Necessity & Possibility are Interdefinable

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A.N. Prior’s formal account of necessity and possibility within a propositional and modal context. Key: ◇ = possibly, □ = necessarily, ∨ = or, ∧ = and, P = proposition, ≡ = if and only if.

Within modal logic, necessity and possibility are interdefinable. In other words, we can define (or explain) necessity in terms of possibility, and we can define (or explain) possibility in terms of necessity.

To say that something is possible isn’t to say that it’s likely or unlikely, or that it probably will happen some time in the future. In this context at least, what is important about any given x being possible is that its (as it were) non-happeningness isn’t necessary.

So there’s nothing necessary about there being no unicorns or seven-foot-high cats.

Again, there are no unicorns. However, it’s not necessary that there are no unicorns. And there probably couldn’t be seven-foot-high cats. However, it isn’t necessary that there aren’t any, or that there won’t be any in the future.

We can kind of invert this possibility-necessity relation by making it a necessity-possibility relation. So instead of defining possibility in terms of necessity, we can now define necessity in terms of possibility.

Something is necessary if it has to be the case, or if it must happen. In terms of possibility, we can say, “that its failure to happen is not possible”. So if we drop a stone here on Earth, it must fall to the ground (i.e., if there is nothing material stopping it). It’s not possible that it would, or could, just float in the air.

This is natural necessity, and we can oppose it to logical necessity. It’s not logically necessary that a stone must drop to the ground.

Semantic Necessity?

Can we say that it is necessary that all bachelors are unmarried? After all, married bachelors aren’t possible.

However, is this simple semantics?

The word ‘bachelor’ is a synonym for ‘unmarried man’. Thus, if we say that

“John the bachelor is married.”

we’re also saying that

“John the unmarried man is married.”

Thus, with the (as Quine put it) “substitution of synonym for synonym”, we arrive at a straightforward assertion of a logical contradiction. In other words, we’re saying that John can be both unmarried and married at one and the same time. Thus, John’s unmarried status is necessary precisely because he’s a bachelor. Therefore, his being a married bachelor isn’t possible.

To repeat. The necessity of the statement

“John the bachelor is unmarried.”

being true is partly a result of the impossibility of the statement

“John the bachelor is married.”

being true.

[See note.]

From all the above, we (to use another modal term) couldn’t have necessity without possibility (or something’s impossibility). Similarly, we couldn’t have possibility with necessity (or something’s being necessary).

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Note:

The American philosopher W.V.O. Quine (1908–2000) critically examined this account of what can be called conceptual (or linguistic) necessity. However, it was worth noting the basics first. [See Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’.]

There are No Proofs in Science

There are no proofs in science - at least not strictly speaking. There are in mathematics and logic.

In basic terms, why is that?

This is how John Horgan puts it:

“The only propositions that can be verified – that is, proved true – are those dealing in pure logic or mathematics.”

Horgan continues:

“Such systems are closed, in that all their components are based on axioms that are true by definition.” (202)

In other words, such propositions can be proved because they belong to systems which make it the case that they can be proved. Or, more formally, they can be proved because they are "based on axioms that are true by definition”. That basically means that the propositions or theorems are provable – and sometimes easily so – precisely because they're derived from axioms which are true by definition and which, in turn, belong to systems entirely created by such axioms and the following theorems; as well as by the deductive rules from which the theorems are generated. That means, in essence, that proof is possible because the axioms - which generate the theorems - were designed to be true by definition. That truth-by-definition is passed on (as it were) from the axioms to the theorems/propositions.

In a simple sense, all this makes proof easy. Or at least in makes proof dependent only on systems and their contents – nothing more.

Truths about 'external reality', on the other hand, depend on a whole lot more and that's why they can never be proven. And that's as true of scientific statements as it is of the statements of religion or politics.

However, it's proof that's being spoken of here, not truth itself. Thus some of those scientific statements can be taken to be true – just not provably true. (Indeed since Godel we have known that some 'Godel sentences' within maths and logic are true; though not provably true.)

Thus truth and proof are intimately connected in logic and maths. Though that's not the case with science; if only when taken separately from its mathematical underpinnings.

As for that 'external reality'. Horgan continues by saying that “[n]atural systems are always open”. Moreover,

“our knowledge of them is always incomplete, approximate, at best, and we can never be sure we are not overlooking some relevant factors” (202).

