Derrida's Others

i) Introduction

ii) Derrida's Non-Conceptual Concepts

iii) Derrida's Language Game?

Deconstruction and/or post-structuralism attempted to “liberate the Other”. The problem is that there's an indefinite number of Others. And many Others are also at mutual odds with each other.

Whatever the case is, surely only a shared language - the language that deconstruction rejected or deconstructed - can liberate the Other. As Thomas A. McCarthy once put it:

“Deconstruction can hardly give voice to the excluded other. The wholesale character of its critique of logocentrism deprives it of any language in which to do so.”

That's why deconstruction couldn't even hint at anything directly political (rather than tangentially political) in any traditional sense. Hence the ineffable, obscure and pretentious prose. 

This is McCarthy again:

“It is [] merely by accident that his writings contain little analysis of political institutions and arrangements, historical circumstances and tendencies, or social groups and social movements, and no constructions of right and good, justice and fairness, legitimacy and legality?”

Isn’t it the case that ‘legality’, ‘legitimacy’, ‘fairness’, ‘justice’ - and nearly all the other concepts and words referred to by McCarthy - are examples of transcendental signifieds in Jacques Derrida’s book (or "text")? Thus, Derrida's only interest in words/concepts (or at least his interest in political and philosophical positions) was to violently deconstruct them. If he hadn't done that, then his whole enterprise would have self-destructed (if not deconstructed) itself.

So perhaps all this is the reason why Derrida only started to wax lyrically about Marx very late in his life. 

For example, he wrote his Specters of Marx in 1993 – some 40 years or more after he first started writing philosophy. Yes, this was Derrida's “political turn”.

Derrida's Non-Conceptual Concepts

Let's go into a little detail here with the example of justice.

If Derrida had created a new concept of JUSTICE (that's if one can have a new version of an old concept), then that would have been just another “centre” or “sign substitution”. (Or at least it would have been to Derrida himself.)

Even if a new concept for an old word were created, it would still be parasitical on the old concept (i.e., otherwise it wouldn't be a new concept for an old word).

That's why, for example, Marx wasn't just a “Left Hegelian”: he was still also a Hegelian. That's why “neo-Aristotelians” were/are still Aristotelians. And even an anti-Christian like Nietzsche was infected (as it were) by - and parasitical upon - Christianity itself.

So perhaps the very notion of a new version of an old concept doesn't make sense. It may be better to call it a variation on an old concept (or an elaboration on it); rather than an equivalent. If we want a strict equivalent (or just any equivalent), then why not stick with the old concept?

An alternative to an old concept, however, is a different thing entirely. This might have been what Derrida was trying to do. If that were the case, then he could hardly have used words like ‘fairness’, ‘right’, ‘legitimacy’ or any of the other words referred to by McCarthy above. However, if Derrida created an entirely new conceptual vocabulary (or a Wittgensteinian private language), then this would explain the difficulty in reading his work. Thus, either he wasn't using traditional concepts at all; or he was creating new concepts - en masse. Alternatively, perhaps Derrida used old words and applied new concepts to them. In that case, complications would multiply indefinitely.

All this made Derrida's philosophy suspect and problematic when he used old words for alternative or new concepts. How would we know (as new readers) that this is what Derrida is actually doing? And if Derrida never gave definitions of his alternative concepts (which used old words), then we'd still be in the darkest of dark places.

Indeed, Derrida couldn't even use the concept CONCEPT because that too belongs to the forbidden vocabulary of (as he often put it) “traditional Western metaphysics”. Of course, it may not even be possible to reject the concept CONCEPT and still do philosophy - or even write or speak at all (as the late Wittgenstein might have put it). Thus, this was surely a rhetorical claim on Derrida’s part.

For a start, one must already have concepts to reject the concept CONCEPT. However, Derrida might have replied that he did indeed have the concept CONCEPT. However, it was his job to reject or deconstruct it. Thus, perhaps what he wrote is so far removed from traditional philosophy (of whichever kind) that he didn't even need the concept CONCEPT (or any other concept for that matter).

