Monday, 27 October 2025

The Religious Physics of Paul Davies, as Expressed By the Physicist Himself

 

The central argument in this essay is that the theoretical physicist Paul C. W. Davies believes that he’s moved beyond (what he often calls) “conventional religion” into the realms of his very own religion of physics and physical cosmology. What’s more, the evidence provided for this conclusion can be found in his own words.

The title of this essay may seem to some readers to be clickbait or deliberately provocative. So it needs to be explained straight away.

The central claim is that the theoretical physicist Paul Davies sees physics (alongside physical cosmology) as a religion. More accurately, he sees his own physics as a religion. However, this isn’t a religious physics that has anything to do with those religious and “anti-materialist” critics who believe that scientists treat science as a religion without really knowing that they do so. Nor is this essay about those physicists who’re supposed to have “faith in physics” or who believe in “non-empirical theories”. Indeed, Davies himself accuses other physicists of “taking science on faith”.

So does Davies’s strategy amount to the following position? -

If both religion and science are based on faith, then why shouldn’t physicists make the faith elements of their own physics both stronger and more explicit?

Of course, Davies and others may say that there’s no such thing as “religious physics” — there’s only physics. In a certain sense, that’s true. However, what we’re really talking about here are the interpretations (or philosophies) of physics, not physics itself. (This is parallel to the many interpretations of quantum physics.)

So, if the title is clickbait, then Davies’s own claims are clickbait because he is honest and open about his own take on physics. For example, take the following passage:

“It struck me then that the best way to answer not only the puzzle of free will but all the Really Big Questions of existence was not through religion but theoretical physics.”

And then comes the clincher:

“So theoretical physics became, in a sense, my religious quest, the best hope I had of making sense of the world and my place within it.”

Davies then offers his readers some autobiographical details to make sense of all this. He tells us that he

“flirted with conventional religion in my midteens but found it disappointingly shallow, the answers either too glib or else incomprehensible”.

Davies even uses the language of a prophet of guru when he says that he was “born to be a theoretical physicist”. Then, in the following passage, he also comes clean about what drives him:

“There has always been something deep inside me — a sort of restlessness, verging on a sense of destiny — that drives me. It’s a feeling of being drawn inexorably toward the serene heart of existence, a compulsion to search for hidden meaning in the universe, along with a conviction that meaning is in fact out there, lying just — but only just — within my grasp.”

Apart from writing in extremely portentous terms (as well as his honest and detailed acknowledgement of his psychological motivations), Davies believes that he knows that the universe has a meaning. Yet, if the “meaning is in fact out there”, then he’s not searching for something that may exist: he’s searching for something which he (already) believes does exist. Not only that: Davies claims the meaning of the universe is within his own grasp.

Making Sense of Davies Making Sense of the World

Wikimedia Commons. Source here.

If we backtrack to the quotes above. Physics has nothing to say about “making sense of the world”. It has nothing to say about our “place within it” either.

Paul Davies doesn’t mean physical sense, or the sense that physics may provide about the laws, and fundamentals of the universe. His sense is a meta sense — i.e., something over and above anything that can be offered by physics alone. Instead, it’s something that can be supplied only by religion or philosophy. Indeed, it’s something that’s supplied by Davies’s own religious physics.

Of course, Davies and physicists generally can use the theories and findings of physics to make sense of the world and their place within it. Yet physics alone will never provide us with meaning or the sense of place within the universe which Davies so desires. (Most physicists would argue that the universe has no meaning — at least not in the sense desired by Davies.)

In any case, “the meaning of the universe” is an idée fixe of Davies. Readers will loose count of the times he uses that phrase in his many books. Davies admits this when he tells his readers that theoretical physics was “better suited [to his] temperament and conformed to [his] long-standing quest for meaning”. He then jumps forward in time and expresses his current position:

“Like most scientists, I still look at the world with wonder and ask myself, ‘What’s it all about?’ One day I’ll know.”

It’s true that “most scientists” look at the world with wonder. However, they rarely also ask, “What’s it all about?” This isn’t a phrase that they’d use. That said, even if some physicists do use it, then it wouldn’t have the same meaning to them as it does to Davies himself. This is because the aboutness that Davies desires cannot be found in physics itself (or physics alone). However, Davies believes otherwise.

“Occult” Mathematical Physics

In Raphael’s fresco The School of Athens, Pythagoras is shown writing in a book as a young man presents him with a tablet showing a diagrammatic representation of music theory on a lyre above a drawing of the sacred tetractys. Wikimedia Common. Source here.