In other words, natural systems aren't based on axioms which are true by definition. They aren't human creations. Having said that, numbers and logical relations can be deemed to be platonic/abstract in nature; though the systems themselves are still human creations. It is the abstractions and entities they capture that are – if they are – platonic or mind-independent.

A Reductionist Analysis of Reductionism?

It can be seen that reductionism isn't only a scientific and philosophical obsession - it's actually a human obsession.

People naturally reduce things. They also seek out essences even if there are no essences to seek. Indeed the use of stereotypes and generalisations - in all walks of life - is often a result of this way of thinking. And the thing is - it's not always wrong or suspect. Sometimes there are generalisations which contain a lot of truth - if not the whole true. Stereotypes capture elements of truth. And almost everything can be reduced down to more basic elements; whether material things or problems.

Perhaps physicists and philosophers are indeed the worst offenders. As John Horgan puts it:

“They want to show that the complicated things of the world are really just manifestations of one thing. An essence. A force. A loop of energy wriggling in a 10-dimensional hyperspace.”

Then, ironically, Horgan says that the arch-reductionist - a sociobiologist - may himself argue that

“a genetic influence lurks behind this reductionist impulse, since it has motivated thinkers since the dawn of civilisation. God, after all, was conceived by the same impulse”.

Here a (possible) sociobiologist is giving a reductionist account of the reductionist impulse itself. In other words, just as a sociobiologist may boil many - or even all - (biological) things down to genes; so he may also boil the reductionist impulse (or even instinct) itself down to genes. Thus sociobiological reductionism is applied to sociobiological reductionism - as indeed it must be (if you think about it).

So it's ironic that reductionism - which is the enemy of so many religious people and many philosophers - should itself be seen (by some) as a result of a religious impulse.

As I said about generalisations and stereotypes, many reductions may be largely correct. Still, they could/can never be the whole story - though even this could be deemed a generalisation! It depends, first of all, on what's being reduced. It also depends on what, exactly, is being said about what's being reduced and what it's being reduced to. In the end, the sociobiological claim may not be as monumental and all-encompassing as one first imagines. It's often people's gut reactions to some kinds of reductionism that overstretches things rather than the reductionist himself.

In the end, most people are happy with some – or even many - reductions. This is primarily the case because many reductions don't seem to have any direct impact on human beings as such; either philosophically, morally/religiously or politically.

Earlier John Horgan mentioned that God was “conceived by the same impulse” which drives reductionism. Later he says that “[m]ost of Einstein's contemporaries saw his efforts to unify physics as a product of his dotage and quasi-religious tendencies”. However, perhaps I'm cheating here because that “dotage” was about scientific unification, not scientific reduction. Though unification and reduction often - or always - walk hand in hand.

For example, Horgan cites Einstein's own case in which he “spent his later years trying to find a theory that would unify quantum mechanics with his theory of gravity, general relativity”. This appears to be an endeavor in unification which, at the same time, would have required reductive work. After all, when you get down to the basics (or when you reduce things to quantum mechanics), then that's when you see that things are unified. The unification would come from the reduction of the separate elements. However, it can be said that quantum mechanics is in itself a reduction in that in order to get there (as it were), things/objects would have had to have been reduced to matter and forces; matter, forces and fields to molecules, forces and fields; molecules to atoms; and then atoms to sub-atomic particles.... and what have you. Knowledge of gravity and even general relativity is also the natural result of reductive work in physics and cosmology...

So what about a sociobiologist reducing love down to genes or at least to some other lower (biological) level?....

Asadullah Ali al-Andalusi's Argument Against Atheism & Naturalism

This piece is a response to a discussion I had on the Facebook page Analytic Philosophy.

At first I simply responded to a post by Sufian Moin which presented Asadullah Ali al-Andalusi's argument. Later, Andalusi himself joined in the discussion and defended his position.

Asadullah Ali al-Andalusi is described (in The Andalusian Project) in this way:

“Asadullah Ali al-Andalusi is an international speaker for the Muslim Debate Initiative and Intellectual Wisdom Malaysia on the subject of Islamic thought and civilization. He holds a B.A. in Western Philosophy, an M.A. in Islamic Philosophy, Ethics, and Contemporary Issues, and is currently pursuing his PhD on the topic of the misapplications of Shariah Law in the modern world. He has lectured primarily on the phenomenon of contemporary atheism and has pioneered new arguments against atheists’ central tenets and beliefs. He also specializes in topics related to the philosophy of science, Islamic political thought, Liberalism, terrorism, and other issues regarding the current struggles of the global Muslim community.”