Derrida's Language Game?

How far removed from philosophy - and indeed traditional language - can one be and still make sense and say something? Again, I can hear a Derridean reply: I'm not saying anything! This wouldn't be so far removed from Wittgenstein (in certain moods) and Heidegger who emphasised the point of pointlessness or the need to escape from traditional kinds of thinking. There's still a problem. What does non-statemental and non-conceptual philosophy look like? Is the answer simple? It looks like Derrida’s philosophy and prose.

“Writing” (a term Derrida often used) itself needs to be overcome, rejected or deconstructed. The very thing that is WRITING is highly suspect and related to (amongst other things) “violence”. That's if we can call violence violence, it it, if...

References

Derrida, Jacques. (1973). Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs.

McCarthy, Thomas A. (1991) Ideals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contemporary Critical Theory.

Jacques Derrida on the Signifier and the Signifier

The writer Geoffrey Bennington goes into detail about Jacques Derrida's position on "signifiers". Derrida took the signifier-signified distinction to be central within Western metaphysics. It was supposedly believed that the general

“description of writing is that it is the (graphic) signifier of a (phonic) signifier, which is the signifier of an (ideal) signified”. 

This temporal relation between phonic and graphic signifiers was taken by Derrida to express the metaphysical belief - common from Plato onward - that whereas we have “full presence” in the case of a phonic signifier, we only have a second-order presence when it comes to the graphic signifier (i.e., in the case of "writing"). Generally speaking, sense, meaning or the signified is to some extent lost when it's written down because it no longer has its close relation to the signified – which itself can be taken to be the meaning, sense or concept (of a word).

Bennington goes on to say that “it can be shown that all signifiers refer for their meaning only to other signifiers” [2000]. Thus not only do we not have the referent (or object) as the signified (or meaning) of a word: a word doesn't even really have its own independent sense (or meaning). It is, instead, supplied with a sense (or meaning/signified) by other words. It thus follows, according to Bennington's Derrida at least, that if

“metaphysics wants to call the 'signifier of the signifier' by the name of 'writing', it has better call all language 'writing' if it wants to be consistent”. [Bennington, 2000]

The distinction here is that writing should be seen as “the signifier of the signifier”; whereas other forms of language (including speech) are “the signifier of the signified” because they're closer to the signified (or to meaning/sense). This distinction, however, was deemed bogus by Derrida because he believed that all language is infected by “writing” and thus all language is really “the signifier of the signifier”.

No spoken word has a privileged or closer position to the signified (or to meaning) than a written word. If we had that close relation to the signified (which constitutes “full presence” in Derrida’s terminology), then the “play of the sign” (another phrase from Derrida) wouldn't actually occur because we could bypass the signifier of the signifier (that is writing) and achieve closer harmony with the signified (or with meaning/sense).

Many philosophers have happily accepted that this distinction was indeed the case when it came to Plato and those Platonists who followed him. However, not all commentators would agree with Derrida’s metaphysical and ethico-political conclusions and interpretations. The fact that many 20th and 21st century analytic philosophers, for example, still accept not only the existence of abstract non-spatiotemporal meanings/senses and propositions: they also deem such things to be of vital philosophical importance. (Primarily because of the role they play in achieving determinacy of meaning, objectivity and even truth.)

For example, Frege (in his paper ‘The Thought’) deemed what he called “the Thought” (or the ‘sense’ of a true proposition/sentence/statement) to be of vital importance in the battle for objectivity and against what was then called - and still is - ‘psychologism’.

The Play of the Sign

It can be seen that Derrida’s “play of the sign” partly follows from the thesis of the “indeterminacy of meaning” (to steal - and perhaps misuse - a term from W.V.O. Quine).

Yet if meaning is genuinely indeterminate (in whichever way), then why did Derrida feel the need to emphasise the play of the sign? If all we have is play, then why the compulsion to emphasise this play in the first place? Perhaps Derrida's answer might have been this: 

All we have is play; though it doesn't follow that we believe that all we have is play. 