Like a true (neo)Pythagorean, Paul Davies stresses mathematics.

Firstly, he asks his readers the following question:

“How is it, indeed, that we can capture the workings of nature using human mathematics?”

This is a question (even if not expressed in precisely the same way in which Davies expresses it) that’s been asked by many physicists over the years. However, it’s what Davies draws from this that’s interesting, and which divulges his religious leanings too. Indeed, Davies deliberately expresses himself in a religious language.

For example, Davies tells his readers that he “came to see the equations of theoretical physics as the universe’s hidden subtext”. Then the language is upped a little when Davies adds the following words:

“By learning the arcane language and procedures of mathematics, I could access an occult world of forces and fields, of invisible subatomic particles and subtle interactions.”

Here again, what Davies says is not too out of tune with what non-religious physicists say (i.e., apart from the addition of the words “occult world”). As before, it’s what he adds to this that’s of interest.

Davies also tells us that he

“felt as if I had been inducted into a secret society, where by following a set of special rules I could unveil an alternative reality — in fact, a deeper level of reality, which somehow came closer to the soul”.

There’s nothing wrong with Davies using metaphors and poetic phrases. However, he does far more than offer his readers a literary prose style. Indeed, he freely confesses — many times — that he’s doing more than that.

As a quick example, the words “closer to the soul” can be simply interpreted as Davies writing in a literary style. Yet I don’t believe that it’s only that.

Part Two

“Religious Physics”?

God the Geometer — Gothic frontispiece of the Bible moralisée, representing God’s act of Creation. France, mid-13th century. Wikimedia commons. Source here.

I didn’t make up the term “religious physics”. It already exists. Indeed, religious physics can take on many forms and come under various names.

In some detail. In his own religious physics, Davies focusses on fine tuning, the laws of the universe and even evolution, rather than on, say, quantum physics and consciousness.

The following description of religious physics (also called “theophysics”) perfectly describes Davies’s own position on physics:

“In philosophy, theophysics is an approach to cosmology that attempts to reconcile physical cosmology and religious cosmology. It is related to physicotheology, the difference between them being that the aim of physicotheology is to derive theology from physics, whereas that of theophysics is to unify physics and theology.”

Oddly, the either/or option above doesn’t seem to work for Davies because it can be argued that he’s attempting to “unify physics and theology” too.

More specifically, Davies’s position is very close to those who believe that they can deduce their religion (or theology) from the existence and nature of the physical world itself.

It was said that the paragraph above perfectly describes Davies’s position — with one big (or small) exception! That exception is that Davies says that he doesn’t believe in God…

But hang on here. Davies both does, and does not, believe in God. So, as it stands, it depends on exactly which God is being talked about. [See here.]

Davies and God

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Levi Ponce’s Luminaries of Pantheism mural in Venice, California, for The Paradise Project. At Wikimedia Commons. (The source is here.)

Paul Davies isn’t a Christian. He’s not a follower of any other conventional religion either. Davies even says that his belief in a “directional principle” is a “far cry from the God of traditional monotheism”. Yet the argument in this essay is that Davies is still religious. So, sure, Davies’s “cosmic purpose” may well be a far cry from the Abrahamic God. However, it’s not a far cry from other notions of God, or from the beliefs of other religions dating back well over two thousand years.

Davies’s position also squares fairly well with the position of “theistic evolution”, in which it is held that God acts through the laws of nature, which also includes evolution. Yet, in his case, God is the laws of nature, etc. (See a Muslim scholar classing Davies as a “pantheist” here.) Consequently, one position Davies certainly won’t accept is what’s called “interventionism”. This is the position that has it that God can intervene in the natural world, and by so doing actually break the laws of nature.

In any case, Davies is certainly attempting to “reconcile physical cosmology and religious cosmology” — just not with what he often calls “conventional religion” (or with conventional religious cosmology).

As already stated, Davies says that he doesn’t believe in the conventional God. Thus, the “God of the gaps” won’t have any appeal to him. What’s more, none of the quotes in this essay suggest that Davies is speaking in terms of the God of the gaps.

For example, Dr Brandon Rickabaugh wrote the following words:

“Paul Davies, for example, entertains the hypothesis that ‘the universe has engineered its own self-awareness through quantum backward causation or some other physical mechanism yet to be discovered.’ ‘In this way,’ says Davies, ‘the universe could both create itself and steer itself toward its destiny.’”