In terms of the specifics of the debate on naturalism, atheism and theism, Andalusi can be seen and heard discussing these issues in his 'Understanding Atheism' videos.

Introduction

Sufian Moin presents Asadullah Ali al-Andalusi's argument in the following way:

“A supposedly new argument that makes theism rational and renders naturalism false has been formulated by a Muslim philosopher whose name is Asadullah Ali Al-Andalusi. This is his argument:

P1) If meaning (and explanation) can only be derived from the natural world, then all conceptions of reality are derived from the natural world

P2) If all conceptions of reality are derived from the natural world, then they must be a coherence of meaningful experiences

P3) People believe that there is a meaningful transcendental reality (God) that shares no properties with the natural world

P4) “If P1 and 2, then P3 is a conception of reality derived from the natural world, which content is a coherence of meaningful experiences

P5) “No number of meaningful experiences can direct one to consider the possibility of something meaningful beyond said experiences

C) “Therefore, P3 is not a conception of reality derived from the natural world

“This argument was presented in a lecture series that Asadullah gave in Malaysia...”

Sufian Moin goes into more detail by explaining the above in this way:

“P1 and P2 simply state the naturalistic worldview. 'Coherence of meaningful experiences" simply means meaningful experiences that are logically consistent. An example of a "non meaningful experience" is that of a round square, or a married bachelor.

“P3 just states a belief people hold (note: the argument is not arguing for the existence of God, so there is no presupposition here).

“P4 follows from P1 and P2.”

Naturalist/Empiricist Combinatorialism

Combinatorialism is usually seen as a philosophical position which refers to the combination of universals or elements/parts (e.g., resulting in a possible - rather than an actual – molecule). In other words, it's not usually taken to be about the combination of different experiences or different concepts (as in Andalusi's argument). However, it can indeed be applied to – or used in – this discussion.

So what does it mean to “imagine” the possibilities in Andalusi's argument? When people imagine such things, what, exactly, are they imagining?

When Andalusi says that the 

“mind is capable of imagining and conceiving of possibilities that the external world does not offer through direct experience” 

that means virtually nothing until I know what it is he's imagining and why he takes it to be an imagination of something real/actual and not simply an imaginative act.

Al-Andalusi says that “the mind is not constrained by concepts”; and yet he doesn't explain what that means. It's simply a statement as it stands and there's no reason for anyone to accept it. (It is like me saying “the body moves beyond the physical” and leaving it at that.)

In any case, there are naturalist (as well as plain old empiricist) explanations of the “mind [being] capable of imagining and conceiving of possibilities that the external world does not offer through direct experience”. The fact is, the mind doesn't really move beyond experience in these instances (though it may in others). It simply plays with experiences and juxtaposes them to create something that doesn't itself exist in experience.

All sorts of philosophers have tackled this issue. 

Take D.M. Armstrong's paper 'The Nature of Possibility' (1986). He sums of what happens with a single word: 'combinatorialism'.

He states, for example, that “all mere possibilities are recombinations of actual elements”.

However, I don't need to rely on this naturalist or empiricist position. My questions come before that. These are the questions:

i) What does it mean to imagine Allah existing in a place beyond time and space?

ii) What constitutes that act of imagination? Was it its content? What is being imagined?

The basic fact is that Allah and a place beyond time and space may not be imagined in the first place. Some x's are imagined, sure; though there's absolutely no reason to believe that what's imagined are actually Allah and a place beyond time and space.

Simply repeating the mantra that the “mind [being] capable of imagining and conceiving of possibilities that the external world” doesn't get us anywhere.

Andalusi himself expresses a perceived limitation with the combinatorialist position:

“The idea of something being 'beyond' is not the result of direct experience from the natural world -- rather it is a projection.”

If by "going beyond" Andalusi means that such composite entities don't actually exist, then that's correct. However, what makes up the composites aren't beyond anything. The composite is exactly that. Indeed the word 'composite' itself suggests that it doesn't actually exist in the natural world (or perhaps anywhere else).

Empiricists or naturalists have no reason to reject composites or combinatorialism.

Conceiving Allah in a Place Beyond Time and Space?

Sufian Moin explains Andalusi's argument by stating the following:

“It's P5 that Asadullah really defends. Imagine you're a fish in a fish tank. Can you, with your little fish brain, come up a concept of the universe as we humans have?”