The deconstructionist strategies simply tell us that we have play and that the determinacy of meaning was (or is) a grand illusion which has played a huge part in Western philosophy.

Although we've been talking about the indeterminacy of word-meaning, such indeterminacy will evidently spread to “texts”; and, in fact, become even more apparent and inescapable in such contexts. Thus it was texts - not individual words or concepts - which were Derrida’s prime concern.

To put it at its most acute and simple, Bennington says that a

“text cannot exhaustively control the reading you give it (no text can read itself without remainder)… there is no end to reading, no conceivable horizon of interpretation”.

We can also say that even if a text did have a determinate meaning (or interpretation), then that meaning (or interpretation) wouldn't force itself on us - or even on an ideal reader. This parallels, to some extent, the argument against metaphysical realism in that we can say that even if there's a "way the world is" (that elusive “view from nowhere”), then this still wouldn't - and couldn't - guarantee that we'd get the world right. The text and the world don't tell us what to say about them - no matter how determinate the text is (or how "real" the world is).

As Bennington puts it: “no text can read itself”. Neither, for that matter, can the world. Just as in the Quinian scheme of “radical translation” we require the relativity of “translation manuals” (or conceptual schemes), so texts require interpretations. And interpretations are just that – interpretations. In that sense there can't be a true interpretation of a text; though Derrida did appear to argue (in later life) that that could be a better one. (Here we have a similar problem with the word "better".)

The Syntax & System of Western Metaphysics

What was being said by Derrida isn't that different words have the same meaning or even a similar meaning. Instead it's argued that we have a “network of mutually-defining elements in dynamic solidarity” (Bennington). In other words, once we bring on board one word or concept, then - almost of necessity - we'll also be required to bring on board other words and concepts. This won't simply be in order to define the word (or concept) under scrutiny: it will also be to back it up (argumentatively speaking). That's why Derrida argued that once we bring in a single metaphysical concept into the discussion, then we must also bring in “the entire syntax and system of Western metaphysics” [1970].

Just as mathematical structuralists stress the place of a number (or a numerical inscription) within a number-system (as well as under-stress - or deny - its referential role), so we can say something similar about the word’s role within a linguistic system and how that determines its meaning or even its identity. Thus what matters with the numerical inscription ‘3’ is that it comes below ‘4’ and above ‘2’. Similarly with the word ‘freedom’, which comes alongside words like ‘liberty’, 'rights' , ‘choice’ and whatnot. In other words, try defining ‘freedom’ without bringing in other terms (or concepts); which, in turn, will either eventually refer back to the word ‘freedom’. (Or, alternatively, contain terms which will themselves need defining.)

Think also of the vast armoury of terms which are brought on board when one uses the metaphysical term ‘substance’: such as ‘accident’, ‘property’, ‘essence’ and all the rest. This is indeed a package-deal. Can we go so far as Derrida and say that if we use a single (important) concept from Western philosophy, then we must also bring along with it “the whole syntax and system of Western metaphysics”?

A.N. Whitehead famously said that Western philosophy has just been a “footnote to Plato”. And since the resurrection of Aristotelian metaphysics (in Anglo-American analytic philosophy, at least) some fifty years or so back, we still have a whole battery of Aristotelian terms to deal with.

Another thing which Derrida argued is that we sometimes believe that we have new technical terms; though often they're nothing but what he called “sign-substitutions”. That is, a term that's substituted with another term which is only infinitesimally different to the original. Indeed sometimes the word is different; though the concept is exactly the same... 

References

Bennington, Geoffrey. (2000) Interrupting Derrida

Derrida, Jacques. (1970) 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences'
Frege, Gottlob. (1918) 'The Thought: A Logical Inquiry'
Whitehead, A.N. (1928) Process and Reality

Laurence BonJour’s Apriorism

The American philosopher Laurence BonJour (born in 1943) belongs to a group of philosophers who are re-evaluating aprioristic and rationalist philosophy. More concretely, these philosophers are both reassessing the a priori as well as mounting a defence of it. Some commentators, however, may say that it’s an exaggeration to claim that such philosophers are also re-evaluating rationalism itself; rather than their more selective (epistemic) apriorism.