Now let Davies speak for himself:

“[My religious physics] builds purpose into the workings of the cosmos at a fundamental (rather than an incidental) level, without positing an unexplained pre-existing purposive agent to inject purpose miraculously.”

Paul Davies put his own teleological position in the following way too:

“[T]he bio-friendliness of the universe arises from an overarching law or principle that constrains the universe/multiverse to evolve towards life and mind. It has the advantage of ‘taking life seriously’, treating it neither as a completely unexplained bonus [] nor as a mere passive selector [].”

So it’s almost as if what is found in physics (or in the universe itself) is all that Davies needs. Of course, this may seem like a brand of pantheism to many. More clearly, while it can be said that Davies isn’t a strict pantheist, he does argue that the laws of physics aren’t actually an expression of an external (conventional) God. Instead, the laws of nature constitute God. Or, less abstractly, the universe itself is God.

Saturday, 11 October 2025

Babbage, Lovelace and the Analytical Engine: Symbols vs Numbers

 

Ada Lovelace (often called “the first computer programmer”) had an important insight when she contemplated Charles Babbage’s difference engine. She believed that it should move beyond mere calculation. It should, instead, tackle computation more generally. In other words, it should move from numerical operations to “symbolic manipulations”. This raises the philosophical issue (at least in this essay) as to what numbers are: Are they abstract objects or mere “marks on paper”? Moreover, how do this question relate to our view of computers generally?

Charles Babbage’s analytical engine, via Wikimedia Commons. Source here.)

General Purpose?

When the words “general purpose computer” are used it’s often the case that they aren’t really explained. Indeed, some laypeople may even interpret such words literally. However, the “general” in “general purpose” is far less… general than you may think.

In very simple terms, the words “general purpose” refer to a machine that’s Turing-complete. Moreover, that term only refers to a machine’s relation to other machines, not to being able to do the washing up or take the dog for a walk.

A machine (or something purely abstract) is said to be Turing-complete if it can be used to simulate any Turing machine. Thus, this refers to a machine understanding, decoding or simply recognising other machines — and, more importantly, working on — or with — their rules, algorithms, data, etc. This is technically expressed in terms of Turing equivalence. Thus:

Two computers P and Q are called equivalent if P can simulate Q and Q can simulate P.

Charles Babbage

Charles Babbage. Source, Wikimedia Commons here.

The interest in general-purpose computers dates back to the work and designs of Charles Babbage. So it’s here that Babbage’s “difference engine” and “analytical engine” need to be discussed.

The analytical engine was a proposed computer (or engine) designed by English mathematician Charles Babbage. He first described it in 1837 as the successor to his own difference engine, which was a design (i.e., not a concrete thing) for a mechanical calculator.

The historian of computing, Doron Swadestates that the analytical engine

“is a general-purpose computational engine [which] embodies [ ] almost every single significant logical feature of the modern digital computer”.

[See note.]

The difference engine, on the other hand, dealt with “something specific that has a fixed set of functions”.

The analytical engine was general purpose because “it was meant to be programmable, and it would automatically execute multiplication, division, subtraction and addition”.

In terms of the title of this essay: it can be seen here that we’re still dealing with numbers when it comes to the difference engine. Or, more accurately, we’re dealing with arithmetic. Clearly, a machine that deals exclusively with numbers (or arithmetical operations) cannot be “all purpose”. So the advance here is to use numbers to deal with… all purposes. Or, more widely, to use symbols to deal with all purposes. (Numbers and symbols as they are instantiated within “engines”, machines or computers.)

Ada Lovelace

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Ada Lovelace, by Alfred Edward Chalon. Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons here:

An historical account of the difference between the difference engine and the analytical engine may be of help here. The following paragraph is Doran Swade on that subject as it relates to Ada Lovelace:

“[ ] For those years [in the late 1930 and early 1940s], John Fuegi suggested, there is no evidence that the first machines were moving beyond the difference machine in the way Lovelace’s notes move beyond. They were still continuing with calculation, as though they had gone back to the difference engine rather than the analytical engine. After that it is hard to define historically when computers moved from calculating, say, the simple trajectories of artillery shells and mathematics to general-purpose computing.”

The important word in the long quote above is “calculation”. Simply put, calculation alone couldn’t have been classed as general purpose. So it can be asked here how the move from calculation to “general-purpose computing” came about.