The fish analogy doesn't work because fish probably don't think at all. Or, at the very least, they have no imaginative capacities. Human beings do have imaginative capacities: hence the Ontological Argument; which Andalusi's argument seems very indebted to.

We don't need to apply a British Empiricist position to Andalusi's argument. We can simply ask:

What do you mean when you say you imagine Allah and his being beyond time and space? What is it, exactly, that you imagine?

There's no need to give Asadullah Ali al-Andalusi the benefit of the doubt. That is, if we assume that he does imagine Allah and his being in a 'place' beyond time and space, then how do we account for that? Why not simply say? -

He doesn't imagine or conceive such things in the first place. Sure, he conceives something. Though what he conceives is not an x outside time and space.

Now we could say (if we wanted to) that what al-Andalusi conceives is entirely determined by his experience. Though we don't even need to go that far.

Andalusi puts what he deems to be one aspect of the naturalist position:

“I can't think of a better way to make it clearer, but the claim is in effect like saying if my experiences determine everything I believe, then I would never be wrong about what my experiences commit me to.”

In Andalusi's case, experiences may well determine everything he both believes and conceives. However, that doesn't stop him from being committed to believing that he conceives of Allah and his being in a place beyond time and space. What he conceives is a x and he takes that to be Allah existing outside time and space.

Andalusi writes:

“.... we shouldn't be able to think of infinity or limitlessness, because both these concepts do not exist in our surroundings.”

These are all very familiar arguments.

Do people really “think of infinity” or imagine it? What does that mean, exactly? You can use the word “infinity” and even tackle the notion or concept [infinity]. However, since this argument depends on conceivability, I can ask the questions I asked earlier. 

What does it mean to “think of infinity”? What are you thinking of? Are you thinking about George Cantor's statements, a set of equations, a visual image of vast space, etc.? 

Perhaps; though none of these things, strictly speaking, capture infinity; let along imagine it.

In terms of infinity as tackled in mathematics, this can't be what this writer is talking about because that wouldn't deliver what he wants. You can't get infinite space, (non-mathematical) infinity or Allah out of mathematics alone.

And, in a similar vain, he writes:

“We can think of Allah being outside time and space (to an extent) and being beyond merciful and beyond kind, et cetera.”

So what was said about infinity applies to that statement as well.

What does it mean to “think of Allah being outside time and space”? It doesn't by definition mean that we do think of an actual Allah and an actual 'place' (which word can I use?) outside time and space. All we may be doing is simply using the words “I imagine Allah outside time and space” and that's it! Just because we utter the words that doesn't mean that something must match the words we utter.

I can utter the words "round square". A round square is logically impossible; though I still uttered those words. What about the words “I imagine Allah outside of time and space”? That situation isn't logically impossible (as such) – though that doesn't mean my words refer to anything specific. And if they do refer to something, it may not be to an x and that x's being outside of time and space. Whatever goes on in this writer's (or mystic's) mind when he says he can imagine “Allah outside time and space”, that doesn't mean that he has literally imagined Allah and his being outside time and space. His might have simply imagined what he deems to be Allah outside time and space.

Andalusi backs up his argument by saying:

“But, responding to the contention, a unicorn is just a combination of things that do exist in the real world.”

Yet you could say more or less the same about the locution “I imagine Allah outside time and space” as you would say about statements which refer to unicorns.

One, that imaginative act may indeed include things which “do exist in the real world”. Anything over and above that (such as a place or an existence outside time and space) isn't imagined at all – it's only spoken about. Either that, or some proxy is imagined instead.

My point is blatantly simple: 

It may be that no one “travels beyond the limits of the external world”. 

People may believe that they do so; though believing that you do x doesn't mean that you do x. That is, no one conceives or imagines Allah beyond time and space. That which they do imagine will be proxies for Allah and a place beyond time and space. And those proxies may well be derived from their experiences of the natural world.

This isn't Andalusi's attempted proof of Allah's existence as such. If anything, it's an attempted proof that we have knowledge of Allah and Allah's existing beyond time and space – beyond the natural world. Yet there's no such proof because it all depends on the assumption that people do conceive of Allah 'in' a place beyond time and space. It is that which must be tackled.

Conceiving Allah Beyond Time and Place?

Andalusi now makes a distinction between the words 'conceive' and 'imagine' He wrote:

“Let's not reduce my argument to only one of the terms I used: 'imagination'. I also used the word 'conceive'.”