Perhaps BonJour goes the furthest towards the kind of rationalism we would recognise from the Rationalists of the late 17th and early 18th centuries. Nonetheless, there are still substantial differences between BonJour’s work and these philosophers. The principle difference, to my mind, is BonJour’s acceptance of the possible experiential (or empirical) defeasibility of a priori claims, “reasons” or beliefs.

Is Thought Itself A Priori?

BonJour argues that in reasoning one can’t ever rely solely on experience. Even in the case of reasoning about premises which are empirical or experiential, something a priori is required to be added to the reasoning process. BonJour particularly talks in terms of the relations between the antecedent/s and consequents of arguments. His position comes in three parts; which I’ve schematised (using BonJour’s own words) in the following way:

i) “If all the things for which there are direct experiential reasons are already contained in the antecedent.

ii) “and if the consequent genuinely goes beyond the content of the antecedent.

iii) “then experience can offer no direct reason (and no indirect reason without assuming some other conditional of the same sort) for thinking that such a conditional proposition is true.”

What’s being stressed here is that the a priori move (or inference) — i.e., from the antecedent to the consequent — can’t itself rely on experience. Experience itself doesn’t provide the grounds for such a move.

BonJour argues that what is stated in i) to ii) above can be said of all reasoning and indeed of thinking itself. Thus, if the a priori is rejected, then that will lead to

“a deep and pervasive version of scepticism, one in which we have no reason for thinking that any of the various seemingly empirical claims that are not directly justified by experience are true”.

The point which is repeatedly made by BonJour is that even if our claims (or premises) are empirical (indeed even if they’re directly or fully empirical), that empirical content itself can’t account for the transitions between those empirical (experiential) premises and other empirical claims or conclusions.

It can of course be said that such logical moves have been made — and experienced — before and that is an empirical fact. Despite that, experiencing logical moves (in the past) and the logical moves themselves aren’t the same thing. We can make an inductive inference about the kinds of moves “average reasoners” make; though that won’t tell us anything about the move itself or whether or not it’s a priori in nature.

BonJour’s basic point is that, for example, conditionals can’t be shown — or known — to be true by recourse to experience itself; even if the antecedent and the consequent of a conditional are themselves have empirical (or experiential) content.

According to BonJour, naturalists and the followers of W.V.O. Quine, on the other hand, do believe that

“we never have a priori reasons for thinking that if one claim or set of claims is true, some further claim must be true as well”.

If such people do believe that, then what does BonJour think will follow from that position? BonJour believes that

“there is simply nothing that genuinely cogent reasoning could consist in… the rejection of a priori reasons is tantamount to intellectual suicide”.

So what, exactly, is BonJour’s problem? Why these severe words?

If a priori moves are really necessary and fundamental, then even if Quineans reject the a priori in word — they still won’t do so in deed. After all, BonJour has already argued that they can’t do so. Thus there could never be any such thing as “intellectual suicide” - and that’s according to BonJour’s own lights!

Reference

BonJour, Laurence. (2008) ‘In Defence of the a Priori’, in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (edited by Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa).

[I can be found on Twitter here.]

Laurence Bonjour on the A Priori Links in a Quinean Web

We can give an example of Laurence BonJour’s logical links between beliefs in the Quinean web.

Take this argument:

((P ∧ Q) ⊃ (R))

Say that we experience something which gets us to reject R above. If that happened, then we must reject the conjunction P ∧ Q because if P and Q are taken together they imply R. Thus either P is true or Q is true; though not both (perhaps neither is true).

In terms of the interactions of beliefs in the web, we may be led to reject or deny Q instead of P in order to achieve an overall equilibrium within the whole system. The point is that although experience inspired us to reject R, it didn't (directly) inspire us to the rejection of the conjunction, P ∧ Q. (Or perhaps it did; though indirectly.) That is, a direct experience got us to reject R, and then that same experience does get us to reject the conjunction, P ∧ Q, in that without it we wouldn't have rejected the conjunction. We can say, then, that experience only indirectly got us to reject the conjunction P∧ Q.

