” and Georg Cantor’s “different infinities”.)

So does “use” rely — or depend — on reality?

[It can be seen in the quote above — from Philosophical Grammar — that Wittgenstein never believed that this issue was only about “use”.]

Isn’t it the case that, say, the concepts ROUND SQUARE and FLAT NUMBER aren’t much use if the entities they refer to don’t exist or aren’t real?

[The word “refer” as just been used. It’s usually words or terms which are said to refer, rather than concepts. Concepts are said to have extensions instead.]

Take the possible worlds of analytic philosophers.

Possible worlds may not be real, However, they have proved to be useful and fruitful when it comes to formalising and clarifying our modal notions. Thus the concepts PHILOSOPHICAL DONKEY and GOLDEN MOUNTAIN may prove useful in some respects. That said, these two examples aren’t exactly equivalent to the concepts ROUND SQUARE and FLAT NUMBER. That’s primarily because there are mountains, there is gold, there are donkeys and there is the phenomenon of being philosophical. And gold and mountain can be juxtaposed without contradiction. So too with donkey and being philosophical. However, roundness and squareness, as well as flatness and number, can’t likewise be juxtaposed.

The American philosopher W.V.O. Quine’s position on (abstract) numbers wasn’t so distant from Wittgenstein’s position on the introduction of new concepts. Quine basically believed that numbers have instrumental use value. Quine also believed that it’s dishonest to deny the existence or reality of numbers when during one’s practice (i.e., in mathematics and physics) one effectively assumes that they do in fact exist or are real. (See ‘Quine–Putnam indispensability’.)

So is it the case that because numbers have instrumental value, then they must also exist or be real?

Why use the concept (to use Wittgenstein’s own example) SUBCONSCIOUS THOUGHTS (or plain SUBCONCIOUS) in our grammar if there are no such things as subconscious thoughts? What possible use could such a concept have if that usage doesn’t depend on the reality or existence of subconscious thoughts?

[Unconscious or non-conscious mental activities shouldn’t be confused with Freud’s and other theorists’ subconscious thoughts.]

Of course we can now debate the concept EXISTENCE itself; which has been used — or hinted at — a couple of times above. However, that’s doesn’t seem to be the point that Wittgenstein was making. In his view, we could introduce just about any concept into our grammar if we deem it useful to do so.

In a sense Wittgenstein was absolutely right.

The concept SUBCONSCIOUS THOUGHTS no doubt does have its uses. In other words, that concept explains many mental and behavioural phenomena.

For example, why does subject S behave in such a self-contradictory manner? It can be supposed that he does so because his subconscious thoughts are having some kind of effect on his conscious mental life and behaviour…

… Yet is it actually the case that S has such subconscious thoughts?

After all, there may be many other explanations of S’s behaviour which don’t include references to subconscious thoughts or to the subconscious generally.

Perhaps Wittgenstein might have responded: Then why not introduce new concepts into your grammar instead?

The only thing that matters, according to this reading of Wittgenstein, is whether or not these new concepts work within the overall domain of our grammar (or within a particular language-game).

Additionally, if old concepts no longer work, then get rid of them.

Some will argue, however, that certain old concepts didn’t work precisely because they had no basis in reality (e.g., PHLOGISTON, ETHER, etc.). That said, the characters and events in works of fiction aren’t actual or real; though they nevertheless prove to be (if in a loose sense) useful. They’re useful in that they display to readers, say, general kinds of situation and general kinds of character. That said, fictional events and characters are often (or always) parasitical on events and characters in the real (or actual) world. Thus such works of fiction work precisely because they indirectly refer (in the minds of the readers) to existents. Indeed even the most extreme works of fictional irrealism must depend on these kinds of indirect reference otherwise their readers wouldn’t relate to the works or even be able to make sense of them.

If we return to Wittgenstein’s general thesis.

Wouldn’t such a fast-and-loose attitude to concept-formation result in a multiplicity of contradictory concepts?

Relativism, Rules and Laws

If practices, customs, “forms of life” (see Wittgenstein’s position here) or language-games are truly autonomous, then perhaps the notion of conceptual contradiction doesn’t really have much purchase. That’s primarily because it presumes the existence of a correct (or true) language-game (or even a meta-practice) which somehow stands above all other language-games to pass its supreme judgement on them.

So if we take Wittgenstein’s (possible) position to its extreme limit, then any group can formulate any concept it wishes. That is, there will be no meta-language-game (or meta-practice) to tell them what concepts they can or can’t formulate. Thus everything everybody says would make sense in the context of the language-game it’s embedded in.

Again, Wittgenstein’s position automatically rules out any meta-language (or meta-language-game) which would try to make sense of the conceptual flux and chaos around it. Thus we would simply need to accept that it’s literally the case that anything goes. And that would primarily be because each individual language-game would be formulating its own rules.

In any case and according to the late Wittgenstein, such rules aren’t (as Ray Monk puts Wittgenstein’s early position) “fixed by immutable laws of logical form”. They are, instead, fixed by custom, practice or forms of life. Therefore, on this reading, rules couldn’t possibly be laws (certainly not “immutable laws”). That’s because laws are (usually) deemed to be universally applicable — i.e., applicable across the board. The rules of a language-game, on the other hand, may only apply to two individual (as it were) players.

Rules are therefore simply contingent conveniences instigated to serve the particular purpose at hand. Indeed they can be disregarded (or amended) according to new situations or purposes.

In may even be the case that — at least some — laws are laws even though they simply and only abide by arbitrary and contingent rules which are themselves custom- or practice-relative. Thus on this reading such laws are custom-built entities which have often (or usually) come to be seen as belonging to something beyond the station of mere rules. In other words, at least some laws are taken to be universal. However, such laws may be no more universal than poached eggs or flared trousers.