They may not be synonyms. However, everything that's been said about Andalusi's use of the word 'imagination' can also be applied to his use of the word 'conceive'. Exactly the same problems arise.

Despite that, Andalusi explains the distinctions which can be made between conceiving and imagining. He writes:

“Imagination is the the result of experiences and the minds ability to mold them into different forms or to conclude connections between them. It takes two to tango in this regard. Conception is more abstract and doesn't require external experiences at all.”

Nonetheless, imagination may still be required to juxtapose or 'tango' with one's 'conceptions'. If conceptions (does Andalusi mean concepts?) are abstract entities, it will still require the imagination to juxtapose or use them. And Allah and a place outside of space and time aren't deemed to be abstract entities or concepts themselves.

Terms used in the Argument

Now I'll make some very short points about the (philosophical) terms Andalusi uses in his argument.

So let's take each premise one at a time:

P1) “If meaning (and explanation) can only be derived from the natural world, then all conceptions of reality are derived from the natural world.”

Meaning isn't derived from the natural world. I believe that Andalusi means significance (at least in this context) when he uses the word 'meaning'. However, let's take it that he's using these words as (near)synonyms.

Conceptions of reality aren't only derived from the natural world – they are applied to it. Though conceptions themselves can be seen as being part of the natural world.

What is meant by 'conceptions' anyway? Here again I believe that Andalusi means concepts by 'conceptions'. Concepts can be seen as abstract entities or mental items. Conceptions are usually seen as the result of mental acts. For example, you can form a conception of the concept [liberty] or [truth].

P2) “If all conceptions of reality are derived from the natural world, then they must be a coherence of meaningful experiences.”

Again, does Andalusi mean significant experiences when he says “meaningful experiences”? What does he mean by “meaningful experiences” anyway? Is Andalusi doing ethics or theology or is he talking about the semantic content of experiences regardless of what he calls 'meaningfulness'? (I think the former is the case.)

P3) “People believe that there is a meaningful transcendental reality (Allah) that shares no properties with the natural world.”

Andalusi uses the word 'believe' here. That is, he says that “people believe that there is a meaningful transcendental reality....” He doesn't say that “people conceive a meaningful transcendental reality”. He's talking about people believing in a “meaningful transcendental reality”.

I can also add the Kantian point that if something is truly transcendent, then it can't be either conceived or imagined. (As with Kant's noumena; which are “beyond experience”.) I also believe that Andalusi means transcendent when he says 'transcendental'. These two words have different meanings in philosophy. For example, in Kant again, the transcendental concepts or categories of the mind determine what is transcendent. More succinctly, things that are transcendent are beyond experience. The transcendental in Kant, on the other hand, determines experience; though, in other philosophies, it can determine or delimit other spheres.

P4) “If P1 and 2, then P3 is a conception of reality derived from the natural world, which content is a coherence of meaningful experiences....

P5) “No number of meaningful experiences can direct one to consider the possibility of something meaningful beyond said experiences Therefore, P3 is not a conception of reality derived from the natural world.”

If you ignore all these philosophical and definitional problems, then of course P5) follows from the rest. Yet you can't have a logical argument if some of the language is confused or can't be accepted as it stands. In other words, before you follow through from P1) to P5), I believe that there's a bundle of assumptions and mistakes in between. Indeed P1) only follows through to P5) if we don't see those assumptions and mistakes.

So, sure, if you ignore all that, then P5) "logically follows" from the rest.

The other thing that can be said is that Andalusi doesn't really have a position on naturalism as such (in the above argument) other than to hint that naturalism may well (or does) explain things up to the point that 

“people believe that there is a meaningful transcendental reality (Allah) that shares no properties with the natural world”. 

That could be an acceptance of naturalism up to Allah and the transcendent realm. Thus the argument isn't itself an alternative theory of naturalism.

Against Scientism

Andalusi says that his “main target is scientism”.

If the main target is scientism, it would have helped if he had said that. The original argument (of five premises and a conclusion) doesn't (in itself) read like an attack on scientism at all. It may be an implicit or tangential attack on scientism; though the central thrust of the original post is that we can move beyond the natural world. That is an attack on naturalism. Unless, of course, Andalusi is using 'the words scientism and 'naturalism' as synonyms. (They aren't synonyms.)

Now we have what amounts to Andalusi's definition of the scientistic stance:

“It is the belief that 'science is the only way to know anything' or in the very least that 'science is the most reliable form of knowledge about anything'.”