One of BonJour’s main targets is the idea that Quinean ‘systems’ or “the web of belief” somehow escapes from the a priori. Such a web or system is holistic in nature and is only supposed to “touch experience at the edges”. BonJour firstly describes the Duhemian thesis from which Quine derived his holistic position. BonJour writes:

“Quine’s extreme version of this thesis is the holistic claim that nothing less than ‘the whole of science’ can be meaningfully confronted with experience.” (ibid., p. 104/5)

It's because of the holistic nature of the entire system that even “a priori reasons” (or “our cherished logical laws”) may be given up if they don't concur or cohere with the whole system. Thus Bonjour writes:

“From this he infers that any claim in the total ‘web of belief’, including those for which there are allegedly a priori reasons, might be ‘given up’ in order to accommodate ‘recalcitrant experience’, and so, apparently, that such a priori reasons do not exist after all.” (ibid., pp. 104/5)

The interesting thing about this quote is that BonJour himself believes that some a priori reasons (or beliefs) may or can be “given up” due to new experiences. So why not all of them? The point is, however, that they can indeed be given up; though still be a priori in nature (as we shall see in a moment).

The first point that BonJour makes about Quine’s position above is that it “begs the question” against the a priori in that there's a simple assumption that, when it comes to the web of belief, experience (whether ‘recalcitrant’ or not) is everything. BonJour is claiming that the Quinean web of belief must contain a priori links between the individual beliefs contained in the web. However, BonJour is keen to stress that

“the rationalist can freely admit that holistic empirical reasons of this sort may count against a claim for which there is an a priori reason (or the reverse), with the ultimate outcome depending on their relative weight in a particular case”. (ibid., pp. 104/5)

Does this mean that BonJour believes that an “a priori reason” (which has “holistic empirical reasons” which “count against” it) must not thereby be a genuine a priori reason? Or does BonJour believe that a reason can indeed be a priori and still have holistic reasons which count against it?

Despite that acknowledgement of the corrigibility of a priori reasons, BonJour says that the rationalist will still “also insist that the very connections among beliefs that result in the holistic web can only be understood as a priori in character” (ibid., pp. 104-5).

BonJour state two moves here which he believes must be a priori in nature. First, take the ‘conditional’:

P) If a claim satisfies all of the conditions thus specified

Q) Then it's likely to be true.

Clearly the move from P to Q can't be empirical in nature nor based on experience. Thus the inference, according to BonJour, must be a priori. Not only that: BonJour questions the truth of the conditional by asking: “[W]hat reason there is for thinking that this conditional proposition is itself true?” (ibid., p. 105) In other words, our earlier conditional, if P, then Q, is “not directly justified by experience” (ibid., p. 105). Thus can it be included in a system of belief which is based around the importance of the outer beliefs and their direct relations to experience? BonJour thinks that it shouldn't be because an “appeal to its inclusion in such a system of belief would be plainly circular” (ibid., p. 105). BonJour’s general conclusion to this is that

“the idea of an a priori reason is both indispensable for any justification beyond that yielded by direct experience and at least as well understood as the idea of holistic empirical justification, which turns out in fact to depend upon it”. (ibid., p. 105)

BonJour then puts a point which was once expressed by Donald Davidson:

“Only another belief can justify a belief, not experience itself.”

From this we can say that experience, in and of itself, never justifies a belief. It may follow from this that a priori logical connections to previous beliefs and reasons provide us with the complete picture of justification. It's this very link between one belief (close to experience or not) and another that BonJour fixes upon. He writes that

“experience can provide a good reason for thinking that a belief in this category is true only if we have a logically prior good reason”. (ibid., p. 102)

Thus an experiential belief can only be deemed true if it has an a priori link with a “logically priori good reason” (ibid., p. 102) or with other beliefs (as Davidson puts it). That link won't be empirical or experiential in nature.