Swade tells us that Ada Lovelace

“saw that these machines were not bound exclusively by numbers, making the essential transition to a number representing something other than quantity”.

So numbers weren’t actually transcended here. Instead, the idea of numbers as exclusively representing “quantity” was transcended. This is what flummoxes many laypersons. They see numbers, and then they assume either that such numbers have a relation to other numbers, or that the numbers must refer exclusively to quantities of some kind.

These distinctions were captured by Lovelace herself. She made the distinction by stating that calculation and computation aren’t the same thing. This also shows us that calculation is a subbranch of computing, rather than computing being a subbranch of calculation.

In terms of the analytical engine, it “could represent something other than quantity, such as notes of music or letters of the alphabet”. Indeed, if you randomly throw a pack of cards onto the floor, the many relations between the cards can still be represented numerically — even if they don’t instantiate symmetries or patterns. (There is little point in actually doing this.) On the other hand, numbers can represent the physical nature of a quark or the tensile strength of a bridge over a river.

Lovelace also captured something that later became important in late-19th-century logic. As Swade puts it, Lovelace “made the transition from arithmetic to symbolic manipulation”. Indeed, what the manipulation of numbers and symbols share is that this is carried out “according to rules”. (It can now even be said that rules are fundamental: numbers or symbols are secondary.)

[All this can be seen in Ada Lovelace’s “notes”, as found in ‘Sketch of of the Analytical Engine Invented by Charles Babbage’. These notes can also be found here.]

Gödel Numbering, Numbers and Symbols

Now take the specific and well-known case of Gödel numbering some eighty years after Lovelace’s death.

Kurt Gödel assigned numbers to things which aren’t quantities, such as mathematical and logical statements, proofs, etc. In this limited sense, then, numbers are convenient tools for representing things which aren’t themselves numbers.

However, what about using numbers to symbolise literally anything at all?

This is why non-mathematicians are often intimidated by the use of numbers and other mathematical devices. In other words, many people don’t realise that there can be a numerical account of almost anything! (For example, window open = 1. Window shut = 0.)

Numbers are as useful or convenient as hammers, nails, or whatever. This idea is a seemingly non-Platonic view of numbers. And even in physics a physicist can take a non-Pythagorean (rather than non-Platonic) position on numbers as they relate to the world, and on their use in physical theories.

Symbols can represent things other than numbers or quantities. Added to that, if one is a non-Platonist (rather than a non-Pythagorean), then, say, the number 2 is a symbol even if there are no quotation marks around it. In other words, 2 (not just ‘2’) is a (both metaphorically and literally) “mark on paper”. This stance is directly relevant to the use of numbers in computers and other machines.

Plato. Wikimedia Commons here.

Platonists and many others, on the other hand, believe that the number 2 is an abstract object. (They may never express their position in that precise way.) This basically means that 2 is an abstract Platonic form in Platonic heaven — alongside 3, 1001, Truth, Justice, Man, etc.

Of course, even non-Platonists deny that numbers are purely symbols. Take this categorical statement:

“Numbers are not symbols, but they do have a meaning that allows them to be added, multiplied, compared, and so on.”

If a number is only a mark on paper (or purely syntactic in nature), then it doesn’t offer us information or a meaning. Arguably, if 2 isn’t a mark, then it it must have, say, a “meaning” or even a “referent”.

This debate parallels one which occurred within modern logic.

Take this remark which states that modern logic is

“fundamentally a calculus whose rules of operation are determined only by the shape and not by the meaning of the symbols it employs, as in mathematics [ ]”.

It’s also often said that logic concerns itself with the form of arguments, not with their contents.

So now we can say that arithmetic (i.e., not all of mathematics) concerns itself with the forms of numbers, not with their contents.

This huge and historical debate needn’t be discussed here, save to say that it has relevance to the use of numbers and symbols in computers. In this case at least, the “shape” of numbers is, arguably, all that’s required.

Note:

Those outside computer nerdery may now be wondering how the word “logical” (as in the earlier clause “almost every logical feature of the modern digital computer”) is being used here. More precisely, some readers may wonder how “every logical feature” can be captured or represented by the actions of a computer.

For example, how do we move from either/or (logically symbolised as ∨) to 1 or 0, and then to an “on or off” operation (as found in logic gates) in the computer’s circuitry? Moreover, what about every other logical feature (or operation) human beings have created and been interested in?