Here we almost have a conflation of two things which are very different; though Andalusi does seem to acknowledge the difference.

One can happily believe that “science is the most reliable form of knowledge about anything” without also believing “science is the only way to know anything”. How can even hardcore scientists believe the latter?

For example, what about maths and logic? (Unless logic and maths are seen as science.) What about knowledge of past events? The additional point here is that all these modes of knowledge have naturalistic explanations and will therefore be acceptable to 'scientistic' philosophers and scientists.

I would say that most scientists and even scientistic philosophers would express their position this way:

Science is the most reliable form of knowledge about "most things". However, science isn't “the only way to know anything”.

Clearly, if we paint our opponents as saying extreme things, then they will seem extreme.

One further argument offered by Andalusi - against what he calls 'scientism' - is this:

“.... the Verification principle, it became a full blown ideology that is still expressed today among the lay masses and even scientists themselves....”

The “lay masses” certainly do not adhere to verficationism. The reason for that is that it's a philosophical notion; it doesn't belong to any kind of "folk theory" (as it were). So this is like saying that the lay masses adhere to eliminative materialism or to transcendental realism. Of course there may be some vague analogies between what non-philosophers believe and verificationism; though it can also be said that there are vague analogies between anything and anything. Indeed even the scientists who accepted verificationism will have needed to have done so explicitly. And I doubt that there are any philosophers around today who do so.

Scientism &/or Naturalism?

Scientism can be seen as a position (or stance) on the huge importance of science to philosophy and - often more broadly - to just about everything else. Thus this position needn't be taken to be a philosophy which advances independent arguments or positions on philosophical subjects. Indeed if it did do such things, it would be like a position within philosophy (such as anti-realism or physicalism)...

Naturalism, on the other hand, is indeed a position within philosophy.

Scientism, therefore, can be deemed to be over and above naturalism.

It can be argued that one can be a philosophical naturalist without displaying strong scientistic leanings. Such a philosopher can be broadly naturalistic in his philosophy; yet not strongly scientistic. Indeed he may know little science and therefore not feel the need to consult the findings of science every time he tackles a philosophical issue. A scientistic philosopher, on the other hand, would argue that science must always be consulted when it comes to virtually every issue.

For example, if a philosopher is tackling the notion of an object or a person (or even if he's tackling whether or not there's a God who exists outside space and time), he must see what science has to say on this issue. Either that or he must use scientific findings as a tool to clarify the issue or help him find the answers.

In terms of self-described supporters of scientism, they'll carry lots of baggage about the relation between science and... well, everything else. As for those who're accused by others of being proponents of scientism (which happens a lot), I don't suppose they'll carry that much – or any – baggage.

Thus scientism, surely, requires an explicit and self-conscious commitment to science and its role in all subjects.

In terms of philosophers and scientism again.

A distinction has to be made between what philosophers actually write (or argue) and their general attitude towards science. What they write (or argue) can't itself be science; though they can still have an attitude towards science which people may call "scientistic". This was true of the logical positivists – and that's a point which they admitted to.

In more detail: the logical positivists - and Quine later - argued that science tells us “what is” (i.e., it provides our basic "ontological commitments"). That effectively means that science has the last word on what is. Nonetheless, what scientistic philosophers (as well as logical positivists in the past) do isn't itself science. It can be scientistic (as well as scientific); though it isn't itself science.

Criticisms of Scientism

Having said all that about the relation between scientistic philosophers and science, some would still argue that

“scientistic people tend to be less concerned about actually consulting scientifically sound theories and more about being arrogantly in opposition to whatever they deem 'unscientific' -- notably religion”.

Following on from that, others have argued (understandably) that scientism works against the “commitment to religious freedom as an integral part of democracy”. However, I could imagine even a hardcore scientistic philosopher still being committed to religious freedom. If I were that hardcore scientistic philosopher, I would be committed to religious freedom.... except when that religious freedom leads to a lack of other people's freedoms and even (I dare say) to the destruction of “evil atheistic secularism”. In other words, the freedom of a religion may bring about the denial other people's freedoms. Indeed such religions exist.

However, there's also a problem with coming at scientism from that angle: i.e., that scientism is automatically arrogant and even somewhat totalitarian. Sure, it could be... in principle; though that's true of all philosophical and non-philosophical positions. So I'm not sure why scientism should be singled out for displaying traits that most schools display and which nearly all religions and political ideologies most certainly have displayed.

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