On Michael Devitt’s “Quinean alternative” we have the following two-fold web. It includes:

i) Beliefs which are ‘close to experience’ (on the ‘periphery’ of the Quinean web).

ii) Beliefs that are in the interior of the web.

According to the Quinean picture, beliefs captured by 2) above are justified “via links with beliefs at the periphery” (2008: Devitt, p. 2). There's a link between interior beliefs and the peripheral beliefs which are “close to experience”. Though, as many aprioristic logicians and philosophers point out, what about these links themselves? That is, “these justifications depend on the links themselves being justified” (ibid., p. 2). These links must be logical. And if they're logical, then they must be a priori in nature. Thus even Quine’s web has an a priori element. Or so the story goes.

BonJour has more to say about the links in Quine’s web of belief (or the links in any such system). He writes (quoted in Devitt, 2008):

“… if there is no a priori insight… no prediction will follow any more than any other… any… sort of connection between the parts of the system will become essentially arbitrary.” (2008: Devitt, p. 3)

BonJour is simply saying that if you don't accept a priori justification (or ‘insight’) for the links in Quine’s web of belief (or any other corresponding system), then the “connection between the parts of the system will become essentially arbitrary”. This must mean that if we don't have a priori justification (or insight), then we effectively have nothing (in such systems). And if we have nothing, then that is bound to lead to the “arbitrary” nature of the “connections between the parts of the system”.

The question remains: Is the a priori way out the only way out?

If we accept BonJour’s prognosis of the rejection of the a priori vis-à-vis Quine’s web of belief (or any other such parallel system), then it's no surprise the BonJour thinks “the rejection of all a priori justification is tantamount to intellectual suicide” (ibid., p. 3).

The question is again: Is the a priori the only game in town?

I mentioned that most people see logic as perhaps the only domain of the a priori (along with mathematics). Devitt says that

“the objection is that logic must be seen as a priori because we need logic to get evidence for against anything”. (ibid., p. 3)

BonJour is saying that, yes, fair enough, evidence is of supreme importance in science and in just about every other disciple. However, without the framework of logic, all this evidence would amount to nothing. Indeed it wouldn't even be evidence “for or against anything” if it were not for this logical framework or the logical links between this beliefs and that belief, or between this bit of evidence and that bit of evidence. Logic ties the whole thing together. That is why people say that “the logic of science” isn't itself scientific or a science. Science, as well as naturalism or empiricism, require logic. Thus science and empiricism (or naturalism) also require the a priori.

References

BonJour, L. (2008) ‘In Defense of the a Priori’, in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (eds. M. Steup and E. Sosa, Blackwell Publishing).

Devitt, M. (2008) ‘There is no a Priori’, in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology
Quine, W.V.O (1970/78) The Web of Belief

Lisa Warenski on Naturalism, Fallibilism and the A Priori

Lisa Warenski is a naturalist. She's committed to the “scientific method”. She characterizes that method by its “ongoing responsiveness of theory to evidence”.

How does the a priori fit into this?

Many apriorists would argue that “some class of claims [are] immune to empirical evidence”. Thus, such a position “would be in conflict with the naturalist’s commitment to scientific method”.

Fallibilism has been an important part of naturalist and empiricist philosophy - especially since C.S. Peirce. One would think that a naturalist and fallibilist would be against the a priori in all its forms. That isn't so in Warenski’s case. She says that

“[t]his fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with the naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it allows for a priori-justified claims to be sensitive to further conceptual developments and the expansion of evidence”.

Thus not only is Warenski a fallibilist, she also applies her fallibilism to the a priori itself; rather than simply rejecting it. She says that

“[g]iven the overthrow of Euclid’s parallel postulate and the discovery of the set-theoretic paradoxes, an apriorist has reason to be fallibilist about a priori claims independently of considerations of naturalism”.

Warenski divides her aprioristic fallibilism into two parts:

1. One might allow that we could be mistaken in thinking that an a priori claim is true.
2. One may be wrong in thinking that an a priori claim’s justification-conditions are actually a priori.

Warenski also accepts empirical defeasibility for a priori beliefs/claims. That empirical defeasibility applies to the two distinctions mentioned above:

1. The ‘truth’ of an a priori statement/belief can be defeated on empirical grounds.
2. The a priori warrant of a statement/belief can be defeated on empirical grounds.

There's more to this.

An a priori statement or belief can also be “revised on a priori grounds”. Thus it would be a priori defeasible rather than empirically defeasible. Warenski cites some interesting examples of the a priori defeasibility of the a priori. She says that

“[t]he need to revise naive set theory was recognized on purely conceptual grounds, and non-Euclidean geometries were developed prior to the discovery that space was non-Euclidean, so arguably the grounds for revision of an a priori claim could be purely conceptual”.

Thus “conceptual revision” amounts to a priori revision, according to Warenski. We can now say that “[i]f an a priori claim were to be revised on purely conceptual grounds, the revision would not undermine its a priori status”.

We can revise the a priori with the a priori. Not only that: a priori justified beliefs/claims may also come to be empirically supported!... Though not so quick! If an a priori justified belief/claim does come to be empirically supported, then Warenski argues that we can conclude with two points:

1. The belief/claim, or truth, wouldn't be defeated.
2. The a priori justification of the belief/claim above would be defeated.

Warenski offers us another interesting example. She writes:

“… Gauss doubted the a priori status of Euclid’s parallel postulate, understood as a claim about physical space; however, he thought it to be empirically corroborated.”

Here again there are two things to conclude from the quote above:

1. The parallel postulate itself wasn't undermined.
2. The a priori warrant for the parallel postulate was undermined.

A Priori Fallibilism & Naturalism

Despite this fusion of naturalism and apriorism (if that’s what it really is), Warenski happily accepts that a naturalist account of the a priori will prove to be, at best, problematic. She gives two primary reasons for this:

1. “The range of different kinds of beliefs, inference rules or claims that we might classify as a priori may not admit of a single positive characterization.”
2. “Different standards apply to different forms of positive epistemic appraisal: the conditions that must be met for entitlement or epistemically-blameless reasoning are weaker than what must be met for justification sufficient for knowledge.”

It's still clear that Warenski’s principle target isn't radical rationalism; but (extreme?) Quinean naturalism. Putting her case intuitively, she says that

“[i]t is hard to think of convincing cases of empirical observations that should count as evidence against elementary principles such as the law of identity or modus ponens”.

However, the rationalist shouldn't think that Warenski is a completely compliant rationalist.For example, she says that “given the peculiarities of quantum mechanics, perhaps there are such possible observations”.

A Priori Fallibilism & Revisability

Warenski is more explicit about apriorist fallibilism. She says that

“[a] fallibilist about a priori justification thinks that an a priori claim is empirically indefeasible, but he allows that we don’t know that future conceptual developments will never come to reveal empirical evidence against it”.

That characterization may sound self-contradictory at first sight. She's saying that a priori claim is indefeasible as it stands today; though it may defeasible according to how things stands in the future.

This isn't unlike Rudolph Carnap’s position on analyticity. Thus we can distinguish the following alternatives:

1. An analytic statement. Full stop.
2. Analytic-in-L

And in the case of fallibilist apriorism:

2. An a priori belief or justification. Full stop.
3. An a priori belief or justification at time t. (Or, perhaps, a priori-in-L.)

Warenski’s is clearly aware of one possible riposte to her position:

1. If P is known to be true,
2. then P is true.
3. If P is known to be true,
4. then it follows that P won't come to be undermined.
5. Therefore the fallibilist can't claim that both P is known to be true and that it's not known that P won't come to be undermined in the future.

If the a priori is revisable. Then logic, after all, is revisable. And then we're back to Quine.

Reference

Warenski, Lisa. (2008) ‘Naturalism, Fallibilism, and the A Priori’